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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to investigate US foreign policies in the post-9/11 world, focusing on 
the ways in which they affected the Iranian women’s movement after Iran was 
included in the Axis of Evil in January 2002. The focus of the thesis draws on the 
Bush Administration’s decision to use Muslim women’s human rights as moral 
justifications for the War on Terror. The thesis argues that, despite the US 
commitment to Iranian women’s human rights, Iranian women’s movement advocates 
have found themselves in an even more challenging environment. Both the physical 
and discursive spaces for women’s activism has been narrowed due to the increasing 
violence, deteriorating living conditions resulting from the US/Western sanctions and 
hardline nationalist-militaristic politics. Drawing mainly on postcolonial feminism, 
the thesis evaluates how artificially enacted gendered, racial and sexualised 
exclusions and borders contributed to this. The thesis contends that after 9/11, the 
Bush Administration’s identity became hypermasculinised and this effectively led to 
the transnationalisation of violence that often materialises itself on the bodies of 
Feminine Others, which in this case was the Iranian Feminine Other. What further 
informed the Bush Administration’s identity formation and policies was the anxious 
logic of orientalism. The thesis examines how this orientalist anxiety built and 
sustained much of the US post-9/11 (in)security imaginary. The thesis makes the 
argument that orientalist anxiety produced two orientalised bodies, that of the Dark 
Monster and the already mentioned Feminine Other. This specific framework allows 
us to complicate the US conceptualisation of the Self as disconnected and unrelated to 
the Other and how the Self justifies the Other’s disciplining and policing via this 
disconnectedness. The thesis calls for a political vision that engages with difference, 
alternatives and real life experiences and eventually recognises everyone’s right to 
security. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction 
On January 29 2002, only a little over four months after 9/11, President George W. 
Bush changed the nature of the War on Terror in his State of the Union Address. 
While the hunt for Osama bin Laden was still on, the war’s focus shifted to the Axis 
of Evil, which linked Iran, Iraq and North Korea to the War on Terror. The State of 
the Union Address in January 2002, restated the need of Americans to get justice and 
secure their borders again. But in essence, the War on Terror became about 
preventing another 9/11 from happening.  
 
The extension of the War on Terror was justified with similar arguments that had 
been heard earlier in the autumn of 2001 when the Administration defended the 
invasion of Afghanistan. On the night of the Address, President Bush declared: 
America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human 
dignity: the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, 
private property, free speech, equal justice and religious tolerance. America 
will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around 
the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective 
than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and 
peaceful world beyond the war on terror (Bush, G.W. 2002a). 
 
On June 20 2009, a mobile phone video uploaded from the streets of Tehran showed 
us a young woman’s last moments after a governmental sniper had shot her. She had 
ben one of the hundreds of thousands of women demonstrating against the election 
results that were allegedly forged by the Iranian regime. The ones, Muslim women, 
who the US had pledged to protect in the aftermath of 9/11, were increasingly being 
targeted not only in Iran but also in other countries singled out in the US War on 
Terror. From 2001 onwards, the moral superiority of the US in defending women’s 
rights across the world has been employed to justify interventionist foreign policies, 
which resulted in the destruction of everyday life, insecurity and a loss of hope for a 
better future. Afghan women have paid a high price for the American mission to 
protect its national security (see e.g. Farhoumand-Sims 2007; Rostami-Povey 2007b) 
as well as have Iraqi women (see e.g. Al-Ali 2005; Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Pratt 2005). 
Much has been written on Iranian women and their human rights situation but this 
literature has mainly addressed how the state affects the contours of women’s lives 
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and women’s activism in the sphere of gender relations in Iran. This thesis explores 
the impact of the international on Iranian women in the post-9/11 world.  
 
The thesis hopes to shed light on how despite the US emphasis on women’s rights in 
Iran, the environment in which Iranian women activist work has become even more 
challenging and even ordinary women’s living conditions have deteriorated. The 
thesis argues that there is a growing need to recognise that the lives of Iranian women 
are not solely shaped by cultural factors. This is extremely important in the post-9/11 
period when cultural explanations have overridden political, economic and social 
factors in explaining Muslim women’s human rights situations across the world. 
Thus, instead of cultural explanations, this thesis scrutinises how the aggressive US 
rhetoric of regime change and the economic sanctions have affected women’s 
circumstances and status in Iran. Moreover, the past ten years in Iran have been 
coloured with political infighting between the reformists and hardliners. This adds yet 
another layer to the picture of women’s rights in Iran. However, the internal power 
relations are interconnected with the events taking place at the global level. And 
women have, as they have for centuries, assumed a central role in the marking of 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Women are not only used to consolidate 
boundaries but women also bore the burden that results from this type of boundary 
drawing. Thus, while both sides – the US and the Iranian regime – pledge to protect 
Iranian women, they both have failed miserably. This is not to argue that Iranian 
women are passive victims, they have continued their work despite worsening 
economic situation and increasing state violence. They have showed extreme 
determination and adapted to the changing environments. This means that the 
characteristics of Iranian women’s movement advocates have also changed: they do 
not only call for revisions in the Iranian legal system but the advocates have 
increasingly made demands for more humane international politics and they have 
profiled themselves as anti-war and anti-sanction activists. 
 
At the empirical level, the aim is to demonstrate that women’s rights are always in a 
flux and are influenced by a variety of factors of which this thesis highlights the 
international. At the theoretical level, the thesis has two aims. Drawing on post-
colonial feminist theory, the aim is to find a middle space for the transformation of 
the fixed binaries (e.g. ‘us’ versus ‘terrorists’) and demonstrate the intimacy of the 
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Self and the Other in world politics. This would hopefully point the way toward more 
ethical foreign policy making and in a growing sense of interconnectedness of 
worldwide inequalities. The second theoretical aim, drawing on post-structuralist 
feminist critique of the autonomous liberal-humanist subject, is to explore the moral 
agencies of religious women’s movement activists in the post-9/11 era in Iran. The 
aim is to suggest that even moral discourses, which can be seen as part of political 
traditions, have reformative capacity in the public sphere. 
 
2.0 Objectives of case study 
I have a number of objectives that I wish to examine. The first one is to demonstrate 
that women’s rights are always in a flux and are influenced by a variety of factors of 
which this thesis highlights the international. The second objective was to gather 
primary data on Iranian women’s movement activists living in the post-9/11 
environment, something that had been missing in the studies focusing on War on 
Terror and women. The third objective is to provide a deeper understanding of the 
everyday conditions of both activists and ordinary women living in Iran where the 
hardliners are trying to suppress ‘oppositional voices’ singled out by the US. 
 
My primary theoretical framework, postcolonial feminism, deals with inclusions and 
exclusions that are decided on the basis of one’s gendered, racialised and sexualised 
body. What also informs the building up of these segregations is the anxious logic of 
orientalism. Considering the modern history of the US-Iran relations, for example the 
hostage crisis 1979-1981, I found the framework appropriate to examine the period 
2002-2010 in the US-Iran relations. The mentioned hostage crisis broke off the 
diplomatic relations between the two countries, but despite this, or maybe because of 
this, Iran has been at the center of American foreign policy in the Middle East. The 
US-Iran relations experienced a détente in the late 1990s that lasted until the autumn 
of 2001. This is why it is interesting to apply this specific theoretical framework as is 
allows us to complicate the US conceptualisation of the Self as disconnected and 
unrelated to the Other and calls for a political vision that engages with difference, 
alternatives and real life experiences and eventually recognises everyone’s right to 
security. To keep the research focused, I have concentrated on Iranian women 
although also men have experienced the violence emanating from American foreign 
policy. 
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The thesis is divided into two parts. The first two chapters after the Introduction focus 
on developing my theoretical frameworks. Chapter 2 develops the primary theoretical 
framework of postcolonial feminism elaborated above. Chapter 3 deals with women’s 
agency, which I wished to address due to the one-dimensional understanding of 
Iranian women’s agency in contemporary Iran. This chapter offers a critique of the 
autonomous liberal-humanist subject in order to explore the moral agencies of 
religious women’s movement activists in the post-9/11 era in Iran. I draw on Saba 
Mahmood’s work but I also have moved my analysis from the individual/private to 
the public and in the thesis I explicate how women’s (public) piety is both constructed 
in the public sphere and how their public activism is constitutive of their piousness. 
Hence, I propose that women’s socio-economic and political locations increasingly 
inform their piety and activism. This section also offers a brief literature overview of 
studies on Iranian women. 
 
The second part consists of the empirical chapters, which, in turn, are divided into two 
parts: 
 
1) The first part, Chapters 4 and 5, covers Iran’s inclusion in the Axis of Evil in 2002, 
Iran’s nuclear crises and the country’s economic sanctions. While the focus is on the 
period 2002-2008, this part covers also the sanctions imposed by the Obama 
Administration. In this period, an internal power struggle was taking place between 
the reformists and hardliners in Iran. The hardliners were making their drive to power 
and trying to consolidate their power after years of reformist politics. In essence, the 
Bush Administration facilitated the hardliners return to power by providing them with 
the old enemy discourse. But most importantly, this part scrutinises how the Bush 
Administration’s hypermasculine policies, by singling out Iranian women’s human 
rights, invited Iranian masculinities to participate in the global game of masculinities. 
This materialised, in different stages, in narrowed physical and discursive activism 
space and even in violence on the bodies of Iranian women’s movement advocates. 
This part also examines the US sanctions against Iran. While aimed at disciplining the 
deviant masculinities, the sanctions resulted in deteriorating living conditions on the 
bodies of the very femininities that the US had pledged to protect. 
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2) The second part, Chapter 6, examines the extensiveness of the effects of the Bush 
Administration’s War on Terror materialised in the lives of ordinary Iranian women. 
While president Bush left office in January 2009, the echoes left behind by his 
threatened masculinity had not yet disappeared outside the American borders. Iran’s 
2009 presidential elections that turned into one of the bloodiest years in the Islamic 
Republic’s history finalised the hardliners’ take over the body politic and extended 
their backlash on ordinary women. The events in Iran in this period demonstrated how 
the Bush Administration’s mission to get justice in the aftermath of 9/11 had indeed 
transnationalised insecurity and violence on the bodies of those who the US had 
pledged to protect. 
 
3.0 Research methods and sources 
Information for the backbone of the thesis, the Bush Administration’s foreign policy, 
was attained through publicly available primary sources. I studied predominantly 
president Bush’s official statements, State of the Union Addresses and press 
statements ranging from September 2001 until 2008. For the time period 2009-2010 I 
investigated similar documents by president Barack Obama. Both time periods also 
included public government and congress documents, statements and public 
interviews in international newspapers and magazines of the key figures of both 
Administrations. Also, what proved important were analyses by and interviews of the 
Bush Administration’s neoconservative supporters based at think tanks and other non-
governmental institutions, including the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) 
and the RAND Corporation. For some parts of the thesis (e.g. Chapter 5) I also 
followed both the US news –and popular media. The news media included sources 
such as CNN and The New York Times; popular media included TV shows such as 
Homeland and top selling books focusing on Muslim women such as Betty 
Mahmoody’s Not Without My Daughter.  Research on Iranian domestic and foreign 
policy responses was carried out by reading the key office holders (president, supreme 
leader, ministers, high ranking security officials) statements, public addresses 
including Friday Prayers, UN speeches, and so on. I also consulted secondary sources, 
read Iranian newspapers online, followed BBC Farsi, Iranian state media including 
the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) and the Fars News Agency that is closely 
affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and read some of the 
reformist and hardline newspapers through the BBC Monitoring Middle East. The 
	   6	  
approach I employed to analyse these documents and media follows Shepherd’s 
understanding of discourses which considers them as ‘systems of meaning production 
rather than simply statements of language, encompassing narratives, texts, and 
images, systems that “fix” meaning, however temporarily, and enable us to make 
sense of the world.’ Moreover, as Shepherd argues, the systems of meaning making 
cannot be divorced from practices of power – the one who has the power to control 
the meaning making has also ‘the power to define and defend “reality”’ (Shepherd 
2006a: 20). I paid particular attention to the ways in which gender and race were 
employed to construct different gendered and racial discourses of identity and 
security. I deepened my understanding on these analyses with interviews with 
European diplomats based in Tehran and with an American diplomat based in 
Helsinki.  
 
Research conducted on the outcomes of the Bush and Obama Administration’s 
foreign policy in Iran was carried out by examining various international (Iranian, 
American, British and European) newspapers, online news providers and the BBC 
Monitoring Middle East; reports by international and non-governmental organisations 
(I have included human rights organisations in this category as well) that included 
well-known ones such as Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), 
Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (Iran HRDC) and smaller ones such as 
Zunia and Human Rights and Democracy for Iran. I also used various reports 
produced by the United Nation’s (UN) different organisations and missions. I also 
followed Iranian and non-Iranian bloggers writing on human rights issues, YouTube 
channels focusing on Iran’s human rights situation and various Facebook pages linked 
to the GM. The problem with especially with online sources coming from Iran was 
the increasing state organised censorship that made some of these sources short-lived. 
I also read individual Iranian human rights activists’ reports, analyses and opinion 
pieces published in the West. These resourced helped me to form a wide and 
multidimensional understanding of the impacts of the US foreign policy on Iranian 
civil society and women in particular, especially after it became hard for foreigners 
obtain visas to Iran. It gave at least a partial voice to those who were not heard by the 
Bush and Obama Administrations.  
 
	   7	  
To complicate the picture more, I undertook a two-week fieldwork to Tehran in April-
March 2010. I had envisioned to conduct further fieldwork but the deteriorating 
security situation in Iran and the regime’s tense relations with the outside world meant 
that my visa applications after the first trip were denied.  
 
The reality of conducting fieldwork in Iran after the presidential elections of 2009 set 
certain limitations on the available research methods. When I was planning my 
fieldwork, I envisioned my data to derive from a number of domestic human rights 
institutions, the UN mission based in Tehran, NGOs and human rights activists and 
people involved in social and political activism in general. I had set up interviews 
prior to my trip but it did not take me long to realise that such a rigid methodology did 
not work in the streets of Tehran in the spring of 2010. Many of my interviewees 
never showed up or they cancelled the meeting. Thus, one of the methodological 
challenges I faced was how to organise data collection and conduct interviews in the 
post presidential election environment, which was coloured by the government’s 
clamp down techniques and its policy of isolation from the world outside its borders. 
Hence my fieldwork consisted mainly of qualitative participatory research. This 
approach allows one to ‘learn from, and validate the knowledge of intelligence of, 
ordinary people’ (Rostami-Povey n.d.). Principally the research involved 14 
individual interviews with women activists and NGO workers and three group 
interviews of which one was a group interview at the United Nation’s Population 
Fund Office (UNFPA), and two others were conducted with NGO employees of a 
NGO specialising in health and educational services. I also had four interviews with 
European diplomats, which have tried to continue having a focus on the human rights 
situation in Iran. Finally I spent a day at an Afghan refuge school/center, which has a 
special focus on women and girls. Additionally I conducted observational and 
informal interviews with some women’s rights advocates and students who have been 
involved in the Green Movement demonstrations. To avoid too much attention from 
the authorities, I was ‘hanging out’ with them. This particular approach enabled me to 
ask questions in safe locations and the informal settings usually encouraged people to 
express their feelings and share their experiences. I conducted all my interviews either 
myself in English and/or in partial Farsi or with the help of an interpreter. Women 
activists who I met during my stay in Tehran were pious activists from the middle –
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and working classes. They represented different ages, ranging from their mid-twenties 
to the late sixties.   
 
Also, I am aware that the group of people who talked to me was a very special sample 
of Iranians and the civil society. Considering the current political atmosphere, which 
is shadowed by the governmental clampdown on social and political activism, the 
people who came forward and talked to me all have their own reasons and agendas 
why they decided to talk and to express certain views on the society. The reason why 
I chose Tehran as my principal research location is partly due to the number of human 
rights activists residing in Tehran but it is however mainly due to my own limitations 
and resources. Thus I hope the reader will keep this in mind when reading the chapter.  
 
The deteriorating security environment in which civil society actors were pursuing 
their work after the 2009 presidential elections and considering the real risks that they 
can face after talking to foreigner, all my interviewees and organisations (with the 
exception of the UN) asked me not to reveal their real names. Before my trip, a more 
experienced scholar working on Iran advised me not to record any of my interviews 
and translate my interview notes/responses into Finnish in order to protect my sources 
until I had left the country. 
 
4.0 Subject position 
I am aware of my own limitations and biases in this research. Not only my gender 
(female), age (late twenties-early thirties), class (working class), worldview (secular) 
and nationality (Finnish), to name a few, have influenced my thinking but also my 
mother with her strong feminist leanings. Moreover, I agree that a researcher’s 
‘positionality’ is not fixed but is shaped by the subject of the research, the wider 
environment in which the researcher operates and the multiple interactions between 
researcher, interviewees, and audience (Törrönen 2001). While I have found my 
research interesting and enjoyable, I have sometimes felt that because I am neither 
Iranian nor Muslim, I have no authority to speak about women in Iran. I am still 
struggling with this question. However, the status of an outsider has two sides. At 
times I felt that some of my interviewees shared stories and information that they 
would not have necessarily shared with someone coming from ‘inside’ – that in a way 
it was easier for them to talk to someone who was not closely connected to their 
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environment and to the events we talked about. Some people felt that as I was 
someone conducting ‘objective’ research, I should hear the ‘truth’ and make sure that 
the outside world would hear it as well (see also Al-Ali and Pratt 2009). 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY I: POSTCOLONIAL FEMINIST FRAMEWORK: 
(IN)SECURE HYPERMASCULINE STATE IDENTIES, BROWN MONSTERS 
AND THE FEMINE OTHER 
 
‘Either you are with us or against us.’ 
- George W. Bush (2001) 
 
‘This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who 
believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.’  
- George W. Bush (2001) 
 
1.0 Introduction 
What emerges from the quotes above is a world filled with segregations, borders, 
disconnectedness and violence. President Bush’s question after the horrible events of 
9/11, ‘Why do they hate us?’ and the American political and military response to the 
attacks reflect the imagined and physical boundaries that build our worlds: the 
inclusions and exclusions; whose security matters, whose doesn’t; who is to be 
protected and who is to be attacked, and so on. Said differently, the American 
response enacts and sustains a fixed and seemingly unbreakable boundary between 
the Self and the Other – a baseless fantasy of disconnectedness – and as such it 
obscures the violence and destruction that inheres in this type of imagining and 
making of boundaries. This fantasy of disconnectedness has its roots in the ways that 
the state is understood in contemporary world and how the politics of empire 
effectively shadow the ways in which different identities are constructed in order to 
naturalise and justify segregations, borders and violence. 
 
The thesis draws upon postcolonial feminism to understand how the politics of empire 
materialise violently on the bodies of ordinary women who live in the outskirts of the 
empire. The current project of American neoimperialism has materialised itself in two 
related but asymmetrical constructions: 1) the Self manifested in the geopolitical-
economic Self that disciplines any deviancy (of its ideology, material being, and so 
on) into the margins and 2) a cultural one that has established itself in an aggressive 
white hypermasculinity that efficiently denies relating to others and/or exploits the 
vulnerable others to further the Self’s profits (see Ling 2008). The postcolonial 
feminist framework deployed here offers the tools to examine how the Self has 
ontologically disengaged itself from the Monster who it has itself created. Such 
theoretical framework allows us to interrogate how boundaries – both imaginative and 
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physical – discipline, police and violate gendered, racialised, sexualised bodies. It is 
further proposed that the current martyred US (in)security seeking identity is drawing 
and building upon segregations that are sustained by the anxious logic of orientalism. 
Thus, in effect, the framework aims to complicate the US conceptualisation of the 
Self as disconnected and unrelated to the Other and calls for a political vision that 
engages with difference, alternatives and real life experiences and eventually 
recognises everyone’s right to security (see also Agathangelou and Ling 2004a; 2004b 
and 2005). 
 
In what follows, I first discuss the crafting of state identities and (in)securities. After 
this, I briefly explicate how state identities are gendered; the aim is to examine the 
ways in which especially (hyper)masculinities and (hyper)femininities emerge and 
how they become central elements in the construction of state responses to different 
types of crises. In the second section, I turn to Said’s concept of orientalism to 
examine how orientalist anxiety builds and sustains much of the US (in)security 
imaginary. I make the argument that orientalist anxiety is also about the Self 
constructing itself as much as it is about dominating the Other. In this section I also 
draw attention to the Orientalised Body, in particular to that of the Monster and the 
Feminine Other, that allow the Self’s existence and its self-constructed right to 
discipline and police the Other via gendered, sexualised and racial violence in the 
name of national security. In this section it an argument is put forward suggesting that 
the Monster and the Feminine Other are instrumental and constitutive mechanisms for 
the Self’s existence and identity and how the politics of empire would not work or be 
sustained without them. I conclude the chapter by exploring possible ways of 
breaking up these crafted and constructed identities that only artificially justify and 
naturalise borders, and as already said, materialise in violence on the ordinary bodies. 
Thus, I close with an argument for collective engagement that pushes us to recognise 
our worlds interconnectedness which is needed in order to find more ethical ways of 
doing foreign policy – foreign policy that understands the importance of human 
security that the artificial segregations shadow (see also Agathangelou and Ling 
2004a; 2004b; 2005). 
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2.0 Crafting identities and (in)security 
State identity continues to hold a rather debated status in the literature of International 
Relations (IR). The classical realist understanding of the state – a rational, unitary and 
fixed entity – has continued to be popular both among scholars and policy makers. 
However, I would like to approach the state – and indeed its identity – as a continuous 
social and cultural process that is never fully completed or natural and, further, it is a 
process that does not take place in isolation from others. The state produces and 
reproduces its identity and borders – both physical and imaginative – in order to both 
maintain the nation’s identification with the state and secure and guard itself both 
domestically and in international politics. Thus, state identity may seem like a mere 
abstract symbolic attachment but I would argue that it also the condition of its 
possibility. I have to point out that I do not argue that the process of crafting (state) 
identities is an uncontested process. Identity making is always a fractured and 
imperfect process and it can be contested and contradicted by other actors who are 
involved in the process. The very nature of the crafting process opens it up for 
contestation and possible change. As Campbell has pointed out, ‘the drive to fix the 
state’s identity and contain challenges to the state’s representation cannot finally or 
absolutely succeed’ (Campbell 1992: 11). However, the purpose of this thesis is to 
explore how one particular discourse of identity became more dominant than any 
other, and moreover, what were the consequences of this on the bodies of ordinary 
people. 
 
2.1 Identity 
The scholarship on national –and state identities springs from the concern to 
understand the origins of these communities, their identities and how they emerge. 
Two competing schools exist of which the first one, the so-called ‘primordialists’, 
sees nations as natural extensions of prior family and kin relationships (Yuval-Davis 
1997:15) and thus they are understood as inevitable and given. Arguing against this 
understanding, the ‘modernists’ contend that nations are modern and invented 
constructs. For Anderson (2006), the nation came into being through the printed word 
that allowed a larger number of people to ‘imagine’ their nation; for Hobsbawm 
(1992), it was the capitalist economic system that facilitated the emergence of nations; 
and finally, for Gellner (1983), nationalism and concrete identities were required in 
order to create homogeneity for the needs of modern technical society. I follow 
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Anderson’s conception of imagined nations which pushes us to recognise that state 
elites are required to craft recognisable, culturally and socio-historically situated and 
meaningful national identities and myths of sovereignty that help to consolidate, 
mobilise and sustain the public’s identification with the state. Particularly, in times of 
crises, the need to articulate and craft a solid, identifiable and hegemonic national 
and/or state identity becomes central to the state’s regulatory and disciplining role. 
Said differently, with the help of one identity that is uplifted to a hegemonic status, 
the state is able to counter any deviant identities (domestic or foreign) that may 
challenge its hegemonic status.1 
* 
I start with the premise that identities are crafted in relation to others and in effect we 
intersubjectively create our worlds (Agathangelou and Ling 2004a). The 
interconnectedness forces us continuously to (re)craft and perform our identities and 
new hybrid ones are enacted in order to adapt to the changing environment. However, 
not fully (or at all) knowing/understanding the difference that constitutes the Other 
may threaten and provoke the Self and often this materialises in the 
transnationalisation of insecurity (Agathangelou and Ling 2004a). But that difference 
of the Other is instrumental for the Self’s identity. In his eloquent work on the politics 
of identity, Connolly argues that identity is ‘established in relation to a series of 
differences that have become socially recognised. These differences are essential to 
its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness 
and solidity’ (Connolly 2008: 64). Thus, the narratives and frames used for the 
identification of the Self and the Other need to resonate both culturally and socially so 
that they can have a meaning to the audience who needs to confirm them for the 
wanted identity to be consolidated. Moreover, identity cannot be crafted in isolation 
but it draws its power on difference and oppositions existing outside the Self and 
which have been institutionalised to mark the boundary between ‘I’ and ‘you’, ‘us’ 
and ‘them’. Or as Campbell writes: identity is constituted in relation to difference, 
which, in turn, is similarly constituted in relation to identity (Campbell 1994; 1998). 
This, according to Campbell, leads us to notice that there are ‘no foundations that are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Another school exists as well, the so-called ’instrumentalists’. This tradition studies how 
state builders/politicians provide incentives for the diverse populations they wish to 
incorporate into their polity, while at the same time they provide disincentives for those who 
would rather give their loyalty to another group (see Haas 1993). 
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prior to, or outside of’ identity’s operation’ (Campbell 1994: 149) but that identities 
are performatively constructed. The fact that identities are performatively constituted 
means that they are spatial, historical and time-bound constructs. The performative 
production of identities requires that clear boundaries are inscribed to separate ‘an 
“inside” from an “outside”, a “self” from an “other”, a “domestic” from a “foreign”’ 
(Campbell 1998: 9). The never-ending (re)production of a binary world allows the 
state to constitute its myths of sovereignty, security, borders and eventually establish 
its monopoly over the instruments of coercion which in turn enables the elites to 
retain the power that allows them to decide the borders between the Self and the Other 
(see Krishna 1999:18; Agathangelou 2004) As Bigo argues, these elitist discourses 
‘always structure our thought as if there existed a body – an “envelope,” or 
“container” – differentiating one polity from another. The state justifies itself 
as the only political order possible as soon as it is accepted that sovereignty, 
law and order, and single body are the prerequisite for peace and 
homogeneity. It justifies the “national” identity that the state has achieved 
through a territorialisation of its order, by cutting up of borders’ (Bigo 2002: 
67 quoted in Agathangelou 2004: 128). 
 
Consequently, the enactment of external, of the Other, rationalises a logic of identity, 
which essentially becomes necessary for the state’s existence (Campbell 1998: 12). 
Connolly elaborates on this: 
Entrenched in this indispensable relation is second set of tendencies, 
themselves in need of exploration, to congeal established identities into fixed 
norms, thought and lived as their structure expressed the true order of things. 
When these pressures prevail, the maintenance of one identity (or field of 
identities) involves the conversion of some differences into otherness, into 
evil, or into one of its numerous surrogates. Identity requires difference in 
order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own 
self-certainty (2008: 64). 
 
However, Connolly also argues that by understanding this relational and constructed 
relationship of the Self and the Other it becomes possible to imagine and practice 
more ethical policy making (Connolly 2008: ix). I will elaborate on this in this 
chapter’s Conclusion and in the final chapter so it is sufficient to say here that, if we 
begin the process of problematising our identifications of the Self and the Other, we 
should come to recognise that these are essentially artificially constructed myths that 
sustain binaries such as ‘us versus them’ and ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘masculine versus 
feminine’, ‘developed versus developing countries’, to name a few  - but by unlocking 
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these myths it becomes possible to transform the often conflict infused politics that 
follow from these identity constructions. 
 
2.2 Enter (in)security 
In the process described above, the state identity that emerges has the power to 
constitute what is meant by ‘us’ and ‘them’, what we should be afraid of, what is alien 
to us and what we should be secured against – thus we are knowingly distanced from 
the Other by emphasising the representational differences between the Self and the 
Other. Essentially, ‘a range of differences as intrinsically evil, irrational, abnormal, 
mad, sick, primitive, monstrous, dangerous, or anarchical’ is constituted to provide an 
imaginary of insecurity that enables the construction and enactment of a state identity 
that is understood by non-elites as a physical construct capable to ‘protect [us] from 
the other’ (Connolly 2008: 65). The result: ‘boundaries are constructed, spaces 
demarcated, standards of legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of history 
privileged, and alternatives marginalised’ (Campbell 1990: 266). Agathangelou’s 
work on female migrants from less developed economies working in desire industries 
(e.g. domestic and sex work) in the world’s core economies examines how these 
boundaries are drawn. The study shows how the traffickers and the (illegal) migrants 
are effectively constructed ‘as major violators of the integrity of what is “inside” the 
state as well as a danger and threat to the homogeneity of the state, society and the 
polity’ while at the same time they are desired as a commodity by the very same state, 
elites and anyone who can profit from and exploit them (Agathangelou 2004: 129). 
 
However, as Connolly notes, the state does this policing and disciplining in order ‘to 
protect the purity and certainty of a hegemonic identity’ that is essential for the state 
to assert its role as the protector against the Other and thus, the Other and its 
difference become both a necessary element of the Self’s being but also a threat to its 
being (Connolly 2008: ix, 67). In other words, ‘insecurity itself is the product of 
processes of identity construction in which the self and the other, or multiple others, 
are constituted’ (Weldes et al. 1999:10). However, as Agathangelou criticises, this 
line of reasoning (and as already noted above, Connolly would agree with 
Agathangelou) obscures the Self to see its interconnectedness with the Other and in 
the unresolved structural questions such as: why do people migrate to the core 
economic states; why political upheaves continues in postcolonial states; why 9/11 
	   16	  
happened … However, it is because of this type of (in)security shaped identities that 
political decisions lack any meaningful basis for constructive change; as 
Agathangelou argues with the help of her case study of the female migrants: 
‘Defining the female migrant as “third country” national as opposed to an European 
makes possible particular practices and the continuation of social relations of 
exploitation and inequality’ and renders ‘security to a select few nationally and 
transnationally’ (Agathangelou 2004: 131, 133). Said differently, the established and 
socially approved identity of ‘third country’ effectively shadows and naturalises the 
insecurity effects of the Self’s security. 
 
Yet, as Campbell has argued, the danger posed by the other does not have to be an 
actual threat to the Self’s existence but an issue may rather become a security threat 
through a process of interpretation. By employing the concept of discursive 
economy,2 Campbell demonstrates that no real experience of threat needs to exist in 
order to laid the foundations for danger. Discursive economy allows us to understand 
discourse as a space in which some narratives, representations and interpretations are 
encouraged and privileged while others are marginalised or even denied. 
Consequently, 
‘The mere existence of alternative mode of being, the presence of which 
exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the 
claim of a particular identity to be the true identity, is sometimes enough to 
produce the understanding of a threat’ (Campbell 1998: 3). 
 
Hence, in effect, a hegemonic discourse has the power to normalise violence against 
the Other, and as stressed several times above, this results in security seeking 
identities that continue enacting differences, segregations and borders and creating 
negative elitist, militaristic and non-democratic state identities and insecurities that 
eventually materialise in violence on the bodies of ordinary people – hence, mere 
discourses and imagined threats can and do have material effects. For instance, 
Shaikh’s study on Pakistan’s state identity reveals how Pakistan, struggling to find a 
source of unifying national identity, consciously crafted a negative identity that 
established India as a political and military threat to Pakistan, effectively enacting a 
destructive and oppositional state identity. This, according to Shaikh, resulted in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For Campbell, discourse means the constitution/representation of the ’real’ (see Campbell 
1994: 161) 
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military emerging as the dominant state institution and the key arbiter of Pakistan’s 
national identity overriding other institutions and contributing to the internal and 
regional insecurity (Shaikh 2009, Kanwal Sheikh et al. 2012). More recently, in an 
effort to avoid the international community’s criticism of Pakistan’s anti-India stance 
and to find alternative sources for identity making, the military has launched domestic 
campaigns targeting ‘impure Muslims’ as internal security threat and/or has given its 
blessing to Sunni militant groups such as the Army of Jhangvi to freely target these 
marked communities. This has effectively insecured society for Shiite minorities – 
especially for the Hazaras - who are experiencing a growing sense of insecurity and 
vulnerability (see Shaikh 2009).  
 
When does a construction then become accepted, to have connection with the real 
world, and have material effect? 3 A construction is successfully transformed into a 
social fact when the relationship of a particular construct to reality is defined as one of 
correspondence – meaning that a particular construct is transformed into a naturalised 
and unquestioned fact of reality which obscures the fact’s constructed nature and its 
origins (Shepherd and Weldes 2008: 534). Language must have an empirical point of 
reference here – think of racial and gendered embodiments of danger (e.g. Arab male 
à terrorist) – otherwise a construction does not become a recognised social fact with 
material effects (e.g. Arab male à terrorist à Abu Ghraib à interrogation and 
torture of terrorists). The imaginary that comes into being from this process is what 
enacts and enables real and meaningful social identities and practices, on the other 
hand, we have reached the boundaries of a discourse when ‘particular representations 
of the world seem “unintelligible”, “irrational”, “meaningless”, or “ungraspable” 
(Muppidi 1999: 124-125), (e.g. Arab male à women’s empowerment). Particularly, 
in the case of defining national security, it is paramount to reach ‘the moment of 
extreme ideological closure’ (Hall quoted in Weldes et al. 1999: 17) which grants the 
state elites the power to define the contours of the national discourse, deny and 
challenge any contesting or oppositional constructs and continue exercising their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Weldes et al. have noted that it is useful to employ the terms construction and production to 
mark the distinction between non-material and material practices. According to them, 
‘linguistically, discourses are the vehicle for the construction of categories (of difference, of 
identity, of threat, etc.). Through both linguistic and non-linguistic practices, they are the 
vehicle for the production of social facts (such as insecurities)’ (Weldes et al. 1999: 17) that 
then form actual (in)security issues on the bodies of ordinary men and women.  
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national political authority. Hence, the way national security – or insecurity for that 
matter – becomes understood is through the dissemination of information made 
possible by certain authored constructs that interpret the (in)security in a specific way. 
As Weldes et al. point out, for this to be possible, ‘anything outside of the discourse – 
statements expressing possible worlds or forms of life, for example – is represented as 
implausible, ideological or spurious and so often consigned to the realms of fiction, 
fantasy, or nonsense’ (Weldes et al. 1999: 17). 
 
Thus, in essence, discourses of identity and insecurity are sites of social power 
(Agathangelou 2004). As will become clear in the sections below, power, and state 
power in particular, ‘is not neutral, but classed, sexualised and racialised’ 
(Agathangelou 2004: 15). Political and military elites usually have an uncontested 
position of privilege to craft, articulate, fix and constitute hegemonic identities and 
security constructions as they have the institutional power to do so; they are speaking 
for the state but ultimately for ‘us’ (Shepherd and Weldes 2008: 534). These 
constructions are projected essentially through the ‘categories of the state’ (i.e. its 
sovereignty and the national), which sanctions the elites’ construction of different 
peoples, movements and crossings of borders as dangerous to the ‘national security’ 
(Agathangelou 2004: 128). In the post-9/11 political milieu the US political and 
military elite not only employed its superior role in crafting and articulating the 
traumatised state identity but it also had the institutional power to project and 
disseminate this image not only within the US but also transnationally through 
globally reaching media and consumer culture (Grewal 2003). As Agathangelou and 
Ling carefully note, political interpretations of the world – such as threats to national 
security – are essentially exercised through a Gramscian methods, coercion and 
consent, so that the non-elites would accept the crafted and articulated identity and the 
possible insecurities that come with it – even when these are against the non-elites’ 
interests (Agathangelou and Ling 2004b: 829). Hence, the most powerful discourses 
become and remain dominant in part because of the power relations sustaining them 
(Weldes et al. 1999: 18). Especially in times of conflict, certain (state orchestrated) 
discourses are little resisted and their representations of insecurity become hegemonic 
which allows the elites to dismiss contesting discourses naïve or even as treasonous 
(Weldes et al. 1999: 18).  Nevertheless, even hegemonic discourses may and do 
crumble. For instance, the traumatised US national identity that was disseminated by 
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the elites in the aftermath of 9/11 was embodied in the white heterosexual, nuclear 
family grieving identity. The voices of non-whites, lesbians, gays, and bisexuals were 
simply ignored in the dominant constructions of the events and even more so in 
aftermath that unfolds in the battlefields where these alternative voices are active 
participants (think of gay/lesbian/black/Latino bodies in the US Army). Moreover, as 
Weldes et al. argue, as discourses have the power to define and thus to constitute the 
world, these representations of insecurity also become important sources of power 
(Weldes et al. 1999: 18). 
 
2.3 Gendered identities 
Feminist theorists have noted how state identities are gendered – and especially how 
the discourses of nationalism, war, national security and colonialism/imperialism 
allow the political and military elites to craft particular gender identities that are used 
to frame the state’s projects and construct boundaries between different groups 
(national, ethnic, gendered, religious, sexual) (see among others Agathangelou and 
Ling 2004a; Elshtain 1987; Enloe 2001; Goldstein 2001; McClintock 1995; 1997; 
Ruddick 1990; Shepherd 2006a; Tickner 2002; Zalewski and Parpart 1998). And as 
already noted in the Introduction, the role of gender and race in the War on Terror 
narrative has been central for the construction of the Self and the Other; in the post-
9/11 political milieu, both gender and race has been deployed to craft identities 
including that of a perpetrator, protector, saviour and victim. The ways in which 
conflicts are being gendered and framed affect the way we (non-elites) understand 
and come in terms with these conflicts. The gendered and racialised identities of 
protectors and enemies effectively allow us to ignore and normalise the (in)security 
implications resulting from conflicts (Shepherd 2006: 9). 
 
As feminist scholars have argued, gender – as the culturally and socially constructed 
categories of masculinity and femininity – does not point to the characteristics of any 
particular men and women but it places masculinity and femininity on stark opposite 
sides emphasising that ‘the essence of being masculine is to be not feminine’ 
(Charlesworth and Chinkin 2002: 604). Thus gender does not exist objectively but it 
is a spatial and historical discursive practice ‘through which social difference [and 
power relations are] both invented and performed’ (McClintock 1997: 89). 
Consequently, in this thesis identities like gender are seen not as ‘natural’ nor 
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‘essential’ but as social, cultural, historical and material practice constructed to 
privilege a colonial, imperial, patriarchal, and heterosexist order (Agathangelou and 
Ling 2004). Going back to the binary representation of gender, what is essential to 
this specific binary is how the masculine is typically presented with characteristics 
and capabilities – such as power, rationality and strong physical power to ‘do’ justice, 
which are valued higher than the characters and capabilities of the feminine side, such 
as dependency, emotionality and nurturing. 
 
For Elshtain, war has the power to call forth powerful prototypical gender identities 
for men and women alike. The first one she identifies, the ‘Just Warrior’, is the heroic 
man who ‘takes up arms reluctantly, and only if he must to prevent a greater wrong or 
protect the innocent’ (Elshtain 1998: 452). The innocent is, naturally, the female 
embodied in the ‘Beautiful Soul’ who is ‘too good for the world yet absolutely 
necessary to it’ (Elshtain 1987: 140) and what she naturally needs is protection 
provided by the Just Warrior. With the help of these gendered constructs, the realms 
of public, war and security, the ‘high politics’, are placed in the elite world of 
masculinities (Blanchard 2003: 1289) while private, peace and self-sacrifice are 
placed on the shoulders of the femininities (Enloe 2001:13)4. Thus as McClintock 
explains, this results in masculinised politics: 
Not only are the needs of the nation typically identified with the frustrations 
and aspirations of men, but the representation of male national power depends 
on the prior construction of gender difference. All too often in male 
nationalisms, gender difference between women and men serves to 
symbolically define the limits of national difference and power between men 
(McClintock 1997: 89).  
 
The myth of protection or saving the female essentially assigns the masculine with an 
active agency while the feminine is constructed as a symbol of the nation in need of 
protection, which, in turn, allows naturalising and legitimating militaristic and 
aggressive politics. However, the masculinist anxiety about failing in these politics 
often materialises itself in violence on the bodies of the very women they are meant to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 It would be quite wrong to suggest that masculinities or femininities are not prone to change 
– even when talking about militarised or victimised masculinities and femininities.  However, 
my intention is to show how certain forms of traditional and conservative gender roles are 
emphasised when societies are faced with external or internal threats. See an excellent study 
on changing masculinities in the US military; Melissa T. Brown, Enlisting Masculinity: The 
Construction of Gender in US Recruiting Advertising during the All-Volunteer Force 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). 
	   21	  
protect/save (think of peace keeping forces using local women as prostitutes; see 
among others Agathangelou and Ling 2003; Razack 2004a).  
 
2.3.1 Hyperformations 
Hooper has argued that militarised masculinities have laid the basis for what it means 
to be a man in the modern era (Hooper 2001: 81) and Enloe has continued the 
argument by noting how militarised masculinities are now also found and prioritised 
outside the military institutions such as in foreign policy establishments.5 This has 
effectively naturalised masculinised and militarised foreign policy making and foreign 
policy decisions reflect this ‘manly culture’ which eventually helps to sustain conflict 
ridden and (in)security seeking policymaking  (Enloe 2004: 123-125). This hierarchy 
that devalues femininities leaves them in the margins assigned with the silenced role 
of a victim or someone to be protected.6 And as Owens writes: ‘The hegemonic 
masculinity […] is made possible through a continual effort to define its sexuality 
relative to the sexuality of inferior others, setting it apart and protecting it’ (Owens 
2010: 1042).  
 
In times of conflict and insecurity, these identity formations have a tendency to over-
perform and result in hyper-formations. Hypermasculinity, first coined by Nandy in 
her work on British colonialism in India, refers to a reactionary masculinity that 
‘arises when agents of hegemonic masculinity feel threatened or undermined, thereby 
needing to inflate, exaggerate, or otherwise distort their traditional masculinity’ 
(Agathangelou and Ling 2004a: 519). Hypermasculinities contribute to the trans-
nationalisation of militarisation and insecurity globally ‘with [their] imagery of 
protector/protected, inside/outside, and order/anarchy – a situation in which the 
security for the few is bought at the cost of insecurity of the many’ (Zalewski and 
Parpart 1998: 87).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 However, it is worth noting what Ruddick has argued; ’In all war, on any side, there are men 
frightened and running, fighting reluctantly and eager to get home, or even courageously 
resisting their orders to kill’. Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace 
(Boston, Beacon Press, 1990): 218. Similarly, women are fighting, supporting wars and 
interventions. 
6 See Madeleine Bunting’s media analyse of how American women disappeared from the 
public sphere after 9/11 and the crisis was left to men. Madeleine Bunting, (2002) ‘Women 
and War’, Meridians, Vol. 2 (2): 309-311 
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Hypermasculinity would not, however, work effectively without its binary and 
subordinated counterpart – hyperfemininity. Hyperfemininity denotes to ‘an idealized 
and radicalised version of traditional femininity’ under threat and this allows the 
patriarchal state to use it as an ideological frame via which the hypermasculinity is 
executed and projected (Agathangelou and Ling 2004a: 519). Hypermasculinity is 
dependent on its counterpart but ‘does not acknowledge this dependence and devalues 
it at the same time’ (Agathangelou and Ling 2009: 3). More specifically, 
hypermasculinity 
de-emphasise[s] speculation, intellection and caritas as feminine, and 
justifie(s) a limited cultural role for women – and femininity – by holding that 
the softer side of human nature [is] irrelevant to the public sphere. It openly 
sanctifie[s] – in the name of such values competition, achievement, control, 
and productivity – new forms of institutionalized violence and ruthless social 
Darwinism (Nandy quoted in Agathangelou and Ling 2004b: 40). 
 
Hypermasculinities invite, or provoke, other masculinities sensing threat to engage in 
hyperformations and together these hyperformations can lead to ‘a heterosexist 
hierarchical punishing system of power’ (Eisenstein 2004). These manifestations of 
masculinity find their expression on the vulnerable and hyperfeminised bodies that 
bear the violence following the masculine anxiety. An example can be drawn from 
South Korea where in the 1960s and 1970s the state constructed a hybrid 
hypermasculinist state identity of Western white masculinist capitalism and 
Confucian patriarchy in order to develop its economic performativity. With the help 
of this new hypermasculinist identity the state assigned to Korean society the 
characteristic of a typical Confucian womanhood: diligence, discipline and deference. 
Consequently the hyperfemininised society bore the burden of economic development 
and sacrificed its own wellbeing (e.g. long working hours and low wages) for the 
national good (i.e. economic development) without access to political representation 
or voice (unions were banned, political dissident repressed) (Han and Ling 1998). 
 
3.0 Orientalist anxiety 
As already noted in the introduction to the chapter, I argue that an anxious orientalist 
imaginary sustains American’s new interventionist and aggressive identity projection 
– materialised in the War on Terror, the Monster and the Feminine Other - in the post-
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9/11 world.7 Thus, it is worth going back to Said’s work Orientalism (2003 [1978]) in 
order to continue setting the analytical framework.  
 
For Said, orientalism is a discursive regime that essentially enacts ontological and 
epistemological distinctions between the Self and the Other, the Occident and the 
Orient (Said 2003: 2). This discursive regime, by establishing ‘truths’ about these two 
opposites, provides the tools to reinforce inclusions and exclusions but ultimately it 
allows the Self to dominate, restructure and have authority over the Other (Said 2003: 
3). In effect, certain ‘othered’ modalities are allowed to exist (e.g. scary Muslim/Arab 
man and victimised Muslim woman) while others are denied or restricted (e.g. 
rational Muslim/Arab man and empowered Muslim woman). The ensuing power 
relationship between the Self and the Other thus exceeds information production and 
the violence of orientalism – both discursive and material – was, and continues to be, 
embedded in contemporary political, social and economic practice (Ganguly 1992; 
Said 2003: 6). In other words, the Self occupies a positional superiority to the Other, 
which is achieved, according to Said, by the Self’s reliance on a discursive 
consistency of the Other which, in turn, is woven into material power of institutions 
and organisations. This combination of discursive and material power effectively 
creates the Other and assigns it with an inferior status in the imagination of the Self 
(Said 2003: 40, 273; emphasis in original).  
 
What is central for my argument here is 1) how Orientalism is first and foremost a 
means to construct the Self through a discourse about the Other/the Monster, which, 
in turn, serves to construct global (and/or local/internal) hierarchies – often 
consolidated with violence; and 2) how the Feminine Other is harnessed in the Self’s 
disciplining of the Other. 
* 
What is central to the crafting of the Other is its locking into representations of 
cultural practices that are both constructed and articulated by the Self for and on 
behalf of the Other. Put differently, the power of orientalism, and as Said refers to 
Foucault, emanates from its power ‘to construct the object it speaks about and from its 
power to produce of a regime of truth about the Other and thereby establish the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 As Agathangelou and Ling (2004a) have carefully noted, the Bush Administration’s early 
sematic shift from terrorism to terror points to the change from a political to cultural agenda. 
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identity and the power of the subject that speaks about it’ (Yegenoglu 1998: 90-91). 
Thus, the Other’s historical and spatial specificity is denied and its individuality is 
reduced to ‘collective self-consistency’ such as ‘the Arabs’ (Said 2003: 229). These 
representations eventually become naturalised ‘truths’ and are built on ‘the absolute 
and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, 
superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior’ (Said 2003: 300). 
However, as Bhabha has argued, the created image is more than a false image that 
naturalises discriminatory practices against the Other: ‘It is a much more ambivalent 
text of projection and introjection, metaphoric and metonymic strategies, 
displacement, over-determination, guilt, aggressivity; the masking and splitting of 
‘official’ and phantasmatic knowledges to construct the positionalities and 
oppositionalities of racist discourse’ (Bhabha 2004: 117). And as Said writes, the 
Western imagination about the Orient is far more powerful in dictating the truth than 
the actual reality: the ‘abstractions about the Orient […] are always preferable to 
direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities’ (Said 2003: 300). This means 
that the Orient is conceptualised as ‘eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself’ 
(Said 2003: 301) but whom is to be rescued from ‘the obscurity, alienation and 
strangeness’ to progress and development by the heroic West (Said 2003: 121). 
However, the West does not conceptualise intervention as aggressive or imposing – it 
is ultimately the Orient’s liberation (Said 2003: 172). Hence, the West assumes that 
the Orient feels threated by the West’s superior civilizational status but instead of 
cooperation and dialogue the Orient is assumed to respond with the menace of jihad. 
And the consequence of this is: ‘a fear that Muslims will take over the world’ (Said 
2003: 287). Thus, to counter the Orient’s challenge, the West must make the Orient 
‘to perform, its power must be enlisted on the side of “our” values, civilization, 
interests, goals’ (Said 2003: 238). 
 
However, although the central aim of an orientalist discourse is to enact both 
imaginative and concrete boundaries between the Self and the Other, the 
consolidation of the Self’s identity formation builds on this very same process. As 
Said argued; ‘Indeed, my real argument is that Orientalism is – and does not simply 
represent – a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as 
such has less to do with the Orient than it does with “our” world’ (Said 2003: 12). 
Chow has elaborated this point eloquently and it is worth quoting it at length: 
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What I am suggesting is a mode of understanding the native in which the 
native’s existence – that is, an existence before becoming ‘native’ – precedes 
the arrival of the colonizer. Contrary to the model of Western hegemony in 
which the colonizer is seen as a primary, active ‘gaze’ subjugating the native 
as passive ‘object’, I want to argue that it is actually the colonizer who feels 
looked at by the native’s gaze. This gaze, which is neither a threat nor a 
retaliation, makes the colonizer ‘conscious’ of himself, leading to his need to 
turn this gaze around and look at himself, henceforth ‘reflected’ in the native-
object. It is the self-reflection of the colonizer that produces the colonizer as 
subject (potent gaze, source of meaning and action) and the native as his 
image, with all the pejorative meanings […] attached to the word ‘image’. 
Hegel’s story of human ‘self-consciousness’ is then not what he supposed it to 
be – a story about Western Man’s highest achievement – but a story about the 
disturbing effect of Western Man’s encounter with those others that Hegel 
considered primitive. Western man henceforth became ‘self-conscious’, that 
is, uneasy and uncomfortable, in his ‘own’ environment (Chow 2003: 342-
343). 
 
Essentially, as Connolly and Campbell already discussed above, the division that 
make ‘us’ look and feel distinctive from ‘them’ are essential for the Self’s 
construction and understanding of itself, thus, the Self ‘more often than not, glares 
back in the reflected image of’ the Other (Agathangelou and Ling 1997: 12). 
However, the above-mentioned ‘truths’, created by the Self without interaction, 
dialogue and engagement with the Other, prevent the Self from gaining the security it 
desires against the Other. In the words of Said, a discourse like orientalism ‘retards 
the process of enlarged and enlarging meaning through which true understanding can 
be attained’ (Said 2003: 254) and because of this orientalism sanctions the Self with 
the moral right to invade, discipline and civilise other lands and peoples. However, 
the spiral of anxiety embedded in orientalism threatens to circle back:  
‘orientalism’s very raison d’etre rationalise[s] violence in the colonial order. 
What results […] is a mirror strategy of imperial politics by both colonizer 
and colonized. Each feels justified to do unto the Other what has been done to 
it in the past without regard to those who violated and sacrificed in the 
process’ (Agathangelou and Ling 2004b: 33, emphasis mine). 
 
3.1 Orientalised body 
In the above section, I covered some of the general gender roles that the state crafts in 
times of conflict and war. However, hierarchies exist within masculinities and 
femininities – in other words, gender is often articulated in relation to other 
differences and categories such as race, class and sexuality. Put differently, the 
politics of power, exclusion and marginalisation are intensified with these further 
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signifiers of differentiation and otherness. In the colonial times race marked the 
boundary between one’s right to citizenship and being a mere subject (Stoler 1989) 
but the racial anxiety has stayed with us. A concrete example is the US government’s 
introduction of posthumous citizenship to non-citizens (e.g. Latinos) who have died in 
serving in active duty in the US army.8 When brown bodies are needed to be 
sacrificed for the security of the White Self, these non-citizens have been drafted as 
eligible and worthy to serve in the War on Terror while at the same time their bodies 
are violently fenced-off from the US borders and/or coded as threats to national 
security.  
 
Current racial hierarchies that employ race as a signifier of otherness allow for 
categorisations such as ‘different’, ‘traditional’, ‘poor’, ‘oppressed’ ‘inferior’, 
‘irrational’, ‘fanatical’, ‘oppressive’, mad, ‘illogical’, and so on to be applied to 
outsiders – examples like the victimised Muslim woman, suicide bomber, the Taliban, 
and crazy mullahs are found in our everyday imagination and politics – which, in 
turn, naturalises the West’s image of itself as rightful to police, discipline and 
terrorise both within and without its borders. I will now move on to examine the 
Oriental Monster and the Feminine Other that the White Self needs in order to create 
and sustains itself. 
 
3.2 The new Oriental Monster: Islamic fundamentalist 
Studies focusing on the sexual and racial aspects of the post-9/11 political milieu have 
pointed to the re-emergence of the old racial Monster in foreign policy discourses 
after the 9/11 attacks (see for instance Grewal 2003; Ling 2004; Puar and Rai 2002; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The US Citizenship and Immigration Services state: ‘Public Law 101-249 provides for the 
granting of U.S. citizenship to an alien or noncitizen national whose death resulted from 
injury or disease incurred on active duty with the U.S. armed services during specified 
periods of military hostilities. Posthumous citizenship is an honorary status commemorating 
the bravery and sacrifices of these persons; it does not convey any benefits under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act to any relative of the decedent. If [the] application [for 
posthumous citizenship] is approved, a Certificate of Citizenship [is issued] in the name of 
the decedent. The certificate establishes only that the person is considered to be a citizen of 
the United States as of the date of his/her death’ (US Government (2013), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgne
xtoid=0dc18d5032b5d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD, retrieved March 16, 2013). 
However, it is worth noting that the relatives of non-citizens working for private-owned 
security firms in Iraq and Afghanistan have no similar rights to apply for the posthumous 
citizenship. Many of these private-owned security firms draft their employees from Latin-
American countries such as Peru. 
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Rai 2004). The emergence of monsters has been connected to Western modernity and 
its colonisation projects and thus the numerous figures of brutality, monstrosity and 
horror have shadowed ‘civilization as its constitutive and abjected discontent (Rai 
2004: 538). The post-9/11 Monster, the ‘Islamic fundamentalist’, – stereotypically 
male, often Middle Eastern and Muslim in his origin – has his roots in the racial and 
sexual monsters of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when European colonial 
powers employed ‘the term monstrosity [to] mobilise a set of discursive practices that 
tied racial and sexual deviancy to an overall apparatus of discipline, and, later in the 
nineteenth century, to the emergence of biopolitics’ (Rai 2004: 539). The Monster 
that is produced through these discursive practices – as both instrument and target of a 
diffuse power –establishes the ontological difference and borders of nations, races, 
sexes, genders, classes and humanity (Rai 2004: 539).   
 
As Puar and Rai have demonstrated, central to the production of the Monster is its 
construction ‘as a regulatory construct of modernity that imbricates not only 
sexuality, but also questions of culture and race’ and as such the Monster ‘is not 
merely an other; it is one category through which a multiform power operates’. 
Moreover, discourses that deploy the Monster ‘as a screen for otherness are always 
also involved in circuits of normalizing power as well: the monster and the person to 
be corrected are close cousins’ (Puar and Rai: 2002: 119). In the contemporary world, 
the violent civilising mission targeting the ‘natives’ has been moved on the body of 
the Islamic fundamentalist. 
 
Today’s Monster has materialised himself in the Palestinian suicide bomber, the crazy 
Iranian mullah, the ‘Arab’, the Taliban, and in the different looking (brown) man in 
the street.9 Drawing on Foucault’s concept of ‘abnormals’, Rai has noted how the 
racial images of the current enemy in the War on Terror re-play the colonial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Out of interest, I conducted an informal survey among my Finnish friends (15 people) 
earlier in 2012 – all educated in higher educational institutions, considering themselves 
’liberal’, ’cosmopolitan’ or ’well-travelled’ at least, anti-racist, and from diverse social 
backgrounds – and I asked them what is the first image that comes to their mind when they 
hear the word ’terrorist’. All of them answered an Arab. As one of them described the image 
she had: ‘He is dark-skinned, maybe he also fashions a beard, has dark hair and brown eyes, 
you know, the stereotypical kebab-shop keeper who you find in the every corner of the city’. 
They all recognised how this image has been socially constructed and they were aware of its 
political connotations but they say that it is the first thing that automatically pops up when 
one hears the word ‘terrorist’.  
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constructs of the ‘Oriental despots’ who were presented as  ‘the quintessential 
enemies of (Western) civilization’, as he explains: 
Developed in the wake of Enlightenment critique of the ancien regimé, the 
divine right of kings and aristocratic privilege, the discourse of Oriental 
despotism posited an essentially Western order as a civilizational corrective to 
Eastern irrationality. The representative of this moderate and reasonable West 
would confront (and eventually dominate) their supposed opposite. […] It was 
almost as if these inherent differences logically and naturally gave rise to two 
radically different traditions of political and economic organization. For 
Europe, a constitutional monarchy or republic would be the characteristic form 
of polity, while the capitalist mode of production its characteristic economic 
institution. For the East, despotism … would be the normal and distinctive 
form of government […] Today, the monster has re-emerged at the centre of 
‘an axis of evil’, as a masculine-effeminate ‘subject’ that embodies Western 
civilization’s ultimate enemy: the Islamic terrorist (Rai 2004: 548; 539).  
 
Constructing the enemy as animalistic, violent, irrational, evil and manic effectively 
allows the Self to deny the Monster’s right to voice its social, economic and political 
concerns and, at the same time, its relationship with the Self is denied, the 
interconnectedness of these two is washed away. Moreover, as Agathangelou and 
Ling careful analysis on the 9/11 Report shows, followers of leading enemy figures 
are usually dumped into a similar but distinct category and characterised as ‘misled, 
mistaken and misguided’ (Agathangelou and Ling 2005: 830), reflecting the old 
colonial representations of passive, enslaved and primitive barbarians. This type of 
dehumanisation has critical (in)security implications for those who are constructed in 
monstrous terms, including violent racism (think of the targeting of ‘Muslim’ looking 
citizens in the US after the 9/11 attacks), the denial of human rights (think of 
Guantanamo Bay detention camp); and the transnationalisation of militarisation (think 
of Afghanistan, Iraq …). 
 
3.3 The Feminine Other 
If the Oriental Monster is the source of fear in colonial –and neoimperialist projects, 
the Feminine Other is the object of imperial desires of protection and possession. The 
Feminine Other offers the Self/the West the myth of protection and saving imagined 
through othering, silencing and insecuring the object. The Feminine Other is of 
inferior status – just like the Oriental Monster – however, a minor but important 
difference is found in the Feminine Other – she is capable of change. Said differently, 
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it is possible to civilise and improve her, unlike her partner, the Monster who is 
eternally doomed. 
 
3.3.1 Othering the Feminine Other 
Yeğenoğlu’s seminal work in 1998 challenged us to see how feminine gender and 
sexuality are not simply representations of the Other but are constitutive of 
hegemonic projects like orientalism and imperialism (Yeğenoğlu 1998). Even more 
than with the Monster, the tropes of modernity follow the Feminine Other. In 
imagining the Feminine Other, the West constructs her by emphasising certain 
(ostensibly) negative characteristics of the backwardness of the Orient, for instance 
her religiously sanctioned veiling or gender segregation, that allow for easier and 
clearer lines to be drawn between the modern and Enlightened West and the 
stagnating Orient. Thus, women have been, and continue to be, deployed as signifiers 
of ethnic, national and cultural-civilizational boundaries and they reinforce and 
structure the (neo)colonial/imperial relationship of the dominant power to the 
subordinated (Yeğenoğlu 1998; Yuval-Davis 1997). Moreover, the characteristics 
applied to women are often divorced from their localities, histories and cultural 
situations. Generalisations of these localities, for instance of Islam, are employed as 
root causes of the Feminine Other’s oppression. As Lazreg writes: ‘[T]he overall 
effect of this […] is to deprive [her] of self-presence, of being. Because women are 
subsumed under religion presented in fundamental terms, they are inevitably seen as 
evolving in nonhistorical time. They have virtually no history’ (Lazreg 1988: 86). The 
Self/West is presented as the protector of women’s human rights and its women are 
paraded as empowered and equal. In the eyes of the West, for the Feminine Other 
longs to free herself, she needs to break off from her cultural and religious 
background – preferably with the help of the West who is guiding her in the process. 
In this way, the West is connected to modernity, progress and emancipation and the 
East to backwardness, tradition and oppression. 
 
Koikari’s work on American occupation of Japan in 1945-1952 offers an example 
how the US enlisted inferiorly represented Japanese women to its cause. Koikari 
shows how the civilising and transformation of Japanese women and the issue of 
women’s rights came to form the moral rationale for the American occupation to 
reform the country. The Americans presented themselves as the protectors of 
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Japanese women who had fallen victims of the chauvinistic Orientalist-Japanese 
culture while the US and its cultural background were represented as providing 
‘”superior” and more “democratic” political and educational guidance’ to the 
Japanese women (Koikari 2002: 24); the US simply ignoring 1) the local gender 
relations, practices –and histories and 2) how, at the same time, American women 
were fighting their own feminist agendas back in the US. Throughout the US presence 
in Japan, the politics of occupation – the reorientation and rehabilitation of the 
country – were played on the bodies of Japanese women who were actively 
constructed as helpless oriental victims lacking agency and who, without the help of 
the Americans, would not have been able to free themselves from their fanatical men 
and oppressive culture or gain any political rights. This reframed, justified and 
legitimised the interventionist occupation as a mission to ‘save’ these women and 
consequently Americans came to see and understand ‘the occupation […] as a 
blessing bestowed on Japanese women’ (Koikari 1999: 319). The American logic was 
simple: the brutal and barbaric Japanese men oppress their helpless women; as such 
they must be an uncivilised and inferior race; consequently they are in need of 
American Enlightenment that will guide them to democratisation (Koikari 2002). 
 
Razack has discussed the intersection of violence and race, gender, hierarchies and 
she shows how the process of othering takes place in a more contemporary context 
(see Razack 2004b; 2005; 2008). In her study on domestic violence among Muslim 
minorities in Norway, she shows how violence in minority (‘coloured’) communities 
is conceptualised as cultural but how violence in the majority (i.e. Norwegian/white) 
community is understood as exceptional and reflecting the actions of very few sad 
drop outs of the (white) society (Razack 2004b; 2012). She has called this the 
‘culturalisation of violence’, and as she explains: 
The body of the Muslim Woman, a body fixed in the Western imaginary as 
confined, mutilated, and sometimes murdered in the name of the culture, 
serves to reinforce the threat that the Muslim man is said to pose to the West 
and is used to justify the extraordinary measures of violence and surveillance 
required to discipline him and Muslim communities (Razack 2004b: 130).10 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 As Razack continues her argument, the idea of the woman living an autonomous life 
(meaning freed from communal ties) with ties only to the state has not materialised in less 
violence against women (Razack 2004b: 168). For instance, a study from a few years back 
concluded that in Finland, which has been claimed to be one of the most gender equal 
societies in the world, 43.5 per cent of Finnish women have become subjected to physical or 
sexual violence or threat of violence at least once after age fifteen. Of women currently living 
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Thus today, the process of contemporary othering has materialised in the Imperilled 
Muslim Woman and the Dangerous Muslim Man (Razack 2004b). Cooke argues that 
this reveals the four-stage gendered logic of empire: 1) women have inalienable rights 
within universal civilisation 2) civilised men recognise and respect these rights 3) 
uncivilised men systematically abrogate these rights, and 4) such men thus belong to 
an alien (Islamic) system. She explains: 
Imperial logic genders and separates subject peoples so that the men are the 
Other and the women are civilizable. To defend our universal civilization we 
must rescue the women. To rescue these women we need to attack these men. 
These women are to be rescued not because they are more “ours” than “theirs” 
but rather because they will have become more “ours” through the rescue 
mission (Cooke 2002: 469). 
 
As colonial and imperial histories have demonstrated, these projects not only 
privilege Western perspectives of gender and gender equality over local ones, but they 
also place ‘other’ women outside socio-economic and political relations and 
experiences. By placing women outside their social relations, the West denies them 
from practicing agency and by doing so their unique needs, opinions and desires are 
ignored. In effect, these protection scenarios become processes of violence, and 
racialisation in which everything local is rejected and devalued and everything 
Western is declared superior (Moallem 2005; see also Razack 2004b; 2008). This, in 
turn, makes not only invisible the hegemonic and interventionist politics behind the 
oppressed Feminine Other but also the actual and real sources of her socio-economic 
and human insecurity. 
 
3.3.2 Silencing the Feminine Other 
While the Self/West is promoted as the locus of agency and knowledge, the Feminine 
Other is effectively silenced and her maturity to act as a subject is denied. Pui-lan, 
referencing Spivak, has argued that the Feminine Other is not even allowed to speak 
but someone is always ready to represent her: ‘the subaltern woman has been written, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in a relationship 19.6 per cent of them had experienced physical or sexual violence or threats 
of violence by their spouse; 49 per cent of women who had been married or in a relationship 
had been victims of violence or threats by their former spouse. Minna Piispa, Markku 
Heiskanen, Juha Kääriäinen, & Reijo Sirén (2006) Naisiin kohdistunut väkivalta 2005. 
Oikeuspoliittisen tutkimuslaitoksen julkaisuja 225. Helsinki: Oikeuspoliittinen tutkimuslaitos 
(in Finnish), http://www.minna.fi/web/guest/lahisuhde-ja-parisuhdevakivalta, retrieved March 
14, 2013.  
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represented, argued about, and even legislated for, but she is allowed no discursive 
position from which to speak’ (Pui-lan 2002: 67). Koikari, for instance, shows how 
the American women attached to the occupation forces took the central role in the 
women’s reform movement under the American occupation – effectively allowing the 
occupational forces to ignore the actual needs and voices of Japanese women (Koikari 
2002). The Feminine Other who emerges from the Western authored presentation of 
the subaltern is what Mohanty has called the singular monolithic subject who ‘leads 
an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) 
and her being “third world” (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, 
domestic, family-orientated, victimised, etc.)’ (Mohanty 1988: 61, 65). When one is 
being represented and silenced, she is denied the opportunity to voice her alternative 
discourse to the discourse articulated on her behalf and her ability to construct her 
subjectivity is impeded. However, it needs to be noted that silence should not be 
always to be understood negatively - as a sign of disempowerment or lack of agency. 
Cheung has argued that Western feminists have had a tendency to valorise speech, 
which has led to reductive conclusions that silence is always signifying the Feminine 
Other’s lack of agency, passivity or marginality (Cheung 1993). However, what 
colours (neo)colonial or imperial discourses is their non-dialogical nature, which 
effectively via (neo)colonial violence, narrows both physical and discursive spaces for 
those who are articulating alternative voices and actions. 
 
Similarly, it is also worth noting that sometimes articulation spaces were/are granted 
to alternative ‘native’ voices. However, these alternative voices are being policed and 
disciplined in ways that they will satisfy the needs – such as the intact cultural borders 
- of colonial and imperial projects. Foucault’s (1990a) biopolitics sheds light onto the 
reasons why the Other may be inclined to ’convert’ to the Self’s – it can be 
understood as self-making that ensures the Other’s inclusion in the Self – reasons for 
the need or desire to be included in the Self may vary for example from the need for 
political asylum to assimilation. However, this policing and disciplining of biopolitics 
allows the Self to emphasise the Other’s appreciation of the Self’s lifestyles (e.g. 
secular vs. religious), the Other’s condemnation of their own culture and how well the 
Other has adapted to the Self’s world and finally to draw a clearer image of the enemy 
who must be resisted. With the help of these ‘alternative’ voices that support the 
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Self’s political agendas, the Self is granted the moral justification to act as the saviour 
of the Feminine Other who the Self itself has created as a subject in a need of saving.  
 
3.3.3 Insecuring the Feminine Other 
Violence has always coloured colonial and imperial fantasies and desires and as it has 
been already indicated, gender violence is constitutive of hegemonic projects like 
(neo)colonialism and imperialism. This has resulted in transnationalised militarisation 
and insecurity played on the body of the Feminine Other (see e.g. Abu-Lughod 2002; 
Agathangelou and Ling 2004a; Razack 2005). As already argued above, these 
fantasies and desires stem from ahistorical oriental myths of possession and protection 
that emphasise virile white men as agents and the “Oriental” Feminine Other as a 
passive victims in need of saving by white men (Spivak 1988). In effect, the Feminine 
Other is rendered into a commodity to be fetished; by transforming the exotic woman 
into a commodity, the ‘fetish’ is conquered and subjugated (Lalvani 1995).  
Moreover, Abu-Lughod has reminded us, saving others not only implies that one 
wants to save one from something but wants to save her to something – a different 
world and set of arrangements – and this is almost always a process subdued with 
violence (Abu-Lughod 2002) – both corporeal and psychological. In other words, the 
erasure of the Feminine Other as an agent of her own life not only constitutes 
epistemic violence but ‘creates the epistemological conditions for material harm 
(Ayotte and Husain 2005: 113; Spivak 1988).  
 
3.3.4 Epistemic violence 
The saving of the Feminine Other – a scenario that combines military intervention 
with modernity and progress – thus not only denies her indigenous discourses and 
knowledge but also sanctions someone else to speak on behalf of them. The Feminine 
Other and her veiling have been central in this respect. Yeğenoğlu has remarked that 
the veil is ‘taken as the sign of the inherently oppressive and unfree nature of the 
entire tradition of Islam and Oriental cultures and by extension it is used as a proof of 
oppression of women in these societies (Yeğenoğlu 2002: 84). By claiming 
authorship to the meaning of the veil, the West has established its understanding of 
the practice as right and irrefutable. No space for alternative discourses or 
understandings is granted. However, as many scholars have now argued, veiling 
carries a variety of meanings; for some it is a bodily means to cultivate their virtue 
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(Mahmood 2005a), for some it's a means of political resistance (Mahdavi, P. 2009a); 
it is a religiously sanctioned form of dress that allows women freely to participate in 
the public sphere (Abu-Lughod 2002) and so on. The relational superiority 
materialising in speaking on someone’s behalf, claiming authorship to someone else’s 
subjectivity, her practice and creating homogenous and generalising descriptions 
about the Other’s social, historical and cultural practices is violence as it denies and 
devalues the Feminine Other’s agency and subjecthood. As Ayotte and Husain 
explain: 
‘the overt vilification [of veiling] becomes a rhetorical technique whereby 
[Western] discourses inflict epistemic violence on [Muslim] women by 
denying the very possibility for agency through the choice of dress, ostensibly 
the cause at issue with these representations in the first place’ (Ayotte and 
Husain 2005: 119). 
 
3.3.5 Physical and structural violence 
As several academic works on American post-9/11 military interventions have 
recently noted, the American imagery of Muslim women as victims in need of saving 
– which morally legitimised and justified the War on Terror – has materialised not 
only in epistemic but increasingly physical –and structural violence on Muslim 
women’s bodies - both via the military intervention and domestic militarisation of 
society – (see among others Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002; Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; 
Ayotte and Husain 2005; Rostami-Povey 2007a). And thus IR feminist –and 
postcolonial feminists scholars have called for wider analysis of security (see for 
instance Agathangelou and Ling 2004a; 2005; Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Ayotte and 
Husain 2005; Bachetta et al. 2002; Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002; Ling 2008; 
Tickner 2002).  
 
In one of the sections above, I introduced the concept of hyperfemininity that allows 
hypermasculinities to use it as an ideological frame via which the hypermasculinity is 
executed and projected. Here I would like to draw attention to the process of 
feminisation. Feminisation process presents a way to understand why certain 
individuals, groups or communities are presented as victimised, vulnerable, incapable 
of defending themselves but why, at the same time, their sufferings may be 
conceptualised as mere ‘collateral damage’. For Peterson, feminisation is a process 
that pervades language and culture and leads to the normalisation of ‘the devaluation 
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of feminised bodies, identities and activities’ (Peterson 2005: 507; emphasis in 
original). She clarifies: 
‘feminisation of identities and practices effectively devalues them in cultural as 
well as economic terms. Briefly: the taken-for-granted devaluation of 
‘women’s work’ is generalised from women to include feminised ‘others’: 
migrants, marginalised populations, ‘unskilled’ workers, the urban underclass 
and developing countries’ (Peterson 2005: 507-508, emphasis in original). 
 
Thus, feminisation does not only apply to women but is also employed to devalue 
racially and culturally different masculinities (e.g. individuals and states). This 
denigration of the feminine creates local and international hierarchies (materialising 
for instance in the masculine/feminine/modernist/traditional dichotomies) and 
produces (neo)colonial and imperialist relations of power –and domination that are 
used as justifications for disciplining, policing, controlling, invading and ‘saving’ 
others (see also Mohanty 2006; Marchand and Runyan 2011), I will employ this 
concept later in the thesis when I examine the US sanctions against Iran. 
 
One final point on the insecuring of the Feminine Other. In her seminal article in 
2000, Hansen highlights the realms of voice and sight for the construction of security 
subjects (Hansen 2000). The salience of these two is even higher to the issue of 
gender security that forms Hansen’s main concern in the paper. Hansen notes that 
women’s insecurity often stays unheard both at the national and international arenas 
due to their structurally limited visibility and inability to speak up. Hansen remarks 
that in the absence of voiced concerns, what Hansen terms as ‘security as silence’, 
others may fail to see the real location and problems of the subject. Occasions rise 
when subjects are unable to voice their security concerns either because it is 
impossible or voicing the insecurity may aggravate her security situation. Hansen uses 
the example of rape in a social context where the stigma of rape may worsen the 
victim’s security status (Hansen 2000: 287). The imposed silence, Hansen argues, 
prevents women from ever fully materialising as an embodied subject and it prevents 
us/the outside from seeing how our construction (or lack of it) of her subjectivity 
effectively endangers her (Hansen 2000). Although Hansen’s paper was aimed at the 
gender blind Copenhagen School, her criticism is not just theoretical but it points to 
the more practical questions of security as she draws attention to the question ‘how do 
we decide what constitutes insecurity’, or, ‘how can we improve someone’s security 
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if out there exists a group of people who we cannot see or hear?’ I will elaborate on 
this particular point in the final chapter that discusses the aftermath of the 2009-
presidential elections in Iran and how women’s movement advocates experienced the 
state repression. 
 
3.3.6 Deviant sexuality 
What often figures in the representations of the Other – be that internal or external 
other – is its sexuality. Sexuality, like the former signifier of otherness discussed 
above, reflects power relations; heterosexuality and homosexuality are hardly ever 
understood as equal practices or identities and the latter is often disciplined in order to 
be corrected. For Foucault, the two categories reflected the power of discourses in 
regulating normalcy – heterosexuality overriding and disciplining homosexuality 
(Foucault 1990a). Sexuality has also been central to the workings of 
colonialism/imperialism and it assumed a dominant role marking the civilizational 
boundaries between the colonising (heterosexual and masculine) West and the 
colonised (effeminate) Orient. As Stoler argues, ‘sexual control was more than a 
“social enactment” – much less a convenient metaphor – for colonial domination, it 
was; a fundamental class and racial marker implicated in a wider set of relations of 
power (Stoler 1989: 634). Thus, the effemination of the Other male – a means to 
subordinate and devalue – takes places by defining his sexuality as inferior to the 
Self’s sexuality. In other words, by presenting the Other as homosexual or in other 
ways sexually deviant and the Self as heterosexual effectively enables the Self’s right 
to disciplining and correcting it. Scholarly analyses of the sexual abuse and torture by 
American soldiers at Abu Ghraib have pointed to a heterosexist 
punishment/disciplining system materialising on the male bodies of the detained (see 
among others Eisenstein 2004; Owens 2010). The horrible events at Abu Ghraib took 
gendered, racial and sexualised identities to their extremes; white Western 
masculinised women (and men) torturing and raping brown Eastern effeminated men. 
To ‘protect’ the self’s hetero-normativity (or the masculine Empire), the ‘other’ is 
degraded as homosexuals or effeminate and who then can be disciplined and/or 
humiliated. 
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4.0 Conclusion 
So why do they hate ‘us’?, as President Bush asked. Does the Self ever find an answer 
that fully satiates it? Already the structuring of the question reflects the impossibility 
of finding a lasting solution – if that solution is meant to be what it is claimed to be; 
spreading democracy, human rights, civility, and respect towards each other. As 
Connolly and Campbell have eloquently argued, the state employs the self and other 
distinction in order to satisfy their desire for national security but this singling out of 
differences eventually manifest itself in a distinct identity which continues to create 
inclusions, exclusions, imaginative and physical borders, good and evil. This is a 
process of rationalisation that culminates in the Self and the Other so that we, the non-
elites, come to know and understand what we are, what makes us secure or insecure 
and who protects us. This last point takes us to the importance of (in)security to state 
identities. The Self does not only need the Other’s difference to craft a distinct 
identity for itself but the inability to fully know and understand the Other – the 
insecurity about otherness and the threat it poses – becomes a constitutive element of 
the Self’s identity. However, the failure to understand otherness sanctions a world of 
fear which manifests itself in a global game of masculinities that, in turn, 
transnationalises militarisation that is eventually experienced as insecurity and 
violence on the feminised bodies of ordinary people (Agathangelou and Ling 2004a). 
In effect, discourses that emphasise the distance of the Self from the Other legitimate 
and naturalise the use of violence against the unknown and this violence is intensified 
by sub-categories of otherness such as gender, race, class and sexuality. 
 
These sub-categories of otherness play a central role in the orientalist anxiety which, I 
argue, is instrumental to the sustaining the US War on Terror imaginary and the US 
sense of self. This orientalist anxiety, which is driven more by the Self’s anxiety 
about itself, has manifested itself in the Monster and the Feminine Other who help the 
Self to continue its masculinist (in)security seeking policies of discipline (the 
Monster) and protection (the Feminine Other). Only that the Self does not realise that 
the security it is seeking is an elitist construction of security that only secures the 
bodies of a minority living within the white-hetero-masculine borders. 
 
* 
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Is there any other way than to discipline, police and humiliate the Other in order to 
secure the Self? Is there a way to make sure that the violent effects of hyper-
performing masculinities do not get played on the bodies of innocents – like those of 
Iranian women? Postcolonial scholars have for a long time argued how not 
recognising the interconnectedness of ‘our’ lives to ‘theirs’; not hearing the other side 
of the story’ or not suspending judgement based on the imagined borders between us 
and them, prevents us, together with them, finding solutions to political, economic 
and social hierarchies and inequalities that both the mental and physical boundaries 
uphold between the Self and Other. Relating to the Other enables us, the Self, to see 
how to find a middle space for the transformation of the fixed binaries and 
hegemonic/oppressive social relations that dominate our world and global politics 
(Ling 1996).  
 
Following the steps of Said, postcolonial feminists are pushing other scholars and 
policymakers to recognise their responsibility in the process of enacting of politically 
naturalised (but artificial) borders between peoples, societies, and lands. In effect, 
they are arguing for a more ethical and humane foreign policy making which would 
hopefully materialise in fewer segregations and in a growing sense of 
interconnectedness of worldwide inequalities. Chowdhry has deployed Said’s concept 
of contrapuntality to demonstrate the intimacy of the Self and the Other in world 
politics. Contrapuntality is a method that makes ‘visible the erasures and silences 
around concepts such as culture and identity, nation and memory and […] engender 
the articulation of exiled voices’ ignored in international relations and in the field of 
IR (Chowdhry 2007: 102-103).11 The method aims to ‘reveal the ‘wholeness’ of […] 
the intermeshed, overlapping, and mutually embedded histories of’ the Self and the 
Other (Chowdhry 2007: 105). The voice is given to a multiple agencies who are 
interrelated which, in turn, allows us to historise ‘texts, institutions and practices, […] 
[to] interrogate their sociality and materiality, [to] pay attention to the hierarchies and 
the power-knowledge nexus embedded in them, and [finally to] recuperate a non-
coercive and non-dominant knowledge’ (Chowdhry 2007: 105). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Contrapuntality was Said’s response to his critics who accused him of ignoring the 
colonised agency. Thus, with the help of contrapuntality, Said demonstrated ’a simultaneous 
awareness both of the metropolitan history and of those other histories against which (and 
together with which) the dominating discourse act’ (Said quoted in Chowdhry 2007: 104). 
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But to do this requires a major change in the way we see, understand and theorise 
about the world. Agathangelou and Ling have a proposed a way to start this journey. 
They have named it ‘Worldism’. Worldism starts with five epistemological 
commitments: 
1 – intersubjectivity; defined as the institutional social structures that emerge 
through the labour of agents in relation to other agents and thus dissolves 
sovereignty by challenging the center-periphery segregation that legitimates 
exploitative practices as ‘natural’ 
 
2 – reverberating agency; dissolves hierarchies if we recognise how the 
dominant binaries can be broken down and together 
masculinities/femininities; domestic/foreign; public/private can contribute to a 
more integrated life 
 
3 – identity; whose abstract subjectivity (e.g. notions of the Self) emerges 
from materiality (e.g. the body) and the social relations of production that 
produce it. This pushes us to recognise the intimacy of the Self with the Other. 
 
4 – critical syncretic engagement; artificial boundaries can be dismantled if 
we engage in critical syncretic negotiation – this invites and includes agents 
from multiple worlds – whether marked by tradition, gender, race, culture, 
class, sexuality – to build communities together.  
 
5 – accountability; we need to reframe the realist conception of power as 
providing security. This moves us to interrogate the meaning of power; 
‘Whom does it benefit?’; ‘Whom does it sacrifice?’ (Agathangelou and Ling 
2004b: 42-44) 
 
 
With the help of Worldism, we can start seeing possible better futures. Some may call 
Worldism naivety, idealism, political immaturity, or not realising how the real world 
works. However, if one does not start thinking and pondering over new ways of 
understanding the world, how could we make it better? I would like to put forward an 
argument for collective engagement that pushes us to recognise our worlds 
interconnectedness, which is needed in order to find more ethical ways of doing 
foreign policy – foreign policy that understands the importance of human security that 
the artificial segregations built on otherness shadow. If we break down the artificially 
constructed segregations that materialise in insecurity and violence, we may find 
understanding and tolerance of the Other and eventually ‘the Self finds its definition 
through and with the Other, not against it (Ling 2008: 20). 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY II: AGENCY: TALKING BACK – BEING PIOUS AND 
POLITICAL 
 
1.0 Introduction 
While I was in Iran, I attended a small brainstorming session organised by a NGO 
activist Nassim. She is in her early 50s and was born to Iranian-German parents in 
Germany but moved to Iran in her early teens. She has been involved in civil society 
activism all her adult life and at the time of the interview she was the director of her 
own NGO. In her small office Nassim, me and four other women discussed women’s 
general socio-economic situation in Iran and the women showed me how they had 
mainstreamed gender issues into various technical, health –and educational projects 
that they had organised in the past. We then moved on to discuss the problem of 
funding that has been a pressing issue for NGOs especially since the 2005 presidential 
election that brought president Ahmadinejad to power.12 It was then when Nassim got 
up and began to pace impatiently in her office and said: 
Of course the lack of funding makes our work almost impossible but in a way 
I’m happy that I’m more independent now. Earlier I had to please people who 
funded us. Either I had to be secular or almost Westerner in my approach to 
women’s issues or I couldn’t even mention the word woman in my programs. 
Some of my friends in Europe say that I’m more Iranian than Iranians are in 
my views regarding women and some of my friends here say that I’m too 
Western. Well, I’m neither of those. I’m an Iranian woman and I have my 
belief but that doesn’t mean that I’m not progressive or modern and more 
importantly I’m able to help women! (Nassim, April 2010, Tehran). 
 
The reason why I chose to start with this anecdote is because it brings up some of the 
themes that surfaced in many of the conversations I had in Tehran in the spring of 
2010. My interlocutors identified themselves as working class or middle-class, 
religious, educated, modern and Iranian. What dominated my conversations with 
these women was their frustration with the elite classes’ secular understanding of 
women’s rights and socio-economic change in Iranian society. In my interlocutors’ 
discussions of women’s rights, which they located in egalitarian reading of Islam, 
questions of social –and economic justice were always present and seemed to be very 
central to the current understanding of women’s rights among these women. Another 
theme that many of my interlocutors brought up in their discussions was connected to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 After the conservatives’ take over of the state institutions (the Majles, city councils and the 
presidential seat) they set out to deliberalise civil society. Fearing the authorities punitive 
policies, many funding bodies withdrew their financial support from NGOs. 
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the boundaries of modernity, civility, and otherness. These women articulated a 
message in which they positioned themselves not only against the Western image of 
its women as emancipated and free but also against the image of victimised and 
passive Muslim women that they could not identify with. Many of my interlocutors 
wanted to address the inequalities that materialised in the lack of social and economic 
opportunities especially among women and youth and wished to ‘talk back’ to elite 
women, international actors –and organisations and the Western popular imagination 
in order to demonstrate that Iranian women, and by extension their society, can be 
modern and civil. Many women found that their work in gender activism as pious 
agents was central to this. Similarly, they wanted to evidence that being pious does 
not mean that they are non-democratic or anti-reform. 
 
Whereas the previous scholarship has kept the ‘subordination-submission’ model 
alive and well with regard to women’s agency in Iran, this chapter suggests that it is 
time to move on and explore alternative understandings of agency. The analysis draws 
on the post-structuralist feminist critique of the autonomous liberal-humanist subject 
in order to explore the moral agencies of religious women’s movement activists in the 
post-9/11 era in Iran. Although Saba Mahmood’s work has been influential for the 
discussion, I have moved my analysis from the individual/private to the public and in 
the thesis I explicate how women’s public piety is both constructed in the public 
sphere and how their public activism is constitutive of their piousness. I also propose 
that women’s socio-economic and political locations increasingly inform their piety 
and activism, thus I also pay attention to the material context that shapes their agency 
(see for similar findings for example Brenner 1996; Deeb 2005; 2009; Jamal 2009; 
Rinaldo 2010). 
 
1.1. Why agency? 
The reason why I am addressing women’s agency in my work is influenced by two 
different factors. The first reason is theory related and results from my experiences in 
the field. While I was conducting my fieldwork, I began to question the idea of 
agency that inheres in the current feminist literature on Iranian women. The agency 
that I encountered in the field did not resonate with the binary representations of 
agency (resistance vs. subordination, modern vs. traditional, progressive vs. religious) 
that have dominated the understanding and exploration of Iranian women’s agency 
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since the 1990s. Thus, I felt that there was first and foremost a need to investigate the 
idea of agency that has shaped our understanding of women’s agency and 
subjectivity. Second, I realised that we need to openly explore women’s alternative 
worldviews and attempt to give them space even if they challenge our own way of 
conceptualising life or refute our analytical tools. 
 
The second reason why I find it important to address the issue of agency stems from 
the War on Terror milieu and its subsequent ‘Let’s Save Muslim Women’ policy 
narrative, which have tried to create ‘a global consensus’ on what is meant by 
womanhood and women’s rights (Hatem 2003/2004). This has privileged Western 
perspectives of gender over local ones and has demonstrated that there is an urgency 
to call in question the hegemonic and universalised secular conception of desire that 
contains within it parochial (and decidedly Western) assumption about female 
subjectivity (Bautista 2008). In particular women’s support or participation in ‘non-
liberal’ Islamic movements continues to be understood with difficulty and this is 
reflected both at the individual level and that of organisations. Mahmood, whose work 
has been influential for my understanding of agency, has been criticised for 
legitimising Islamic patriarchy and denying Muslim women’s right to emancipation. 
However, as Mahmood writes, there seem to be no parallel critique of secular 
humanism and its projects that are similarly guilty of violence and destruction 
(Mahmood 2005a). In other words, while diversity is being celebrated it is often, at 
the same time, silenced if it does not fit the categories of recognition. Moreover, for 
some reason it is understood that only secular political traditions have the energy to 
transform and improve societies. This is also a point of concern for me in this chapter. 
 
In what follows, I start with a brief note on classical theorisation of agency, which is 
followed by a note on liberal construction of agency. These sections will demonstrate 
where the idea of agency so influential shaping feminist studies has developed and 
how powerful it continues to be. After this, I will move on to interrogate how this 
particular idea of agency has materialised in the current scholarship on Iranian women 
and by extension how this scholarship shaped my own earlier understanding of 
women’s agency, autonomy and subjectivity. After this, I wish to expand explorations 
into Iranian women’s agency by including their ethical-moral agency into my analysis 
and by examining the approach offered by the poststructuralist critique of the 
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autonomous liberal-humanist subject that Mahmood has advanced in her study on an 
urban women’s pious movement in Egypt. However, as I noted above, I am aiming to 
move my analysis from the individual to the public and explicate how women’s moral 
agencies are both formed in the public and how their public activism is an integral 
element of their piousness. I have found Rosi Braidotti’s conceptualisation of political 
agency and Charles Hirschkind’s ideas of moral publics helpful to address this move. 
 
2.0 Classical theorisation of agency 
Agency has attracted a great deal of interest in social science and agency’s relation to 
structure has formed a basic issue in modern social theory (Archer 1996). Questions 
of agency and its relations to structures have been addressed by scholars like 
Durkheim, who saw the social separate from individual agents, i.e. society or 
structure being external to individuals. If one follows the Durkheimian view, an 
individual is born into an already constituted society and the society/structure implies 
constraint over the individual whose actions then follow certain social and cultural 
regularity (Giddens 1979: 50-51: Rapport and Overing 2000: 1). Weber addressed the 
agency-structure relation differently by arguing for the primacy of agency over 
structures, i.e. societies are products of individual actions (Callinicos 2004: 4). Thus, 
the Durkheimian structural model emphasises the structures’ potential of generating 
and determining the very nature of individual consciousness and character, so that 
‘individuals’ ‘acts’ are […] the manifestation of an institutional reality, and a set of 
structural relations’ (Rapport and Overing 2000: 2). The more agent-oriented 
Weberian model argues for the opposite by seeing the structures as abstractions, 
which the individuals create and which cannot define the actions of these individuals 
(Rapport and Overing 2000: 2-3). In this latter model one can recognise an attempt of 
finding individuals’ ability to act independently from structures or even going against 
them. Closely linked to this exercise is the coupling of agency with concepts like 
rationality, individual autonomy, wilful action and moral authority, which are all 
inherent in the humanistic notion of subject (Bilge 2010: 12, see also Davies 2000). 
 
2.1 Liberal construction of agency 
In the secular liberal understanding agency is usually understood as ‘the free exercise 
of self-willed behaviour’ (Mack 2003: 149) and it continues to be ‘closely linked to 
the transcendental humanist subject, a rational, free-willed, choosing agent’ (Bilge 
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2010: 12) that Weber implied in his theorisation. However, as Meyer and Jepperson 
have pointed out, this is largely a Western construct of agency; ‘[I]n the Western view 
of social life, humans have the capacity and responsibility to modify society and to 
intervene in lawful nature in order to reduce discrepancies between mundane realities 
and transcendentally charted goals’ (Meyer and Jepperson 2000: 102). Asad has noted 
that the origins of conceptualising agency this way can be traced to the old Protestant 
doctrine of individual responsibility that influenced thinkers like Locke: ‘individuals 
are agents because they are responsible for their own souls’ (Asad 1996a: 271; see 
also Meyer and Jepperson 2000). Asad continues his argument by seeing the concept 
of agency tied to capitalism that invokes ‘the mutually dependent figures of the 
entrepreneur and the consumer, or more abstractly, the functions of initiating and 
choosing. Liberalism has worked these figures into its individualist theories of politics 
and morality’ (Asad 1996a: 271). 
 
Social theory have been criticised for taking agency as face value around which other 
forms of social behaviour and organisations emerge (Meyer and Jepperson 2010: 100) 
while others have criticised it for the lack of discussion of the definition of agency 
itself and the attention is given to the process ‘how agency is produced or failed to 
develop or develops in the context of constraints (Mack 2003: 152), or it has been 
seen as being an ‘abstraction greatly underspecified, often misused, much fetishized 
by social scientists’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 37). 
 
2.2 Liberal feminists and autonomy 
The inclusion of women’s agency and their agentic capabilities is a relatively new 
development (Meyer and Jepperson 2000: 104) and as such agency has become a key 
concern for emancipatory politics especially in feminist studies, which have gone to 
great distances to account for women’s agency in male-dominated social theory 
(Bilge 2010: 12). Autonomy and free will have emerged almost as a synonym for 
agency in feminist studies and have influenced the focus of agency theorisation 
among feminist scholars. While autonomy is understood as ‘an individual matter, 
involving the exercise of choice, the satisfaction of individual preferences, and the 
capacity for rational self-government (Mack 2003: 151), a subject’s ability to act 
according to her best interests or resist relations of domination even in contexts when 
she is subject to external power is a proof of her unconstrained free will. In other 
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words, there is a tendency to bind women’s agency to the teleology of emancipation 
and as MacKinnon has suggested  ‘the conviction that agency is or should be “most 
one’s own” is not the result of a natural essence but is a feminist belief about human 
fulfilment’ (MacKinnon quoted in Gardiner 1995: 13). 
 
The model of agency that emerges from this scholarship is a liberatory one, 
individualised and emancipatory-orientated. However, when we are trying to address 
women who identify with conservative cultures or traditions and take them as ‘the 
real thing’ – meaning that the norms of a tradition are constitutive of the subject and 
something that the subject aspires to – we are left with no tools to understand and 
explicate these alternative subjectivities. 
 
Furthermore, as Zine has argued, in the post 9/11 political environment it is becoming 
more and more challenging to Muslim women to be recognised as they are and not as 
something they are imagined because ‘the legitimate articulations of the category 
“female” have been discursively drawn and mapped in ways that privilege a particular 
construction of womanhood based on Western, liberal, secular notions’ (Zine 2004: 
167). In the current global discourse on Muslim women, questions of Muslim 
women’s status have centred around two interrelated issues: the veil and the extent of 
women’s public participation in their societies (see for example Abu-Lughod 2006; 
Afshar 2008; Bilge 2010; Hoodfar 1993; Khiabany and Williamson 2008; 
Mookherjee 2005). The fact that these two issues are connected in the Western 
imagination is due, on the one hand, to the persistence of Orientalist assumptions 
about veiling and its power to limit women’s entry to the public sphere and, on the 
other hand, to the liberal feminist postulation that women’s equal standing in society 
is enacted through their public participation (see Abu-Lughod 2002; El Guindi 1999). 
 
3.0 Feminist readings of agency in Iran 
3.1 First wave literature 
The first wave feminist studies (circa 1980-1990) that focused on Iranian women in 
the newly organised Islamic Republic were faced with a tricky research subject. On 
the one hand, Iranian women had succeeded in carving out a space to practice their 
agency in patriarchal society, i.e. in the 1979 Revolution, but, on the other hand, they 
were concurrently helping to consolidate and institutionalise the very structures of a 
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conservative tradition that oppressed them. Thus many secular feminists struggled to 
address this contradiction. Several studies relied on the ‘subordination and false 
consciousness’ thesis and scholars argued that women’s loyalty to the new state or 
participation in Islamic practices was either coerced or simply a result of a false 
consciousness (see for example Afshar 1981; 1982; 1984; 1985; Azari 1983a, 1983b; 
Ferdows 1983; Nashat 1980; 1983; Tabari 1980; 1982; 1985; 1986; Yeganeh 1982). 
Many scholars singled out women’s veiling as a practice that affects women’s 
capacity to exercise their agency. Following this, women, who did not object to the 
state-enforced veiling and thus did not identify with the secular-liberal feminist 
definition of the autonomous and empowered feminine subject, were quite often 
dismissed as devoid of agency.  
 
This type of academic thinking displaced religious subjects from the realm of agency 
through a syllogism: agency involves free will; no woman freely chooses to submit 
herself to a tradition that subordinates her; thus religious women have no agency (see 
Badinter in Mookherjee 2005: 33). As Mookherjee notes, feminists have had a 
tendency to disparage Muslim values – such as female restraint, modesty and 
seclusion – because for them these seem to oppose the sanctity of personal autonomy 
(Mookherjee 2005: 33). This paints a picture in which a person’s autonomy does not 
depend on the choices she makes but also on the content of these choices. This, 
according to Mookherjee, reflects feminists’ universal concern about the risk of 
women’s subordination within their cultures (Mookherjee 2005: 33.). 
 
The first-wave literature on women’s agency had a tendency to overemphasise agents 
who shared a similar agency – a secular liberal one with a drive for emancipation – 
with the researcher. This reiteration of especially pious Iranian women as the Other 
led to a situation where many Iranian women were forced to invest a considerable 
amount of time and energy in convincing researchers that they are active and equally 
respected actors. 
 
3.2 Second wave literature 
In the mid-1990s a more multifaceted analysis of gender and agency began to emerge 
and many scholars identified themselves as postcolonial feminists or expanded their 
concepts of agency by drawing on subaltern studies (see for example Afkhami et al. 
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1994; Afshar 1995; 1996; 1997; Hoodfar 1994; 1996; Bayat 1996; 1997; 2007; 2010; 
Kian-Thiébaut 1995; 1997; 2002; 2005; Najmabadi 1998c; Torab 1996; 2007). 
Scholars built on women’s real experiences in Iran and began to examine the 
operations of women who were able to practice their agency within structures of 
subordination such as patriarchy and religion. Since then the focus has been on 
women’s strategic use of these structures and how women employ them to further 
their social, economic or political objectives. In the 2000s several scholars have 
investigated how women, and especially younger generations, have crafted space in 
their everyday lives to exercise both political and social agency (see for example 
Amir-Ebrahimi 2008; Honarbin-Holliday 2009; 2012; Mir-Hosseini and Longinotto 
1998; Nooshin 2008; 2011; Osanloo 2009; Sadeghi 2008a; 2008b; Farid Shirazi 
2012). Thus, instead of seeing the Islamic Republic and patriarchal society simply as 
mechanisms for controlling people and women in particular, feminists have examined 
how the Islamic Republic could offer novel possibilities for women to practice their 
agency. 
 
In what follows, I trace two different ways of conceptualising Iranian women’s 
agency that have dominated the studies since the late 1990s and have also influenced 
my own thinking at the earlier stages of my research. The first one is located in the 
‘everyday resistance’ approach and which, in the Iranian case, has been used for 
example by Pardis Mahdavi; the second example draws on the works of Elaheh 
Rostami-Povey and Shahla Haeri who have focused on how women’s political agency 
has emerged in Iran and how women’s political activism takes place within the 
patriarchal culture but how they are, at the same time, able to exert pressure within it. 
After this section, I will turn to examine an alternative way of conceptualising 
women’s agency by drawing on the insights of the Butlerian model of non-liberatory 
agent used by Mahmood, which will hopefully shed light on women’s agencies that 
are not located in secular-liberal contexts. 
 
3.2.1 Agency and everyday politics in Iran 
Mahdavi’s work follows Asef Bayat’s studies on ‘everyday resistance’ that Bayat 
introduced to the study of Iranian women in the 1990s (Mahdavi, P. 2009a; 2009b; 
Bayat 1996; 1997; 2007; 2010). Mahdavi has studied young Iranian women and in 
particular women’s agency in post-revolutionary Iran. In her eloquent anthropological 
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work on women’s everyday practices as forms of resistance she has given a voice to a 
largely ignored majority in Iran, namely the generation that was born after the 
revolution but is now the largest demographic group in the country. Mahdavi 
conducted her fieldwork among urban Tehranis whose fashions, mores and sexual 
practices, she contends, should be regarded as a serious form of political protest 
against the Islamic Republic (Mahdavi, P. 2009a).  
 
Through her detailed ethnography on young women’s behaviour, Mahdavi proposes 
that in the Islamic Republic, where sexuality and its related functions such as dress 
code and mores are officially regulated, women use these practices as a space where 
they can express themselves and resist the authorities and patriarchal culture. The 
Islamic Republic controls peoples’ appearances and ideologies but, according to 
Mahdavi, young women have been able to create a subordinate discourse, which 
through their fashion and rebellion in sexual practices, articulates their resistance to 
the state. Mahdavi argues that the Islamic rituals – like dress code – that play a central 
role in the state’s effort to formulate proper Islamic subjects, are actually subverted by 
many young women ‘in an attempt to reclaim them [Islamic rituals] as well as their 
own agency and citizenship, vis-à-vis the state’ and as such ‘their sense of style, 
comportment, and outward appearance is linked to their agency, resistance, and sense 
of self and citizenship (Mahdavi, P. 2009a: 8, 107). Mahdavi’s examples include for 
instance badhejab, an incorrectly worn head cover that often shows strands of hair. 
Furthermore, by challenging these rituals, women feel that they have the power to 
change the system and ‘this power gives them a sense of agency and citizenship’ 
(Mahdavi, P. 2009a: 122). Said differently, Mahdavi argues that women’s body, 
morality and sexuality, which are officially controlled by the state and men, actually 
work as mediums to assert their individuality and resistance against patriarchal culture 
and its enforced conservative moral code. For scholars like Mahdavi, agency is 
located in acts of resistance that take place against relations of domination, such as 
patriarchy, and it can be employed even by women who do not have access to the 
political sphere of influence (see among others; Gerami and Lehnerer 2001; Faegheh 
Shirazi 2001). 
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3.2.2 Claiming political agency in post-revolutionary Iran 
Elaheh Rostami-Povey (and her work under the pen-name Maryam Poya) and Shahla 
Haeri have examined women’s political agency with regard to Iran’s democratisation 
process and have noted that women and their agencies are integral to the project both 
at the state level and in civil society. Rostami-Povey has conducted fieldwork among 
both rural and urban women but her more recent work has focused on middle class 
and elite women (see Poya 1999; Rostami-Povey 2001; 2004). Haeri on her part has 
focused on women involved in formal politics (Haeri 2001; 2009).   
 
Rostami-Povey, together with Haeri, contends that women’s agency and their sense of 
feminist consciousness have emerged as a result of certain socio-economic and 
political contradictions13  that have taken place within the Islamic state and its 
institutions (Rostami-Povey 2001, Haeri 2009). Rostami-Povey’s work has examined 
elite women’s agency in the indigenous democratisation project and her detailed 
fieldwork demonstrates how women’s agency in institutions such as religion, media, 
legal-sphere and politics has shaped these institutions and initiated internal reform 
that, in turn, has facilitated more equal gender policies and relations in Iran. Rostami-
Povey proposes, and Haeri’s argument is similar, that through the involvement in the 
various above mentioned institutions and ‘despite the strict social rules, conventions 
and structural limitations’ women are social actors who are able to ‘challenge gender 
construction and behavioural conformity dictated by the state and other institutions’ 
(Rostami-Povey 2001: 44, see also Haeri 2009:127). Both scholars see women’s 
agency being enacted in the public and political sphere where women have been able 
to use the very structures, or incongruities within the structures, to exert pressure on 
the Islamic state, which in turn has increased women’s feminist consciousness and 
built their agency stronger through their involvement in the public sphere as MPs, 
journalists, and so on. 
 
3.3 Not talking back? 
The above mentioned works and many others with their eloquent and detailed studies 
about Iranian women’s agency have broaden and complicated our understanding of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Rostami-Povey singles out, for instance, the enforcement of hejab, sex-segregation and the 
war with Iraq (1980-1988) that opened doors for women’s legally sanctioned public presence 
and politicised many women to demand their rights from the late 1980s onwards. 
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the lives of women living in post-revolutionary Iran (see for example Mir-Hosseini 
1993; 1996; 1998; 1999; 2007; Kian 1995; 1997; Kian-Thiébaut 2002; 2005; 
Moghadam 2003; 2011; Moallem 2005; Sedghi 2007; Afary 2009; Moghadam and 
Gheytanchi 2010). However, in the course of my own fieldwork I began to feel 
uncomfortable with the models of agency that I had previously deployed in my 
research to understand women’s agency in the Iranian women’s movement. Women 
who I interviewed did not talk back to the models I had in my mind. The model that 
emerges from the works above is one in which agency continues to be understood in 
terms of subordination and subversion. However, the form of agency I encountered 
either in the field or in my later discussions with Iranian women could not be boxed 
into that one model. Surely, resistance was present in some of the activities that 
women carried out but it was certainly not the only form of agency that these women 
embraced. I realised that I had been ignorant (and even arrogant!) about the 
theoretical frameworks and concepts through which I tried to filter women’s 
experiences, arguments and worldviews. This forced me to rethink my own location 
and position to these women and how to move forward with my own thinking about 
women’s different modalities. The fact that women did not talk back to my ideas how 
to understand their activism reflected the need to revisit the models and notions of 
agency that have dominated the field and that had not necessarily validated the 
experiences of women who I met in the field.  
 
Yet, Mahdavi’s work has been helpful in tracing and recognising women’s actions 
that would not be necessarily seen carrying political messages by outsiders. Her work 
also makes locations other than formal avenues visible for political activism. While I 
am not denying the richness of women’s everyday resistance, I would contend, 
however, that one needs to be careful in presuming that there exists a universal need 
or desire among women to work against the prevailing norms or structures. Women’s 
participation in movements that are built on conservative ideologies continues to be, 
however, puzzling for both academics and non-academics. As Mahmood has 
eloquently argued: We should challenge  
‘the normative liberal assumptions about human nature […] such as the belief 
that all human beings  have an innate desire for freedom, that we all somehow 
seek to assert our autonomy when allowed to do so, that human agency 
primarily consists of acts that challenge social norms and not those that uphold 
them.’ (Mahmood 2005: 5) 
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Although the current scholarship has corrected and nuanced the previous scholarship 
that relied on the concept of ‘false consciousness’ to explain women’s participation in 
conservative religious movements, the normative agency that emerges from the 
literature on Iranian women is tied up almost solely with resistance. Mahmood 
explains:  
Even in instances when an explicit feminist agency is difficult to locate, there 
is a tendency among scholars to look for expressions and moments of 
resistance that may suggest a challenge to male domination. When women’s 
actions seem to reinsncribe what appear to be ‘instruments of their own 
oppression,’ the social analyst can point to moments of disruption of, and 
articulation of points of opposition to, male authority – moments that are 
located either in the interstices of a woman’s consciousness (often read as a 
nascent feminist consciousness), or in the objective effects of women’s 
actions, however unintended these may be (Mahmood 2005: 8, emphasis in 
the original). 
 
This reductionism produces an eviscerated notion of agency which ignores other 
configurations that women’s agency may take and even excludes social action 
involving ‘complicity with, accommodation to, or reinforcement of the status quo – 
sometimes all at the same time’ (Ahearn 2001: 55). For instance, Mahdavi recounts a 
story about a blogger who discusses hymen reconstructions, which are increasingly 
popular in bigger cities in Iran, and interprets this case to be one of the ways women 
have embraced resistance against the regime and its strict sexual code (Mahdavi, P. 
2007: 18). However, what she fails to do is to consider the context in which these 
women are made to undertake these surgical operations.14 This social context in Iran 
continues to be very much shaped by the male control of women’s sexuality and 
men’s (and women’s) conservative or traditional views on women’s purity and sexual 
passivity prior (or in) marriage. Thus, in studies like Mahdavi’s, women’s agency is 
seen possible even when it takes place ‘against the weight of custom, tradition, 
transcendental will, or other obstacles [whether individual or collective]’ (Mahmood 
2005: 8). Said differently, agency may develop in a context which structures, 
regulates and even subjugates the subject, but the subject is, nevertheless, able to 
operate within and resist these power relations according to her own interests. This 
reminded me of Abu-Lughod’s question: are we misattributing to women we study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For example, in many social circles, including the more liberal middle –and upper classes, 
men still assume their bride to be virgin (Interview with Sarah, Tehran, April 2010).  
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‘forms of consciousness or politics that are not part of their experience – something 
like a feminist consciousness or feminist politics?’ (Abu-Lughod 1990: 47). As 
Mahmood wants to connote, there is a need to be careful with the concept of 
resistance, which seems to ‘impose a teleology of progressive politics on the analytics 
of power’ and which leaves out many other ways of being that are not considered in 
the framework that focuses on the subversion of norms and structures (Mahmood 
2005: 9).  
 
I am also indebted to the works of Rostami-Povey and Haeri, which have shown how 
Iranian women’s agency inheres and operates in the public sphere. However, what is 
present in these works is the tendency to reduce agency to one’s ability to work 
against structures. Although both scholars have engaged with Islamic feminists, 
practices of piety continue to be interpreted as means to secure gains other than 
religious/pious/moral in the political or economic spheres. The slippery slope here is 
to translate women’s activism and women’s re-interpretations of Islamic texts used in 
gender activism as always ‘feminist’ and not recognising piety as a form of agency in 
and of itself. As Avishai has argued, when religion enters feminist analyses, women’s 
adherence to or employment of religion is often interpreted as women’s strategic use 
of religion to meet ‘extra-religious ends such as economic opportunities, domestic 
relations and political ideologies and cultural affiliation,’ which in turn, locates 
women’s agency ‘in the strategic use and navigation of religious traditions and 
practices to meet the demands of contemporary life’ (Avishai 2008: 411). However, 
scholars like Mahmood and Hollywood are pushing questions about women’s 
feminist inclinations aside and are focusing on explicating how the women in their 
works are enacting their piousness in their contemporary lives either in modern Egypt 
(Mahmood) or the Middle Ages (Hollywood) and not how these religious practices 
could be qualified as feminist (see Hollywood 2004; Mahmood 2005). 
 
From the brief discussion above it becomes clear that the question of pious or moral 
agency has been an issue within Iranian feminist studies. Thus, pious women’s 
activism and their re-interpretations of Islamic texts used in gender activism are often 
translated into feminist politics and piousness is not recognised as a form of agency in 
and of itself but as a strategic use of theological language to mask women’s own 
agency (Hollywood 2004: 516). In short, in this type of analysis questions of piety 
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and religion that may have shaped and driven women’s choices are often ignored. By 
ignoring questions of piety, morality or religiousness and ‘translating’ women’s 
actions into a more comprehendible secular/rational choice language that resonates 
with the researcher and his/her audience, I think we are leaving at least some 
women’s real motivations behind. I am not denying that, for instance, the state-
imposed veiling is an issue to many women in Iran nor I am not denying that there 
have been several cases in which wearing badhejab has carried messages of political 
resistance (the most recent example could be the Green Movement demonstrations 
where women wore green veils to show their support to the presidential candidates 
Mousavi and Karroubi). However, I suggest that there is a need to question our urge 
to turn everyone into a ‘rational-choice-orientated dissident’ and interrogate different 
understandings of agency, autonomy and see beyond the resistance paradigm and see 
that there are ‘ends other than those of emancipation’ (Hollywood 2004: 528).  
 
4.0 Poststructuralist challenge 
Within feminists, poststructuralists have questioned and dismantled the humanist 
notion of morally and politically autonomous subject that has dominated feminist 
projects. As Glegg has noted, this deconstruction of the humanist subject took place 
historically with the emergence of new political subjects that organised movements 
around gender, sexual identity, race and other oppressions (Glegg 2006: 313). Part of 
the deconstruction project is to call in question the validity of researchers’ hegemonic 
explanatory and descriptive categories that may not resonate with the ‘nonhegemonic’ 
subject studied. Said differently, scholars have recognised the need to hear the 
‘othered’ subject’s voice and validate subjects’ experiences with concepts and 
categories that are meaningful to subjects themselves. But first and foremost 
poststructuralists have set out to dismantle the rational, self-authorising, morally 
autonomous and free-willed agent and have instead argued that ‘human subjectivity is 
constructed by ideology (Althusser), language (Lacan), or discourse (Foucault), [thus] 
any action performed by that subject must also be to some extent a consequence of 
those things’ (Ashcroft et al 2000: 8). Hence, the individual becomes part of a larger 
discursive structure – which may be political, religious, social or philosophical – that 
is constructive in subject formation.  
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Poststructuralist feminist view of the subject has been criticised for undermining 
feminist politics and projects and for almost denying or dismantling the feminist 
agency (see for instance Moghissi 1999a). Critics contend that poststructuralists have 
made it almost inconceivable that ‘anyone could criticize, resist, or act to change their 
society’ (Fraser 1995: 66). However, as Butler responds,  
‘We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is 
necessary in order to safeguard the agency of the subject. But to claim that the 
subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined: on the contrary, the 
constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency’ 
(Butler 1995: 46).  
 
Most pertinent for my purposes in this thesis is the way in which poststructuralism 
opens up a venue that will challenge one to rethink agency as pre-fixed and locked in 
progressive politics. The poststructuralist approach pushes one to explicate the 
structures and norms through which particular subjects are enacted and which, in turn, 
elicits different forms of modalities. 
 
4.1 Talking back? 
As has already been sketched above, Mahmood’s work on the Egyptian urban 
women’s piety movement has offered an alternative way to explicate women’s moral-
ethical agencies and subjectivities within a conservative tradition (Mahmood 2001; 
2005a). In her Politics of Piety Mahmood develops her theory of embodied agency 
with the help of women who participate in Egyptian mosque movements. These 
women are actively involved in groups that teach and debate about Islam and its 
teachings and Mahmood shows how these women practice religion, aspire to its 
teachings and by extension affect their society and political environment around them. 
Mahmood’s work on the women’s piety movement could be read as a case of 
women’s feminist intervention in a male dominated institution because women’s 
presence placed them in conflict with several structures of authority; however, 
Mahmood insists that her ethnographic account of the movement has pointed to the 
limitations of liberal feminist theories that have proved inadequate when applied to 
women whose conceptions of self are formed by non-liberal traditions (Mahmood 
2005: 15). Thus, Mahmood’s ethnography of the mosque movement is also a critique 
of the epistemological conditions under which Muslim women have been studied in 
the past (see Bautista 2008). Following this, Mahmood’s work builds on 
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poststructural feminist studies but also departs from it and challenges us to rethink the 
concept of agency itself and uncouple it from progressive politics.  
 
For Mahmood, this coupling of agency with resistance is problematic. She argues that 
if the ability to change the world is dependent on historical and cultural context, then 
the meaning of agency should not be fixed in advance. For instance, what may be 
described as passivity and docility by progressive feminists could actually be a form 
of agency by which specific discourses and structures have enacted. If understood in 
this way, we can broaden the concept of agency from resistance to inhabiting norms 
(Mahmood 2005a: 14-15, emphasis in the original). Hence, Mahmood is asking us to 
see that there are more than the two dominant ways to understand agency; i.e. women 
are repressed by norms/structures or they have found ways to destabilise them. 
According to Mahmood, norms can be something that subjects aspire to, desire to and 
even wish to submit to.  Further, Mahmood seeks to rethink the concept of individual 
freedom and asks researchers to adapt their work to varying historical, social and 
political contexts where the distinction between ‘the subject’s own desires and 
socially prescribed performances cannot be easily presumed, and where submission to 
certain forms of (external) authority is a condition for achieving the subject’s 
potentiality’ (Mahmood 2005a: 31). 
 
Mahmood also argues for a rejection of feminist theory’s ‘dual character as both an 
analytical and a politically prescriptive project’ (Mahmood 2005a: 10, emphasis in 
the original). Thus feminism is offering both the diagnosis of women’s situation 
(subordination and marginalisation) and the prescription for altering women’s 
subordinate status. Mahmood is not suggesting that we should not be critical of 
practices, traditions or institutions that we regard unjust or oppressive but rather she is 
implying that we should  
‘leave open the possibility that our political and analytical certainties might be 
transformed in the process  of exploring nonliberal movements of the kind I 
studied, that the lives of the women with whom I worked might have 
something to teach us’ (Mahmood 2005a: 39).15 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Several feminists have questioned the feminist value of Mahmood’s work; see for example 
more recent criticism Sindre Bangstad (2011). ‘Saba Mahmood and Anthropological 
Feminism After Virtue’, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 28 (3): 28-54; Lene Sjørup and 
Hida Rømer Christensen (Eds.), ‘Pieties and Gender’ (Leiden, Brill, 2009) 
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Thus, instead of making particular political judgements about women participating in 
conservative traditions or movements, we should understand that there is a need to 
move beyond our own experiences and standpoints so that we can learn something 
new and meaningful. 
 
4.2 Butlerian non-liberatory subject 
Mahmood builds her work on Butler’s theorisation about agency, which has widened 
debates about agency within poststructuralist feminist circles (see for criticism Bordo 
2003 (1993); Benhabib et al. 1995; and Fraser’s (1995) examination of Butler and 
Benhabib’s differences). Butler has developed her theory on Foucault’s works on 
power and subjectivication and on the Lacanian tradition in psychoanalysis. 
Foucault’s understanding of power as repressive and productive at the same time and 
the creation of agentive self through power relations, which in themselves not only 
enable the subject’s subordination but also enact the subject to self-authorise herself 
have formed the basis for Butler’s, and later Mahmood’s, theorisation (Foucault 1980; 
Butler 1989; Mahmood 2001; 2005). As Mahmood explains, the Foucauldian 
understanding of power and subject formation broadens our horizons as it ‘encourages 
us to conceptualise agency not simply as a synonym for resistance to relations of 
domination, but as capacity for action that specific relations of subordination create 
and enable’ (Mahmood 2005: 18, emphasis in the original).  
 
Butler’s argument proceeds from the Foucauldian subject formation, when she 
contends that the concept of agency that draws on an ‘epistemological account of 
identity’ should be shifted to one that locates the problematic within practices of 
signification (Butler 2003: 49). Butler challenges the feminist scholarship to reassess 
how independent we are from social norms as, according to her, our agencies are 
formed and enacted by them: 
Even within the theories that maintain a highly qualified or situated subject, 
the subject still encounters its discursively constituted environment in an 
oppositional epistemological frame. The culturally enmired subject negotiates 
its constructions, even when those constructions are the very predicates of its 
own identity (Butler 2003: 48) 
 
Once Butler has located agency ‘within the meaning making process, within the 
possibility of variation in signification’, the question that she asks is ‘how 
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signification and resignification work?’ (Butler 2006: 197). Butler draws on Derrida 
when she replies to herself by arguing that subjects are produced and interpolated 
through language but for her, the subject is also constantly performative through a 
reiterated enactment of regulatory norms (1997a: 51). 
 
For Butler, performativity is an intrinsic element of her theory of subject formation 
and as she writes: 
The performative is not a singular act used by an already established subject, 
but one of the powerful and insidious ways in which subjects are called into 
social being from diffuse social quarters, inaugurated into sociality by a 
variety of diffuse and powerful interpellations. In this sense the social 
performative is a crucial part not only of subject formation, but of the ongoing 
political contestation and reformulation of the subject as well. The 
performative is not only a ritual practice: it is one of the influential rituals by 
which subjects are formed and reformulated (Butler 1997a: 160). 
 
Moreover, for Butler performativity ‘consists in a reiteration of norms which precede, 
constrain, and exceed the performer and in that sense cannot be taken as the 
fabrication of the performer’s ‘will’ or ‘choice’’ (Butler 1993b: 234). However, the 
criticism that Butler has received from her emphasis on linguistics made her address 
the materiality of the body (Butler 1993a: ix-x). Butler understands subjects 
constituted not only through speech acts but also through the subject’s bodily 
practices (see Butler 2006 (1990); 1993a; 1997a). When Butler moves on to discuss 
the materiality of the body, she draws on and critiques Bourdieu’s notion of habitus16 
(Butler 1997a, see chapter 4, emphasis in the original). Butler contends that habitus is 
something that emerges over time (thus it is formed) and its formation sustains and 
enacts the subject herself and her belief in a given reality (thus it is also formative) 
(Butler 1997a: 152, 155). As Butler explains; ‘bodily habitus constitutes a tacit form 
of performativity, a citational chain lived and believed at the level of body’ (Butler 
1997a: 155). Thus for Butler, for example ‘the materiality of sex is constructed 
through a ritualized repetition of norms’ (Butler 1993a: x). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In very basic terms, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus refers to corporal dispositions and 
cognitive templates that together create a society’s social structure (e.g. values, norms, 
language, etc.), which however, is dependent on the collective history, which means that 
habitus is tied to time and place (see Anthony King (2000) ‘Thinking with Bourdieu Against 
Bourdieu: A ‘Practical’ Critique of the Habitus’, Sociological Theory, Vol. 18 (3): 417-433  
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With the help of psychoanalysis, Butler further explains subject formation by 
employing two concepts from Lacan, namely “foreclosure” and “abjection” (Butler 
1993: 3). Butler contends that the subject is formed through ‘the simultaneous 
production of a domain of abject beings […] who form the constitutive outside to the 
domain of the subject’ (Butler 1993: 3). Thus, the subject repudiates and excludes 
certain identifications but which are, at the same time, constitutive and required for 
the subject’s self-hood and subject making. For Butler, foreclosure does not happen 
only once but needs to be repeated ‘to reconcile its power and efficacy […] and that 
what is reinvoked by its continued action is precisely that primary scene in which the 
formation of the subject is tied to the circumscribed production of the unspeakable’ 
(Butler 1997: 139). 
  
Mahmood’s own work is indebted to Butler’s critique of the humanist conception of 
agency and subjectivity. Most importantly for Mahmood, is Butler’s departure from 
the ‘emancipatory model of agency’ that continues to dominate feminist politics and 
which Mahmood herself wishes to dehegemonise. For Butler, agency is located within 
power relations; as she explains: agency ‘cannot disavow power as the condition of its 
own possibility’ (Butler 2006: xxv). However, Butler also introduces temporality to 
the thinking of social formations of which agency is one (Butler 1997b: 13), as she 
clarifies: 
‘No social formation can endure without becoming reinstated, and that very 
reinstatement puts the “structure” in question at risk, [this] suggest[s] that the 
possibility of its own undoing is at once the condition of possibility of 
structure itself’ (Butler 1997b: 14). 
 
In other words, Butler uses performativity also in her conception of agency and 
argues that all social formation, including agency, are results of iteration of norms, 
however, these reiterated enactments of norms are fragile in ‘the very operation of 
their iterability’ and are hence open to their own collapse (Butler 1997b: 14). As 
Allen has explained: ‘[T]he very fact that it is necessary for norms to be reiterated or 
cited by individuals in order for them to maintain their efficacy indicates that we are 
never completely determined by them. […] If we were completely determined by 
gender norms, there would be no need for us to continually cite and reiterate them; 
that we are continually compelled to do so gives us good reason for thinking that we 
	   59	  
are not so determined’ (Allen 1998: 462). Butler clarifies her position in the following 
quote on the forming of sex: 
Construction not only takes place in time, but is itself a temporal process 
which operates through the reiteration of norms; sex is both produced and 
destabilized in the course of this reiteration. As a sedimented effect of a 
reiterative or ritual practice, sex acquires its naturalized effect, and, yet, it is 
also by virtue of this reiteration that gaps and fissures are opened up as 
constitutive instabilities in such constructions, as that which escapes or 
exceeds the norm […]. This instability is the deconstituting possibility in the 
very process of repetition, the power that undoes the very effects by which 
‘sex’ is stabilized, the possibility to put the consolidation of the norms of ‘sex’ 
into a potentially productive crisis (Butler 2011: xviiii). 
 
This is where Mahmood decides to depart from Butler, however, mainly because 
Butler’s work should be understood in its ‘performative dimension’ specifically 
aimed at dismantling the ‘instruments of regulatory categories’ of gender and 
sexuality (Mahmood 2005: 21; Butler 2006b).  One key problem in Butler’s work for 
Mahmood is Butler’s development of agency in context in which the emphasis is on 
the resignification and subversion of norms (Mahmood 2005: 21). As Mahmood 
explains: 
‘[E]ven though Butler insists time and again that all acts of subversion are a 
product of the terms of violence that they seek to oppose, her analysis of 
agency often privileges those moments that “open possibilities for resignifying 
the terms of violation against their violating terms”’ [Butler 1993: 122]’ 
(Mahmood 2005: 21). 
 
Mahmood finds Butler’s analysis of power problematic because it remains locked in a 
framework in which ‘norms suppress and/or are subverted, are reiterated and/or 
resignified’ and as such the analysis of subject formation does not stretch beyond the 
registers of suppression and subversion and thus continues the resistance approach in 
feminist studies. Mahmood exemplifies her point by referring to Butler’s discussion 
of drag queens (see Butler 1993b) and how drag queens’ successful parodisation of 
heterosexual norms reveals the vulnerability of those imitated heterosexual norms. 
However, when the mosque participants in Mahmood’s study succeed in cultivating 
and practicing the norms/virtues – like modesty – in the required manner, their 
success in realising the ideal leads actually to strengthen the structure and not the 
opposite (see Mahmood 2005a: 164, and for more comprehensive elaboration chapter 
5).  
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Mahmood wishes to depart from the proclivity of ‘suppressing/subverting norms’ to 
explore how norms are inhabited, aspired to and consummated (Mahmood 2005a: 23). 
This requires, Mahmood argues, that one takes seriously Butler’s argument about 
norms being both constraining and constituting elements of one’s subjectivity. This, 
in turn, pushes one to examine the relationship between ‘the immanent form a 
normative act takes, the model of subjectivity it presupposes and the kinds of 
authority upon which such an act relies’ (Mahmood 2005a: 23). 
 
Another juncture where Mahmood wishes to modify her theory from Butler’s is the 
emphasis that Mahmood puts on corporeality. Mahmood does not disagree with 
Butler’s understanding of how subjects are produced and interpolated through 
language but for Mahmood’s purposes it is inadequate. The emphasis on linguistics 
does not, at least not for Mahmood, help one to understand that the body is not simply 
a sign of the self but also a means to its formation (Mahmood 2005a: 166). Said 
differently, whereas the women involved in Mahmood’s study employ their bodies to 
enact the self and moreover to cultivate and develop more virtuoso selves, for Butler 
the body is a sign of what language has authorised. For instance, in her discussion of 
female modesty and veiling Mahmood demonstrates how veiling is not merely 
assigning one’s Islamic identity but rather a necessary component of this particular 
virtue as it not only assists women to express their modesty but also to acquire and 
embody modesty. 
 
Lastly, Mahmood’s understanding of the body as a medium for realising the self 
raises questions about how norms might be subverted if the body is at the center of 
analysis. In the case of Mahmood’s study, women’s observance and subversion of 
norms are both dependent on the body, meaning that the body has to be taught to both 
observe and/or resist norms. Whereas for Butler, the destabilisation of 
norms/structures lies in the reiterative nature of these norms, for Mahmood the simple 
act of resignifiying of norms is not enough to reform the meaning of a 
tradition/practise/norm like veiling. In Mahmood’s argument, to change or reform a 
norm, one has to take into account how the subject has embodied the norm and how 
the norm is also constitutive of the self. 
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4.4 Moral-ethical subject formation 
Mahmood explores Foucauldian ‘positive conception of ethics’ – drawing on the 
Aristotelian tradition of ethics and in contrast to the Kantian tradition – which enables 
us to think of ethics as ‘always local and particular, pertaining to a specific set of 
procedures, techniques, and discourses through which highly specific ethical-moral 
subjects come to be formed’ (Mahmood 2005a: 28). This Foucauldian approach to 
ethics allows one to understand agency in terms of an individual’s capacities and 
skills that are required to transform the subject to a particular being within a particular 
moral discourse. As noted above, an important dimension of Mahmood’s argument is 
Foucault’s view on the subject, which is not voluntaristic or autonomous, but is rather 
formed within historically and culturally specific disciplines – what Foucault 
characterises as “modes of subjectivication”’ (Mahmood 2005: 28). For Foucault, 
subjectivity is enacted by power that ‘applies itself to immediate everyday life which 
categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his 
own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize’ (Foucault 
1982: 781). Thus, subjectivity in the Foucauldian terms is not, as Mahmood points 
out, ‘a private space of self-cultivation’ but as an affect of power that constitutes the 
individual. For Mahmood’s purpose – which is to look at agency in terms of the 
capacities and skills needed to embark upon moral actions – Foucault’s concept of 
‘moral subjectivation’ is useful. Foucault’s ‘moral subjectivation’ denotes the models 
available ‘for setting up and developing relationships with the self, for self-reflection, 
self-knowledge, self-examination, for the decipherment of the self by oneself, for the 
transformations that one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object (Foucault quoted 
in Mahmood 2005: 28).  
 
For Foucault, these practices that the subject performs to meet the object of his moral 
code are essentially a way to the subject’s self-formation (Bernauer and Mahon 2005: 
151). These practices or activities that subjects undertake in order to recognise 
themselves as ethical subjects involve both corporeal and mental exercises (Mahmood 
2005: 29). As Foucault explains: ethical subject formation is the process ‘in which the 
individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, 
defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain 
mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to act upon 
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himself, to monitor, to test, improve and transform himself’ (Foucault quoted in 
Bernauer and Mahon 2005: 152-153).  
 
The Butlerian-Foucauldian framework that Mahmood develops in order to revisit the 
normative agency and subjectivity in feminist studies is an important step for feminist 
studies. The challenge not to think agency as something pre-fixed on the 
submission/subversion model pushes us to explore different modalities and how 
agencies are grounded in norms. Further, when we disengage agency and subjectivity 
from the liberatory–model we are pushed to interrogate them in their own particular 
context. In this way, we may notice that the capacity to shape and effect world does 
not take place only through resistance against norms/structures but by living, desiring 
and aspiring to norms. Mahmood has been criticised for ‘othering’ Muslim women 
with her account of agency and even endorsing patriarchal traditions. However, 
Mahmood does not refrain from criticising patriarchal traditions that are harmful for 
women; but she argues against fixing definitions in advance. I would contend that she 
has challenged feminists to rethink their positions to the subjects they study, and 
moreover, the theoretical assumptions about human nature, agency and subjectivity 
that underlie their works. Mahmood’s re-opening of the concept of agency allows one 
to explicate how women’s specific lives, experiences and locations would not be 
validated if we stayed locked in the resistance-subversion framework, as she explains: 
[M]y suggestion is that we leave open the possibility that our political and 
analytical certainties might be transformed in the process of exploring 
nonliberal movements […] that the lives of the women with whom I worked 
might have something to teach us beyond what we can learn from the 
circumscribed social-scientific exercise of “understanding and translation” 
(Mahmood 2005: 39). 
 
5.0 Piety going public: from individual to public piety and gender activism 
5.1 Individual piousness 
The above framework that Mahmood proposes to complicate the study of pious 
women activists is helpful in many aspects. The women who were involved in my 
study practiced religion very much like the women in Mahmood’s work. Many of the 
women involved in my study found that their personal faith was the source of their 
agency and selfhood. My interlocutors consumed religious rituals, such as prayer and 
veiling, to perform their individual piousness and build their moral-ethical agency in 
	   63	  
the private sphere. 17  They recognised their moral obligations through their 
relationship to God and reading the words of God. Moreover, cultivating their faith 
and the bodily functions of religion (such as the already mentioned veiling) were a 
means to reform their individual habits, desires, actions and interests until these 
would meet the requirements set by God. As Zahra, a teacher, explained: ‘I’m a 
believer and I wouldn’t be me without my religion. I practice and implement the 
teachings that God has given us, this is what constitutes me.’ (Zahra, Tehran, April 
2010) 
   
Many of the women emphasised that their actions, both in the private and the public, 
followed Islamic teachings of what is just and right. The women argued for the 
sanctity of the Sharia and the Quran that for them embody the justice and 
righteousness of their religion. These two sources formed the basis for women’s quest 
for equality and for their critique of the fegh that in their opinion is the source of 
unequal gender relations in contemporary Iranian society. However, I need to point 
out that many of the women did not only refer to Islam when they determined what 
was right or just. Personal experiences in their material environment played a central 
role in determining what women considered being right or just; for instance, the 
current socio-economic situation and how it affects gender relations in society 
characterised many of the conversations I had with women. This mixing implies, I 
suggest, that women followed not only the truth laid out by God but also their own 
individual moral guidelines that may have been influenced by women’s individual 
experiences and locations (for instance her socio-economic location) in society.  
 
While Iranian women’s individual pious agency is something that should be explored 
in more detail (see for exceptions: Bucar 2010; Osanloo 2009; Torab 1996; 2007,), 
my fieldwork and the women who I met during the fieldwork pushed me to explore 
women’s public piousness. My fieldwork results suggested that women’s gender 
activism in the public sphere was a constitutive element of their piousness. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Many of them also wanted to note that they would be performing their religious duties even 
if there were no Islamic Republic. 
	   64	  
5.2 Piety going public 
Although Mahmood’s work has been influential for my discussion and understanding 
of women’s agency, I have moved my analysis from the individual to the public and I 
explicate how for the women I encountered religiosity and piety were public 
practices. Yet, as already noted, we should not forget that private piousness was 
central to my interlocutors’ formation of moral selves; however, as my argument 
goes, we need to recognise that these women’s activism in the public sphere 
constituted an expression of and a way of cultivating their piety as well. As one of my 
interviewees Maryam, a NGO teacher, explained: 
‘My faith is what makes me the person I’m today and it’s the most important thing in 
my life. But why do I participate [in activism]? Because my duty as a good Muslim is 
to improve my society, I need to help people around me, I can improve their lives and 
futures and that’s what God teaches us too’ (Maryam, Tehran, March 2010). 
 
Several scholars have argued that we need to problematise the relationship between 
secularism/religiosity and public/private. These scholars have argued that the almost 
taken for granted notion of secular public sphere needs to be revisited and they have 
pointed to the role that religious institutions have played in the development of public 
spheres (Asad 1993; 1999; Bracke 2008; Braidotti 2008; van der Veer 1999; 2001). I 
have found Hirschkind’s work useful for the discussion. Hirschkind has argued for the 
role of moral discourses in creating the public sphere and shaping processes, values 
and ideals within it (Hirschkind 2001). Hirschkind’s work on Islamic publics sheds 
light on how cultivation of Islamic virtues by the al-da’wa movement in 
contemporary Egypt has created the ethical conditions for a domain of public 
deliberation and argumentation that can be seen as an attempt to establish the 
conditions for the practice of a particular kind of politics. As Hirschkind explains: 
‘Indeed, insomuch as the moral discourse that constitutes this domain is directed at 
the remaking of the practices and institutions of collective life in Egypt, it is 
fundamentally political’ (Hirschkind 2001: 5). One of the central points Hirschkind 
wishes to make is to push us recognise religious movements in the public sphere as 
more complicated than simply as renditions ‘of the normative structure of the public 
sphere’ (Hirschkind 2001: 26). If we fail to do this, Hirschknd argues, we may also 
fail to recognise the reformative capacity of political traditions other than liberal 
democracy: 
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‘To focus solely on the process through which the concepts and modular 
institutions of modern liberal democracy have been inflected by non-Western 
traditions is to fail to explore the often parallel projects of renewal and reform 
launched from within the conceptual and practical horizons of those traditions’ 
(Hirschkind 2001: 27). 
 
In my view Hirschkind’s argument explains not only the narrowness of our concepts 
of the public/private but it points to the paradox of modernity/tradition binary that 
limits our understanding of social and political change; we are leaving out movements 
and agendas that are not possible to analyse within such a narrow conceptualisation. 
By widening our conceptualisation of the public/private sphere distinction and 
challenging our view on what belongs to private and what to public sphere we are 
able to investigate forms of activism that have not traditionally been considered as 
having political effect. 
 
I have found Braidotti’s conceptualisation of agency helpful to address pious 
women’s public moral agency and subjectivity. Braidotti draws on Butlerian subject 
formation like Mahmood but also on a feminist tradition that has addressed the ethical 
and religious dimension of women’s lives. Following the ideas of Luce Irigaray, 
Elizabeth Schussler and Audre Lorde, Braidotti challenges secular-liberal feminists 
by arguing that ‘agency, or political subjectivity, can actually be conveyed through 
and supported by religious piety, and may even involve significant amounts of 
spirituality’ (Braidotti 2008: 2). However, Braidotti’s main challenge to liberal 
feminist scholarship is when she contends that ‘political agency need not be critical in 
the negative sense of oppositional and thus may not be aimed solely or primarily at 
the production of countersubjectivities’ (Braidotti 2008: 2). In converse, Braidotti’s 
analysis of agency allows one to explore subject’s daily practices and their dialogs 
and negotiations with dominant norms and she re-conceptualises political agency and 
subjectivity in terms ‘of multiple micro-political practices of daily activism or 
interventions in and on the world’ (Braidotti 2008: 16, 19).  
 
Lastly, I would like to include Braidotti’s concept ‘affirmative ethics’ in my 
discussion of public piety. I also want to include an anecdote from my fieldwork here. 
Many of the women who I interviewed were frustrated with secular women’s 
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dismissive attitude towards religious women and their activism. I have included 
Zahra’s comment here: 
‘I don’t understand why it is so difficult to understand that although I’m 
religious I can also be modern and progressive. Some think that being 
religious and modern are two different things, why? My passion is to improve 
women’s lives and that’s what I’m doing, despite the fact that I’m religious.’ 
(Zahra, Tehran, April 2010). 
 
Braidotti’s notion of ‘affirmative ethics’ seeks to affirm otherness instead of 
emphasising sameness. The idea of the ethical approach is ‘to increase one’s ability to 
enter into modes of relation with multiple others’ and thus create affirmative 
alternatives (Braidotti 2008: 16). Conditions for political agency in this formulation 
are ‘not tied to the present by negation; instead they are affirmative and geared to 
creating possible futures’ (Braidotti 2008: 16). Thus, instead of being biased against 
alternative agendas, worldviews and subjectivities, we may want to explore and 
affirm the possibilities that this otherness could create and offer. Consequently, 
otherness is not seen as an-already-failed platform for co-operation but as a means for 
opening up possibilities and avenues that were not visible before. 
  
With the help of Mahmood, Hirschkind and Braidotti, one can explicate and 
understand pious women activists and their experiences without divorcing them from 
their own specific context. Even more importantly, by including the public in the 
analysis, it is possible to see a wider picture of their piousness. Rather than 
invalidating their activism, experiencing and worldviews when they are being 
analysed within the binaries of subversion vs. submission and public/private one can 
now attend to women’s alternative ways of conducting their work and in addition 
appreciate their maybe differing views on social –and political order and change. 
 
5.3 Public piety as a religious duty 
As already noted, for the women who were involved in my research, piety was not 
confined solely to the individual/private but it was practiced and expressed also in the 
public sphere. More specifically, their moral agency was enacted and realised through 
their public activism aimed at reforming gender relations in Iranian society, which 
they saw as patriarchal deformations of true Islam. For them their private moral self is 
not disconnected from the public moral self but it are closely connected and they 
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reinforce and complete each other. Public virtues that women regarded as something 
to be encouraged and aspired to included among other qualities a good sense of 
justice and righteousness, civility, education, communal spirit and courage to act 
against injustices. Practicing and cultivating these virtues was essential for activists 
not only at the individual level but also at the public level when they wanted to 
establish their credibility among the people they worked with.  
 
If we go back to the quote from Maryam, we can see how she conceptualised her 
activism as a religious duty: ‘[B]ecause my duty as a good Muslim is to improve my 
society, I need to help people around me, I can improve their lives and futures and 
that’s what God teaches us too’ (Maryam, Tehran, March 2010). In her work on Shi’a 
women’s movement activists in Lebanon, Deeb noticed how gender activism had 
developed itself into a new religious norm among women activists (Deeb 2009). Deeb 
observed how women’s entry to the public sphere has emerged as a new social norm 
for pious women. The women in her study had institutionalised forms of public 
activism, such as volunteering, as a social norm and over time incorporated it into 
their normative moral system (Deeb 2005). Similar development was taking place 
among the women who I encountered in Tehran. 
 
Through their activism, these women were seeking to mobilise other women to 
participate in the public sphere and even in politics and spread gender awareness 
among both women and men that would eventually incite legal, societal and political 
change at large. How women pursued gender activism varied. For some women 
gender activism was embedded into their everyday lives and in their interaction with 
other people, for others it built on their participation in NGOs, community work, and 
so on. For instance, Nassim, the director of her own NGO mentioned in the 
introduction, gender activism was not confined to her community work through her 
NGO but also demonstrated itself in her interaction with her daughter who she had 
tried to raise to gender awareness. For Nassim, her daughter negotiating the terms of 
her marriage and demanding equal pay at work were the most important achievements 
of her gender activism. 
 
While the central goal of these women was the promotion of a more true and 
egalitarian reading of gender relations and legal reforms, the women articulated 
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several other goals. One of these was the already mentioned demand for just and right 
socio-economic justice in society. My interlocutors had a strong sense of economic 
justice providing women (and men) with an equal access to labour market which, in 
turn, would grant people more equal opportunities in life, including better education, a 
possibility to marry and set up a family, buy a house/apartment, to name a few. 
Another objective that these women had was articulated, if not against, then towards 
the elite women and their discourse of women’s rights. Many of the women who I 
interviewed had grown uncomfortable with the elite classes’ women’s campaigns and 
the model of womanhood and societal change that they offered to Iranian women. The 
secularity that dominates the elite classes’ understanding of women’s rights was one 
of the problems that my interlocutors often voiced and they linked it (again) to the 
growing social and economic inequality in Iranian society. Secularity was often seen 
to materialise in individualism, self-interest and disconnectedness from ordinary 
women’s problems. Although the women found that there were several bridges to be 
crossed before they could find common ground with secular women, as Braidotti has 
argued about ‘affirmative ethics’, many of the women who I talked to, sought for 
engagement with the more secular women’s movement wing and saw both sides’ 
‘otherness’ as a resource or strength for gender advocacy. A related theme that 
emerged in the discussions was the meaning of progress/modernity. Women involved 
in my research wanted to demonstrate that, contrary to the ideas of many elite class 
women, pious women are modern, progressive, politically enlightened, educated and 
gender conscious. As Zahra’s quote above indicates, the women who took part in my 
study, saw that Islam is modern and not something that needs be modernised or 
changed to meet certain standards set from outside. This is not to argue that Islam is 
frozen in time or ahistorical but that Islam is similar to any social construct such as 
the West or Christianity. This can be seen as these women will to engage with the 
global discourse of victimised, passive and traditional Muslim woman who they could 
not identify with. Many of my interlocutors found that their work in gender activism 
was a proof that Iranians and Muslims are modern, civil and progressive and should 
thus be respected and heard at the global arena (see for similar findings Deeb 2009). 
Thus, gender advocacy for pious women was also about engaging in debates about 
modernity and how they relate to it in contemporary Iranian society. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
In this chapter I touched on the issue of agency in feminist studies, and in particular in 
the case of Iranian women, and I proposed that there are both theoretical and 
empirical reasons why we should leave the old subordination and submission model 
behind and explore alternative formations of agency. I argued that the agencies and 
subjectivities of pious women activists in Iran have been partly ignored by the 
previous scholarship on the Iranian women’s movement. I proposed that with the help 
of the post-structuralist feminist critique of the autonomous liberal humanist subject, 
it is possible to engage with the worldviews, experiences and activism of pious 
women’s activists. I have drawn heavily on Mahmood’s theory of the embodied 
agency but I also shifted my analysis from the private to the public. To this shift, the 
theoretical openings of Braidotti and Hirshckind about ethical political subjectivities 
and moral publics were helpful. 
 
In order to understand why pious women have largely been overwritten in the current 
scholarship, I briefly examined how agency has been theorised by Weber and 
Durkheim and how liberal-humanist conceptualisations of agency were developed 
later on. I noted that the inclusion of women to the theorisation of agency took place 
at much later stage and I also noted that in particular liberal feminists rely heavily on 
the liberal-humanist concept of agency as autonomous, free-willed and emancipatory 
orientated. 
 
I examined the works of Pardis Mahdavi, Elaheh Rostami-Povey and Shahla Haeri, 
all of which have been influential for my own work and thinking of agency. I am 
greatly indebted to all of these scholars but I also argued that there are some key 
problems with their accounts of agency. First of all, they all appear to couple 
women’s agency with progressive politics. Said differently, all women, by virtue of 
being women, seem to share a desire to free themselves of practices and structures, 
such as patriarchy or religion, that (supposedly) subordinate women. Secondly, 
women’s autonomous agency is seen possible even in a context that may regulate and 
even structure the subject, but the subject is, nevertheless, able to operate within and 
resist these power relations according to her own interests. Thirdly, I argued that there 
has been a tendency to ignore women’s religiousness or pious acts even when 
scholars have engaged with Islamic feminists. Women’s employment of religion or 
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piety in their public life is not recognised as a form of agency in and of itself but their 
employment of religion has been seen as a means to secure non-religious gains (e.g. 
political or economic) while their aim may have been to drive for better and just Islam 
unclouded by power politics and patriarchal distortions as my interviewees informed 
me. 
 
My suggestion was that we should also recognise alternative formations of agency, 
including pious and moral agencies that have been central to women’s understanding 
of self in the Iranian women’s movement. I proposed that this is possible with the 
help of Mahmood’s theorisation of moral-ethical agency that divorces women’s 
agency from progressive politics, which, in turn, allows us to engage with agencies 
other than resistance. Mahmood’s model allows one to explore alternative agencies 
that are not prefixed or prevalidated by our own worldviews or political positions. It 
also enables us to recognise that there are different ways of understanding concepts 
such as freedom, equality and gender. However, whereas Mahmood’s focus has been 
on the individual (although she has noted how these women affect change in their 
environment), I have moved my focus on the public and I suggested that women who 
were involved in my study constructed their piousness also in the public and their 
public activism was constitutive of their piousness. I find Braidotti’s ethical political 
subjectivity helpful to address this shift in my work. Most importantly her 
interpretation of ethical-political subjectivity and interventions in the public, which 
she insists do not have to be interpreted as oppositional and negative, were helpful for 
my work and this will be developed in the coming chapters. With the help of 
Mahmood and Braidotti, one is able to rethink and appreciate the lives and 
experiences of women who have found alternative ways to assert equality and whose 
agencies do not build on secular-liberal conceptions of autonomy and freedom. 	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CHAPTER 4: THE AXIS OF EVIL: CREATING MONSTERS AND CLEARING 
WOMEN FROM FORMAL POLITICS IN IRAN, 2002-2004 
 
1.0 Introduction 
On 29 January 2002, in his State of the Union Address President Bush opened a new 
front in the War on Terror. Three countries were included in the so-called ‘Axis of 
Evil.’ These three countries were Iran, Iraq and North Korea, which were now 
excluded from ‘us’ and named as threats to the American national security. This 
policy metaphor came to have far reaching consequences not only to global politics 
but also to ordinary people in the targeted countries. This chapter discusses how the 
Bush Administration’s interventionist policies rebutted Iran’s tentative diplomatic 
gestures aimed at improving relations between the two countries and eventually 
linked Iran to the War on Terror via the country’s inclusion in the Axis of Evil. The 
naming of Iran as one of the rogue states, campaigning for regime change, and 
excluding Iran from global politics hardened Iran’s foreign policy stance towards the 
US. As a result of the new international political environment, Iranian hardliners who 
had lost all the elections since the 1997 presidential elections gained more leverage in 
domestic politics and began to crawl back to the center of political life. The rise of 
this group resulted in nationalist-militaristic politics that can be seen mirroring the 
Bush Administration’s hypermasculinist game. By the summer 2005, the hardliners 
had taken over all the key political institutions including municipal councils, the 
Majles and the presidential seat. 
 
In the period 2002-2004, the hardliners’ attempt to establish their control over Iran’s 
body politic and society materialised in the de-liberalisation of the country’s political 
and social life and in a gradual state-repression. It is argued that, as a result of the 
Bush Administration’s campaign of regime change in Iran and singling out of 
women’s movement advocates in the country’s reform project, the hardliners in Iran 
were able to frame women’s movement advocates as ‘threats to national security’ and 
as such Iran’s women’s movement advocates were one of the first sectors to feel the 
hardliners’ backlash. The women’s movement’s repression was gradual. In the period 
2002-2004, the crack down targeted women in formal politics, particularly women 
MPs in the Majles. The clearing of high profile women’s movement supporters from 
formal politics was a systematic move by the hardliners in their effort to regain 
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control over the body politic and in determining the types of actors allowed to 
participate in the public sphere. For the women’s movement the clearing of their 
supporters from formal politics was detrimental: women’s movement advocates and 
women’s NGOs were left with no supporters in the higher echelons of the body 
politic to voice their needs and sponsor women friendly bills in the Majles. This 
effectively stifled the voices of women’s movement advocates and narrowed the 
contours of gender debate at the state level. In practice this period witnessed that, for 
instance, the bills that the Women’s Faction in the Majles had campaigned for never 
fully materialised or were increasingly blocked by political bodies overseen by the 
hardliners; the physical space for individual women MPs to endorse their agenda was 
narrowed by harassing and arresting them and finally, many high profile women’s 
movement advocates felt that they had no other option than to exit formal politics. As 
the following chapters will demonstrate, the hardliners’ crack down was later 
extended to civil society and even ordinary people were targeted.  
 
The first part of the chapter discusses the tentative détente that was taking place in the 
US-Iran relationship prior to and right after the attacks of 9/11. This section highlights 
the possible venues where the two countries were taking provisional steps toward re-
establishing their diplomatic relationship; however, and as the chapter shows, these 
provisional steps did not go far enough and eventually materialised in another missed 
opportunity to improve the countries’ relationship. After this section, the chapter 
moves on to explicate how the Bush Administration crafted the Iranian regime as 
another post-9/11 Monster previously incarnated in Osama bin Laden and the al-
Qaida. This role was strengthened in July 2002, when President Bush quite openly 
declared that he supported regime change in Iran. This section also highlights how 
Iranian women’s movement activists were interwoven into the War on Terror 
narrative. In the July statement, the Bush Administration stated its support to human 
rights activists, including women’s movement activists, whom the Administration 
interpreted as working against the current regime in Iran. However, the 
Administration only managed to given another excuse for the hardliners in Tehran to 
intensify its crack down on alternative voices. The third part of the chapter discusses 
Tehran’s response to the Axis of Evil speech and the statement that promoted regime 
change in Iran. The last section also examines how the Bush Administration’s 
decision to make Iranian women as symbols of the (possible) new order adversely 
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affected high profile women’s movement advocates and their work in the politically 
tense environment where the hardliners were fighting to consolidate their power. 
Many high profile women’s movement advocates were forced to exit formal politics 
and this left their protégées, for example the NGO community, not only without a 
venue to voice their concerns in the higher echelons of the body politic but also 
without a shield against the state repression that began to target civil society actors for 
the first time in the 2000s.  
 
2.0 Tentative détente prior and after 9/11 
Prior to the election of US President George W Bush, the US and Iran had gone 
through a short period of détente.18 The détente had resulted from gestures initiated 
from both sides and in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks many Iran commentators and 
scholars both in the US and in Iran saw a real possibility for the two countries to start 
a constructive engagement. However, small, but by no means unresolvable, incidents 
began to emerge in the autumn of 2001 that contributed to President Bush’s hasty and 
unnecessary decision to include Iran in the Axis of Evil. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In 1996 a new debate emerged within the Clinton Administration. As noted in the previous 
chapter, while the neoconservatives in Washington grew more critical about the Clinton 
Administration in the mid-1990s and the president was criticised for not recognising 
American security interests in the Middle East, several people inside the Administration noted 
how the regional interests in the Middle East were shared by both the US and Iran: both 
countries shared an interest in ending the continuing conflict in Afghanistan and containing 
Saddam Hussein. The election of president Khatami in 1997 came to assist the Clinton 
Administration’s provisional change of heart. The symbol of president Khatami’s first term 
was his ‘Dialogue of Civilisations’ that guided his effort to end the country’s international 
isolation. President Khatami’s surprise appearance in a televised CNN interview in 1998, in 
which he declared his respect for American history, ideology and values while, at the same 
time, he diplomatically noted the disagreements between the two countries was Iran’s 
opening line to the Americans (see Khatami 1998). However, it took almost two years for the 
US to formulate its response. In March 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
articulated the Clinton Administration’s response at the American-Iranian Council where she 
delivered a Noruz (Iranian New Year) speech. She began by noting how it was the time to 
start seeing Iran through its current developments instead of viewing it through the lenses of 
the 1979 hostage crisis. The talk also acknowledged Iran’s pivotal role in the region’s 
economic and security issues, and most importantly for ordinary Iranians, Albright admitted 
and apologised for the US involvement in the 1953 coup that had ousted the democratically 
elected prime minister Mossadeq. She similarly acknowledged and regretted the American 
support for the repressive Pahlavi regime prior to the 1979 Revolution and for Saddam 
Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War. Albright officially welcomed president Khatami’s dialogue and 
expressed the US interest in engaging with Iran but she also noted her country’s own list of 
grievances and points that would be central to any negotiations to succeed (See Albright 
2000).  
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2.1 Mutual co-operation 
In September 2001, some hawkish commentators in Washington tried to link the 
terrorist attacks to the Iranian regime but the Bush Administration quickly established 
that the culprit behind the attacks was Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaida harboured 
by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both the Iranian government and the media in Iran 
quickly condemned the attacks. President Khatami was one of the first world leaders 
to express his condolences to American people and he denounced the use of terrorism: 
‘[T]errorism is condemned and the world public should identify its roots and its 
dimensions and should take fundamental steps to eliminate it’ (Iran Press Service 
2001). A few days later Ayatollah Khamenei confirmed Iran’s stance on the attacks 
by stating that ‘[M]ass killings of human beings are catastrophic acts which are 
condemned […] wherever they may happen and whoever the perpetrators and the 
victims may be’ (BBC 2001), and hence, firmly stating that his country is not to be 
connected to the attacks. Ordinary Iranians were also expressing their sympathy with 
Americans; among other things people organised candlelight vigils to honour those 
who lost their lives on 9/11 and the official clergy organised a temporary suspension 
of the ‘Death to America’ chants at Friday prayers. In Tehran, the political 
establishment was firmly supervising the views that may somehow jeopardise the 
country’s position in America’s response to the attacks. Only two days after the 
attacks an editorial in the leading reformist newspaper Aftab-e Yazd called the media 
to refrain from ‘irresponsible’ comments that may harm the country’s relationship 
with the US (Aftab-e Yazd 2001).  
 
Very quickly after the 9/11 attacks, Khatami and the reformist camp realised that the 
attacks could work as a springboard for the US-Iran détente. If possible, this window 
of opportunity was even more important for domestic reasons. Firstly, Khatami 
needed to improve Iran’s economy that was spiralling in deficit. Khatami understood 
that better relations with the Bush Administration would eventually open the US 
markets for Iranian trade. Secondly, the reformists who had won the Sixth Majles 
elections in February 2000 had been delivering much less in formal politics than their 
supporters had hoped for. Thus, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the reformists 
saw foreign policy as a means to break free from the stalemate at home and increase 
their popularity in the eyes of their supporters (Ansari 2003: 231). 
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It soon became clear that the US and Iran had a shared interest in ousting both al-
Qaida and the Taliban from Afghanistan. Iran’s political and social issues with 
Afghanistan drove Iran’s motivation to engage with the Americans. In general, the 
relationship between Iran and Afghanistan had been tense, especially since 1998 
when Iran almost invaded Afghanistan after eight of its diplomats were killed by 
Taliban forces in Mazar-e Sharif. Further, for Iran, the Taliban’s militant and 
extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam was located almost on the opposite ideological 
side from its own Twelver Shi’ism. Hence, Iran had supported the Northern Alliance 
and its leader Ahmad Massoud for years prior to the 9/11 attacks. Moreover, Iran has, 
and continues, to host one of the largest Afghan refugee communities. In 2000, there 
were over 1.4 million registered and an estimated half a million unofficial Afghan 
refugees in Iran (UNHCR 2013). Both the state and society increasingly viewed them 
as a considerable economic and social burden and were keen to see the Afghans 
return home. The shared border with Afghanistan has also contributed to Iran’s 
serious narcotics problem. Iran has one of the highest populations of heroin and 
opium addicts in the world, which in turn, has also increased HIV/AIDS 
transmissions in Iran (UNODC 2012). In addition to the health problems, the 
organised crime resulting from drug trafficking is a major problem, which Iran has 
been tackling for a long time. Thus, for Iran, a stable and conflict free Afghanistan 
would have solved a number of domestic and regional problems.  
 
Therefore, in the aftermath of 9/11, both the Bush Administration and the Iranians 
found common ground on which cooperation could take place.19 In public, the Iranian 
regime emphasised the UN route to solve the Afghanistan question (BBC 2001). 
However, a series of non-official talks were organised between Iranian and American 
officials in Geneva after 9/11 (Crist 2012). Secretary of State Colin Powell chose the 
experienced ambassador Ryan Crocker to lead the talks which officially materialised 
in Iran’s offer to allow the US to use its airfields and ports during the operation in 
Afghanistan. Although the Americans turned this down, they accepted the Iranian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 However, the co-operation between Washington and Tehran did not emerge out of the blue. 
The United Nations (UN) had coordinated informal meetings throughout the late 1990s up 
until 2001 and both the US and Iran had participated in these meetings that aimed at mapping 
out possible ways to start UN peace-making activities in Afghanistan. These talks became 
known as the ‘Six plus Two’ group including, Iran, China, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan and the ‘plus Two’ countries, the US and Russia. 
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offer to provide sanctuary for downed American pilots. The intelligence that the 
Iranians had about the Taliban, via their close relationship with the Northern Alliance, 
and which they passed on to the Americans, was also indispensable to their operation 
(Crist 2012). 
 
The US-Iran cooperation continued at the Bonn conference in December 2001. Iran’s 
role in the conference was reported to be extremely constructive and instrumental to 
the conference’s successful results. Among other things, Iran made one of the largest 
donations to the Afghan government, amounting to $560 million. Thus it was no 
wonder that in January 2002, the Iranian delegation attending the International 
Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan approached the US 
delegation and suggested the Afghanistan talks could be extended to concern the two 
countries’ bilateral relations (Crist 2012). The atmosphere being as constructive and 
positive it had been for the past three to four months, it was rather surprising and 
disappointing to the Iranians that the Bush Administration did not reply to the inquiry. 
 
2.2 Another missed opportunity 
Why did it become another missed opportunity in the US-Iran relations? The January 
suggestion was not the first of its kind, the Iranian delegation had proposed expanding 
the talks already earlier in the autumn of 2001 when the Afghanistan talks had 
progressed well (Crist 2012). At the early stages, the State Department had given at 
least yellow – if not green – light for expanding the talks and it had prepared a 
comprehensive package aimed at easing the tension between the two countries (Crist 
2012). The key issues that structured the package included the old US demands to 
Iran: to end the support for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas and the Lebanese 
Hezbollah; to stop active opposition to the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and to 
start respecting democratic principles of governance within Iran itself (Katzman 
2013). However, it was clear that the Iranians were more than willing to sit down at 
the same table and discuss issues beyond Afghanistan. 
 
In the course of the Afghanistan talks four issues emerged. The first incident was the 
Bush Administration’s refusal to allow President Khatami to attend Ground Zero to 
pay his respect to the 9/11 victims in November 2001 and the rejection of allowing 
President Khatami to expand his entourage to the UN’s General Assembly, which 
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would have allowed Iran to start the bilateral talks. The Bush Administration also 
grew suspicious of al-Qaida members residing inside Iran’s borders and Iran not 
cooperating in the way the US had hoped for. The third issue that complicated the 
new relationship was the Karine A incident in January 2002; and finally, the hawkish 
voices arguing against the old enemy being paraded as a potential partner in the War 
on Terror were growing louder in Washington.  
 
While President Khatami most likely understood the Bush Administration’s decision 
of not to allow him to pay his respect at Ground Zero, the other incidents were a little 
more complicated, but again not unresolvable. In the course of the invasion of 
Afghanistan, the US suspected that high profile al-Qaida members and their family 
members, who had fled to westwards, were staying in Iran with the blessing of Iranian 
officials. Zalmay Khalilzad, President Bush’s special envoy to Afghanistan and a 
strong opponent of the US-Iran relations’ normalisation, argued that ‘[H]ard-line, 
unaccountable elements of the Iranian regime facilitated the movement of al-Qaida 
terrorists – escaping from Afghanistan’ (Khalilzad 2002). Initially Tehran denied this 
but changed its stance later and admitted that Iran had arrested several al-Qaida 
members, including Osama bin-Laden’s wife Khairiyyah, of whom some were 
prisoned while some were under house arrest (Jones 2012 / Helsingin Sanomat 2013). 
The Americans requested Iran to turn them over to the US but the Iranians refused by 
arguing that the al-Qaida captives were important security assets for the Iranians 
themselves as they regarded al-Qaida as a threat to their national security (Crist 2012; 
Jones 2012). Iran’s unwillingness to co-operate in the way that the Americans had 
hoped for unfortunately allowed the hawkish voices in Washington to grow lauder.   
 
The Karine A affair was a more serious blow to the volatile relationship. The Karine 
A carrying fifty or more tons of arms was captured by the Israelis in early January 
2002. The Israeli investigation claimed the cargo had originated from Iran and the 
final destination for the arms was the Palestinian National Authority. The incident 
was filled with contradictory information, fuelled by the strong pro-Israel-lobbying 
against the Palestinian and Iranian authorities and Iranian neglect to counter the 
accusations (Ansari 2003: 234). However, the Karine A affair worked well for the 
hawkish elements in the Bush Administration, letting them demonstrate that Iran 
would never change nor reform itself and it made absolutely no sense to negotiate 
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with terrorists. As a senior staff member of the Bush Administration commented: 
‘[Karine A] was a sign to the president that the Iranians weren’t serious [about 
cooperation over Afghanistan]’ (NYT 2002). 
 
Moreover, not everyone in Washington had been happy about the new Iran 
connection. And the above-mentioned incidents played into their hands. The hawks in 
the Bush Administration – personalities like Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul 
Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of State John Bolton, Special Assistant to the President 
Elliot Abrams, Under Secretary for Defence for Policy Douglas Feith, among others – 
were people who actively and aggressively became involved in the US-Iran talks and 
who, at the same time, campaigned for anti-Iran policy and even for regime change as 
early as in the autumn 2001 (see for example Crist 2012; Franklin 2009). Due to this, 
the more moderate voices in the Administration were pushed to the margins. Thus, the 
enemy picture of the post-9/11 Monster was growing stronger and stronger and the 
mounting domestic and international criticism about the handling of the invasion of 
Afghanistan was pushing the Administration to find ways to convince the American 
public that the War on Terror was justified. As Ansari writes, ‘what changed in 
Washington was not the strength of the anti-Iran lobby, but the new receptiveness 
with which their ideas were received and translated into actions (Ansari 2003: 233-
234). At the same time in Tehran, the domestic power politics were kicking in and 
hampering Khatami’s efforts to engage with Washington. Thus, as in Washington, 
hard-line elements in Tehran were unwilling to see through the normalisation process 
in US-Iran relations and remained, as one observer argued, ‘too locked in their own 
defiance to permit any real evolution in their approach’ to the US (Maloney 2011). 
 
All the incidents and developments recounted above could have been resolved if 
enough political will had existed. However, in late January 2002, American political 
will was running thin. 
 
3.0 The Axis of Evil 
As argued in the Chapter 2, the production of identities never stops, the process is 
continuous and it requires the re-production of differences, of external threats, or of 
the dangerous Other, that ostensibly threaten the Self’s existence. In essence, the Self 
needs the external difference to exist for otherwise the Self and its raison d’être ceases 
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(Campbell 1994; 1998). Similarly, central is also the emphasis put on the Other’s 
threating deviancy – materialised often in the Other’s different material or ideological 
being – that allows the Self to discipline the Other. President Bush’s speech on 29 
January 2002 can be seen as a continuation of the crafting process of identities and 
disciplining difference that had began in the aftermath of 9/11. The Axis of Evil not 
only opened a new front in the War on Terror by singling out three new rogue states, 
but it also recalled 9/11 memories of contemporary evilness and in this way allowed 
two opposing entities, ‘us’ and ‘them’, to be consolidated in peoples’ imaginary of the 
War on Terror. 
 
In the State of the Union Address in January 2002, Bush changed the nature of the 
War on Terror. While the hunt for Osama bin Laden and ousting of al-Qaida fighters 
out of Afghanistan were still going on, the main focus of the speech was the 
introduction of the Axis of Evil, which linked Iran, Iraq and North Korea to the War 
on Terror. The speech articulated two new targets in the widening of the War on 
Terror: 1) rogue states harbouring and sponsoring terrorists and 2) weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) in the hands of rogue states and/or terrorists. The War on Terror 
was no longer just about 9/11 and getting justice to the White Self, it became about 
preventing another 9/11 from happening.   
 
Catching Osama bin Laden had proven to be harder than expected and the 
Administration’s handling of the occupation in Afghanistan was not going as 
smoothly as it had been visualised in Washington in the autumn of 2001. Growing 
criticism about the conduct of the War on Terror, both at home and abroad, pushed 
the Administration to open a new front in it. The search for new Monsters other than 
al-Qaida functioned as a proof of the Administration’s masculine character and 
demonstrated that it had not given up the mission to liberate the world of terror. 
Bush’s remarks a week after the Axis of Evil speech indicate that the Administration 
had, at least partly, employed the Axis of Evil to demonstrate the American public 
that the hunt was still on: 
There's nothing like looking somebody in the eye and letting them know that 
when we say we're going to fight terror, we mean it. And there's nothing like 
people getting a sense of the determination of this government.  There's a lot 
of folks who might have predicted that over time we would grow weary and 
we'd get tired and we'd kind of get faint of heart (Bush, G.W. 2002b). 
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Noteworthy in the Axis of Evil speech was the minimal attention given to Osama bin 
Laden and al-Qaida. The focus of the war shifted from the perpetrators of 9/11 to a 
number of other actors, dangerous others existing in the margins of global politics and 
ready to spread evil to the world. Thus, in this re-faming of the War on Terror, the 
evil was no longer solely incarnated in al-Qaida but in rogue states like Iran and 
organisations such as Hezbollah and Hamas supported by Iran.20 Evil was now spread 
by states like Iran, which (allegedly) developed or owned WMDs and could pass them 
on terrorist organisations. Bush declared: 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to 
threaten the peace of the world.  By seeking weapons of mass destruction, 
these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these 
arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.  They could 
attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States.  In any of these 
cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic (Bush, G.W. 2002a).  
 
The binary world of good versus evil that was created by the Administration in the 
autumn of 2001 was thus now officially extended to encompass Muslim majority 
countries like Iran: ‘[T]he civilized world’ continues its fight against the ‘thousands 
of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw 
regimes […] spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off 
without warning’ (Bush, G.W. 2002a). This only emphasised Bush’s more or less 
direct message that the Western civilisation was under attack by the Islamic Other, 
mostly because of the superiority of the former.  
 
Interestingly, no physical proof that would have linked Iran, or any of the Axis of Evil 
states, to the attacks of 9/11 was being presented.21  However, in the security 
imaginary of ordinary people, the introduction of the Axis of Evil established its 
component countries as equally threating as al-Qaida and bin Laden to the American 
Self. The civilising mission of targeting terrorists ‘hiding in caves’ now moved upon 
the Islamic Republic that needed to be corrected for it to be included in the club of 
civilised nations. Iran’s special role in the Axis of Evil was pivoted on its historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This fact was curiously emphasised over al-Qaida in the speech. Moreover, in the Address, 
both Hezbollah and Hamas were given much more attention than al-Qaida, which seemed to 
be just a small footnote in the speech. 
21 Later in 2004, the 9/11 Commission Report confirmed that Iran had not been involved in 
9/11 (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004).  
	   81	  
character as an evil theocracy, its already mentioned support to Hamas and Hezbollah 
and on its alleged pursuit of WMDs. Bush evaluated Iran’s role in the following way: 
‘[I]ran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few 
repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom’ (Bush, G.W. 2002a). While the US 
concern about Iran’s possible acquisition of WMDs stems from Iran’s supposed 
ability to use such weapons against Israel and US troops in the Middle East and from 
the suspicion that Iran may pass WMDs to terrorist organisations that in turn may use 
them on American soil or against American allies in the Middle East, the second part 
of the argument reframed American foreign policy towards Iran. The target of the 
Bush Administration would also be the Iranian regime and the form of government 
that allows the ‘unelected few’ to rule over the Iranian people. Thus, the regime was 
included in the Axis of Evil not only because of the alleged support for terrorism and 
for acquiring WMDs, but for its despotism, repressive form of government and poor 
human rights record. 
 
By naming Iran as one of the Axis of Evil countries and demonising its government, 
the Bush Administration created a springboard for a new aggressive foreign policy 
approach towards the country. By coding Iran as an official supporter and sponsor of 
terrorism, which 9/11 had proven to threaten the American Self’s existence and well-
being, the Administration laid the basis for justification that would allow them to 
discipline Iran if needed: 
Our cause is just, and it continues. […] What we have found in Afghanistan 
confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning. 
[…] [S]o long as nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk. […] If we stop 
now – leaving terror camps intact and terror states unchecked – our sense of 
security would be false and temporary (Bush, G.W. 2002a). 
 
3.1 Promoting regime change 
In the summer of 2002, the rhetoric from Washington hardened again. The Bush 
Administration and the neoconservatives close to it began openly to advocate regime 
change in Iran. The Administration’s public statements made repeated references to 
Iran’s regime type and its poor human rights record, which both had justified Iran’s 
inclusion in the Axis of Evil. The Administration’s campaign for human rights and 
good governance can also be found in the wider framework of American national 
security, which was laid out in the autumn of 2002. The first National Security 
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Strategy (NSS) published in September 2002, presented human rights and political 
openness as central tools in the Administration’s war ‘between liberty and 
totalitarianism’ (National Security Strategy 2002). In other words, promoting human 
rights abroad was seen to work pre-emptively guarantee American national security 
outside its physical borders. 
 
As already noted above, the Axis of Evil speech had already hinted about this 
development. Bush asserted that ‘freedom, democracy and human rights are universal 
values’ and because 
America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human 
dignity: the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, 
private property, free speech, equal justice and religious tolerance. America 
will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around 
the world, including the Islamic world, because we have a greater objective 
than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and 
peaceful world beyond the war on terror (Bush, G.W. 2002a). 
 
The Administration was certain that ultimately, ‘[W]hen given a choice, people [of 
Iran] will choose freedom, human rights, and democracy (Khalilzad 2002b) and resist 
the ‘unelected few’ (Bush, G.W. 2002a). According to David Frum, Bush’s 
speechwriter, who had invented the ‘Axis of Evil’ metaphor, the January 2002 speech 
was a clear message to Iran: 
He [president Bush] sent a message of hope to the people of Iran. He told 
them that he is serious in condemning their government, that he is not going to 
be one of those world leaders who tries to do business with and prop up their 
oppressors, that in fact he sees their oppressors as oppressors. That is a 
hopeful message to a people who are overwhelmingly sick of being misruled 
by these clerical fascists (Frum interviewed by MacIntyre, Frontline, 2002). 
 
Signs of a regime change policy were already seen in the Administration’s interviews 
and speeches in the spring 2002. For instance, Defence Secretary Rumsfeld argued in 
April that ‘[I] suspect that during my lifetime we're going to see a change in that 
situation over there and that the young people and the women and the people who 
believe in freedom will overthrow that cleric government and it will fall in some way 
of its own weight’ (Rumsfeld quoted in Middle East Online 2002). Or as the above 
quoted Frum noted in April 2002, 
[A]nd the real question is, how long can this regime survive? When this 
regime goes, the Iran that will emerge, I think we have good reason to hope 
that that will be a country that has a strong economic future ahead of it, that 
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will grow, that will be at peace, that will be more secular and more 
democratic. That is an ending to a struggle between good and evil. Struggles 
between good and evil do tend to end with the triumph of good, and what that 
means is not necessarily even a military struggle. […] What the president did 
with his powerful language [in January] was to serve notice on the Iranian 
regime that limits on its conduct that have not been enforced for 20 years are 
going to be enforced now. […] There are going to be real and important 
consequences [if it continues] to pursue nuclear weapons and the missiles to 
carry them. So he's giving the Iranians information they need to have (Frum 
interviewed by MacIntyre, Frontline, 2002).  
 
However, it was Bush’s statement on 12 July 2002, which has been interpreted to 
mark the official US policy shift that favoured regime change in Tehran (Katzman 
2003). The statement was the Administration’s response to the July student 
demonstrations in Tehran that had been organised to commemorate the third 
anniversary of the 1999 student protests. Iranian security forces arrested 200 people 
and whilst most of them were released after singing a written assurance not to 
participate in similar gatherings again, 52 demonstrators faced trial later in the year. 
Bush stated that the US will support those ‘people of Iran [who] want the same 
freedoms, human rights, and opportunities as people around the world’ and warned 
that the Iranian government ‘should listen to [people’s] hopes.’ He continued by 
adding that  
[I]n the last two Iranian presidential elections and in nearly a dozen 
parliamentary and local elections, the vast majority of the Iranian people voted 
for political and economic reform. Yet their voices are not being listened to by 
the unelected people who are the real rulers of Iran. Uncompromising, 
destructive policies have persisted, and far too little has changed in the daily 
lives of the Iranian people. […] The future of Iran will be decided by the 
people of Iran. […] As Iran's people move towards a future defined by greater 
freedom, greater tolerance, they will have no better friend than the United 
States of America (Bush, G.W. 2002b).22 
 
The July statement re-defined the Bush Administration’s approach to Iran. Rather 
than supporting President Khatami and the reformists in the Majles, who could deliver 
reform within the political system itself, the Bush Administration sought to back up 
civil society actors, including women’s movement advocates, in a possible regime 
change in Iran. Later in 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell confirmed the 
Administration’s approach to Iran as an effort to speak directly to the Iranian people 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Voice of America radio station broadcasted the July statement by Zalmay Khalilzad in 
Farsi. 
	   84	  
‘over the heads of their leaders to let them know that [the US] agree[s] with them’ 
(The Washington Post 2003). Powell further weighted in when he promised that the 
US keeps ‘showing to the Iranian people that there is a better world out there waiting 
for [them]’ and ‘why it is in their benefit to demand a better political system from 
their religious and political leaders’ (CNN 2003). Several members in Congress also 
called for American efforts to promote civil society in Iran. Two resolutions (S. Res 
306 and H. Res 504) were introduced in late July 2002 and called for ‘positive 
gestures of the United States’ toward ‘the people of Iran, and not political figures 
whose survival depends upon preservation of the current regime’ (S. Res 306 / U.S 
Congress 2002). Further, the resolutions stated that the US policy should ‘seek a 
genuine democratic government in Iran that will restore freedom to the Iranian 
people, and live in peace and security with the international community (S. Res 306 / 
U.S Congress 2002a). 
Some of the most hawkish elements in the Administration campaigned also outside 
the Administration. One of the strongest proponents of regime change in Iran included 
President Bush’s already mentioned envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, who 
campaigned also outside his mission. He argued for the US to demonstrate to ordinary 
Iranians that, on the one hand, Americans are serious about ‘dealing with threats 
before they manifest themselves’ and, on the other hand, Americans are offering 
‘partnership and support’ to civil society in Iran. He further elaborated:  
Our policy is not about Khatami or Khameni [sic], reform or hard line; it is 
about supporting those who want freedom, human rights, democracy, and 
economic and educational opportunity for themselves and their fellow 
countrymen and women. President Khatami has been ineffective in 
challenging the regime and therefore made only marginal gains. The unelected 
hardliners have consistently been able to checkmate reformists and maintain 
hard-line rule (Khalilzad 2002b). 
The Coalition for Democracy in Iran, established in 2002 to aggressively campaign 
for regime change in Iran within the framework of the War on Terror and supported 
by many in the Bush Administration, was also vocal about its agenda. One of its 
members, Danielle Pletka, argued that diplomatic engagement with the current regime 
is neither desirable nor realistic: 
Any opening from the United States will only lend credibility to that 
government and forever dash the hopes of a population that, according to 
reliable polls, despises its own leadership. […] We have seen that engagement 
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with the current leadership of Iran would not achieve policy change; all it 
would do is buy an evil regime the time it needs to perfect its nuclear weapons 
and to build a network of terrorists to deliver them (Pletka 2004). 
 
Later in 2004, the Rand Corporation, a think-tank that carried semi-official influence 
in the Bush Administration, published a document ‘The Muslim World after 9/11’ in 
which Iran was singled out as one of the countries that needed America’s special 
attention. The document stated that ‘[T]he battle for Islam will require the creation of 
liberal groups to retrieve Islam from the hijackers of religion. […] The initial impulse 
may require an external catalyst’ (RAND 2004: xxii). A year later the institution 
published a blueprint for the catalyst (see RAND 2005). The blueprint laid out a 
detailed plan how to achieve ‘civil and democratic Islam’ – two of the suggestions 
included the support of secular actors and the encouragement of secular civic 
institutions and programmes and the use of American media to broaden peoples’ ideas 
of the world (RAND 2005: 47-48). Later in 2005, to complement RAND’s 
publications, the Administration published a brochure to aimed at explaining Iran’s 
human rights situation to ordinary Americans. The document ‘Iran: Voices Struggling 
to be Heard’ paints a picture of a tyrannical regime which has not only deprived 
Iranians of their rights and hope for a better future but alienated itself entirely from 
society and as such enjoys no legitimacy. The brochure also hints that Iranian civil 
society does not see how democratic change could take place under the current 
theocratic system (Department of State 2005a). 
What emerges from the Bush Administration’s campaign against the Iranian regime is 
the old Orientalist imaginary of the Orient as backward, uncivilised and inferior. 
Iran’s adherence to Islam supposedly demonstrates Islam’s incompatibility with 
Western-capitalist-democratic modernity and justifies and requires the West’s 
guidance in proper nation building and democratisation (see Ling 2004). By 
employing the Axis of Evil, the Bush Administration firmly consolidated the dualist 
world of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and set out to isolate Iran in global politics. With the ‘either 
you are with us, or you’re with the terrorists’ policy no middle ground was left to 
build alliances or cooperation with states like Iran. This lack of middle ground 
silenced moderate voices both in Washington and Tehran.  
3.2 Saving Iranian women 
Muslim women’s human rights had spread into the Bush Administration’s War on 
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Terror vocabulary when it had looked for moral justifications for the invasion of 
Afghanistan. After the Axis of Evil speech, alongside Afghan women, Iranian and 
Iraqi women’s human rights were continuously employed in the Bush 
Administration’s statements and interviews. As Hijri has pointed out, the use of 
women’s rights violations allowed the Administration not only to present ‘the conflict 
more palatable to its citizens’ but it also effectively let the Administration to avoid the 
question of the right to invade a sovereign country and overthrow its government 
(Hijri quoted in Russo 2006: 560). The employment of Muslim women’s human 
rights discourse also effectively assisted the Administration to build a strategic image 
and narrative of the enemy in the War on Terror, which, in turn, helped to promote the 
interventionist foreign policy making in the Middle East. However, and as others have 
noted in their studies on other countries targeted in the War on Terror, the 
Administration’s deployment of Muslim women’s rights effectively silenced women’s 
unique voices both locally and globally and increased violence against women (see 
among others Abu-Lughod 2002; Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Brohi 2008; Rostami-Povey 
2007a). 
What the Administration emphasised in its approach to ‘saving’ and ‘liberating’ 
Iranian women was the conventional image of the West as the locus and champion of 
freedom, superiority and civilisation and of the East as traditionalism, backwardness 
and subjugation. This imaginary allowed to reinforce the image of the enemy as a 
dark Monster oppressing his women and, at the same time, the Bush Administration’s 
right to discipline the Iranian regime was justified. In this way, we were led to 
understand that Iranian women would not be able to free themselves without the help 
of an outsider who knows how to advance women’s rights and what these rights 
should be. The Administration was keen to emphasise how Iranian women were 
different from their oppressors and thus capable of change.  
 
After the July statement, one of the first public efforts to include Iranian women’s 
human rights on the Bush Administration’s agenda were the July 2002 Congress 
resolutions (S. Res 306; H. Res 504) which both stated the U.S concern for ‘the 
continuous repression of freedoms within Iran and of individual human rights abuses, 
particularly with regard to women (H. Res 504 / U.S. Congress 2002b, emphasis 
added). Also Laura Bush, who was one of the public faces for the Muslim women’s 
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human rights campaign, emphasised this when Iranian women were added on the 
Administration’s list: 
‘For a stable world we must dedicate ourselves to protecting women's rights in 
all countries. […] Without women the goals of democracy and peace cannot 
be achieved. Women's rights are human rights and the work of advancing 
human rights is the responsibility of all humanity’ (Bush, L. 2004b). 
 
In her various speeches on women’s rights, Laura Bush painted a dualistic world of 
women’s rights. What she continuously repeats in her statements is the American 
woman, who has been able to assume a position in the public sphere, ‘in business, 
government, the arts, education and every other field’ (Bush, L. 2004c) and as such 
she leads a successful life, whereas in the Muslim world ‘where half of the population 
is left out’ (Bush, L. 2004d), women cannot participate ‘in their country’s civic and 
political life’ (Bush, L. 2003) and as such they need the external hand to guide them 
(see Bush, L. 2004a).  
 
President Bush repeated his wife’s argument by noting the need for external help in 
securing women’s rights in the Muslim world. For instance in March 2004, the 
President stated ‘[T]he advance of freedom in the Greater Middle East has given new 
rights and new hopes to women. And America will do its part to continue the spread 
of liberty’ (Bush, G.W. 2004). In the same speech, President Bush singled out Iran 
and Iranian women’s rights advocates and declared: 
Support for human rights is the cornerstone of American foreign policy. As a 
matter of national conviction, we believe that every person in every culture is 
meant by God to live in freedom. As a matter of national interest, we know 
that the spread of liberty and hope is essential to the defeat of despair and 
bitterness and terror. The policy of the American government is to stand for 
the non- negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, the limits on 
the power of the state, free speech, freedom of worship, equal justice, respect 
for women, religious and ethnic tolerance, and protections for private 
property. That is what we believe, and we're not going to change (Bush, G.W. 
2004). 
 
The Administration was keen to strengthen the link between the repressive Iranian 
regime and women’s human rights violations. In May 2003, then National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice campaigned for a regime change in Iran. According to her 
the US wished to see a regime moving away from ‘pursuing an aggressive agenda 
based on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction’ and instead the Bush 
Administration wanted to work with a government which meets the demands of the 
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Iranian people for ‘a regime which protects the rights of women, which is forward 
looking and modern’ (AFX 2003). Further, the mixing of Muslim women from Iran, 
Afghanistan and Iraq in the Administration’s statements crafted an image of one 
single oppressed Muslim woman, the Feminine Other, which ignored these women’s 
different histories, different socio-cultural, ethnic and economic locations and 
religious differences (Sunni/Shia/religious minorities in these countries). 
 
While the Iranian regime’s violations of women’s human rights are well documented, 
the linking of Iran’s regime and women’s rights violations served strategically the 
Bush Administration’s efforts to strengthen the image of the Monstrous Other. The 
presented brutality of the Iranian regime allowed the Administration to construct itself 
as an authoritative figure that is allowed to police and even discipline the Monster. 
However, at the same time, Iranian women were assigned the role Victimised 
Feminine Other who is passive, veiled and unable to voice her needs, aspirations and 
desires. Similarly, the Administration glossed over certain historical and 
contemporary facts about women’s rights and the women’s movement in Iran, such as 
the movement’s long history that can be traced back to the 1905 Constitutional 
Revolution, women’s participation in the 1979 Revolution and their more recent role 
in shaping gender-specific legislation in the Majles. Moreover, as Stabile and Kumar 
have argued, the Bush Administration represented women’s equality in the West as a 
natural part of ‘Western humanist values’ and ignored centuries of struggle for those 
rights (Stabile and Kumar 2005: 775).  
 
4.0 Tehran’s response 
Had the tentative détente between the US and Iran worked out, Khatami would have 
been able to secure a more favourable balance of power between the reformist and the 
hardliners in Iran. Fruitful cooperation over Afghanistan had not led to an enduring 
détente and the general reaction to the Axis of Evil speech and later to the July 
statement among the reformists in Tehran was disbelief and disappointment. 
Europeans shared Iran’s disbelief and called the Bush Administration’s choice of 
words shortsighted. Several countries voiced their concern that Iran’s efforts in 
Afghanistan had not been recognised and naming Iran as one of the Axis of Evil 
countries was undiplomatic. Critical voices recognised the Bush Administration’s 
hypermasculinist policy-making approach and for example a French editorial called 
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President Bush ‘a sheriff convinced of his right to regulate the planet and impose 
punishment as he sees fit’ (The NYT 2002). Ordinary Iranians had a hard time 
understanding how they could be grouped together with their archenemy Saddam 
Hussein or with the dictatorship of the North Korea.  
For Khatami, the Bush Administration’s rebuttal of his dialogue efforts was 
frustrating and his initial comments on Bush’s speech reflected this:  
[President Bush] spoke arrogantly, humiliatingly, aggressively and in an 
interfering way […] it is an insult to Iranian nation. […] After September 11th, 
we felt there was a great opportunity to mobilize the international will to fight 
terrorism. But unfortunately this opportunity was misused and this abuse is a 
treason to humanity (AP 2002). 
 
Khatami called for national unity against American interventionism and further 
declared that Iran’s nation would stand together if the US decided to attack Iran. 
Khatami’s Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi accused the US of intervening in the 
country’s internal affairs and added that: 
‘We condemn the American accusations and think the world no longer accepts 
hegemony. We think Mr. Bush would do better by providing proof of his 
allegations. […] He should know that the repetition of such allegations is not 
going to help him’ (CNN 2002). 
 
The reformist majority in the Majles, supported by the other factions, published a 
public statement condemning the Axis of Evil speech: 
The expansionist stands taken by the U.S. president originate in the 
monopolistic view of Washington, which believes it deserves to dominate the 
world. […] The new stances of the U.S. president added another black page to 
the error-filled book of American foreign policies. […] The [Iranian] nation 
will strengthen its iron barriers [against the U.S.] and will not allow [the U.S.] 
to destroy [Iran’s] independence and freedom. […] Being able to divide the 
dynamic and active Iranian nation is a mere dream for evil-seekers. The great 
Iranian nation, which has always been an advocate of peace, security and 
justice for all nations […] will fire a bullet at foreign enemies, which will deal 
with it as if it were hundreds of thousands of bullets. […] We, members of the 
Parliament, unanimously stand by the freedom and independence of Iran and 
hereby declare that the statement by the U.S. president […] is a threat to world 
peace and security. It is vital for all freedom –and right-seeking nations to 
stand against this hostile and unwise action (Tehran Times 2002). 
 
For the reformists, the introduction of the Axis of Evil was a blow to their domestic 
game for two reasons. Firstly, the reformists, who had failed with their domestic 
reform and consequently had tried to convince their supporters about Khatami’s 
capability to deliver in foreign policy, were left with nothing to demonstrate their 
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ability to continue leading a reform process. Secondly, Khatami had now failed to 
deliver both at home and abroad and the failures worked as a springboard for the rise 
of hardliners in Tehran, which in turn, materialised in a worsened situation for the 
reformists’ efforts to push for reform at the state level. 
4.1 Civil society’s response 
Civil society activists also condemned the US interference. Ayatollah Yusef Saanei, 
one of the most influential religious authorities in Iran and a supporter of the 
reformists, saw the Bush Administration’s Axis of Evil speech and the July statement 
negatively affecting civil society activism in Iran: 
I think a great injustice has been done to the supporters of democracy and 
freedom and true Islam due to Mr. Bush's speech. And what he said has put 
more pressure on the best men and women in this country. [...] In brief, if 
supporters of democracy in Iran had been under pressure [since January], they 
will be under more stress and pressure tomorrow. And if they were not under 
pressure, they will be, and Mr. Bush has caused this situation and is 
responsible for that, unless he corrects his statements and resolves his issues 
with diplomacy and takes the pressure off the freedom lovers' shoulders [in 
Iran] (MacIntyre’s interview with Saanei, 2002). 
In August 2003, a group of high profile civil society advocates, including women’s 
movement advocates, published a statement in which they declared both their support 
for the Islamic Republic and suggested ways to improve the country’s external 
relations and domestic affairs. They emphasised how the Revolution’s commitment to 
people’s participation, freedom, human rights, democracy and republicanism needed 
to be cherished in order to have a strong and unified nation. The statement further 
stated that  
the people of Iran do not need a guardian to dictate their internal affairs, they 
also do not need an external guardian. The bitter experience that our people 
have derived from the behavior of great powers […] has demonstrated that we 
should never welcome superficial slogans or place the salvation of our nation 
in the hands of foreign powers (Iranian Cultural and Political Activists 2003).  
Shirin Ebadi was one of the women’s movement activists who condemned the July 
statement. In her Nobel Prize speech in December 2003, she stated: 
One has to say to those who have mooted the idea of a clash of civilizations, 
or prescribed war and military intervention for this region [the Middle East], 
and resorted to social, cultural, economic and political sluggishness of the 
South in a bid to justify their actions and opinions, that if you consider 
international human rights laws, including the nations' right to determine their 
own destinies, to be universal, and if you believe in the priority and superiority 
of parliamentary democracy over other political systems, then you cannot 
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think only of your own security and comfort, selfishly and contemptuously. A 
quest for new means and ideas to enable the countries of the South, too, to 
enjoy human rights and democracy, while maintaining their political 
independence and territorial integrity of their respective countries, must be 
given top priority. […] The people of Iran, particularly in the recent years, 
have shown that they deem participation in public affairs to be their right, and 
that they want to be masters of their own destiny (Ebadi 2003). 
 
The message from civil society was clear: civil society advocates would not need the 
US help in their fight for human rights – it would only complicate their position 
within Iran and endanger not only their safety but the success of their work.23 
5.0 Hypermasculine game in Tehrani style 
While Khatami and the reformists had faced a growing challenge from the 
conservatives prior to 2002, the Axis of Evil speech facilitated the hardliners’ 
takeover of the body politic and society at large. The first targets of the hardliners’ 
backlash were high profile personalities but as the coming chapter will demonstrate, 
in the coming years the crack down was extended to the wider civil society. 
 
The hardliners took advantage of the Axis of Evil speech to make their drive for 
power. They set out to craft aggressive nationalist-militaristic politics that aimed at 
ending the détente with the US and clear dissident voices from the public sphere. In 
effect, Bush’s projection of hypermasculine identity and politics invited his 
counterparts in Tehran to engage in a similar exercise on their own turf. As one Iran 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 While majority of the Iranian diaspora understood the reality in which civil society 
advocates conduct their work inside Iran, some pro-regime change Iranians in the US 
endorsed the Bush Administration’s declaration of support for civil society advocates and saw 
the toughening US stand against Iran having positive effects in Iran. Azar Nafisi, an Iranian 
author and scholar whose book Reading Lolita was praised by the neoconservative circles in 
Washington, declared in 2003: ‘[U]nlike what many say, Mr. Bush's statement did not harm 
the reformists, did not add to the number of people being harassed or going to jail. In fact 
there were many outspoken statements after his speech, including a Feb. 4 talk by a leading 
reformist, Abbas Abdi, who claimed that the threat to Iran did not come from any outside 
force but that the main threat was the fact that almost all social and political institutions in 
Iran were crumbling, and that people had lost almost all confidence in the state. I can cite 
many more examples. I can send you the responses that came directly from Iran even after 
Mr. Bush's statement, via email and phone calls, as well as call-ins to Voice of America and 
the Iranian radio in L.A., to show how supportive Iranians were, only because of their 
disenchantment and frustration with the whole regime, hardliner or reformist. The regime as a 
whole, especially the conservatives, despite their vitriolic rhetoric against the U.S., were 
genuinely scared, and they have been trying to save face and polish their act’ (Wen 
Stephenson (2003) ‘Mutual Assured Misunderstanding?: Interview with Azar Nafisi’, 
Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/axis/nafisi.html, retrieved  
May 29, 2013). 
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observer writes, the Axis of Evil speech effectively halted the reformist politics: 
If conservatives had painstakingly prepared [Khatami’s] coffin, Bush had 
unwittingly provided [the conservatives] with the final nail. […] There was 
little doubt that henceforth the perceived threat from the United States would 
cast a long shadow on the political dynamic within Iran. From now on, 
proponents of pluralism and reform would be cast as, at the very least, 
unwitting fifth columnists for a foreign power that was determined to 
destabilise the regime and at worst dismember the country. In language 
reminiscent of right-wing rhetoric elsewhere, dissent and criticism were 
defined as unpatriotic and harmful to the nation (Ansari 2003: 235). 
Similarly, according to Shirin Ebadi the extension of the War on Terror to Iran had 
strengthened fundamentalism not only in Iran but also in the region in general and 
gave the Iranian regime a new justification ‘to keep people silent.’ She argued that 
‘under slogans such as protecting national security or fighting terrorism, there’s 
always a reason to act against and silence human rights advocates,’ and in essence the 
War on Terror ‘hurt[s] the democracy process in Iran’ (Ebadi quoted in Slavin 2004). 
Thus, the hardliners warmly welcomed Bush’s Axis of Evil speech and later the July 
statement. The naming of Iran as an official enemy in the War on Terror gave the 
hardliners maybe the most powerful tool in the internal power struggle against 
Khatami, to repudiate domestic reforms and block any initiatives for détente between 
Iran and the US. On the one hand, they were now able to demonstrate that there was 
absolutely no reason why a closer relationship should be re-established between 
Tehran and Washington. The ideological opposition to the Great Satan was once 
again proved to be the right stand to be taken in the country’s foreign policy and it 
gave them a powerful tool for domestic politics. On the other hand, they were able to 
intensify their campaign aimed at clearing the political sphere of the reformists.  
Soon after the Axis of Evil speech, the hardliners launched a campaign that 
blackmailed reformists and forced them to withdraw from pursuing any talks with the 
US.24 An editorial in the ultra-conservative Kayhan newspaper outlined the campaign: 
Under the present conditions the real enemy of the people and the revolution is the 
United States and any kind of dissent in this regard is either the work of American 
spies or it will end up being in America's interest. If someone does not accept the fact 
that the Islamic revolution is against the United States, he should not hold any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 However, it seems that some segments inside the conservatives were secretly trying to 
pursue negotiations with the Bush Administration in the spring 2002 but these ultimately 
failed. See Ali Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change 
(London, Chatmam House, 2003) 
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executive positions. That would be a betrayal of the ideals of our nation, which 
screams against the United States as the nation's real enemy (Kayhan 2002). 
 
From the spring 2002 onwards, reformist politicians were aggressively attacked by 
the hardliners and accused of being the enemy’s ‘fifth column’ working towards 
American ‘aims and goals’ which included the overthrow of the Islamic Republic 
(Kayhan 2002) and as such they were accused of treason. By June 2002 President 
Khatami was forced to admit his defeat and reverse his policy of engagement: 
[W]hen a great power abuses a nation's feelings in response to the ugliest form 
of terrorism that happened there, to pursue its particular interests […] and 
when it addresses another nation in a martial, insulting, degrading and 
threatening tone, in such a situation, the slightest flexibility, let alone 
negotiations, signify a lack of attention to the interests and dignity of the 
Iranian people. I declare and believe that this is the opinion of all the Iranian 
people and the country's official policy, and in this situation, the slightest 
flexibility, let alone talks, signify a lack of attention to the interests and dignity 
of the Iranian people. In fact I am surprised with all the fuss made over a 
matter that has not yet happened. More or less all those who speak about talks 
with America are either opposed to them or agree that now is not the time for 
such talks. Why must we create the impression that this is the time for talks? I 
follow the political system's overall policies. Let us not do anything that will 
threaten the country's interests and dignity and the system's overall policies 
(Hayat-e No 2002). 
 
 If effect, the reformists were left with no other option than to join the hardliners’ anti-
American rhetoric.  
If the hardliners’ first task had been to end the détente with the US, the second task 
was to oust the reformists from formal politics as conclusively as possible. The Bush 
Administration’s July statement not only encouraged the hardliners’ repression 
against the reformists but increasingly also against civil society actors in the NGO 
community, including women’s movement advocates whom the Bush Administration 
had singled out. Ayatollah Khamenei responded to the statement in the following 
way: 
In the propaganda and the remarks by the Americans […] they talk about 
reform in Iran. Reform is a nice word. In the eyes of the Americans however, 
reform means the elimination of the Islamic Republic. […] Sometimes one 
hears that […] such and such opportunity was lost. What opportunity? 
Surrender before the bullying and greed of a world predator and an arrogant 
power is no honor (Khamenei quoted in Clawson, 2002). 
 
According to the hardliners, the July statement presented the Iranian civil society 
clearly as ‘an American project’ (Kayhan’s editorial quoted in World Press 2002). 
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The clearing of reformists from formal politics was done at four levels: 1) in the 
Majles reformist orchestrated bills, particularly ‘women-friendly’ bills that may have 
consolidated the reformists’ popularity, were systematically blocked with the help of 
the Guardian Council and the judiciary; 2) by employing the state’s security forces, 
the Revolutionary Guards and the Basji, in systematic campaigns violently targeting 
and harassing reformists and their high profile supporters; 3) in the coming Majles 
and presidential elections the Guardian Council’s right to veto candidates was 
exercised systematically and thousands of reformist candidates were disqualified; and 
finally 4) at the level of civil society a gradual environment of fear was created 
through intimidation of civil society actors – effectively allowing the hardliners to 
demonstrate that the reformists were not only unable to deliver the promised reforms 
but also unable to protect their supporters. These factors together with the nationalist-
militaristic discourse sponsored by the hardliners made the political atmosphere 
extremely tense in the country. These developments came to reduce both physical and 
discursive activism spaces for civil society actors and in particular for women’s 
movement advocates who had been singled out by the Bush Administration in its 
campaign for regime change in Iran. The following months and years saw as a period 
of general apathy about possible political and socio-economic change among the 
reformists and their supporters. 
5.1 Repression in the legal sphere and parliamentary politics 
Khatami and the reformist dominated Sixth Majles (2000-2004) had envisioned that 
they could materialise their vision of Iran via their legal work in the Majles. Several 
bills proposed in the Sixth Majles aimed at reducing the power of the unelected 
bodies such as that of the Guardian Council, setting the legal framework that would 
ensure civil society actors freer and safer operation in society and improve the 
country’s human rights situation. However, from the early 2002 onwards the 
Guardian Council increasingly blocked the reformists’ bills in the Majles as un-
Islamic or incompatible with Islam and as such reducing the reformists’ ability to 
deliver their promises. 
 
5.1.1 Women’s Faction in the Majles 
In the Sixth Majles, thirteen reformist female MPs formed the so-called Women’s 
Faction that was supported by other reformist MPs and sometimes even by the more 
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conservative MPs in the Majles. The Women’s Faction placed their demands firmly 
within the framework of Islam and showed loyalty to the 1979 Revolution and to the 
Islamic Republic. However, at the same time, according to one of the Women’s 
Faction MPs, Elaheh Koolaee, the Faction aimed to address ’the gap between the 
ideals of the Islamic Revolution and the reality of women’s status and rights’ in Iran 
(Koolaee 2005: 207). These women representatives saw responsibility for women’s 
subordinate legal status as lying within Iran’s power politics and in patriarchal 
interpretations of the Sharia which were controlled and interpreted by certain 
segments of the state, leaving no room for alternative interpretations. Thus the 
problem was not the religion but the interpreters of the religion (see for instance MP 
Fatemeh Rakei’s interview in Payvand 2004). For ordinary women and women’s 
movement advocates, Khatami’s election in 1997 and re-election in 2001 and the 
reformist dominated Sixth Majles had raised hopes about legal changes among many 
women and many felt that ‘under [Khatami’s] presidency women’s issues could be 
fought more easily’ than under a more conservative president (Rostami-Povey 2001: 
49). And this was the case for the first part of the parliamentary session. The 
Women’s Faction secured several legal changes improving women’s legal position in 
Iran.  
The Faction focused its efforts especially on family law, education and penal code 
and successfully amended several sections during the first part of the parliamentary 
session. In May 2002, women’s long campaign for changes in child custody was 
rewarded when the Majles ratified the amendment of the Article 1169 of the Civil 
Code which now allows divorced women to retain the custody of their children under 
the age of seven. Women also managed to secure a new clause to be included in the 
Article that allows judges to rule case-by-case who can retain children in spousal 
disputes over children’s custody – leaving women with more leeway in child-custody 
cases.25 In August 2002, the Women’s Faction campaigned for the passing of a new 
divorce law. The amended law granted women full divorce rights and the right for 
financial claims in the divorce. Prior to the law was approved in December 2002, 
woman could not have filed for divorce without the permission of her husband or she 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See an excellent study by Mir-Hosseini and Longinotto (1998) on Iranian women’s use of 
family courts and individual judges to further their claims in legal process prior to the legal 
changes in the 2000s. 
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had had to prove that her spouse was either unable to deliver support for his family, or 
that he was a drug addict, impotent or insane. The Women’s Faction also worked to 
create guarantees that professional married couples would be able to work in the same 
city and at the same time keep their families intact. Similarly, the Faction campaigned 
to exempt women’s dowries (mahrieh) from taxation (Koolaee 2005: 210). Moreover, 
in the sphere of family law, the legal age for marriage rose to thirteen years for girls 
and fifteen to boys. 26 In the educational sphere, the Women’s Faction was successful 
opening scholarships to young women wishing to study abroad – prior to the change 
only men could receive these scholarships but now the Faction secured this right to 
women as well. They similarly pushed the right to study subjects such as mining, 
technical sciences, engineering and agriculture which had previously been available 
only to men (Koolaee 2005: 209).  
However, later in the year of 2002 the political environment grew tenser and this was 
felt in the workings of the Women’s Faction as well. The Guardian Council 
increasingly and repeatedly blocked women’s initiatives in the Majles (Human Rights 
Watch 2003). One of these legal concerns was that of stoning in the penal code. In 
Iran, more women than men tend to face stoning, which is prescribed for adultery 
while being married, and several women’s NGOs had actively campaigned against 
stoning.27 The Women’s Faction wanted to remove stoning from the penal code but 
the Guardian Council strongly objected. As Ayatollah Gholamreza Rezvani, one of 
the Council’s members, argued: ‘[T]here is no replacement for stoning as a sanction 
because the ruling of Islam does not depend on the tastes of society’ (Hayat-e Now 
2002b). The Women’s Faction failed to deliver on this issue, but in December 2002, 
the judiciary intervened and agreed to place a moratorium on stoning.28 However, 
several human rights organisations and women’s NGOs have reported of women 
being stoned around the country since the moratorium. In the same category was the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 It is worth noting that in reality the average age for both women and men to marry is over 
twenty years. 
27 In 2006, a number of civil society actors led by women’s movement activists started a 
campaign named ’Stop Stoning Forever’ against stoning in Iran. 
28 The judiciary’s decision came from the head of the judiciary, Ayatollah Shahroudi, who 
although conservative was also known for his ’fair mindness’ (see Ansari on Shahroudi as the 
head of the judiciary in early 2000s (Ali Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of 
Managing Change (London, Chatmam House, 2000)). The judiciary’s intervention also 
helped to evade the Guardian Council’s interference in the issue, which would have most 
likely kept the bill allowing stoning effective. 
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Faction’s campaign for equal blood money to be paid for women. The Faction was 
hopeful that this would succeed after the law was changed in 2002 to apply equally to 
Muslims and non-Muslims but the hardline forces objected strongly and the Faction 
failed to reform the law (Koolaee 2005: 214). 
One of the main goals of the Faction was the ratification of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The 
Women’s Faction was sceptical how quickly the Convention would materialise on the 
domestic scene but they also saw it as a means to demonstrate that Iran was not to be 
stigmatised as one of those War on Terror targeted Muslim societies disrespectful of 
women’s right and that Iranian women should not be seen or presented as victims of 
Islam or the Islamic Republic (see MP Fatemeh Rakei’s interview on the issue for 
IRNA 2003). Or, as one of my interviewees argued, for her, the ratifying of the 
Convention would have signalled that Iran is a modern and civil nation state (Zahra, 
Tehran, April 2010). Unsurprisingly, the Guardian Council rejected the bill by 
claiming that ‘[O]nce Iran signs the convention, it will be obliged to accept its 
contents in cases that are against Islamic rulings’ and therefore, the council voted the 
bill as against the Sharia (Payvand 2003). 
Other legal reforms that the women representatives failed to deliver due to hardline 
backlash in the second half of their term included the nationality status of Iranian 
women married to foreign men and the student quota system in the fields of medicine, 
dentistry, and pharmacology. In this particular case the Ministry of Health claimed 
that the number of female students had risen too much in these scientific disciplines in 
the universities and to keep the balance in the field it was necessary to have gender 
quotas. With the cooperation and support of the Majles’ education committee the 
Women’s Faction proposed a bill prohibiting the use of any gender-based quota 
system in university admissions, however, the bill was rejected (Koolaee 2005: 210). 
Also, the Faction campaigned hard to pass a law that would have secured equal pay 
for men and women but they failed due to the conservative forces in the Majles 
(Koolaee 2005: 211). 
5.1.2 Seventh Majles elections 
When the Seventh Majles elections were approaching in the spring of 2004 and 
candidates were submitting their registration to the Guardian Council, the political 
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environment was extremely tense and many felt that political apathy was taking over 
society. Moreover, the Guardian Council’s decision to disqualify more than 2,500 
reformist candidates from standing in the elections took the hardliners’ backlash to 
another level. Since the 1979 Revolution, Iranian elections had been fairly open and 
transparent and although disqualifying candidates was not a new development, the 
sheer volume of banned candidates was a slap in the face for people who had believed 
in and supported the Republic. In January 2004, the Sixth Majles’ reformist MPs 
staged a sit-in in which they protested against the Guardian Council’s decision to vet 
reformist candidates from running. In a published statement, the reformists accused 
the Guardian Council of undermining and sacrificing the republican elements of the 
Islamic Republic (IRNA 2004). The manipulation of the Seventh Majles elections 
also stirred the reformist side when over one hundred reformist MPs decided to resign 
in protest. 
 
This wave of resignations also meant that many of the Women’s Faction’s MPs 
decided to exit formal politics. Fatemeh Haqiqatjoo was one of them. In January 
2004, she delivered her resignation speech in the Majles and it resonated with the 
views of many ordinary Iranian women who had supported the reformists but had also 
been disappointed with the little progress that they had achieved in the past seven 
years. Haqiqatjoo’s speech repeated her loyalty to Islam, Ayatollah Khomeini and the 
Islamic Republic and she stressed how it was within this framework that she had 
wanted to pursue her work, however, she felt that working for reform within the state 
was no longer possible. She then proceeded to critically analyse the current state of 
affairs in Iran. For her, the Islamic Republic had diverted from its democratic path in 
the hands of a ‘power-drunk’ few who, in order to keep themselves in power, accuse 
anyone who criticises the system of crimes against national security (Iran Press 
Service 2004). She concluded her resignation by referring to her oath that she had 
taken when she sworn in as a MP in 2000. The oath requires MPs ‘to remain faithful 
to Islam and the constitution, to defend the independence and the interests of the 
country, and to serve the people.’ However, Haqiqatjoo felt that: 
[S]ince the possibility of keeping my oath has been taken away from me and I 
have been deprived of the [ability to] defend your legal rights, it is no longer a 
source of pride for me to stay in this house and see the deviation from the 
Imam’s ideal, the nation and the constitution. Therefore, by my resignation, I 
declare my protest at the incorrect, illegal and non-religious conduct of the 
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appointed bodies in recent years, which has reached its peak in the February 
22 [2004] elections (Iran Press Service 2004). 
 
For the women’s movement advocates this had far reaching consequences. Haqiqatjoo 
was not the only woman MP who decided to leave formal politics. Disappointed with 
the reform movement and the increasing state repression facilitated the exit of many 
women MPs from formal politics and activism. During the Sixth Majles, several 
individual women’s movement advocates and women’s NGOs had formed close 
relationships with the reformists MPs and with the Women’s Faction especially. Now, 
there would not be a similar close working relationship between women working in 
civil society and people supporting them and representing their ideas and agendas in 
formal politics. As one of my interviewees working for a NGO noted, 
‘[T]his meant that we would have no access to the corridors of power. We 
were in no position to inform the Majles of the problems that women face in 
their everyday life or how we could improve women’s status. Because of this 
any progress or legal change that might have taken place was halted’ (Nasrin, 
Tehran April 2010). 
 
On February 20 2004, the hardliners secured a victory with 54 per cent in the Seventh 
Maljes (2004-2008) elections. The winners of the elections were the hardliner parties 
Abadgaran and Isargaran that won the majority of seats, including in Tehran. The 
take over of the Majles was seen as the second step in the hardliners’ attempt to 
regain control over the body politic. A year earlier, the above named parties had won 
the municipal elections, again with a low turnout. However, whilst many Iranians 
boycotted the Majles elections, the turnout, estimated between 47 to 52 per cent, was, 
according to an Iran specialist, ‘not sufficiently low to provide the reformists with a 
moral victory’ (PBS 2004; Ansari 2003: 265). People were not only protesting against 
the hardliners but also silently demonstrating against the disappointing performance 
of the reformists.  
Twelve women were elected to the Seventh Majles but only one of them, Mehrangiz 
Morovati, represented the reformists. The conservative women who were elected 
decided to discontinue the Women’s Faction and without the support of the Faction, 
Morovati found it hard to push for legal reforms in favour of women (Koolaee 2012: 
144).  The other eleven women came from the conservative ranks of Basij (who were 
one of the main forces behind Ahmadinejad election a year later) and they had a 
different approach to women’s roles and duties in the public sphere (Koolaee 2012: 
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144). While women in the Sixth Majles had emphasised the importance of family life 
in women’s lives, they had also campaigned hard to include women as active 
participants in the public sphere. However, the women representatives of the Seventh 
Majles emphasised women’s familial roles as wives and mothers. They, for example, 
campaigned against the ratification of CEDAW, proposed to reduce women’s 
working hours so that women could spend more time at home and defended men’s 
right to polygamy (Koolaee 2012: 145; Kian n.d.: 17). Many felt that the hardliners 
who secured a majority in the Seventh Majles effectively halted debate on gender 
issues and stifled alternative voices. 
5.1.3 Silencing high-profile women reformists 
From the above section it becomes clear that the hardliners undermined, via unelected 
institutions, the ability of the reformists, and women reformists in particular, to 
deliver changes in legislation. This not only cleared women reformists from formal 
politics but also made it harder for women’s movement advocates to be heard in 
formal politics as women MPs had often been their supporters and pushed for their 
agendas in the Majles. To further demoralise the reformist, the hardliners had begun 
an intense and violent campaign against key reform figures. Informal security forces 
such as the Basij who were loyal to the hardliners increasingly conducted the 
harassment and arrests. High profile female reformists felt the crack down especially 
hard. Several human rights reports noted how state violence increased in the period 
2002-2004. Reformist MPs and people close to them were increasingly harassed, 
intimidated and even jailed. Reformist newspapers were periodically closed down and 
their editors and key journalists were jailed. As a human rights report from 2004 
reports, the hardliners managed ‘to virtually silence the political opposition within the 
country through the systematic use of indefinite solitary confinement of political 
prisoners […] and denial of basic due process rights to all those detained for the 
expression of dissenting views’ (HRW 2004:2). According to the same report, women 
MPs were among other things harassed, arbitrarily arrested, summoned to court, 
jailed, interrogated by security forces and banned to leave the country (HRW 2004). 
This, together with the undermining of the reformists in the Majles, effectively 
cleared high profile reformists from formal politics.  
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5.2 Civil society targeted 
President Khatami’s election back in 1997, Iran’s first local elections in 1999 and the 
Sixth Majles elections in 2000, had activated many new people to participate in 
politics and this, in turn, had brought the issue of civil society on Iran’s political map. 
The reformists who dominated all the major elected political bodies between 1997-
2004 encouraged civil society activism and facilitated the emergence of indigenous 
social, economic and cultural projects while, at the same time, they tried to shelter 
them from the hardliners’ attempts to restrict grass root activism. However, when 
Khatami’s credentials were crushed in foreign policy as well, he was no longer able to 
protect civil society actors. In a speech delivered on August 3 2003, he apologised for 
and cautioned his supporters of the slow progress of reform but also reminded that it 
was still attainable. Khatami admitted that not all the ‘legitimate demands’ and 
‘expectations’ could be met at this point due to the ‘many obstacles and difficulties 
from within and without’ but he believed that they had ‘no alternative but to continue 
with the current path’ and if they ‘resort to prudence and patience, God willing, [they] 
will reach [their] destination’ (Network 1, 2003). Yet, for many Khatami’s words 
came too late and offered very little concrete support. Shirin Ebadi argued a few 
months later that ‘[P]resident Khatami has wasted all the historical changes given 
him, and the domestic reform movements have passed by him’ (Ebadi quoted in 
Amuzegar 2004: 81).  
 
5.2.1 Women’s NGOs 
Since his first election in 1997, Khatami and his Administration had encouraged 
citizen participation and supported particularly NGOs working with women and 
children (Namazi 2000: 73). President Khatami set up a Centre for Women’s 
Participation in the Office of the Presidency, which encouraged women to found and 
participate in NGOs. Post-revolutionary Iran’s NGO scene emerged in the mid-1990s 
when women’s issues re-emerged in the debates both at the state level and in society 
and as such they can be seen as an extension of Iran’s post-1979 women’s movement 
(Rostami-Povey 2004: 257). The number of women’s NGOs rose from 67 in 1997 to 
480 in 2005 and in addition to this there were over 3,000 women’s cooperatives, 
which often worked together with NGOs (Amnesty International 2008; Namazi 2000: 
102). Women’s NGOs work both in urban –and rural areas where the state is less 
present or had retreated its services. Women’s NGOs concentrated on educational, 
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health and population issues, income-generating activities, family and youth 
programs, prostitution and drugs, sustainable development and refugees. Almost all of 
these programs, however, mainstream gender issues into their agendas. While Iranian 
women’s NGOs have been criticised for being relief focused and as such reinforcing 
dependency and undermining self-reliance of the target groups (see e.g. Namazi 
2000), Rostami-Povey’s study has shown that since the early 2000s women’s NGOs 
have been challenging several different types of institutional power including the 
state, family and community and as such they have created a space of their own in 
which women have been able to improve their life by learning how to earn their own 
income, and develop organisational, leadership and negotiation skills, to name a few 
(Rostami-Povey 2004). In addition to this, women’s NGOs have proved to be 
instrumental in shaping gender-specific legislation at the state level (Nazir, Tehran 
April 2010). 
 
However, the flourishing women’s NGO scene in Iran began to suffer in 2004. As 
argued above, several human rights organisations have noted how the hardliners’ 
victory in the Seventh Majles election marked a watershed in the country’s political 
regression. However, this soon materialised also in restrictions on civil society 
activism (see among others Freedom House 2005; Human Rights Watch 2004; 
Human Rights & Democracy for Iran 2004). A report from November 2004 
documents that in September 2004 a new development emerged in which the regime 
is attacking mid-level activists in the NGO community for the first time. The report 
states that these activists were targeted as the hardliners’ attempt ‘to purge critics 
from society’ and the activists detained in the autumn of 2004 were accused by Jamal 
Karimi Rad, the Judiciary’s spokesman, of ‘propaganda against the regime, 
endangering national security, inciting public unrest, and insulting sacred belief’ 
(Human Rights & Democracy for Iran 2004).  According to my interviewees, several 
NGO activists were arbitrarily arrested, harassed by the security forces and banned to 
travel abroad. Since the elections that brought the hardliners to power, many NGO 
workers felt that they spent more time fighting against structural obstacles limiting 
their work than making any real ‘hands-on’ work (interview with Nazir, Tehran April 
2010; see also Human Rights Watch 2004). They also reported of increasing mistrust 
between different NGOs and individual sponsors halting their funding due to the 
authorities’ increasing surveillance and targeting of sponsors as ‘counter-
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revolutionary’. Moreover, links to foreign NGOs and sponsors were being severed 
due to the increasing surveillance. This information is supported by documents from 
human rights organisations.  
This was an unfortunate development as in the early 2000s the working environment 
for NGOs had improved quite dramatically. While Khatami Administration had 
supported citizen participation, the working environment had not been easy for NGOs 
due to the overcomplicated and uncoordinated but necessary registration process, 
which often arbitrarily accepted or denied NGO licenses. In late 2002, a group of 
women’s NGOs gathered together and drafted a letter to Khatami. The letter included 
an update on the political milieu in which Iranian NGOs were working and a detailed 
plan how to improve the situation (interview with Nazir, April 2010, Tehran). This 
materialised in the Ministry of Interior’s new guidelines and in a new NGO law later 
in 2003, which improved NGOs working environment in several fields. 29 This 
positive trend was however reversed when the hardliners’ crackdown intensified. 
Many NGO activists felt that they were let down by the reformists while at the same 
time they were bearing the burden of factional political fighting in which none stood 
up for them: 
I personally feel that Khatami let us down. Words never protect you. Someone 
needs to act in order to protect you. It’s been terrible to see your friends being 
harassed, arrested. We paid for Khatami’s inaction. Maybe he lost his vision 
for reform? It was like our movement meant nothing when something bigger 
was on the table (Zahra, Tehran, April, 2010). 
 
The crack down on the NGO community, a community that had worked besides the 
state and assisted it to provide basic services, effectively created an atmosphere of 
fear among NGO activists and made the state violence to be felt on the backs of 
ordinary people working for NGOs. And this time around, there was no reformist 
leadership to shield the activists from the repression. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The new law included the introduction of a supervisory committee to oversee the activities 
of local NGOs operating in the provinces; additional resources, including financial aid and 
assistance from government organisations which were made available to NGOs; the law also 
improved current procedures for appealing decisions regarding NGOs licenses; and maybe 
most importantly the new law granted NGOs to pursue legal remedies on behalf of the public 
interest (see an excellent review of Iran’s NGO laws: Negar Katirai (2005), ‘NGO 
Regulations in Iran’, The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Vol. 7 (4); On NGOs 
general problems in Iran see Ali Akbar Bromideh (2011), ‘The Widespread Challenges of 
NGOs in Developing Countries: Case Studies from Iran’, International NGO Journal, Vol. 6 
(9): 197-202. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
In January 2002, the Bush Administration opened a new front in the War on Terror. 
With the introduction of the new policy metaphor, the Axis of Evil, Iran and the 
Iranian regime were placed on the opposite side from ‘us’, on the dark side. This 
change of heart of the Bush Administration washed away the tentative détente 
between Iran and the US that had promisingly started in the aftermath of 9/11 and 
which was, over the cooperation in Afghanistan, achieving some concrete results. 
Iranians, and the reformists in particular, had a hard time to understand why Iran had 
suddenly qualified as a member of the Axis.  
This chapter argued that Iran’s naming as one of the enemy countries resulted partly 
from President Bush’s needs to flex its hypermasculine identity. For domestic reasons 
the Administration needed to demonstrate that it was ‘doing something’ and that the 
War on Terror’s continuation was justified. In essence, the introduction of the Axis 
allowed the Administration to exercise positional superiority, which made it possible 
to reinforce the simplistic division of the world into good and evil and simplifying the 
conflict into one in which the Other’s agency, history, voice and concerns are silenced 
and/or denied. However, the Administration’s persistence in producing and crafting of 
external threats, or of Monsters, was not only driven by its need to secure its 
distinctive identity but also by its need to discipline and police borders between the 
Self and the Other that creates a sense of security to the Self. The Self’s existence 
relies and builds on the violent production of borders and segregations which reflect 
the ‘insecurity about the Other becoming an actor rather than object’ in international 
politics (Nayak 2006: 45, emphasis in original). The orientalist anxiety about the 
Other exercising its individual and even equal subjectivity (to the Self), seen in the 
violent response to the attacks of 9/11, was only intensified with the introduction of 
the Axis of Evil. While the Bush Administration needed Iran to exist as the Monster 
in order to secure it own distinctive role in the post-9/11 world, there was anxiety 
about Iran establishing itself as a respected member in the global community, in 
particular via Iran’s constructive role in the rebuilding of Afghanistan.  
The Bush Administration justified Iran’s inclusion in the Axis of Evil by its type of 
government, the regime’s support for anti-Israeli Palestinian groups and its poor 
record of human rights and women’s rights in particular. With the help of these, the 
	   105	  
Administration created a strategic image of the Iranian regime that allowed the 
Administration to police and discipline this yet another Monster. The Iranian regime’s 
deviance from Western civilisation was manifested in its fundamental Islamic 
ideology, repression of human rights and its treatment of women. This demonisation 
of the Iranian regime via old Orientalist words and imaginaries of Muslims as 
enemies of the West effectively lent support to the Bush Administration’s vision of 
war as a solution to the post-9/11 milieu.  
As a consequence of the labelling Iran as one of the Axis of Evil countries, Iran’s 
foreign policy hardened and the door that had been ajar for diplomatic détente was 
shut again. The hardliners in Tehran used this new political environment as a license 
for their re-take over politics and their drive for power can be seen mirroring 
President Bush’s hypermasculinist policies. While calling for national unity and 
return to the Republic’s ideological foundation, the hardliners lashed out on reformist 
politicians, including supporters of the women’s movement, and the NGO sector. The 
Axis of Evil speech and the Bush Administration’s statement in July 2002 that 
declared the Administration’s support for Iranian civil society in its supposed attempt 
to overthrow the regime had far reaching consequences for those who the 
Administration pledged to support and protect, civil society advocates and women’s 
movement advocates in particular. The Bush Administration’s already started 
campaign to save and liberate Muslim women was now extended to include Iranian 
women. The Administration framed Iranian women and the women’s movement not 
only as different from the regime but also supportive of regime change which allowed 
the Iranian regime to name women’s movement advocates as westernised, immoral, 
anti-Islamic and assisting the West in regime change. The hardliners set out to purge 
women’s movement supporters from the high echelons of the body politic and most of 
the high profile women’s movement supporters had exited formal politics by the end 
of 2004. This meant two things to the women’s movement and its advocates in Iran: 
First, the women’s movement had no lobbying access to the Majles where legislation 
takes place and where female reformist MPs had previously sponsored women 
friendly bills. Second, by clearing reformist from formal politics, women’s movement 
advocates had no protection against the increasing state repression that began to target 
civil society after the high profile reformists were forced to exit formal politics. 
Women’s movement advocates, those who the Administration had pledged to support 
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since the autumn of 2001, saw the detrimental consequences of the American 
campaign for their rights their everyday work and life. As Mahboubeh 
Abbasgholizadeh, one of the most known woman’s movement advocates in Iran, 
declared in 2004 that 
[W]omen are the real victims of fundamentalism, be it Islamic or American. […] The 
women’s movement in Iran, although diversified and varied is nonetheless extremely 
alive owing to challenges in obtaining women’s human rights and achieving gender 
equity and equality. The women’s movement in Iran is confronted by two types of the 
“others” in order to obtain their independent identity, “internal” and “external”, the 
former being Islamic fundamentalism and the latter being western fundamentalism 
(Abbasgholizadeh 2004).  
 
The Self’s security seeking foreign policies have the power to conceal the ways in 
which different identities, like that of the Monster and the Feminine Other, are 
constructed in order to naturalise and justify the Other’s disciplining and policing in 
the name of national security. These identities also conceal the ways in which the 
Self’s endeavours to secure itself materialise in violence outside the Self’s borders – 
often on the bodies of ordinary people. In essence, the Self’s need to secure itself and 
to construct and craft its identity via the Other’s difference obscures the violence and 
destruction that inheres in this type of imagining and making of world politics. 	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CHAPTER 5: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND FAILING TO SECURE 
FEMINITITIES, 2005-2008 
 
1.0 Introduction 
By 2005, the Bush Administration’s liberation wars had turned into years of 
occupation and materialised in deteriorating security conditions to people in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The Administration was increasingly challenged not only over 
its decision to waste tax payers’ money on wars that seemed to have no ends to them, 
but also by civil society actors and international organisations working in Afghanistan 
and Iraq that were criticising the Administration over its failure to stabilise the two 
countries and provide security to those it had pledged to protect. This chapter 
examines how the challenge to the Bush Administration’s post-9/11 identity as a 
morally and militarily superior actor pushed the Administration to further inflate its 
masculine identity in global politics. It is argued that the growing criticisms over the 
US role in contributing to the increasing insecurity in both Afghanistan and Iraq made 
the Bush Administration look for ways to re-establish itself as the virtuous Self 
against the Dark Monster and that Iran assumed a central role in this. This search took 
place at the same time with two other developments: 1) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a 
populist hardliner and regime ideologist, won the presidential elections in Iran in June 
2005; and 2) the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the Europeans reached a 
deadlock in the spring 2005. Not only did the new Iranian President Ahmadinejad 
incarnate the Dark Other with his deeply fundamentalist worldview, seemingly 
irrational personality and opposing ideology, but he presented the Bush 
Administration with an opportunity to reclaim its role as the western world’s saviour 
if it succeeded in closing down the nuclear program and toppling the Islamic regime 
that repressed its people and its women in particular.  
 
From 2005 onwards, the Bush Administration employed a new disciplining technique 
against Tehran: economic sanctions that have continued to date. However, the Bush 
Administration’s disciplining policies gave yet another excuse to the hardliners to 
extend their domestic crack down. From the summer of 2005 onwards we can witness 
how the hardliners began to execute the second stage of their plan of taking over the 
body politic. The hardliners had now all the elected institutions in their hands – the 
municipal councils, the Majles and the presidential seat – and this allowed them to 
extend their crack down against the Iranian civil society, the women’s movement 
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included. In this period we see an increasingly conservative gender ideology crafted at 
the level of the state and the state repression of the women’s movement expanding to 
target increasingly ordinary advocates and their activism.  
 
The Bush Administration had been criticised for the lack of support for its invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq inside these countries. To avoid this and to counter some of 
the criticism that the economic sanctions were most likely to cause, the 
Administration introduced the Iran Democracy Fund in 2006. The Fund was aimed at 
creating an internal support base for regime change within Iranian civil society. 
However, the sanctions and the Fund exacerbated trends that contributed to the 
increasing hardliner-organised repression and violence against women’s movement 
advocates. Moreover, these trends began gradually to materialise also in the lives of 
ordinary women not involved the women’s movement. Social conservatism sponsored 
by the hardliners materialised for example in the educational sphere and in campaigns 
targeting public morality.  
 
First, the chapter looks at the ways in which the Bush Administration’s masculine 
identity was undermined by the developments in Afghanistan and Iraq and how this 
led the Administration to look for alternative ways to inflate its masculinity and 
justify its interventionist foreign policy. At the same time in Tehran, the newly elected 
President Ahmadinejad was preparing his own hypermasculine game by reinforcing 
the hardliners’ positions in the body politic. One of the most visible developments 
was the entry of military and paramilitary officers into the country’s political life, 
which effectively militarised the state-society relationship. The second section of the 
chapter turns to look at Iran’s nuclear issue. With the election of Ahmadinejad, the 
US focus shifted to Iran’s nuclear program. The Bush Administration employed 
economic sanctions to discipline Tehran’s hardliners. The sanctions, however, failed 
to achieve the desired policy changes in Iran’s behaviour and actually resulted in 
growing humanitarian costs bore by ordinary Iranians and Iranian women in 
particular. Therefore, the second section of the chapter also examines the impact of 
US/Western sanctions on Iranian women. After the introduction of the Axis of Evil, 
the Bush Administration had pledged to protect Iranian women but both the Bush 
Administration and the Obama Administration, which has only intensified the 
sanctions, effectively feminised Iranian women to bear the burden of sanctions ‘for 
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the greater good’. The final section of the chapter looks at the Iran Democracy Fund 
(2006-2009). The Fund came to mark another failure by the Bush Administration to 
secure femininities it had promised to protect. This section of the chapter sheds light 
on how the Fund facilitated the hardliners’ nationalist-conservative gender ideology 
and intensified the crackdown on civil society activists. Compared to the period 2002-
2004, the state repression was widened to target not only high profile women’s 
movement actors but also low profile women’s movement actors and ordinary 
women. 
 
The chapter argues that despite the Bush Administration emphasis on democratisation 
and Muslim women’s human rights, Iranian women’s movement advocates have been 
violently pushed to the margins and the space – both physical and discursive – for 
their activism has been narrowed as the hardliners have interpreted them to embody 
the enemy. Moreover, when compared to the 2002-2004 period when high profile 
activists were targeted, in the period 2005-2009 more and more ordinary Iranian 
women became victims of state repression. In essence, fundamentalist worldviews – 
both American/Western secularism and hardline Islamism – have materialised not 
only as outright violence against women but also as deteriorating living conditions 
under the economic sanctions. 
 
2.0 The Bush Administration’s de-masculinisation 
The Americans re-elected President Bush in 2004 but like in 2000, the 2004 
presidential elections were decided by one state. Ohio’s twenty electoral votes gave 
Bush his margin of victory over the democratic candidate Sen. John Kerry. Both 
candidates’ campaigning focused heavily on foreign policy. Bush emphasised 
questions of national security and the on-going War on Terror and cast himself as a 
leader who would lead ‘with strength and confidence’ and declared that ‘[I]f America 
shows weakness and uncertainty, the world will drift toward tragedy. That will not 
happen on my watch’ (Bush quoted in The Washington Post 2004a). However, in the 
campaign period Bush was continuously challenged over his decision to invade Iraq 
and polling rates for supporting the war in Iraq were souring dramatically.30 The fact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Whereas in 2003, seventy-six per cent of Americans initially supported the Iraq war, in 
April 2004 only forty-seven per cent of Americans thought that the US had done the right 
thing by invading Iraq. Moreover, fifty-eight per cent of Americans did not see the war in Iraq 
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that no WMDs were found in Iraq, humanitarian costs in the post-invasions societies 
were becoming more and more visible, the US forces were being increasingly targeted 
by insurgents both in Afghanistan and Iraq, two foreign invasions eating tax-payers 
money and an increasing number of American soldiers being stationed abroad and 
coming home in coffins were damaging the Administration’s claims about the 
character of the Monster and evaporating American public’s enthusiasm for the War 
on Terror which was becoming harder and harder to rationalise. With the marginal 
victory over Kerry, Bush needed to prove that the way he had imagined and created 
the American Self and its disciplining relationship with the Dark Other were justified 
in his War on Terror. 
 
2.1 Failing to secure and protect 
Bush’s mission to liberate the world from terror and tyranny was not only challenged 
and criticised by his domestic constituency but also increasingly by the international 
actors and the very people who Bush had pledged to save. By 2005, the ‘illusory guise 
of “protection” and “security”, “democracy” and “freedom”’ (Russo 2006: 559) was 
dissolving report-by-report coming from Afghanistan and Iraq. Insurgency was on the 
rise in both countries and human rights advocates and organisations from both 
countries were reporting on worsening human rights situations of civilians and 
women and children in particular.  
 
For instance, the Afghanistan Human Development Report from 2007 reported that 
violence against women in Afghanistan had reached ‘epidemic proportions’ (UNDP 
2007: 26). The Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences challenged the Bush Administration’s cultural explanations of Afghan 
women’s human rights violations and argued that there was an urgent need to 
recognise the ways in which the US invasion and the post-conflict situation in 
Afghanistan had accelerated violence against Afghan women. The Rapporteur singled 
out four factors: 1) the traditional patriarchal gender order had been strengthened due 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
worth the loss of American lives and other costs. As one of the people who had been 
interviewed for the poll argued: ’[I]n going to war with Iraq Mr. Bush took that fight in the 
wrong direction. I believe we've gotten sidetracked from finding Al Qaeda’ (An interviewee 
quoted in the New York Times/CBS News Poll 2004). 
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to the invasion which had threatened local masculinities;31 2) the erosion of protective 
social mechanisms;32 3) the lack of the rule of law in war situation/post-war situation 
which reflects the West’s failure to provide security and unify the ethnically diverse 
country;33 and finally 4) poverty and insecurity that had only worsened after the US 
invasion34 (UN Economic and Social Council 2006). As one analyst summed up 
women’s situation in Afghanistan: 
‘[T]he war on terror did not present Afghan women with an immediate change 
in status, rights or opportunity. In fact, the deteriorating security situation has 
severely negatively affected women’s ability to enjoy the rights and 
opportunities promised them by the international community’ (Farhoumand-
Sims 2007; see also Rostami-Povey 2007). 
 
A very similar situation was taking place in Iraq. By 2005, several Iraqi NGOs, 
women’s rights activists, scholars and international organisations were pointing to the 
occupation’s failure to improve Iraqi women’s situation in the country and to the 
ways in which, like in Afghanistan, it had rather eroded women’s rights situation and 
security in the country (see among others Amnesty International 2005; Human Rights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For instance, it has been noticed that domestic violence has increased in the post-invasion 
Afghanistan due to the experienced trauma, frustration and inability to access economic 
possibilities by masculinities. See Lina Abirafeh, Freedom is Only Won From the Inside: 
Domestic Violence in Post-Conflict Afghanistan (The Peaceful Families Project 2006). 
32  In 2001-2002, the US invasion displaced at least 2.2 million people internally and 
thousands of civilians were killed in the coming years and it is estimated that by 2013 over 
30,000 civilians have died in the post-invasion situation in Afghanistan. A UNAMA report 
from 2013 found that deaths and injuries to women and children in particular, and whom the 
coalition forces pledged to protect, have disturbingly increased year by year (UNAMA 2013). 
Moreover, deaths in family, migration and/or growing refugee numbers have broken up 
families and larger social communities and left particularly women vulnerable. 
33 In the post-invasion period, Afghan women’s physical insecurity materialised for instance 
in increasing numbers of rape, kidnapping and trafficking. See for example Elaheh Rostami-
Povey, Afghan Women: Identity and Invasion (London, Zed Books, 2007). And as the 
Rapporteur argued in the report, it is the rule of power rather than the rule of law that has 
become the norm in Afghanistan. 
34 The report noted how the invasion contributed to the transformation of the country’s 
economy away from subsistence agriculture and pastoralism to a war economy based on 
drugs. In 2011, the director of operations of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
reported that after twelve years after the US invasion, insecurity is at a critical level for 
civilians in Afghanistan and further noted that ‘Afghans today are living in an environment 
where increasing numbers of people openly carry weapons and armed groups proliferate. […] 
Besides uniformed forces, a multitude of opposition and pro-government armed groups are 
actively engaged in fighting. […] Afghans living in villages where conflict is rife are having 
to take an impossible decision: choose sides or leave home. This is the reality of Afghanistan 
today’ (ICRC 2011). Together worsening poverty –and insecurity levels have materialised in 
people’s lack of access to employment, education and health-care among other things. In 
Afghanistan, women’s access to these services is even lower than men’s (UNDP 2007). 
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Watch 2005; Oxfam 2007; Women for Women International 2005; Al-Ali 2005; Pratt 
2005; Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Salbi 2013). 
 
2.2 Emasculated superiority 
The Iraq occupation slapped the Bush Administration in its face yet in another way in 
April 2004, when photographs of the torture of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib spread.35 
The images angered people around the world and crushed the Administration’s claims 
about America’s moral superiority and exceptionalism and made many of the US 
allies unsettled. While Bush declared that the sexual abuse of prisoners ‘does not 
reflect the nature of American people’ (The NYT 2004a), Puar noted that the torture 
of Iraqi prisoners effectively narrowed ‘the gap between us and them – between the 
patriot and the terrorist’ as the acts not only involved the same site but also the same 
people being tortured (Puar 2004: 523). Bush’s declaration that the torture was 
practiced only by a few perverted individuals and that the rest of the America could 
never perform such acts (The Washington Post 2004b), aimed to salvage both the 
white hetero-normative discourse and America’s superior moral authority position 
against the Dark Monster that had been instrumental to the post-9/11 political 
environment.  
 
Interestingly, the Administration directed the blame also on the victims. Apparently, 
had the US personnel known how degrading homosexual acts are to Muslim men, 
they would not have resorted to these humiliating methods (Hersh 2004).36 By 
presenting homosexual acts as taboos to Muslim men, the Administration employed 
the centuries old Orientalist imaginary of the Middle Eastern sexuality: repressed on 
the surface but perversity bubbling underneath (Puar 2004: 525). However, the torture 
at Abu Ghraib exposed that the US had failed to be superior to one of the Dark 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 These pictures are so well known that I do not describe them. They can be found online for 
example at http://www.antiwar.com/news/?articleid=8560, retrieved November 6, 2013.  
36 According to Seymour Hersh, the Administration was well aware of ’Arab’s/Muslims’’ 
views on sexuality. Apparently the neoconservatives in Washington were circulating the book 
’The Arab Mind’, a book on Arab psyche and culture, written by a cultural anthropologist 
Raphael Patai who died in 1996. The book includes a twenty-five-page chapter on Arabs and 
sex and the book depicted sex as a taboo vested with shame and repression in Arab cultures. 
The Patai book, an academic told Hersh, was “the bible of the neocons on Arab behavior.” In 
their discussions, the academic said, two themes emerged—‘one, that Arabs only understand 
force and, two, that the biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation’ (Seymour M. 
Hers, ‘The Grey Zone’, The New Yorker, May 24, 2004). 
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Monsters, Saddam Hussein, and it did not matter how hard the Administration tried to 
explain the situation, they had lost the moral standing in the Iraq occupation and the 
Self’s hypermasculinity was crumbling. 
 
It can be argued that from 2005 onwards, the Bush Administration’s hypermasculine 
hegemony was under attack. The Administration’s superior moral authority was being 
questioned when it failed to protect Feminine Others whom it had pledged to liberate 
from Dark Monsters. It had effectively transnationalised insecurity and violence, 
which, in turn, materialised on the bodies of ordinary women. Moreover, the 
Administration had not only failed to stabilise the region that it claimed to be the 
number one threat to America’s national security and but had also failed to 
demonstrate how different the White Self was from the Dark Monster as the Abu 
Ghraib torture case demonstrated. 
 
3.0 Enter Ahmadinejad 
In the spring of 2005 Iran was preparing for its ninth presidential elections. The 
elections were allowed to take place in a somewhat more relaxed atmosphere. The 
run-up to the June elections was coloured with vigorous and dynamic debates over the 
country’s foreign policy, economics and the future of reform started by the reformists. 
In the spring over 1,000 candidates registered for the presidential election. The 
Guardian Council handpicked six candidates who were allowed to run in the 
election.37 Interestingly, all the candidates projected themselves more or less as 
pragmatists to appeal to the wider electorate. In the campaigning period, it became 
clear that the reformists’ concept of mardum salari, or the rule of the people, had been 
slowly changing Iran’s political discourse since the late 1990s as all the candidates 
framed their campaigns to reflect what inhered in the concept: greater openness of 
political process, social and economic justice, ending governmental corruption and 
hearing peoples’ voices (see Ehteshami and Zweiri 2007). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The candidates included the former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani who ran on 
moderate-reformist platform; Muhammad Bagher Qalibaf, a conservative candidate and 
former national police chief; Mustafa Moin, a reformist candidate and President Khatami’s 
Minister of Higher Education; Mehdi Karroubi, a reformist candidate and former speaker of 
the Majles; Ali Larijani, a conservative candidate who has served as deputy minister several 
times and is one of the most experienced and high ranking politicians in the country; and 
finally Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tehran’s mayor and the least known candidate in the race. 
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On the Election Day June 17, observers both in Iran and abroad were caught by 
surprise. Many had predicted the former President Rafsanjani would if not win the 
first round, then, at least, enter a second round with one of the reformist candidates. 
However, the surprise was great when the elections’ black horse, Tehran’s hardline 
mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had hardly been noticed in the polls, secured a 
place in the second runoff. Rafsanjani who had entered the race with self-confidence 
had to enter the second round with not so confidence-boosting voting rates that put 
him at 21.1 per cent and Ahmadinejad at 19.4 per cent, leaving the other candidates 
far behind (Iran Election Watch 2005).38  
 
There are several reasons why the first round of the elections went as it did. Two of 
the reformist candidates, Mustafa Moin and Mehdi Karroubi (the latter would become 
internationally known in the 2009 presidential elections), alleged that the 
Revolutionary Guards had rigged the results but the recount ordered by the Guardian 
Council, which is controlled by the conservatives and regime hardliners, concluded 
that there had been no irregularities and no further investigation was carried out. 
Moreover, the political environment in which the elections took place was far from 
free. As argued in the previous chapter, the hardliners’ clampdown on the reformists, 
which was partly the regime’s response to the Bush Administration’s bullying foreign 
policy, had weakened the reformists on several fronts. The lost municipal and Majles 
elections, in 2003 and 2004 respectively, had eroded not only the reformists’ ability to 
perform in formal politics but also their credibility in the eyes of their supporters had 
suffered. Many who had previously voted reformist candidates now either decided not 
to vote in protest or casted their vote to a non-reformist candidate and especially 
Ahmadinejad’s promise of ‘bringing oil money to the tables of the people’ attracted 
voters (Alfoneh 2008a). Further, the clampdown that had targeted many individual 
high profile reformists and civil society activists had forced them to exit formal 
politics and pushed many to work in the margins of organised activism. Thus, in the 
spring of 2005, the reformist leadership was in effect paralysed and they failed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Turnout in the first round stood at 62,8 per cent, considerably lower than in 1997 when 
Khatami was elected by 80 per cent of the eligible voters (Iran Election Watch 2005). Many 
have noted how the total votes of all the conservative candidates combined amounted to 11 
million votes, while the total votes for the reformist candidates came to 17 million votes. 
Thus, the reformists received six million more votes than the conservatives, despite the 
allegations of fraud. Moreover, over 20 million voters decided not to cast their vote, believing 
that the election was not going to be free and fair (see Haghighatjoo 2006). 
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activate their former supporters who felt frustrated and disappointed with the little 
concrete reform that the reformists had been able to deliver and the leadership’s 
inability to stand up and protect their supporters. 
 
3.1 Militarisation of political life 
While Ahmadinejad may have been the least noticed candidate in the presidential 
race, at least internationally, he was brought to power by one of the most powerful 
conservative parties in Iran. The Islamic Developers Council, or Abadgaran, was the 
force behind Ahmadinejad’s campaign. As noted in the previous chapter, the 
Abadgaran was in the right-wing coalition that did well in the 2003 municipal 
elections, winning the majority of seats in Tehran and other large cities. After the 
elections, the party secured Ahmadinejad’s appointment as Tehran’s mayor in May 
2003. Later in 2004, the party did well in the Majles elections, winning again the 
majority of seats in Tehran.39  
 
What is interesting about the Abadgaran is the nature of its membership. Most of the 
members have backgrounds in military or paramilitary organisations such as the 
Pasdaran40, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and the Basij-e Mostazafin41, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See on the rise of neoconservative parties in Iran’s political life in the early 2000s: Mahan 
Abedin (2004), ‘Iran After the Elections’, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 6 (2/3), 
http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0402_iran1.htm, retrieved November 21, 2013; Arshin 
Adib-Moghaddam (2006), ‘The Pluralistic Momentum in Iran and the Future of the Reform 
Movement’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27 (4): 665-674; Anoushiravan, Ehteshami; 
Mahjoo, Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran’s Silent 
Revolution (London, I.B. Tauris, 2007); Iran Data Portal (2008), ‘Association of the 
Devotees of the Islamic Revolution’, 
http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/parties/isargaran/, retrieved November 21, 2013.  
40 Ayatollah Khomeini established the IRGC soon after the 1979 Revolution to guard the new 
regime from domestic and external challenges – both ideological and physical. However, 
since the 1990s the Guards have not only been a military force they have increasingly been 
involved in suppressing and silencing internal oppositional voices rather than external 
opponents. 
41 The Basij force is an ideological voluntary-ran paramilitary group and its members are 
often from the lower classes. The group was formed soon after the Guards in November 1979 
and it provided the new regime with protection against leftist and royalist oppositional 
groups. The role that basij volunteers had in the Iran-Iraq war granted them a special status in 
the state’s military apparatus. Today, their role is to assist the regime in confronting political 
and cultural threats against the regime, enforcing the principle amr-e be ma‘ruf va nahy-e az 
monkar (commanding what is just and forbidding what is wrong), combating the ‘Western 
cultural onslaught’ and assisting other security forces in internal security. The basijs have an 
estimated 14 million members and they are present in practically all sectors of Iran’s social 
life: basij units are found in universities and schools, unions and factories, tribes, and in 
	   116	  
the Mobilisation of the Oppressed.42 Ahmadinejad served in both organisations in the 
1980s and 1990s and his key supporters came from the ranks of these two 
organisations. As such, Ahmadinejad’s election has led many observers to argue that 
a gradual militarisation of Iran’s socio-cultural, political and economic life was taking 
place (see among others International Crises Group 2005; Ehteshami and Zweiri 
2007; Kamal and Pakravan 2009; RAND 2009). While the country’s various military 
and paramilitary organisations have always been central in Iran’s power structure, 
their original role was to support the regime and their presence in politics and other 
areas of social life was restricted. However, this changed in the mid-2000s. Ayatollah 
Khamenei, together with Ahmadinejad, facilitated the expansion of the two above 
named organisations into the country’s political, socio-cultural, educational and 
business life and many observers have argued that the military elites ascendancy can 
be seen as the hardliners’ attempt to counterbalance the reformists and other 
oppositional voices in society and stop the détente with the US.43 Ali Alfoneh, an 
expert on the Guards, has argued that the increase of the military elite in top political 
posts was a tactical move by Khamenei and his allies to counter pressures at home 
and abroad; Khamenei ‘must have considered former members of the Revolutionary 
Guards better at crisis management at home […] but also better [suited] to counter 
external pressure[s]’ (Alfoneh quoted in Bruno, Bajoria, and Masters 2013). 
 
While the presence of the Guards and basij forces in governmental posts is not an 
entirely new phenomenon, following the 2005 elections, the number of military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
private institutions/companies, to name a few. Membership in the Basij is often necessary for 
certain social benefits and for societal mobility for lower classes in Iran. Benefits include 
among other things: welfare subsidies, inclusion in an entrance quota to universities, 
university scholarships and loans. 
42 The Guards have used the Basijs to create a surveillance system that has reached into 
people’s private lives and together the organisations have come to symbolise the state’s 
violent repression after the Iran-Iraq War. The organisations formally merged in 2007. The 
IRGC Commander in Chief General Mohammad Ali Jafari’s praised the merge as a means to 
concentrate the organisation’s all efforts to counter ‘internal threats to the Islamic Republic’, 
which reflects the organisation’s expanding role in suppressing civil society activism (Mehr 
News Agency 2007). 
43 See on the different roles of the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij: Ali Alfoneh (2008), 
‘The Revolutionary Guard’s Role in Iranian Politics’, The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 14 (4): 
3-14); Bruno, Bajoria, Masters, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (2013); RAND, The Rise of 
Pasdaran (2009); Michael Rubin (2008), ‘Iran’s Revolutionary Guards – A Rogue Outfit?’, 
Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 14 (4): 37-48; Fatemeh Sadeghi (2009), ‘Foot Soldiers of the 
Islamic Republic’s “Culture of Modesty”’, MERIP, No. 250, pp. 50-55. 
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personnel in governmental posts rose significantly which allowed the ideological 
security apparatus to infiltrate the government and which, in turn, has shaped the 
relationship between the state and civil society. During Ahmadinejad’s first term 
(2005-2009), out of his twenty-one ministry portfolios, twenty were in the hands of 
former military officers or people who had a background in the IRGC and/or in other 
branches of the state’s security apparatus (see Iran Focus 2005).44 Most importantly, 
three key ministries – Intelligence, Interior and Culture and Islamic Guidance – were 
placed in the hands of Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei (Intelligence), Mostafa Pour 
Mohammadi (Interior) and Mohammad Hossein Saffar Harandi (Culture and Islamic 
Guidance) who all had served in the Guards. As Farhi has noted, the transformation 
that these ministries went through under Ahmadinejad was striking when compared to 
the Khatami period when a great effort was made to render them less intrusive in 
Iranian life (Farhi 2007). After Ahmadinejad’s nominations, these three ministries 
were arguing in chorus that while the US had decided not to engage in direct military 
conflict with the country, the Americans were fighting a soft war with the help of the 
Iranian civil society, including the women’s movement, to overthrow the Iranian 
regime. As such the regime was allowed to use any means to counter this (see IRNA 
2007, Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 2 2007; Farhi 2007). 
 
The worldview of this new political elite brought in by Ahmadinejad unsettled many 
civil society actors. The Abadgaran and the military elite that came to power with it 
took pride in presenting themselves as the true keepers of Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
legacy and the Revolution and honoured Khomeini’s cultural and political vision of 
the Islamic Republic. They argue that society’s current problems are caused by 
people’s eroding values and insufficient internationalisation of revolutionary ideals 
and Islamic principles (Hen-Tov 2006/2007: 167). The West, and the US in particular, 
is seen as the source of impure lifestyles and ideologies. To compensate for people’s 
lack of piety and belief in the system, they promote ultraconservative and patriarchal 
views on social –and cultural issues. When it comes to the women’s rights advocates, 
the agenda of the movement has been interpreted as counter-revolutionary, threating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ahmadinejad also replaced previous provincial governors, deputy governors and bank 
managers with officers from the IRGC and the Basij. Similarly, Iran’s embassies were re-
organised. In November 2005, 40 senior ambassadors were recalled home and replaced with 
less qualified and experienced personnel but who can be identified as supporters of the 
hardliners (BBC 2005). 
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the country’s ideological cohesion and opening the country to foreign forces. In 2006, 
the Guard’s 2006 National Security Report classified women’s movement advocates 
as the main threats to the national security of the country (report quoted in Sadeghi 
2009). Further, in 2007, the Minister of Intelligence declared that women’s rights 
advocates are part of an attempt by outside enemies to bring about a soft revolution of 
the Iranian regime (Iran HRDC 2010: 9). This, according to one my interviewees, 
sanctioned the hardliners’ supporters to attack individual women activists and 
women’s NGOs (Leili, Tehran, April 2010). 
 
While Ahmadinejad’s Administration and the military elite close to it were arguing 
that civil society actors such as the women’s movement are posing a threat not only to 
national security but also to its ideological identity and unity, they were increasingly 
promoting a militarist ideology instead of a religious one. As Hoodfar and Sadr 
(2009) argue: 
Under Ahmadinejad’s […] government [2005-2009], Islam and Sharia have 
actually taken a backseat as the state pushes legislation that promotes a 
patriarchal, conservative reading of gender roles. […] [T]his illustrates the 
government’s determination to force women to comply with an extremely 
narrow, limited version of ‘Islamic’ society (Hoodfar and Sadr 2009: 2009: 
13). 
 
What it comes to the new elite’s views on the country’s external relations, they have 
campaigned for a more isolationist foreign policy particularly in the areas of Iran’s 
nuclear talks with Europe and Iran’s bilateral relations with the US. Ahmad Tavakoli, 
the leader of Abadgaran, has argued that ‘[R]elations with the U.S. are not as 
important as our prayers, nor as sinful as alcohol. […] For more than half a century, 
the American government has been oppressing us, so, unless they change their 
attitude, there’s no basis for rapprochement’ (Tavakoli quoted in Time 2004). 
Ahmadinejad hardly touched upon foreign policy in his campaign. When he did, he 
asserted that relations with the US were ‘not high among his priorities’ or the Iranian 
team was not ‘tough enough’ in the nuclear negotiations with the Europeans. He also 
employed revolutionary language from the 1980s by promising to resist ‘Western 
decadency’ and to build a ‘powerful Islamic Iran’. He touched upon Iran’s oil 
resources by arguing that in his opinion Iranian natural resources should be exploited 
by Iranians not by foreign companies (Saikal 2005; Bakhash 2005). The vision of Iran 
as an equal and respected actor in world politics and as a country that takes pride in its 
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Islamic and revolutionary values in the socio-economic, cultural and political fields 
was an attractive message to many of Ahmadinejad’s voters who had seen what had 
happened in Iraq and its experiment with ‘western democracy.’ 
 
4.0 Dark Monsters and nuclear weapons 
For the hawks in Washington Ahmadinejad was ‘godsend’ as one of the 
neoconservatives’ main commentators declared (Gerecht 2006a). Even before the 
Iranians went to the polls, the Bush Administration declared the process rigged and 
undemocratic and President Bush pledged that the United States and its people will 
stand with the Iranians as they struggle for freedom – language that reminded not only 
the Iranian regime but many ordinary Iranians of the pre-war talk on Iraq in 2003 
(Bush G.W. 2005b). If Ahmadinejad incarnated the Dark Other –fundamentalism, 
irrational personality, opposing worldview – then, according to the hawks, because of 
this, the normal logic of deterrence would no longer apply to Iran (Carpenter T. 
2012). The war/regime change advocates in Washington constantly pointed to 
Ahmadinejad’s belief in the return of the Shia’s 12th Hidden Imam, the Mahdi, an 
event in Shia Islam that is to be accompanied by an apocalypse. Clifford May, the 
head of the neoconservative Foundation for the Defence of Democracies, declared 
that ‘more than a few of Iran’s rulers hold the theological conviction that the return of 
the Mahdi, the saviour, can be brought about only by an apocalypse.’ He then cited 
the neoconservatives favourite Middle East scholar Bernad Lewis, who argues that for 
those who share Ahmadinejad’s vision, ‘mutually assured destruction is not a 
deterrent. It’s an inducement’ (quoted in Carpenter T. 2012).  
 
Ahmadinejad’s election coincided with three significant incidents: 1) Iran’s nuclear 
negotiations with Germany, Britain and France, or the so-called EU-3, had stalled and 
the stalemate was effectively pushing the US to get involved in the process; 2) the 
Bush Administration was desperate to find a way to re-enact clear lines between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ to justify its on-going War on Terror; and 3) after the presidential election, 
Iran’s key political institutions were now securely in the hands of the hardliners who 
had found additional confidence in the US failure to stabilise Iraq, which materialised 
in an even more confrontational foreign policy toward the West (on the final point see 
Ansari 2006b: 217). Thus, Iran’s nuclear program became the new front in the Bush 
Administration’s War on Terror. 
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4.1 Iran’s nuclear program and a global game of masculinities 
Iran’s nuclear program was revealed as early as in August 2002 when the National 
Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a group that takes pride in presenting itself as 
the official opposition to the Islamic Republic, 45  informed the international 
community of Iran’s two unknown nuclear sites, a heavy water production plant in 
Arak and an uranium enrichment plant and research lab in Natanz, which had been 
developed outside its official nuclear program at the Bushehr and Isfahan plants (Iran 
Watch 2002).46 In February 2003, Khatami denied the accusations of a nuclear 
weapons program that emerged after the revelations but acknowledged the existence 
of the two sites and committed his country to negotiations with the international 
community. Since the two new sites became known, Iranians have argued that the two 
plants, Natanz built in 1996 and Arak in 2000, are instrumental for Iran’s medical and 
energy needs given the Bushehr plant’s disastrous development by the Russians and 
the country’s limited oil and gas resources.47 In the years that have followed the 
revelations, a large majority of Iranians have come strongly to believe that Iran has 
the same right as other nations to develop nuclear energy, including the construction 
and operation of nuclear enrichment facilities. When I was in Iran in 2010, many of 
the Iranians I encountered took pride in the nuclear program and argued that it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The organisation is linked to the Mujahideen-Khalq (MEK), which is an organisation that 
both the US and the European Union (EU) have previously listed as a terrorist organisation 
and Iranians themselves do not sympathise with the group. See Ervand Abrahamian, Radical 
Islam: The Iranian Mojahideen (London, I.B. Tauris, 1988) on the organisation’s history. 
46 However, as one Iran analyst has pointed out, rather than revealing a secret program hidden 
from the international community and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the 
findings revealed that the country was further ahead in its nuclear research than had been 
known. It should also be noted that the US was well aware of Iran’s nuclear program. The 
Bush Administration’s hawks, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz had held senior posts in the Ford Administration. In 
April 1976, President Ford issued National Security Decision Memorandum 324 supporting 
the shah’s ambitions and helping Iran formulate a plan to build 23 nuclear power reactors and 
the policy was continued under the Carter Administration. Moreover, President Bush’s 
advisor on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, who has strongly campaigned for regime change 
in Iran, had written his PhD on nuclear proliferation and used Iran as his case study (see Ali 
Ansari Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust 
(London, C. Hurst & Co Publishers, 2006): 199-200; and Semira N. Nikou, ‘Timeline of 
Iran’s Nuclear Activities’, The Iran Primer (2010).  
47 As Farhi’s work demonstrates, from the very beginning, when the Iranian public learnt 
about the secret programs, the government never referred to the nuclear program as a solution 
to Iran’s security needs. In fact, governmental officials repeatedly argued that pursuing 
nuclear weapons would insecure the country, See Farideh Farhi, ‘”Atomic Energy Is Our 
Assured Right”: Nuclear Policy and the Shaping of Iranian Public Opinion’ in Judith S. 
Yaphe (Ed.), Nuclear Politics in Iran (Washington D.C., National Defense University 
Press/Institute for National Strategic Studies): 3-18 
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showed to the world how advanced and modern the Iranian nation is. And as a RAND 
report has concluded, if Iran’s nuclear facilities were to be bombed by the West, 
public support for any retaliation its government – without regard to what faction is in 
power – took would likely be widespread (RAND 2008: xvii). 
 
Several rounds of negotiations followed the revelations and at first the Bush 
Administration left the nuclear issue to the EU-3, which negotiated with Iran’s 
reformist government. These negotiations have been studied in detail elsewhere48 and 
I move on to examine the time period when the US began to invest in the process. 
However, it is necessary to offer a brief background where the negotiations stood in 
2005. 
 
4.1.2 Iran’s nuclear negotiations in a deadlock 
Just prior to Ahmadinejad’s election, the nuclear negotiations were in a deadlock. The 
Europeans who had been in charge of the negotiations were now balancing between 
the Bush Administration, which insisted on Iran ending uranium enrichment entirely 
as for them Iran’s enrichment activities were enough to confirm the country’s nuclear 
weapons program,49 and the Iranian negotiation team’s equally intractable position 
which insisted that it would not give up its national right to pursue activities that other 
countries were allowed to pursue (Farhi 2010: 10). In the spring of 2005, Tehran had 
prepared a package that proposed limited enrichment activities for a period of time,50 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See for example Kaveh Afrasiabi and Mustafa Kibaroglu, ‘Negotiating Iran’s Nuclear 
Populism’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 12 (1): 1-17; Ali Ansari, Confronting Iran: 
The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust (London, C. Hurst & Co 
Publishers, 2006); Bernd Kaussler, ‘European Union Constructive Engagement with Iran 
(2000-2004): An Exercise in Conditional Human Rights Diplomacy’, Iranian Studies, Vol. 41 
(3): 269-295 
49 Since the NCRI’s initial revelations about Iran’s unknown nuclear programs, the Bush 
Administration’s stance was that the regime’s decision to build an undeclared uranium 
enrichment plant in Natanz was a proof of the country’s intention to acquire nuclear weapons, 
and therefore Tehran was in breach of its obligations laid out in the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). The argument that the Bush Administration put forward was that due to this violation, 
Iran was no longer entitled to exercise its right under the Article IV to develop nuclear 
technology. Consequently, the Administration’s policy was to demand Iran to halt its nuclear 
enrichment entirely. 
50 According to the details published by an Iranian reformist newspaper later in August 2005, 
Iran offered to produce only low-enriched uranium; to limit the amount of uranium enriched; 
to convert all low enriched uranium to fuel rods for use in reactors; to limit the number of 
centrifuges in Natanz; to refrain from reprocessing spent reactor fuel and hence keep open 
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however, the EU-3, anxious to know how the upcoming presidential election would 
shape the country’s political landscape, decided not to respond to the proposal. The 
EU-3 had hoped to see Rafsanjani to return to power but when Ahmadinejad assumed 
power in August, the Europeans drafted their own counter proposal that not only 
ignored the Iranian offer earlier from the spring but simply restated proposals that 
Tehran had already rejected (Farhi 2010).51 In short, in August 2005, the EU-3, with 
the US behind the scenes, insisted on at least temporary suspension on uranium 
enrichment and Iran on its part insisted on its national right under the NPT to continue 
enrichment. The insistence of the US on the suspension on uranium enrichment and 
the EU-3’s failure to offer anything new to the negotiation table strengthened 
Tehran’s hardliners who had been arguing for a some time now that negotiations were 
a waste of time. 
 
4.2 Masculinity game in Tehrani style 
When Ahmadinejad came to power in August, he was determined to do things his 
way. With Ahmadinejad a change took place in the nature of the nuclear negotiations 
and effectively in the country’s foreign relations at large. Instead of seeking a deal 
with the West, the negotiations were aimed at creating and sustaining a crisis in the 
country’s international relations (Ansari 2006b). One of the first decisions that 
Ahmadinejad made was the replacement of Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s chief nuclear 
negotiator, who had been considered as a moderate by the international community, 
with Ali Larijani, a well-known hardliner, who came to mark the rise of Iran’s 
confrontational foreign policy. As soon as Larijani was nominated, he publicly 
denounced the competence of Rouhani’s team in the negotiations between Iran and 
the EU-3 and sought a radically different route to solve the situation (see for instance 
Sharq 2005). With Larijani’s team in charge, the EU-3 August proposal was rejected, 
an expected move but which was strengthened with the publication of a letter that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
fuel cycle; and finally, to give the IAEA a permanent on-site presence at all sites for uranium 
conversion and enrichment (quoted in Farhi 2010: 11-12) 
51 The proposal was a reworded version of the November 2004 package. The November 2004 
agreement was basically a reworded version of the 2003 Tehran agreement in which Iran 
agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and processing activities and to open nuclear sites to 
unannounced inspections by the IAEA. It also agreed to sign the Additional Protocol, which 
would allow more extensive IAEA inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, under the 
original safeguard agreements of the NPT, Iran was not required to declare new nuclear 
facilities unless Iran decided to start processing new nuclear material in those very facilities. 
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demanded a public apology from the EU-3 for the insult they had made to the Iranian 
nation. At the same time with the letter, Ahmadinejad let the international community 
know that Iran had resumed uranium enrichment at the Isfahan plant by declaring that 
‘[T]he opponents of Iran's nuclear program should revise their viewpoints and 
recognize our rights. They should not be under the illusion that they enjoy more rights 
than other nations’ (Ahmadinejad quoted in IRNA 2005c).52 Later at the UN General 
Assembly in September, Ahmadinejad accused the US of subjecting Iran to ‘nuclear 
apartheid’ by declaring certain nuclear technologies off-limits to Iran. He further 
added that ‘[I]f some try to impose their will on the Iranian people through resorting 
to the language of force and threats […] we will reconsider our entire approach to the 
nuclear issue’ (IRNA 2005d).53 Ahmadinejad was increasingly taking part in the 
global game of masculinities, which further increased tensions between Iran and the 
US. One of the (in)famous comments came in October 2005, when Ahmadinejad 
declared that Israel must be ‘wiped off the map’ in order to end the hegemonic 
powers’ meddling in the region’s affairs (The NYT 2005c). As the White House’s 
spokesman commented, for the Bush Administration Ahmadinejad’s speech simply 
‘reconfirm[ed] what we’ve been saying about the regime in Iran. […] It underscores 
the concerns [the US has] about Iran’s nuclear intentions’ (The NYT 2005c). 
 
4.3 Masculinity game in Washington style 
Secretary of State Rice outlined the Bush Administration’s policy on Iran’s nuclear 
issue in the autumn of 2005. By September, the Bush Administration had grown 
impatient and was prepared to discipline Tehran with a referral to the UN Security 
Council (UNSC). Moreover, the Administration now had the Europeans – who had 
promised the Bush Administration that they would join the US in its efforts to refer 
Iran to the UNSC if the newly elected president rejected the August proposal – on its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 It should be noted that Iran had voluntarily agreed to suspend its nuclear program when the 
negotiations started in 2003. 
53 It is worth noting that while Iran resumed its nuclear program in August 2005, it also 
continued to respect its previous comments under the NPT and its activities continued to be 
supervised by the IAEA. Moreover, what has not been truly acknowledged by the 
international community was Ayatollah Khamenei’s pronouncement on the very same day 
with Ahmadinejad’s statement. Khamenei declared the production, stockpiling and use of 
nuclear weapons as un-Islamic. 
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side (Ansari 2006b: 225).54 Rice’s mocking comments on Ahmadinejad’s speech at 
the UN reflect the Administration’s confrontational approach to Iran: 
Maybe the whole world is wrong and we should all trust them but nobody 
does. And so their problem is they can argue all they want about what their 
rights are. The problem is they've gotten into a situation in which nobody 
believes it is safe for them to exercise those rights — if indeed they have those 
rights. I think their problem is not just coming into compliance but it is 
beginning to repair the sense that Iran is a threat to the international system 
because ultimately, if they keep doing what they've done here, people are 
going to be even more suspicious of what they're doing (Rice’s interview with 
Time 2005).55  
 
A few months later, in February 2006, the US referred Iran’s nuclear case to the 
UNSC. Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld linked the referral to the War on Terror by 
warning that the War on Terror was by no means over and appealed to the US allies to 
show unity and increase their military spending to defeat the threat of a ‘global 
extremist Islamic empire’ (Rumsfeld quoted in CBS 2006). 
 
Ahmadinejad’s response to the referral was to start ‘immediately’ full-scale uranium 
enrichment. In his statement he further argued that ‘[A]ll of Iran's peaceful nuclear 
activities will continue within the framework of the IAEA and based on the NPT and 
the agency's safeguards.’ However he also added that ‘from Feb. 5, Iran will suspend 
its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and its other cooperation 
beyond it’ (The Washington Post 2006a). Ahmadinejad referred to the 2003 Tehran 
agreement that had included an Additional Protocol, which had allowed more 
extensive IAEA inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The Bush Administration had taken a preliminary step to get involved in the nuclear talks 
back in March 2005 when President Bush agreed with the Europeans that Iran needed some 
incentives to end its uranium enrichment. (The Administration was not however unified. Vice 
President Cheney and Defence Secretary Rumsfeld opposed the concession and argued that 
only regime change would remove the threat that the current regime posed to the region 
(Gawenda/The Age 2005).) The American incentives – spare parts for Iran’s civilian airliners 
and allowing Iran to start entry negotiations with the World Trade Organization (WTO) – 
were however too little and too late and the Iranians rejected the EU-3 prepared November 
2004 agreement in which the incentives were included. However, in return for these 
economic incentives, the Bush Administration had extracted a pledge from the Europeans to 
support Iran’s referral to the UNSC if the talks failed (see Peter Symonds, ‘US And European 
Allies Provoke Confrontation with Iran’, World Socialist Website, August 11, 2005. 
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2005/08/iran-a11.html, retrieved August 12, 2013). 
55 Interestingly, a presidential commission report from March 2005 had concluded that 
‘American intelligence on Iran as inadequate to allow firm judgments about Iran's weapons 
programs’ (The NYT 2005a). 
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The consequences of the referral were felt in Iran at large as Farhi has argued: 
The referral of Iran’s case to the UN Security Council in February 2006 
[meant] that the nationalist discourse that had from the beginning been part of 
Iran’s case for pursuing its nuclear program for all practical purposes became 
the whole of the case. In the process, arguments that proposed acceptance of 
the temporary suspension of enrichment-related activities were viewed as a 
reflection of “meekness” or “complacency” and therefore unsustainable (Farhi 
2010: 5; emphasis in original). 
 
In essence, the nuclear issue and the failure of the reformists and the EU-3 to find a 
solution that would have satisfied both sides ‘opened the path for the full-fledged 
ascendancy of the hard-line nationalist discourse that identifies stridence and standing 
firm as the only way to counteract tough external stances (or in Iranian parlance 
“Western bullying”)’ (Farhi 2010: 6). Moreover, the confrontation strengthened the 
hardliners’ domestic standing vis-à-vis the reformists and gave them yet another tool 
to denounce internal opposition.  
 
With the help of Ahmadinejad, the Bush Administration was able to maintain its 
policy of confrontation and disciplining of the Monster. As one observer argued: ‘[the 
election of Ahmadinejad] will feed the arguments of those in the Bush Administration 
who think the only option is to come down hard because they can expect the Iranians 
will take a harder line, too’ (Kenneth Pollack quoted in the NYT 2005b). What 
underlined the Bush Administration’s crafting of the Iranian nuclear issue was the old 
orientalist clichés of Islam as a threat and of Muslims as dangerous beings to the 
existence of the White Self. The Dark Other is portrayed as untruthful and therefore 
not worth the West’s trust (see Izadi and Saghaye-Biria 2007). Rice was not alone 
with her above comments (‘nobody trusts them’). U.S. Ambassador Greg Schulte 
commented on Iran’s referral to the UNSC: ‘[T]he authorities in Tehran, rather than 
threatening the world, should listen to the world and take the steps necessary to start 
regaining its confidence’ (Schulte quoted in The Washington Post 2006a, emphasis 
mine). What emerges from the arguments is not necessarily the threat of nuclear 
weapons to the world but a threat of the current Iranian regime – of its nature and its 
challenge to the security of the White Self (see also Izadi and Saghaye-Biria 2007). 
As Agathangelou and Ling have argued, hypermasculinities invite rival camps of 
hypermasculinity to engage in similar exercises of hypermasculinity and this often 
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locks the two oppose sides into cycles of conflict, retaliation and even annihilation 
(Agathangelou and Ling 2005: 827). 
 
5.0 Disciplining the Dark Monster 
After the referral to the UNSC, the Bush Administration was stressing that it had not 
decided how to respond to Iran’s nuclear threat. For instance, in the NSS of 2006, the 
Administration stated that the US ‘has joined with our EU partners and Russia to 
pressure Iran to meet its international obligations and provide objective guarantees 
that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes. This diplomatic effort must 
succeed if confrontation is to be avoided’ (The NSS 2006: 20). However, while the 
NSS emphasised diplomatic solution, Bush declared several times that ‘all options are 
on the table, including military force, to prevent Iran from developing nuclear 
weapons’ (BBC 2006). In March 2006, the message was echoed by Vice-President 
Cheney who stated with a rather hawkish choice of words that ‘[W]e will not allow 
Iran to have a nuclear weapon’ and the Iranian regime is to expect ‘meaningful 
consequences’ for its failure to end its dangerous nuclear activities (The Economist 
2006).56 However, two foreign invasions were eating American resources and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 And indeed, it seems that the Administration was preparing for a heavier response. Leaks 
from the Administration revealed that in 2006, Turkey was approached for possible use of its 
air bases, which would have allowed the US to conduct B-52 bomber attacks into Iran (Dunn 
2007: 20). In the spring of 2006, it was revealed that the Bush Administration had made 
actual plans for bombing Iran’s nuclear sites – even the use of a tactical nuclear weapon had 
been mentioned – before leaving the office, the estimate for a possible attack was 2008 (The 
Sunday Times 2006a, 2006b). Similarly, in December 2006 when the UNSC was debating on 
Iran sanctions, the US, together with Britain, moved additional mine sweeper vessels and a 
strike aircraft to the Persian Gulf in preparation for possible Iranian retaliation against 
international shipping (Dunn 2007, The NYT 2006). Many analysts also noted President 
Bush’s determination to solve the Iran question before leaving the office in 2009 (Pinto-
Dushinsky 2006). Apparently the Administration did not want to see the enemy go unchecked 
as had happened with Clinton and al-Qaida. According to the hawks in Washington, ‘a 
nuclear-armed Iran is too dangerous to be left to a potential Democrat president’ (The Sunday 
Times 2006b; see also Dunn 2007). Hawks in Washington were actively pushing the 
Administration to take the necessary steps to ensure American’s national security. Reuel 
Marc Gerecht, a fellow at the neoconservative-ran American Enterprise Institute, argued that 
diplomacy with Iran was bound to fail and if the Administration did not prevent the Iranian 
regime from acquiring nuclear weapons, ‘it would, of course, empower its worst enemies in 
Tehran and spiritually invigorate all Muslim radicals who live on American weakness’ (Reuel 
Marc Gerecht, Cognitive Dissonance: The State of America’s Iran Policy’, July 9, 2006. 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/09/reuel-marc-gerecht/cognitive-dissonance-state-
americas-iran-policy, retrieved August 10, 2013). However, at the same time, the 
Administration was apparently ignoring reports, including a CIA report from 2006 that had 
concluded that Iran was not developing nuclear weapons (Seymour M. Hersh, ‘The Next 
Act’, The New Yorker, November 27, 2006. 
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Bush Administration sought a middle way to discipline Tehran. Disciplining took the 
form of sanctions. 
 
It is generally assumed that economic sanctions put political pressure on the target 
country’s political elites by affecting internal power relations (for example by 
strengthening oppositional forces) and as such giving impetus to the target regime to 
cooperate with the sender countries’ demands. 57  And apparently the Bush 
Administration was hoping that the sanctions would facilitate a ‘democratic 
breakthrough’ by weakening the hardliners in Iran (Maloney 2010: 132).  
 
After the referral to the UNSC, three rounds of UN sanctions were introduced. The 
UN Resolution 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007) and 1803 (March 2008) 
imposed an arms embargo, banned the transfer of all nuclear-related technology and 
materials, imposed travel bans on Iranians involved in the country’s nuclear industry 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/11/27/061127fa_fact?currentPage=1, retrieved 
August 1, 2013. 
57 Sanctions have been employed to stop ethnic conflicts, halt non-civilian nuclear programs, 
restore democratic governments, punish states for sponsoring terrorism and end the use of 
repression by governments. However, in the recent years several actors including NGOs and 
international organisations have begun to question both the effectiveness and humanitarian 
cost of sanctions. See among others, Susan Hannah Allen (2008) ‘The Domestic Political 
Costs of Economic Sanctions’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 52 (6): 916-944; David 
Cortright and Georege, A. Lopez, (2000) ‘Learning from the Sanctions Decade’, Global 
Dialogue, Vol. 2 (3): 11-24; Abel Escribà-Folch and Joseph Wright (2010), ‘Dealing with 
Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers’, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 54 (2): 335-359; Johan Galtung (1967), ‘On the Effects of 
International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia’, World 
Politics, Vol. 19 (3): 378-416; Elizabeth D. Gibbons. Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and 
Democracy Under Assault (Westport, Praeger Publishers, 1999); Robert A. Hart, Jr. (2000) 
‘Democracy and the Successful Use of Economic Sanctions’, Political Research Quarterly, 
Vol. 53 (2): 267-284; Denis J. Halliday (2000), ‘The Deadly and Illegal Consequences of 
Economic Sanctions on the People of Iraq’, The Brown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 
7 (1): 229-233; Eric Hoskins and Samantha Nutt, The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic 
Sanctions on Burundi (Provinde, The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 
Brown University, 1997); Dursun Peksen, (2009), ‘Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic 
Sanctions on Human Rights’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 46 (1): 59-77; (2011), 
‘Economic Sanctions and Human Security: The Public Health Effect of Economic Sanctions’, 
Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 7 (3): 237-251; Donald M. Seekins (2005), ‘Burma and US 
Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime’, Asian Survey, Vol. 45 (3): 437-452; Thomas 
Weiss (1999), ‘Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses, 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol.  36 (5): 499-509; Weiss et al. Political Gain and Civilian 
Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 1997). This literature is rather different from the first wave literature that focused 
on the question of sanctions achieving the set policy objectives; or from the second wave that 
examined questions like why and how sanctions work in target countries. 
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and froze assets on designated persons and organisations. The Bush Administration’s 
own sanctions on Iran included the Executive Order 13382 (2005) and a vast array of 
financial sanctions that were increased year-by-year and which aimed at the Iranian 
banking regime and high profile persons in the regime and in its close circle. At the 
state level, in 2007, Florida passed the Protecting Florida’s Investment Act (PFIA) 
which required investments to be withdrawn from Iran’s oil sector; in the same year 
the Californian lawmakers passed the California Public Divest From Iran Act which 
prohibited state pension funds to be invested in Iran’s energy, defence and nuclear 
business. The first Obama Administration’s (2009-2012) sanctions have included the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA) in July 
2010 and the Executive Order 13590 in 2011. 
 
The piling up of sanctions that have only been toughened by the Obama 
Administrations have materialised in an emerging humanitarian crisis on the bodies of 
ordinary Iranians and women in particular. Over the course of sanctions, it has 
become clear that the US and other sanctioning bodies have feminised ordinary 
Iranians to bear the burden of economic sanctions for the ‘greater good’: the White 
Self’s security. Both the Bush and Obama Administrations have used the process of 
feminisation in their efforts to naturalise the dominant post-9/11 discourse of security. 
Feminisation leads to a situation where the experiences of ordinary Iranians under the 
sanctions are being devalued. In effect, when the experiences of ordinary Iranians are 
being feminised, the responsibility of sanctions is assigned solely to the Dark 
Other/Monster: the Monster (alone) needs to correct its behaviour in order to alleviate 
the circumstances of ordinary Iranians. 
 
5.1 Women and sanctions 
Gender has been missing in sanctions literature at large but the few studies that have 
focused on the gender-specific impacts of sanctions are available on Iraq, the former 
Yugoslavia, Haiti and Burma and the empirical evidence from these studies shows 
that sanctions are detrimental to target countries populations and especially to women 
(Al-Ali 2005; 2007; Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Buck et al. 1998; Devin and Dashti-
Gibson 1997; Gibbons 1999; Gibbons and Garfield 1999; Pratt 2005; Seekins 2005). 
The gender specific studies have noted how target states’ declining economic 
productivity that often leads to economic hardship among population is not equally 
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distributed across society and women tend to pay a higher price of these costs due to 
their differing location in the economic domain. It has also been noted that in times of 
economic sanctions, women’s economic status may be additionally weakened by 
societal attitudes towards women’s roles in the formal economy. The social belief that 
men are the main providers for their families becomes more popular when societies 
are undergoing times of economic hardship (see Nelson 2008). This ‘masculine bias’ 
materialises in women’s less secure position in the labour market (e.g. lower pay and 
lower positions) and often shifts women’s economic productivity to the informal 
sector or forces women to leave economic activity altogether (see e.g. Devin and 
Dashit-Gibson 1997; Drury and Peksen 2012). Moreover, the available studies 
demonstrate how economic sanctions stand in uncomfortable juxtaposition with the 
West’s emphasis on the promotion of women’s equal rights58: economic sanctions 
decrease the target state’s economic performance which, in turn, affects the state’s 
ability to provide different welfare services of which women are often the main 
beneficiaries (Al-Ali 2005: 747; Pratt 2005); studies have also pointed to the 
increasing societal and political violence under sanctions and violence often has a 
gendered dimension (Al-Ali 2005; 2007; Ali-Ali and Pratt 2009; Buck et al. 1998; 
Gibbons 1999; Weiss et al. 1997); and finally, sanctions have also been seen as 
contributing factors to the strengthening of certain societal masculinities and 
femininities and in some cases these have, in turn, materialised themselves in 
conservatism/traditionalism towards women and their societal roles (see e.g. Al Ali 
and Pratt 2009; Kabeer 2007; Pratt 2005).  
 
After the Iraq sanctions in 1990-2003, the Iran sanctions have been the most crippling 
sanctions ever imposed on any country. Scattered reports and anecdotal evidence 
from Iran reveal the disproportionate impact of the sanctions on the lives of ordinary 
people, and in particular, on women’s lives. Women have been hit especially hard by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 An example can be drawn from Iraq. Al-Ali has argued that: ‘[T]hirteen years of embargo 
had a particularly detrimental impact on women and gender relations in Iraq. Aside from the 
most obvious and devastating effects of economic sanction, related to dramatically increased 
child mortality rates, widespread malnutrition, deteriorating health care and general 
infrastructure, as well as, widespread poverty and economic crisis, women were particularly 
hit by the changing social climate. State discourse and policies, along with social attitudes and 
gender ideologies, shifted dramatically during this period. The breakdown of the welfare state 
had disproportionate effect on women, who had been its main beneficiaries’ (Al-Ali, Iraqi 
Women: Untold Stories from 1948 to the Present (London, Zed Books, 2007): 186). 
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the deteriorating economic climate, increasing poverty, lack of medicines and 
repressing political climate. 
 
5.2 Impact on economic performance 
The minimal trade that the US had allowed with Iran meant that the Bush 
Administration had to venture outside its own borders in order to maximise the impact 
of the sanctions. In 2006, the Administration began a campaign that targeted other 
governments and actors in the international private sector. The Department of 
Treasury was put in charge of building pressure outside the UN and given the 
responsibility to focus on Iran’s ‘dirty business’ – its WMDs, support for terrorism 
and deceptive financial practices.59 In the course of 2006, US officials met with 
governmental representatives from ‘tens of countries’ and with more than 40 foreign 
banks. In these meetings Treasury outlined the range of Iran’s illicit financial 
activities and argued that Iran’s use of front companies makes it difficult ‘to know 
your customers’ (Jacobson 2008: 72). Treasury targeted especially Iran’s energy 
partners and they were informed how their business with Iran’s oil and gas sector 
could undermine the international community’s efforts to resolve Iran’s nuclear issue 
and what were the potential implications under the US law (Burns 2007; Jacobson 
2008). In 2007, several European and Japanese banks, including HSBC, Standard 
Chartered and Deutsche Bank, ran down their operations in Iran or continued their 
presence with reduced services (The Telegraph 2007; The Guardian 2007: Jacobson 
2008) and other foreign banks have followed the example after 2007. Perhaps most 
importantly, Iran’s largest trading partner, China, joined the financial embargo and 
several Chinese financial institutions tightened their trade credit in the autumn of 
2007 (The FT 2007b).60 Even some of the Gulf States, including the United Arab 
Emirates, began to implement some of the US demands of trade embargo (Takeyh 
and Maloney 2011: 1304; The FT 2007a). In the period 2007-2008, the number of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 After 9/11, Congress had set up a unit within Treasure called the Office of Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence. The office was given a national security mandate and an innovative set 
of powers. An example of this is the Executive order 13224, which gave Treasury the 
authority to freeze the assets of individuals and entities controlled by, or supporting, terrorist 
organisations (see Bay Fang, Treasury Wields Financial Sanctions’, Chicago Tribune News, 
April 23, 2007).  
60 The FT article points out that the Chinese have ignored the embargo with Iranians who 
import goods to Iran through Dubai. Moreover, the tightening of financial relations has had 
no impact on Iran’s oil, petrochemical or mineral exports to China.  
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foreign banks operating in Iran had dropped from 46 to 20 (Jacobson 2008: 76) and 
by 2010, the Bush Administration had persuaded over 80 international banks to cease 
processing transactions with the Iranian authorities (Katzman 2013: 24). 
 
In the US sanctions, Treasury employed so-called smart actions to target specific 
individuals and entities, particularly those operated by the IRGC, in Iran’s nuclear 
program that had been singled out in the President Bush’s Executive Order 13328 of 
June 2005.61  At the same time, the Administration tried to assure the international 
community that ‘our sanctions are now being targeted at specific actors on the basis 
of certain conduct - not conduct that the U.S. doesn't like politically but conduct that's 
contrary to international law or international standards and norms’ (quoted in Fang 
2007; see also Jacobson 2008). One of the organisations targeted by Treasury was the 
state-owned Bank Sepah, which according to Treasury ‘is the financial linchpin of 
Iran's missile procurement network and has actively assisted Iran's pursuit of missiles 
capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction’ (U.S Department of Treasury 
2007). A month later a privately owned bank, Bank Sedarat, was cut off from all 
access to US financial system on the grounds that it had facilitated money transfers to 
terrorist organisations (Jacobson 2008: 71). 
 
For the Iranian economy that is largely dependent on oil revenues, the steps taken by 
the US and international financial institutions were severe. For instance, as a result of 
the financial institutions withdrawal from Iran, the country now experiences extreme 
difficulty processing significant transactions, especially oil transactions customarily 
conducted in euros or dollars.  There are reports that Iran’s main trading partners like 
India, South Korea and China all owe Iran billions for past oil sales, but cannot pay 
their debts due to banking complications (Harper 2011). As foreign investors have 
used global financial institutions to conduct business in Iran, foreign investments have 
declined to almost minimum after foreign banks have withdrawn from the country. 
Moreover, the Iranian private sector had not only seen their import costs rise by 20 or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 As a response to sanctions that failed to deliver their set policy objectives in the 1990s, 
there has been a move towards ‘smart sanctions’. Smart sanctions are applied to individuals 
and/or groups who are held responsible for target country’s transgressions. It is claimed that 
smart sanctions target political elites and their resources and needs while population is hoped 
to suffer only marginally. Smart sanctions have included freezing assets, withholding credits 
and loans, prohibiting investments, and restricting travel, commerce, and communications, to 
name a few (See Weiss 1999: 503).  
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30 per cent because they have to employ middlemen to evade financial restrictions but 
also because foreign currency is less available now and therefore companies’ ability 
to buy essential imports and raw materials has been steadily eroded (The Telegraph 
2007/The WSJ 2010). The sanctions have also been highly effective in discouraging 
much-needed investment particularly in Iran's aging oil and gas infrastructure. For 
ordinary people, the deteriorating economic climate has materialised in increasing 
unemployment rates, high inflation rates, poverty, skyrocketing prices and mounting 
shortages of basic goods. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
whereas in 2007 Iran’s economy grew by 7.8%, in 2008 the rate had plummeted to 
1% (The WSJ 2010). 
 
5.3 Women and employment under sanctions 
The effects of the above-described measures have trickled down to the level of society 
and affected the lives of ordinary Iranians. This section sheds light on the sanctions’ 
impact on women’s employment in Iran. 
 
Women’s participation in the formal economy has been rather low in Iran but they 
have been the main targets of the layoffs after the sanctions were imposed on the 
country. While the public sector has tried to avoid lay offs, the government has had 
difficulties to pay their employees: Iranian news agencies have reported of wages not 
been paid as long as for six months (see e.g. Mehr 2010). Women have staffed both 
the public and private sectors. The hardest hit public sectors have been the teachers 
and nurses and the government owned factories – the largest employers of the female 
labour force in Iran. In the past ten years Asian companies, which have discovered the 
Iranian markets, have increasingly employed Iranian women. However, global 
companies have found it hard to conduct business in Iran due to the difficulties in 
money transactions and Iranians declining purchasing power and lay offs have 
become usual – and again, women have been the first targets of these. According to 
the UN statistics, the female labour force participation dropped from 19.4% in 2005 to 
16.1% in 2010 (UN 2012), which directly affects women’s economic security. 
However, the worsening male unemployment rate, which, according to the most 
recent statistics from 2011 is at 11.5% (UN Date 2012), also affects women’s 
economic security, especially in a country like Iran where the female employment rate 
outside home is low. 
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It has also been reported that monthly salaries in the public sector have dropped 
considerably and the spiralling inflation rate (officially hovering around 25% but 
some have estimated it to be as high as 50%) is making it almost impossible to afford 
basic goods. Also, the national minimum wage has gone down in real terms. The 
statistics go back to 2010 when the minimum wage was just over 300 million rials 
($275) a month. In 2013 the high levels of inflation mean the minimum wage is now 
487 million rials a month, however, it is only worth $134 (BBC 2013a). 
 
One of the Ahmadinejad Administration’s strategies to fight unemployment and 
labour costs has been to implement laws that discourage women’s participation in the 
labour force. One of these measures has been the revival of the Law for Part-Time 
Services for Ladies (1983). The law encourages women to half their working hours, 
which of course means also halving their wages and benefits (FIDH 2013: 24). Other 
studies on gender and sanctions have also noted how deteriorating economic 
conditions caused by sanctions may lead to social conservatisms about gender roles – 
i.e. encouraging women to leave paid work and assume more familial roles (see e.g. 
Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Pratt 2005). 
 
While there are no official statistics on Iranian women’s participation in the informal 
sector, the informal sector, which is often the first ‘economic refuge’ when people are 
laid off, has also suffered due to the sanctions.62 Prior to the sanctions, Iranian women 
from lower classes were actively engaged in the informal sector in areas such as 
cleaning, childcare, homecare, beauty, homecare and in light manufacturing such as 
assembly and packing (Moghadam, F. 2004). However, after the sanctions were 
imposed in 2006, two developments have taken place in the informal sector: 1) 
women who have not been previously in the labour force/or employed in the informal 
sector are now entering the informal economy and; 2) there is less work available in 
the informal sector. When I was in Iran in the spring of 2010, my interviewees 
reported of women even from the middle and upper classes entering informal 
economy in order to help their families with the increasing expenses resulting from 
high prices and inflation. These women offered academic tutoring classes, music 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 According to a survey from 2001, the informal labor force – both men and women – may 
account up to 50% of Iran’s active labor force (Rohani 2001 quoted in Moghadam F. 2004). 
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classes, childcare and household help. Some women had to work on two or three 
different jobs to be able to bring something home. 
 
The informal sector is even more volatile and insecure than the formal sector and the 
tightening economic situation via decreasing purchasing power is also affecting Iran’s 
informal sector. This trend has materialised in lesser employment opportunities, as 
employers can no longer afford extra help at home, and in lower wages (see for 
example CNN 2012). Therefore, women in informal sector are paid less, left with no 
work or forced to work on more than one job. Women’s declining incomes 
materialise in reduced household expenditures: the quality and quantity of food 
declines; the time spent on finding work and/or travelling from one job to another 
reduces women’s time for other activities (e.g. childcare, their own well-being, and so 
on) (see Gibbons and Garfield 1999). Moreover, the informal sector is even more 
volatile and insecure than the formal sector and women face the danger to become 
even more invisible. 
 
One of the bleakest developments in the informal economy has been the increasing 
prostitution activity. There have been reports of women from all economic classes 
being pushed into prostitution as a means to survive (see for example BBC 2012; 
Geobeats 2013; Khanlarzadeh 2009; Persson 2004; The Washington Times 2012). 
Students, divorced women, widowers and married women alike are increasingly 
seeking income in prostitution. In some cases prostitution can pay more than the 
formal sector where wages have been cut down. Bozorgmehr has argued that 
prostitution in Iran has become a means of survival when economic downturn is 
affecting employment rates, which, in turn, materialise in declining marriages that 
have traditionally given economic security to women in a country where female 
employment rate has been customarily low (Bozorgmehr 2011). There has also been 
an increase in the number of teenagers entering prostitution. According to some 
estimates there are 35,000 to 50,000 children under the age of 18 working in the 
streets in Tehran alone. Children’s work is either prostitution and/or sweatshop work 
and a trend is that parents are forcing them to contribute to the household expenditure 
in this way (Trafficking in Persons Report / US State Department 2013).  
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In the past, the Iranian authorities have denied the existence of prostitution in Iran, 
which is a crime under Iran’s law, but lately they have acknowledged that it is a social 
and economic problem that needs to be addressed (BBC 2012). One of steps taken by 
the government has been the promotion of sigheh, or temporary marriage, to tackle 
the mounting social problems that women face. Iran’s Interior Minister, Mostafa 
Pour-Mohammadi, has argued that marriage is a human need and it assists women 
financially (BBC 2007).63 
  
5.4 Women and the cost of everyday life under sanctions 
While the inflation of rial had plummeted prior the sanctions, the sanctions have 
exacerbated the rates. The prices of stable foods like beef, bread, oil and rice have 
more than doubled between 2007 and 2010 (Statistical Center of Iran 2011). It is 
reported that due to the high prices, people’s diets have suffered and there are first 
signs of malnutrition in urban areas where about half of the population lives under the 
poverty line (see for example CNN 2012; The Guardian 2010; Lafayette 2011; Saghri 
2012; Salehzadeh 2013).  
 
The Obama Administration intensified the sanctions with the CISADA in July 2010 
and in 2011 several new sanctions targeting Iran’s financial institutions and oil and 
gas sectors were introduced. The new rounds of sanctions limited and partly ended 
both Iran’s oil and gas exports and refined gasoline imports. (ICAN 2012). To counter 
some of the new sanctions impacts, the government initiated a number of changes in 
the country’s subsidy policies and in the autumn of 2010 the government introduced 
the ‘Targeted Subsidy Reform Act’. The Act cut subsidies for gasoline, gas, bread, and 
other staple foods. As a result, the prise of petrol rose fourfold, gas more than fivefold 
and bread more than doubled (see The Guardian 2010). The Act made Iran the first 
major oil-exporting country to reduce substantially energy subsidies (Guillaume et al. 
2011). The government re-organised the distribution of subsidies and they were 
turned into cash handouts. While everyone was allowed to apply for the new 
compensation, households in the upper income groups were asked to refrain from 
doing so (Guillaume et al. 2011: 14). However, due to the tightening economic 
situation even households in the upper income groups have been forced to use these. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The government’s promotion of sigheh was rather controversial as many regard sigheh as a 
cover for prostitution.  
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According to the IMF, the new legislation was planned to save the government about 
$100 billion a year (Iran Daily 2010). As the economic hardship increases in daily 
life, economic class and societal divisions have also being exacerbated (ICAN 2012). 
Women at the lower end of income suffer the most from the increases in basic goods 
and they are often the ones who first let their families eat before they have their own 
meal. 
 
5.5 Impact on gender relations 
Iran’s economic sanctions have also affected gender relations and family patterns. 
Feminist scholars have for a long time argued that the public affects the private (and 
the other way round as well). In the case of Iran, the trickling effects of economic 
hardship have affected both public –and private gender relations at the level of the 
state, family, couples and individuals.  
 
In its briefing paper on Iran’s sanctions, the International Civil Action Network 
(ICAN) pointed to the similar socio-economic patterns emerging similar to those in 
Iraq during the 1990s. For instance, the report found that women and girls were more 
likely to be withdrawn from school in order to help support their families, or to be 
married off young in order to remove the burden of feeding them (ICAN 2012). Al-
Ali has noted in her study on the Iraq sanctions that the number of women marrying 
expatriates and older men for economic reasons increased under the sanctions (e.g. to 
support their families or to settle a family debt) (Al-Ali 2005: 750). According to 
Khanlarzadeh’s observations, a similar development has emerged in Iran due to the 
worsening financial crisis to which the economic sanctions have contributed. Women 
from all walks of life are increasingly looking for a marriage that would provide a 
financially secure future. According to Khanlarzadeh, ‘[T]he marriage values have 
changed from education, love, and social class to financial stability entirely’ 
(Khanlarzadeh 2009). Moreover, Khanlarzadeh reports of a growing number of 
women agreeing to become the second wife for economic reasons (Khanlarzadeh 
2009). Additionally, the high cost of living materialising in high food prices and high 
rents, worsened with high inflation and salaries that no longer keep up with daily 
living costs, have an impact on peoples’ relationships. Young people find it hard to 
marry and set up families due to the economic hardship that forces young people to 
live at home with their parents.  
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It has also been observed that domestic violence has been on the rise in Iran. Several 
studies on sanctions have noted how certain forms of societal masculinity and 
femininity are being reinforced when societies undergo economic hardship. Men are 
assumed to be the main providers and protectors of their women and families, and in 
converse women are expected to be protected and embrace their responsibilities as 
mothers and homemakers. However, under economic sanctions that affect target 
countries’ economic performance the male breadwinner ideology is being threatened 
when even men are faced by stagnating employment opportunities (see Kabeer 2007: 
Pratt 2005). Scholars have noted how sanctions and the ensuing economic hardship 
have contributed to men’s feeling of lost masculinity through the incapability to fulfil 
their role as the main provider and this has materialised in gender relations as 
increasing domestic violence, divorces or other distressing behaviour affecting 
women (see Al-Ali and Pratt 2009; Gibbons 1999; Kabeer 2007). Khanlarzadeh study 
has observed similar developments in Iran. She argues that the formal sector’s layoffs 
have forced men to work in the unreliable informal sector which has cut down their 
salaries and ability to provide for their families. According to Khanlarzadeh’, the 
resulting financial frustration and humiliation is materialising in men’s relationships 
with their women (Khanlarzadeh 2009).  
 
The above mentioned ICAN report also notes that the sanctions have allowed the 
hardliners to further their patriarchal gender policies that aim to clear women from the 
public sphere (ICAN 2012). Policies and programs aiming to reduce women’s 
visibility and activities in the public sphere have included a governmental directive 
limiting women’s work outside home to daylight hours. Moreover, the state concerted 
social conservatism has been echoed by men who have lost their jobs or who no 
longer can afford studying and are forced to look for low paid part time jobs. Their 
attitudes towards women working outside home have changed and become less 
supportive (Interview with Ali, Tehran, April 2010). 
 
5.6 Impact on health services 
Another area that the economic sanctions have affected is Iran’s healthcare. While 
neither the UN nor US sanctions have banned the export of drugs to Iran, the 
sanctions imposed on the country’s financial institutions have severely disrupted the 
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purchase and availability of medical goods. The exclusion of Iran from the global 
financial system has meant that Iranian medical companies are now using the old 
system of hawala (money transfer) to process its transaction, which, in turn, has 
meant that the process takes longer and is more expensive (Khanlarzadeh 2013). The 
financial embargo and spiralling inflation have contributed to ‘the inability of 
pharmaceutical companies to purchase and import basic life saving medicines, 
ranging from Tylenol to cancer medicine and even prenatal vitamins’ (Ghandehari 
and Shahshahani 2013). The Obama Administration’s additional sanctions on Iran’s 
insurance and shipping sectors in July 2010 further disrupted the import of medical 
supplies (ICAN 2012). According to Khanlarzadeh, the imports of antibiotics have 
been decreased by 20,7 per cent and the prices have been increased by 308 percept as 
of 2013 (Khanlarzadeh 2013). Medicines for diabetes, haemophilia, cancer and post-
stroke treatment are hardly available anymore. Chemical weapon survivors (from the 
Iran-Iraq war) alike are suffering from a shortage of medicine and equipment. The 
medicines used to treat above mentioned conditions are either not produced in Iran, or 
if they are, they are not as effective as those imported from the US or Europe 
(Bajoghli 2013: Khanlarzadeh 2013). 
 
Women specific medicines have been hit particularly hard. According to a human 
rights activist, medicines specifically for women have disappeared from Iran due to 
the sanctions. Women suffering from yeast infections, urinary tract infections, and so 
on, have no medicines available (Bajoghli 2013). Similarly, women wishing to 
undergo IVF treatment have no access to the drugs needed for the treatments 
(Bajoghli 2013). The shortage of birth control pills has led the Iranian pharmaceutical 
companies to purchase the only available foreign brands, Yaz and Yasmin, brands 
that are currently facing major lawsuits in the US because they have been established 
to cause heart attacks, strokes and blood cuts among other things in women (Bajoghli 
2013).  
 
The shortage of foreign medicine has boosted the black market. This has strengthened 
informal power structures such as the IRGC that is one of the main actors in the 
Iranian black market. But maybe most importantly, black market medicines can be 
dangerous and are extremely expensive. The sanctions have effectively also blocked 
medical parcels from relatives and friends in the US as the United States Postal 
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Service and other postal carriers have interpreted this as banned by the sanctions 
(Ghandehari and Shahshahani 2013). 
 
The US sanctions have also affected the country’s trade in medical technologies. 
Advanced technologies such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) machines and 
other nuclear medical devices are on the list of banned export to Iran (see among 
others Ganji 2013b; Khanlarzadeh 2013; Saghri 2012; Salehzadeh 2013). This means 
that in some hospitals cancer patients have gone without radiology treatment (Saghri 
2012). It has also meant that the price for the material and equipment used by doctors 
and hospitals has spiralled and since 2006 the prices have become seven or eight-
folded. In an interview conducted by Khanlarzadeh, a twenty-seven year old 
university student describes the situation in the following way: 
No one dares go to dentists anymore. I had a root-canal seven years ago for 
fifteen Toman, but it now costs three hundred thousand Toman. The famous 
dentists in the city charge one million Toman. Those who care for a sick 
person in their home have it even harder than the rest of us. The medical 
equipment costs have skyrocketed. Medicine and medical equipment have 
declined in quality. Aluminium is no longer imported to Iran and as a result, 
wheelchairs, walkers, and canes have become much more expensive 
(Khanlarzadeh 2013). 
The shortages both in medicines and equipment have led to increase in healthcare 
costs (Salehzadeh 2013). As a result, health care has become a privilege almost 
inaccessible to the working – and middle classes (Khanlarzadeh 2013).  
 
In her study on Iraq’s sanctions, Al-Ali has noted that the disruption of welfare 
policies – including healthcare – is detrimental especially to women as they are often 
its main beneficiaries (Al-Ali 2005: 747). When the state is no longer capable of 
providing services due to the deteriorating economic performance, the responsibility 
of welfare policies is often shifted onto the shoulders of non-state actors such as 
churches, NGOs, and other private institutions (Hoskins and Nutt 1997). This means 
that welfare services are more scattered and often have less capability to provide the 
needed services. However, in Iran’s increasingly tightened economic situation, even 
the NGOs and other private actors are struggling to provide these services (Maha, 
Tehran, March 2010). 
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Iranians both inside and outside the country have tried to raise awareness of the 
critical shortage of many essential drugs. One organisation that has campaigned 
against the ‘medical embargo’ is the ‘Iranian Mothers for Peace’ Organisation which 
published an open letter in January 2013 to Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary General, 
and Margaret Chan, the Director General of the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
in which they demanded the sanctioning bodies ‘to urgently create the necessary 
mechanism for opening financial transactions and letters of credit to facilitate the 
purchase of medicine for Iranian patients’ (Payvand 2013a). 
 
5.7 Impact on women’s civil society activism 
The international community justifies economic sanctions by arguing that they result 
in the politicisation of the target country’s population/opposition forces that in turn 
initiates change in the behaviour of the target country’s government, which is then 
assumed to be more willing to negotiate with the sanctioning bodies. However, 
several studies have pointed to the increasing societal and political violence under 
sanctions (Al-Ali 2005; 2007; Ali-Ali and Pratt; Buck et al. 1998; Gibbons 1999; 
Weiss et al. 1997) and to the failure of sanctions to undermine the coercive capacity 
of the target regime if the target regime is autocratic (Allen 2008). Furthermore, it is 
noted that in autocratic societies, the public is less likely to voice their discontent due 
to the political cost that would follow from oppositional activities. Hence, it is argued 
that autocratic regimes are more likely to benefit from the sanctions and in most case 
leaders are able to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the population (Allen 2008; 
Peksen 2009). Consequently, the cost of sanctions is often placed on the shoulders of 
the target country’s population. 
 
The sanctions against the Iranian regime have allowed it to posit itself as a morally 
superior ‘anti-imperialist entity, resisting the unjust global relations’ (Khanlarzadeh 
2013). As a quote from Ahmadinejad’s comments on the US sanctions in July 2012 
exemplifies: 
A heavy battle has begun by [...] enemies against the Iranian nation. […] A 
big part of the government is working round the clock, working every moment 
[...] to stand up to them. The government will not retreat one iota from their 
rights, values and principles against weakening materialistic powers. This 
fight is going on incessantly. […] If we stay loyal to our principles, then we 
will always be fighting the arrogant powers, whose embodiment today is 
America (Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 2, 2012). 
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Thus, while sanctions have assisted the government to craft a discourse of national 
unity, at the same time, the discourse of unity allows them to push dissident voices to 
the margins. The sanctions have, in effect, allowed the regime to strengthen its old 
enemy discourse of the Western powers. While the regime denies the impact of 
sanctions when talking to the sanctioning bodies, domestically they have real-life 
evidence to prove the validity of the enemy discourse (Khanlarzadeh 2009). 64 The 
enemy behind the sanctions has allowed the regime to enact a more distinctive Iranian 
identity from the enemy, which in turn has allowed the regime to further consolidate 
the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ divide. This has materialised in the state’s tighter control of 
society, in ‘a selective backlash to ideas of concepts considered “western”’ such as 
the women’s movement, in the empowerment of hardliner actors in politics (‘who 
stand up to foreign powers/enemies’) and in the militarisation of society 
(Khanlarzadeh 2009; Raha Iranian Feminist Collective 2012). 
 
The sanctions combined with the discourse of enemy have made it harder to continue 
civil society activism that can be singled out as ‘dissident’ by the regime. The 
sanctions have closed down the little space that activists have had to articulate their 
agendas. As one of the interviewees explained: 
The sanctions and US threats about regime change have changed our agenda. 
While we are still trying to affect legal change, we are scared of the economic 
situation and possible war. We all remember the Iran-Iraq war and how it 
destroys life and everything that matters. A war with the US would destroy 
everything we have achieved. Sanctions are already undoing our work (Hoda, 
Tehran, March 2010). 
 
Or as Maryam, a 24-year old NGO worker, argued: 
‘Sanctions discipline our voices. They make us unheard. Sanctions make 
people depend on the authorities. They can humiliate us because we need to 
survive. When you need to survive you don’t have the strength to do anything 
else and that means that we wont’ be able to push for reform’ (Maryam, 
Tehran, April 2010). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 For instance, Khamenei has denied that the sanctions are having any effect on the country’s 
economic performance. For Khamenei, the sanctions simply show how Iranians are morally 
stronger than anyone else and he has invented a term, ‘resistance economy’, to describe Iran’s 
stance to the sanctions. In 2012 when the Obama Administration introduced a new round of 
sanctions, Khamenei declared that Iran is at a historical juncture, and argued that, ‘[T]he 
problems and difficulties are minuscule compared with the determination and ideals of this 
nation. [...] The resistance economy is not a slogan. It is a fact that can be materialized’ 
(Khamenei quoted in Sahimi 2012).  
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Or as Leili, a fifty-year old women’s movement activist explained her views: 
 
The West’s focus on the nuclear issue and the ways [sanctions] to deal with it 
have contributed to women’s deteriorating economic and societal situation in 
Iran. Ahmadinejad is also to blame for the economic situation but the West is 
not being ethical in its approach. The tense relationship with the US has 
allowed the regime to employ repressive policies that target especially women 
and their work in society, the results are already visible (Leili, Tehran, April 
2010). 
 
As Khanlarzadeh has argued, because of the sanctions, the regime has no interest in 
having a working relationship with civil society actors: ‘[R]ather, it needs only to 
refer to the imposed economic sanctions and threats of war to solidify its discourse of 
national reconciliation and the necessity for the political activists to postpone their 
criticism of domestic affairs’ (Khanlarzadeh 2013). 
 
The sanctions have had an impact on women advocates’ work on the ground and 
consequently deterred improvements in women’s status. While the state has been 
scaling back from certain services such as health care, NGOs have been trying to fill 
the gaps in the system. However, as I have already argued, in the post-9/11 
environment, Iranian NGOs have been increasingly targeted by the regime as ‘counter 
revolutionary’, their employees have been arrested, many of their private funders have 
withdrawn due to the declining economy and fear of retribution on the part of the 
regime, and several NGOs have also lost many of their volunteers because these have 
been forced to find paid jobs. As Noushin who is a co-director of a women’s NGO 
that offers adult classes and free meals in southern Tehran, argues: 
‘The sanctions have squeezed our finances. We are not able to conduct our 
work. Women who have been helped and supported by us are not getting that 
help anymore. Our achievements have been destroyed’ (Noushin, Tehran, 
April 2010). 
 
Or as Mona, a thirty-year old teacher and women’s movement advocate said: 
The sanctions have destroyed our lives through increasing unemployment, 
inflation, poverty, and general anxiety about the uncertain future. Sanctions 
have narrowed the space we have to voice our demands; we have been 
working for so long to implement our work and now it’s undone. Sanctions 
have added an extra layer to our work (Mona, Tehran, March 2010). 
 
In effect, the sanctions and the regime’s powerful message of the outside enemy have 
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narrowed the political environment where women can participate freely and 
consequently silenced many or made them postpone or halt their agendas and/or 
activities. The threat of arbitrary arrests and harassment by the security forces that 
have been on the rise has been powerful. Several studies on the loss of security in 
sanctioned countries have noted how sanctions contribute to women’s loss of security 
and how as a result women’s participation in society declines (see for example Buck 
et al. 1998; Gibbons 1999). This loss of personal security, according to Al-Ali, has 
had a distinct and debilitating impact on women’s everyday life in contemporary Iraq. 
Violence has not only narrowed the sphere where women can safely live their 
everyday lives but it has prevented women from participating in the public sphere 
(e.g. civil society activism, labour force, politics, reconstruction process) (Al-Ali 
2005: 755, 756) and a very similar development is taking place in contemporary Iran. 
 
5.8 Feminising Iran’s society 
Here I would like to draw attention to the process of feminisation in which both the 
Bush and Obama Administrations have been engaged in. As argued in the Chapter 2, 
feminisation process presents certain individuals or groups as victimised, vulnerable 
and incapable of defending themselves but, at the same time, their sufferings may be 
conceptualised as mere ‘collateral damage’. For Peterson, feminisation is a process 
that leads to the normalisation of ‘the devaluation of feminised bodies, identities and 
activities’ (Peterson 2005: 507; emphasis in original). This denigration of the 
feminine creates local and international hierarchies and produces (neo)colonial and 
imperialist relations of power –and domination. These hierarchies, in turn, can be 
used as justifications for disciplining, policing, controlling, invading and ‘saving’ 
others (see also Mohanty 2006; Marchand and Runyan 2011).  
 
Both the Bush –and Obama Administrations have effectively feminised Iranians –and 
women in particular – under the sanctions. For example Obama’s Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, who has also heavily campaigned for Muslim women’s human rights, 
stated in October 2011, ‘[I] am aware that, from time to time, certain sanctions can be 
difficult for totally innocent people going about their daily lives’ but continued by 
adding that  
[I]f you do not want to have a conflict, if you do not want to just give way to 
behavior that is very reckless, […] potentially dangerous, sanctions is the tool 
	   144	  
that we have at our disposal to use. The whole goal is to change behavior, and 
anything that can be done from within Iran to send a message to the regime 
that this is important to change behavior because of the concerns that the 
people have and because of the better potential for a better relationship with 
the rest of the world (Clinton 2011). 
 
This way of thinking has been echoed in the Congress as well. Senator Mark Kirk (R-
IL), one of the Bush Administration’s hawkish supporters, has argued that ‘[I]t is 
okay to take food from the mouth of innocent Iranians’ if the US wanted to see 
regime change in Iran (quoted in Gharib 2011). Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), 
another hawk, expressed a similar view when he stated that sanctions were necessary 
and ‘[T]he Iranian people should be willing to suffer now for a better future’ (The 
Guardian 2012). Moreover, testifying before the Senate in April 2013, Director of 
National Intelligence James Clapper, acknowledged the damage that the sanctions 
have had on Iran’s economy and how they have resulted in increased ‘inflation, 
unemployment and the unavailability of commodities for Iranian people’ (Clapper 
2013). 
 
The quotes demonstrate that US officials are acknowledging the difficulties that the 
sanctions have had on Iran’s population; however, the quotes also expose the US 
intention, which is not solving Iran’s nuclear issue but regime change. Clinton’s quote 
in particular demonstrates how the suffering of ordinary Iranians is ‘collateral 
damage’ to make sure that the White Self is safe and secured. It thus seems that the 
lives of people included in the White Self are understood more valuable than the lives 
of those who reside outside the White Self. A comparison emerges: American vs. 
Iranian wellbeing and security. 
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6.0 Funding human rights and regime change65 
To counter some of the criticism that the Iran sanctions were causing, the Bush 
Administration tried to draw attention to the human rights abuses in Iran. As argued in 
the previous chapter, the Administration justified Iran’s inclusion in the Axis of Evil, 
at least partly, by the regime’s poor human rights record. However, it was after 
Ahmadinejad’s election and the sanctions that the promotion of human rights and 
regime change geared up. In 2006, the Administration began to seek internal support 
for its plans from Iran’s civil society actors, including women’s movement advocates. 
However, as will be shown, this only gave yet another excuse for the Iranian regime 
to frame civil society activists as counter-revolutionaries and increase violence 
against them. As one human rights advocate reflected on the Bush Administration’s 
strategy in 2010:  
‘Unfortunately, the policies of the United States […] fanned the flames of 
Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, particularly during the Bush 
administration. […] The belligerent rhetoric of Bush didn’t help us [the 
Iranian democracy movement], it actually harmed us during that period’ 
(Akbar Ganji interviewed by Matt Duss, Think Progress, 2010).  
 
The Administration’s focus on Iran’s human rights record can be seen as part of the 
larger ‘Freedom Agenda’ that the Administration was promoting in the wider Middle 
East. This agenda consisted of several training and educational programs including 
the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA)66, the Middle East 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Democracy promotion in Iran was a public initiative to erode the Iranian regime by the 
Bush Administration. However, it is claimed that the Administration was meddling in Iran’s 
political future in ways that were less public. A report revealed that in 2007, the Congress 
agreed a presidential request to fund with $400 million covert operations against Tehran (see 
Seymour M. Hersh, Preparing the Battlefield’, The New Yorker, July 7, 2008 2008). These 
operations, which were enclosed in a classified Presidential Finding, were ‘designed to 
destabilize [Iran’s] religious leadership’ and ‘undermine Iran’s nuclear ambitions’ with the 
help of opposition groups and passing money’ (Hersh, ‘Preparing the Battlefield’.). The 
Administration sought to assist and finance ethnic groups such as Ahwazi Arab and Baluchi 
groups in southern Iran in order to foment separatist feelings and activities against the 
government. In 2007, to counter Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, the Bush Administration 
agreed on Special Operations Force operations which were conducted into Iran from southern 
Iraq (Ibid). Dissident groups outside Iran’s borders receiving governmental assistance from 
the US included the already mentioned MEK, which is an organisation that both the US and 
the European Union (EU) have previously listed as a terrorist organisation, and Jundallah, 
which is a militant Baluchi group. 
66 BMENA was launched two years after the MEPI initiative and it was a co-project organised 
by G8 and European governments to ‘strengthen freedom, democracy and prosperity for all.’ 
See http://bmena.state for more information. 
	   146	  
Partnership Initiative (MEPI)67, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)68 and 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).69 While all these 
programs emphasised and aimed at the building of stronger civil society in the greater 
Middle East, they were instrumental in the Administration’s efforts to safeguard the 
balance of power in the Middle East and to ensure America’s national security. As 
Bush’s statement at the 20th Anniversary National Endowment for Democracy 
demonstrates: 
Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of 
freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe – because in the long 
run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the 
Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a 
place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the 
spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our 
friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo (Bush, G.W. 2003). 
 
Secretary of State Rice gave her face to Iran’s human rights project. On February 15 
2006, she asked the Congress to fund a new initiative to promote democracy and 
human rights work inside Iran. Rice’s request of a budget of $85 million was an 
increase of $75million to the State Department’s Iran democracy budget from the year 
before when the State Department had begun to fund TV satellite channels and radio 
stations broadcasting into Iran with $10 million.70 The budget increase was reasoned 
by the project’s aim of engaging directly with the Iranian people. The program that 
the State Department was initiating would lift the old US restrictions to allow federal 
funding for Iranian women’s groups, trade unions, political oppositional groups, 
NGOs working in the fields of human rights, and individual human rights activists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 MEPI was launched in 2002 to initiate and facilitate political and economic reform in 
Middle Eastern countries. See http://mepi.state.gov for the participant countries and more 
information.  
68 NED is a-private owned non-profit organisation but is funded by the Congress. Its work 
focuses on promoting good governance via supporting NGOs working in the fields of 
democracy promotion and human rights. See http://www.ned.org/ for more information. 
69 USAID provides assistance in the fields of economy, education, environment, governance 
and additionally in humanitarian crises across the world. See http://www.usaid.gov/ for more 
information. 
70 Radio stations, which received state funding from this budget, included the Voice of 
America (VOA), Radio Farda. The independent American-Iranian TV channels, like Azadi 
TV, have publicly denied receiving any funding from the Congress but their deteriorating 
financial situation (declining revenue from advertising and donations) has made many to 
question their independence from the US funding (see for example ABC News 2004; BBC 
2003). 
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working inside Iran.71 The Congress approved the increase of funds and allocated $85 
million dollars to the new Iran Democracy Fund. Of the first budget, the majority of 
the funds, $50 million was granted to the Broadcasting Board of Governors. This 
basically involved extra funding for the Voice of America’s (VOA) Persian service 
and Radio Farda broadcasting into Iran.72 The rest of the $85 million was distributed 
by the State Department to different organisations and programs: $5 million to the 
Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs for Iranian student exchanges, another $5 
million to International Information Programs to develop new State Department Farsi-
language websites, $15 million to the Bureau of Near East Affairs (NEA), working 
together with the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) which were 
then to distribute the money to different organisations both in Iran and the US; the 
final $5 million was allocated to public diplomacy (Rice 2006b). The budget was 
renewed in 2007, when the State Department requested another $75 million to 
continue the Fund and the Congress approved slightly amended budget of $66 million 
due in large part to the strong regime change lobbying organised by Senator Joseph 
Lieberman, who has been very open about his anti-Iran views and has campaigned 
vocally for bombing of Iran. 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 However, lifting the restriction was not as straightforward as was first planned. For 
instance, the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) had to revise the rules that 
would permit U.S. NGOs to work inside Iran. In addition, an interagency process to vet 
NGOs took months to develop and then proved highly unpopular with the Fund’s key 
recipients. NGOs refused to share the personal data of their Iranian beneficiaries with the US 
government, as it was seen as fundamentally inimical to the success of their work and to the 
security of their counterparts in Iran (see J. Scott (2009), ‘After the Crackdown: The Iran 
Democracy Fund,’ The Washington Institute, PolicyWatch 1576, September 8, 2009. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/after-the-crackdown-the-iran-
democracy-fund, retrieved June 7, 2012. 
72 The extra federal funding for the radio stations ended up being a blow to the station’s 
independent programs. In 2006, the National Security Council ordered an internal report on 
Persian language programs funded by the Fund. The so-called ‘Archin report’ concluded that 
the current programs were essentially ‘waste of money’ and particularly VOA was too one-
sided and giving too much air time for ‘the Islamic Republic’s version of issues’. The report 
also singled out individual reporters who had been criticising American foreign policy 
towards Iran. Several individuals in the Congress, including Senator Tom Coburn, who held 
strong anti-Iran views and pressed VOA to be harder on the Islamic Republic, echoed the 
report and its findings. Following the report, VOA made an U-turn and their future reporting 
and interviews focused on oppositional groups residing outside Iran’s borders and on 
individuals such as the Reza Pahlavi who propagated revolution via VOA (See Negar Azimi, 
‘Hard Realities of Soft Power’, The New York Times, June 24, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/24/magazine/24ngo-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&, 
retrieved July 12, 2013). 
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Rice wove the Fund into the War on Terror discourse of emancipating the world from 
Dark Monsters and saving Iranian ‘women who long for liberty’ (Rice 2006a). She 
also made the Fund to be part of the American war arsenal by stating in her 
introduction to the project that  
[W]e have been engaged in a war on a group of terrorists who show no regard 
for innocent life, who spawn an ideology of hatred so great that they take 
innocent life without even thinking. […] They take innocent life not as 
collateral to their efforts but as the target of their efforts, and I think that we 
need to understand that this is a different kind of war. […] As a part of that 
war, or rather to make certain that any peace that we achieve in that war will 
be a permanent one, the President has noted the importance of the spread of 
liberty and democracy as antidotes to the ideology of hatred that we are 
experiencing in the world (Rice 2006a). 
 
Following the launch of the Fund, the Administration presented Iranian civil society 
actors, including women’s movement advocates – who they understood as opposing 
the current state and the regime – as the faces of the future Iran. As President Bush 
stated his support for the Fund after it was launched, the US is trying  
to support the Iranian people's efforts to win their own freedom, [and the] 
administration is requesting $75 million in emergency funds to support 
democracy in Iran. […] These new funds […] will support reformers and 
dissidents and human rights activists and civil society organisers in Iran, so 
Iranians can organise and challenge the repressive policies of the clerical 
regime. 
 
And he further added that: 
 
My message to the women of Iran is that the women of America share your 
deep desire for children to grow up in a hopeful society and to live in peace. 
[…] I think the people of Iran are going to have to come to the conclusion that 
a free country is in their interest. We, of course, support freedom movements 
all around the world (Bush G. W. 2008). 
 
Many saw the statement confirming the Administration’s mission of regime change in 
Iran – only softened with rhetoric about working with civil society actors towards new 
Iran. Hillary Mann Leverett, who was Director for Iran and Persian Gulf affairs at the 
National Security Council in 2001-2003, saw the Fund as a concession to those who 
were keen on regime change but, for timing reasons —the Iraq war — couldn’t have 
their way right then:  
There was a strong push for policy toward U.S.-style democracy from the 
White House and the National Security Council. […] They were looking to 
undermine the Iranian government any way they could, from military strikes 
and sanctions to funding U.S.-style democracy activists. The compromise was 
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among the regime-change advocates; some of them believed that all they 
could have gotten then was the democracy funding. But at least it would set 
the U.S. government on a course for regime change (Leverett quoted in Azimi, 
The NYT 2007).73 
 
Initially, the project’s idea was to grant funds to organisations and individuals 
working inside Iran. The aim was to facilitate pro-American sentiments through 
education in human rights work, NGO network building, democracy and training in 
transparent political process (U.S. Department of State 2007). However, essentially, 
participants were to be educated in (Western type of) civil society activism, (Western 
type of) democratisation, (Western type of) and political process, and if they learnt all 
this, they may eventually be lifted on the same level with Western civilisation. The 
Americans would lead the way with their superior moral and intellectual skills (see 
Agathangelou and Ling 2005). 
 
The Fund was obviously not well received by the Iranian regime. The regime saw it, 
quite rightly, as one of the many tools that the Bush Administration had in its regime 
change toolbox. President Ahmadinejad denounced the project in March 2006 by 
stating that ‘[N]o enemy can defeat the Iranian nation by imposing pressure from 
outside the country and, for this reason, they are eyeing certain internal agents and 
resort to political tactics.’ He went on stressing ‘the importance of reinforcing unity 
and convergence as the best defence’, and further argued that ‘a friendly and united 
nation would disappoint the enemies’ (IRNA 2006a). The Ministry of Intelligence 
published a statement that cautioned civil society actors of working with foreign 
contacts as any interaction with foreign actors were suspect unless proven otherwise. 
Minister of Intelligence Ejeii himself warned ‘domestic agents, infiltrators and the 
enemy’s’ fifth column’ that their activities and cooperation with the outside in order 
to create ‘psychological war’ were not hidden from the Ministry (Ejeii quoted in Farhi 
2007).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 It is worth noting that one of the people who helped launch the Initiative was Elizabeth 
Cheney, the daughter of Vice President Dick Cheney. Elizabeth Cheney worked also headed 
the Iran-Syria Policy and Operations Group which, with the financial help of a prominent 
Republican foundation, the International Republican Institute, financed Iranian and Syrian 
exiles to promote regime change in their home countries. 
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While the Fund gave yet another excuse to the Iranian regime to discipline voices that 
they could interpret as oppositional, the Fund was also criticised by Iranian civil 
society advocates. In October 2007, more than two dozens of Iranian-American and 
Iranian human rights groups, including women’s rights advocates, published an open 
letter in which they appealed to the Congress to withdraw the program and stop 
funding any democracy –and human rights promotion projects inside Iran. They 
stated that ‘the Iranian government sees the U.S. funding program as a tool to exact 
regime change through Iranian civil society and has used this perceived threat as a 
pretext to crackdown on the Iranian population at large.’ They continued by arguing 
that rather than promoting reform and democracy, ‘the funding has narrowed the 
space for the pro-democracy movement to operate’ (NIAC 2007). 
 
The Fund was being questioned in the US as well. When the second round of funding 
was approved in 2007 and no signs of the Fund’s success were being seen, many Iran 
observers were wondering where the project was heading. When asked about details 
of these promotion programs, the State Department did not reveal any specifics and 
referred to the classified nature of the Fund’s recipients whom it wished to protect 
against state repression in Iran (Leopold 2008). Carah Ong, an Iran Policy Analyst at 
the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, said in an interview that because 
the State Department operates the program under a veil of secrecy ‘we don’t know 
where the money is going’ and continued by adding that ‘there is no reporting 
requirement to Congress. There’s absolutely no accountability at all with this money’ 
(quoted in Leopold 2008). It seems that soon after the Congress had approved the 
second round of funds, it had become clear that it was rather challenging to channel 
funds to groups and individuals inside Iran due to the security situation that did not 
allow Iranian recipients to accept any US grants. And as such, in 2007, only a year 
after the Fund was launched, the State Department admitted that most of the 
program’s funds had never left the US and most of the money had been granted to 
American based think tanks and institutions such as Freedom House and Eurasia 
Foundation which had announced new ‘Iran desks’ after the Initiative was made 
public (Azimi, The NYT 2007, Leopold 2008). Not even everyone in the 
Administration agreed with the Fund and its mission. For instance, Suzanne Maloney, 
and Iran expert and who was on the policy-planning staff at the State Department, 
reflected on the Fund in the following way:  
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I was worried about the safety of those on the receiving end of the funds. But I 
also just wondered if this was feasible. I don’t see how a U.S. government that 
has been absent from Tehran for 30 years is capable of formulating a program 
that will have a positive effect. […] You had to wonder where this money was 
going to go and what’s going to happen when you don’t have the time to sit 
down and sift through the more questionable proposals. There’s just not 
enough oversight. Of the 100 or more preliminary proposals I saw under the 
first call, it was an enormous challenge to find anything viable. This may have 
been a very high profile, sexy project, but the likelihood of real impact was 
minimal (Maloney quoted in Azimi, The NYT 2007). 
 
To counter some of the criticism and justify the continuation of funding the project, 
President Bush continued to depict the Iranian regime as Dark Monsters who need to 
be defeated. As his comment exemplifies: 
We're taking the fight to those who share their murderous vision for future 
attacks. We will take this fight to the enemy without wavering, and we will 
prevail. […]. The enemy we face is brutal and determined. […] They share a 
hateful vision that rejects tolerance and crushes all dissent. They seek a world 
where women are oppressed, where children are indoctrinated, and those who 
reject their ideology of violence and extremism are threatened and often 
murdered (Bush G. 2006b). 
 
6.1 Failing to secure femininities 
Many scholars on Iran’s women’s movement have reported that the regime’s gender 
ideology changed after Ahmadinejad took office in 2005 (Mir-Hosseini 2006b; 
Moghissi 2008; Koolaee 2009; Hoodfar and Sadr 2010; Moghadam and Gheytanchi 
2010). The change in the gender ideology can be linked to the events in Iran’s 
external affairs. Women’s rights and women in general were, once again, linked to the 
hardliners’ effort to tackle what they saw as society’s westernisation and ‘creeping 
secularisation’ (Hoodfar and Sadr 2009). While under Khatami women’s socio-
political activism had been encouraged and the reformists had facilitated women’s 
entry to the public sphere, after 2005 the hardliners tried to discourage women as 
socio-political participants and contributors in the public sphere. Women’s familial 
roles as dutiful mothers, wives and daughters taking care of family needs and 
ensuring familial well-being and stability in the private sphere were emphasised while 
their presence in social, political and economic activism was being restricted. This 
was the second step in the regime’s attempt to regain control over society and dictate 
the content of socio-cultural, political and legal debates that had been flourishing 
since the late 1990s (interview with Zahra, Tehran, April 2010). 
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6.2 NGOs and the Center for Women and Family Affairs: campaigning for women’s 
familial roles 
One of the first changes in the sphere of gender relations was Ahmadinejad’s decision 
to place the Centre for Women’s Participation Affairs under a new director and 
rename it as the Center for Women and Family Affairs. As shown in the previous 
chapter, the Center has been one of the key actors in organising women’s NGOs and 
their activities in Iran. Many of the activists who I interviewed interpreted the 
renaming to reflect the change in the new Administration’s stance on women’s issues 
and women’s activism in the public sphere. As one of them explained: 
When the leadership of the Center was replaced we lost a friend. Doors were 
shut to this organisation. We had no mutual understanding of what was 
important for NGO community, to women and how to improve women’s 
position in society. Our ideas or agendas were almost unworthy to them. The 
new leadership wouldn’t listen to us; they wouldn’t talk to us (Nazir, Tehran, 
April 2010). 
 
When Khatami had opened the Centre, its mission was to facilitate women’s entry to 
and participation in the public sphere and encourage them as independent and equal 
actors in the country’s affairs. However, now the Center’s mission was dramatically 
reframed and according to its website the Center’s agenda is to promote women’s 
essential role as nurtures of morality in society and stability of families (The Center 
for Women and Family Affairs 2013). One of the first projects that the Center was 
given was the development of Ahmadinejad’s ‘Plan of Mercy’ introduced in 2006. 
The ‘Plan of Mercy’ was a 10 million-rial program aimed at promoting early 
marriage, domesticity and family values (Vakil 2011: 190). Ahmadinejad relied on his 
support network in the Basij forces whose female members were tasked to spread the 
message via mosques and schools (Vakil 2011: 190). Moreover, the second director 
under Ahmadinejad, Zohreh Tabibzadeh Nouri, declared to the disappointment of 
many women’s movement advocates, that she would not support the ratifying of 
CEDAW or any other international treaty promoting Western values as long as she 
was heading the Center (Mir-Hosseini 2006b). 
 
In 2006, the regime also began to fund a number of organisations that were ordered to 
fight feminism and spread the culture of modesty. These organisations were required 
to produce research that was then used by the regime to counter women’s movement 
advocates’ demands for reform (see Sadeghi 2009: 53-54). One of the organisations 
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behind the project was the re-organised Center. The Center replaced its previous 
publications on women’s rights with new materials that promoted early marriage, 
women’s domestic duties and offered scientific explanations for women’s role in the 
private sphere. Another organisation was the Strategic Research Center, which is 
closely affiliated with the Office of the President. In 2006, the head of the Center, 
Alireza Zaker Esfahani, argued that the Iranian women’s movement had originated 
and organised to further the American agenda in fuelling anti-Islamic and anti-
government activism in Iran (Zaker Esfahani quoted in Farhi 2007). At the same time, 
several organisations and institutes formed during the Khatami period were closed 
down. One of these was Shirin Ebadi’s Center for Human Rights Defenders that was 
raided and closed in 2008. Others’ activities were restricted by cutting their budgets 
or by harassing their staff or by limiting their licenses while pro-
Ahmadinejad/conservative institutions were granted more funds (see Khatam 2009). 
 
Some could argue that the pious women who I interviewed would have seen these 
changes in Iran’s NGO life as positive. In essence, the Center was now re-framing the 
agenda to be more ‘Islamic’ and promoted values and ideals that are often linked to 
pious lifestyle. However, for them the reframing of NGO community’s mission and 
agenda via the re-named Center meant that a very limited vision of women’s rights, 
well-being, values and aspirations was being imposed on them. When this was 
combined with the Ministry of Culture and Guidance’s campaign against women’s 
NGOs, which consisted of revoking NGOs licences whose missions were 
contradictory to the new guidelines provided by the Center and accusing NGOs of 
spreading the ‘unrealistic picture’ of women’s treatment to the outside world and 
working with outside powers to prepare the ground for a velvet revolution, many 
women felt that both their discursive and physical space for activism was reduced. As 
one of my interviewees, Nassim, who directs her own NGO in Tehran and identifies 
herself as a pious woman activist, commented on the changes that took place in 2005: 
The changes that were introduced in the mission and reorganisation of the 
Centre for Women’s Participation Affairs had far reaching consequences for 
us involved in the NGO community. First, the space for activism was reduced. 
The close links with the Center and the new authorities were obvious. Many of 
my colleagues were forced to close down their offices when the authorities 
raided their premises. They were told their licenses had expired and they were 
required to apply for new ones, when they did, their licenses were denied. 
NGO workers were also increasingly harassed by the security forces, many of 
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my colleagues were arbitrarily arrested and were later too scared to continue 
their work so they ‘voluntarily’ closed down. Also, this sense of insecurity 
affected our relationships with each other – it became hard to work with other 
NGOs … who could we trust? Second, the new Center and the new 
directorship limited the space for discussion. I mean, what we mean by 
progress and reform. I’m religious and I don’t call myself feminist so you 
would think that I agreed with the new director. No, she had a very narrow 
view on religion and rights. She had no sense of what women are going 
through in their everyday lives in these days. But we were given no space to 
debate this (Nassim, Tehran, April 2010). 
 
Several human rights organisations have also reported how the ascendancy of the 
hardliners increased state violence against women’s NGOs and their workers and 
activists. As Amnesty International reported in 2008: ‘[T]he security forces, led by the 
Ministry of Intelligence and the Judiciary have engaged in a concerted attack on the 
women’s movement. […] This has involved official vilification, harassment and 
arrests of women’s rights defenders.’ Moreover, the report continues, in April 2007 
Minister of Intelligence Ejei publicly accused the women’s movement  ‘of being part 
an enemy conspiracy to bring about a “soft subversion” of the Islamic Republic’ and 
since then women’s NGOs have been closed down and their employees have been 
questioned by the security authorities about their work and finances (AI 2008b). 
 
The new more conservative-traditionalist discourse on women’s roles in society and 
the re-organisation of NGO community demonstrated how suspicious the new 
government and hardliners in general had become of civil society. The flourishing 
civil society and a variety of actors and debates within society were interpreted as a 
challenge to the prevailing order. At the same time, women, once again, assumed the 
centuries old role as symbols of a nation’s distinctive character against the foreign 
enemy. 
 
6.3 The Majles 
As already mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, in the Seventh Majles women’s 
issues were increasingly pushed to the margins. The hardliners, who won the Seventh 
Majles elections back in 2004, renewed their seats in March 2008. Like in the 2004 
elections, in January 2008, the Guardian Council vetted nearly 3,000 reformist 
candidates, including the reformist MP Mehrangiz Morovati, serving in the Seventh 
Majles. The Revolutionary Guards, who won 31.5 per cent of the seats, were heavily 
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represented in the Eight Majles (2008-2012) (The Brookings Institute 2008). 
Khamenei himself announced his preference for candidates who ‘separate their line 
unequivocally from the enemy [the United States]’ (Khamenei quoted in Nafisi 2008). 
As a result, there were only eight women in the Eight Majles and they were all from 
hardline parties.74  
 
The hardliners in the Eight Majles regularly accused women’s movement advocates 
and NGOs of harbouring Western ideas (Koolaee 2009). The Eight Majles’ stand on 
gender relations and women’s issues were embodied in the debated law proposal of 
layehe hemayat-e az khanevade, or the Family Protection Act. The Act was aimed at 
revising Iran’s Family Court Law that has been in place since 1998 (Mir-Hosseini 
2000). Ahmadinejad’s Administration had introduced the Act to the Seventh Majles 
in July 2007 (Iran HRDC 2011) and the revisions suggested by the Legal and 
Juridical Commissions were sent to the Eight Majles where the final content of the 
Act was being debated. In particular the revision of three articles – the Articles 22, 23 
and 25 – resulted in heated debate among women’s movement advocates. These three 
articles aimed at revising registration of temporary marriage (Article 22), polygamy 
(Article 23) and mehrieh, or dower (Article 25). The revision of Article 22 would 
have meant that the registration of temporary marriages is obligatory only in certain 
cases such as pregnancy (Payvand 2012). The revision of Article 23 proposed to 
allow men to marry a second wife without the consent of the first wife and with no 
proof of financial means to support more than one wife. And finally, the revision of 
Article 25 sought to tax excessive mehrieh at the time of registering the mehrieh (see 
Iran HRDC 2011). In September 2007, Ahmadinejad argued that there had been  
organised attempts to tear down the institution of family and to reduce the 
status of women. Family is the most sacred and valuable human institution. 
[…] Today we are witnessing an organized invasion by the enemies of 
humanity and plunderers to tear down this genuine institution. They target this 
noble institution by promoting lewdness, violence and breaking the boundaries 
of chastity and decency. The precious existence of women as the expression of 
divine beauty and peak of kindness, affection and purity has been the target of 
heavy exploitation over the past recent decades by the holders of powers and 
owners of media and wealth. In some societies, this beloved creature has been 
reduced to mere instruments of publicity and all boundaries and protective 
shields of chastity, purity and beauty have been trampled (Ahmadinejad 
2007).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 This was the lowest number of female MPs since the Third Majles (1988-1992) 
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The Act was not well received by the women’s movement advocates and both pious 
and secular advocates have harshly criticised it. Zahra Rahnavard, one of the leading 
reformist and pious women’s movement advocates in Iran and now internationally 
known after being one of the leading figures in the Green Movement, called for the 
proposal’s removal from the Majles’ agenda and argued that the Family Protection 
Act ‘launches the destruction of the families in this nation’ and it ‘gives more power 
to men to have polygamy without the wife’s consent and harshly discriminates against 
the women even further than […] the women are suffering today in Iranian society 
according to the current laws’ (Rahnavard 2010). In the early autumn of 2008, a 
group of both pious and secular women’s movement advocates published a statement 
against the Act in which they argued that the government was seeking to restrict 
women’s roles to that of procreation and they further stated that: ‘[T]o limit the part 
played by women to the traditional roles and stereotypes, to describe women’s 
participation in social and political activities as superfluous and to place restrictions 
on the actions of women’s rights activists, while halting plans for the development of 
women can only perpetuate the vision of a “secondary sex” (quoted in Kian n.d: 18). 
The women managed to spark society wide debate over the content of the Act and it 
was sent back to the Legal and Judicial Commission for review later in the autumn of 
2008. In 2010, a revised Act was introduced in the Majles with revised Articles 22-24, 
which dealt with mehrieh, polygamy and sigheh (Kian n.d.:18). However, the debate 
of the final content of the Act has continued and the last revisions were made in 2012. 
 
6.4 Higher education 
Another area where the hardliners enforced their gender ideology was that of higher 
education. This allowed the hardliners to extend their reach to ordinary women as 
well. Since the early 2000s, more than 60 per cent of Iran’s university students have 
been female but after 2005 Ahmadinejad’s government began to curb women’s 
education in higher institutions. They introduced 30 per cent quotas for female 
students in different degree courses including engineering, nuclear physics, business, 
computer science and English literature. While no legislation was passed in the 
Majles, in February 2008 the Sazman-e Sanjesh-e Amouzesh-e Keshvar (Organisation 
for Evaluation of National Education) admitted that it had been enforcing female 
quotas and promoting a male priority acceptance policy since 2006 (Vakil 2011: 189). 
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By 2013, almost 80 different courses had restrictions for female students (Tohidi 
2013). Moreover, in early 2009, female students were required to get parental 
permission to study at universities outside their own cities, which in effect restricts 
their freedom of study (Vakil 2011: 189). While some courses had quotas for male 
students as well, Ahmadinejad argued that the female quotas were necessary to ensure 
‘gender equilibrium’ in the labour market and at home and that women’s high 
representation in universities was shifting gender relations ‘in an un-Islamic direction’ 
(Hoodfar and Sadr 2009: 13; Hoodfar and Sadr 2010: 896).  
 
Also, the government revised a more gender appropriate school curriculum for female 
students in primary and secondary schools. According to the hardliners, the religious 
curriculum introduced after the Revolution was not extensive enough and did not 
produce the desired effect in society. The revised curriculum and textbooks promoted 
women’s conservative-traditionalist domestic and familial roles. The hardline voices 
were also calling for reducing the years of schooling for girls so that they can 
graduate at the age of 15 or 16 and consequently they could marry earlier and start 
families (Zarabadi 2008 quoted in Hoodfar and Sadr 2009: 13; see also Paivandi 
2008). 
 
Moreover, after Ahmadinejad’s election, it was noticed that the Revolutionary Guards 
were interfering with universities’ hiring and administration practices. Tehran 
University, Allameh Tabataba’i University and the Teachers’ Training University 
offered early retirement plans or simply suspended academics that were categorised as 
‘anti-government’ in their teaching. These vacant posts were filled with basij officials 
who have via their Lecturers’ Basij Organisation (LBO) introduced new curriculums 
that emphasise non-secular subjects (RAND 2009: 39). In addition to the LBO, the 
number of student basijs at university campuses increased after the election of 
Ahmadinejad. To counter the relatively free environment in which universities were 
operating under Khatami, the hardliners have employed student basijs to install 
ideological conformity at universities and identify dissident academics and students 
and other student organisations such as the Office of Consolidating Unity and the 
Islamic Association of Students (Golkar 2010).  
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6.5 Commanding what is just and forbidding what is wrong: crack down on public 
morality 
One of the campaign promises that Ahmadinejad had made was to bring back 
farhang-e effaf, or the ‘culture of modesty’, that would reverse Khatami’s more 
relaxed social and cultural policies. After Khatami’s election in 1997, both sexes had 
been engaging in a more relaxed socio-moral code especially in urban centers such as 
Tehran, Shiraz and Mashhad (Mahdavi, P. 2009a: 4). Women and men mixed more 
freely in public, women wore more colourful and tighter styles of hejab, used more 
make up in public and dyed their hair while men fashioned western-style clothes and 
haircuts. Some have even argued that in certain segments of the urban middle – and 
upper classes young women were staging a sexual revolution against the regime by 
engaging in bold social and sexual relationships denied by the regime (Mahdavi, P. 
2009a; 2009b). The hardliners stated that the more relaxed socio-moral behaviour of 
urban women polluted Iranian society and condemned it as a US effort to weaken Iran 
by spreading immorality: the authenticity and purity of the Iranian nation was in the 
hands of women who needed to be protected from outside powers (Jomhuri-ye Eslami 
2006). 
 
The campaign was executed with the help of basijs and a new civil defence militia 
established to assist in the campaign. In the spring of 2004, after the Majles elections, 
which ousted the reformists from formal politics, the judiciary had established the 
Department for Social Prevention and Protection. The new department set up units in 
the provinces to assist the judiciary in ‘crime-fighting, intelligence gathering and 
providing religious guidance’ (Moaveni 2004). In effect, it was an extra branch of the 
regime that not only provided the regime with information about its citizens but also 
stretched the regime’s control over society. The units became enforcers of social and 
moral regulations similar to the basijs and they targeted women and youth in 
particular (Moaveni 2004). The groups became operational when Ahmadinejad took 
office in August 2005. 
 
After Ahmadinejad assumed power, the campaign against immoral behaviour in 
public began to intensify. While the regime has periodically targeted women’s attire 
and behaviour in public, especially when summer arrives, the campaign that started 
after the hardliners consolidated their power in 2005 went on for years. The language 
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of amr-e be ma‘ruf va nahy-e az monkar (commanding what is just and forbidding 
what is wrong) was employed to tackle un-Islamic behaviour which was seen as a 
result of cultural invasion of foreign enemies and women’s role was to defend the 
Islamic Republic against this invasion (see among others Khamenei’s speech on 
Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 2005; or Khamenei on IRNA 2006). The 
authorities blamed Western ideas of women’s rights and lax moral standards for 
messing up women’s heads and claimed that women’s behaviour was destroying 
‘society’s sanctity’ as one of the senior Ayatollahs, Seyyed Ahmad Khatami, argued 
(BBC Monitoring Middle East 2006). In the autumn of 2005, the regime ran TV and 
radio commercials and shows that promoted the campaign. Later in January 2006, the 
Supreme Council began to implement the Development Plan for Hejab and Chastity. 
It was a ruling requiring all ministries, governmental agencies and NGOs to promote 
the culture of modesty, which mainly targeted women, their attires and behaviour at 
workplace. The ruling also ordered the female Basij forces to enforce the ruling on the 
streets and with force if needed (Sadeghi 2009: 54). By the spring of 2006, the Basij 
had assumed a strong presence on the streets and were threatening and arresting 
women for their attire and behaviour in the public and intimidating and fining 
shopkeepers for selling ‘inappropriate’ clothing (Khatam 2009). In the summer of 
2006, the government, with Iran’s police force, began to sponsor fashions shows that 
promoted proper modest hejab; according to the Hamid Reza Moniri, the show’s 
executive secretary, the shows were aimed at ‘stemming a cultural invasion from the 
West’ (The Guardian 2006). The government also granted extra funds for film 
projects that would promote women’s role as a developer and consolidator of family 
life (Kayhan 2006). Two years later in May 2008, Ahmadinejad’s Administration 
introduced the so-called ‘sustainable security’ plan that ordered Basij forces to patrol 
streets in urban areas from sunrise to sunset (AFP 2008). The Basij began patrolling 
in the autumn of 2008 and they targeted particularly women’s public behaviour and 
attire. 
 
The campaign was of course aimed mostly at the urban upper middle class women 
living in the northern Tehran known for its ‘Western lifestyle’ and where people live 
a vastly different life compared to the lower classes in southern parts of the city. But 
the campaign was effective and the hardliners succeeded in their effort to make their 
power felt even within the walled compounds of the northern Tehranis. As one of my 
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interviewees, Farah told me:  
‘This was clearly the state’s attempt to scare us, to remind us of who has the 
power. And it worked. I began to pay more attention to the way I dressed, I 
hated when they [basijs] came to so close and threatened us. It was awful.’ 
(Farah, March 2010, Tehran). 
 
6.6 Female media 
Women’s magazines and journals have been instrumental for the Iranian women’s 
movement and the pioneering publications including Zanan, Farzaneh and Jens-e 
Dovvom have disseminated and expanded gender debate within Iranians. After 
Ahmadinejad’s election, the hardliners began more forcibly monitoring the female-
ran media, which was accused of engaging in ‘media war’ to weaken the Islamic 
Republic and its religious and cultural ideals and values. The IRGC and basijs were 
heavily involved in the censoring of the media. For example, in 2007, the IRGC 
commander Jafari warned the media community by stating that ‘mass media […] 
should embark on fulfilling their important role to promote and spread [the] Islamic 
Revolutionary ideals and aspirations across the society’ (Fars News Agency 2007).  
 
Maybe the most infamous incident was the closure of Iran’s most well-known 
women’s magazine Zanan in January 2008. Zanan had been published for 16 years 
and had become an influential journal that not only introduced new female 
interpretations of Islam to ordinary women and men but it also advised its readers on 
everyday issues in social, economic and legal concerns. It also brought together Iran’s 
religious and secular women’s movement advocates and invited both sides to take 
part in the debate. The authorities commented on Zanan’s closure by stating that the 
magazine had been ‘painting a gloomy picture of Iran’ and that it ‘compromises its 
readers’ mental health’ by ‘publishing morally questionable information’ (RFERL 
2008a). Most importantly, according to the authorities, the magazine had promoted 
‘insecurity in society, disturbed public rights, weakened military and revolutionary 
institutions’ and had painted a picture of Iran as ‘unsafe for women’ (Le Monde 
Diplomatique). The revoking of the magazine’s license came three days after an 
IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program that the US interpreted as strengthening their 
argument for a new round of sanctions against Iran. It also came just a month prior to 
the Eighth Majles elections that had already witnessed a clampdown on civil society 
and reformist politicians and the closure of the magazine suggests that the campaign 
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of repression directed at civil society actors who the regime could interpret as 
‘oppositional’ was ongoing (Hendelman-Baavur 2008). 
 
Following the crackdown on women’s media, many publications that had previously 
appeared in print moved their publications online. Because of the clampdown on 
traditional media, the Internet and Iranian blogs politicised themselves very quickly. 
Particularly Iranian women embraced the Internet and blogs at a very early stage. 
According to Shirazi, Iranian women have used these mediums not only as a means of 
accessing and disseminating information but also as a means to voice their individual 
views on gender issues and participate in debates (Shirazi 2012). Blogging has 
attracted both professional women’s movement advocates including editors, 
journalists, human rights advocates, and non-professional women’s movement 
advocates. Their blogs have ranged from secular to religious, offering analysis, 
opinions and commentaries about women’s issues in Iran. This has allowed a wider 
audience to become familiar with the women’s movement’s wide and rich agenda. 
Khiabany and Sreberny have noted how Iranian blogs matured, in a matter of a few 
years, from individualistic blogs into collective blogs inciting socio-cultural and 
political debate and change (Khiabany and Sreberny 2007: 572-573). One of these 
collective blogs was womeniniran.net that worked as a platform for women’s issues in 
the Iranian blogistan. It brought together individual blogs and covered a wide range of 
women’s issues voiced by ‘individual and independent voices’ (Khianaby and 
Sreberny 2007: 573). 
 
The Guards’ censorship extended also to the Internet. In Iran, the use of the Internet 
grew rapidly in the early 2000s and it was hardly controlled by the authorities prior to 
2005. However after 2005, the IRGC has assumed a central role in the monitoring of 
the Internet and they have increasingly filtered and banned its content as they interpret 
it to be one of the tools in the West’s regime change toolbox (see RAND 2009; 
Sreberny and Khiabany 2007). Prior and after the closure of Zanan, many female 
bloggers writing on women’s issues were arbitrarily arrested and several of them were 
charged with ‘activity against national security’ and sent to serve long prison 
sentences (see e.g. AI 2008b). One of the banned websites was a very popular site 
called Zanestan that was shut down in November 2007. The website was run by a 
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NGO called the Women’s Cultural Center that focused on women’s health and legal 
issues. 
* 
Thus, a nationalist/conservative/traditionalist gender discourse was imposed on 
society by the hardliners. While its purpose was to consolidate and mark the 
difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ by singling out women as symbols of the nation’s 
purity and resistance against Western interference, what was new to it, when 
compared to previous state orchestrated gender discourses in the Islamic Republic, 
was the absence of religious justifications. As Hoodfar and Sadr have argued 
[I]nstead they simply state what, in their view, are ‘appropriate gender roles’ 
with regards to family stability and societal well-being. Furthermore, this view 
assumes that a patriarchal family structure is the only model for an Islamic 
society, regardless of time or context. This line of argument effectively 
eliminates the possibility for new interpretations of Shari’a, through which 
Islamist women have been advocating a legal improvement of women’s rights 
in Iran (Hoodfar and Sard 2009: 13). 
 
However, in essence, both sides, the US and the hardliners in Iran, affected the 
contours of women’s activism. The declaration of support from the Bush 
Administration endangered women activists’ physical security and the hardliners 
narrowed not only the physical contours of women’s activism but also the discursive 
space by dictating what is the legitimate gender ideology. 
 
7.0 Conclusion 
While the Bush Administration has ostensibly shown an interest in advancing 
women’s rights in the wider Middle East, including Iran, it failed to protect those it 
had pledged to liberate and save. In the period 2005-2008, rather than inciting reform 
in the field of women’s human rights, the Bush Administration facilitated the 
hardliners’ crack down on the women’s movement, which reversed the years of work 
and progress achieved by women’s movement advocates. The singling out of Iranian 
women’s movement advocates was, in essence, the Bush Administration’s attempt to 
find new justifications for the ongoing War on Terror against Dark Monsters, a war 
that had become harder and harder to explain to American people. Thus, in effect, 
Iranian women were employed to demonstrate that the Dark Monster is still well and 
alive and it needs to be disciplined.  
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The disciplining of the Dark Monster, however, materialised on the bodies of Iranian 
women. The Bush Administration, and later the Obama Administration, feminised 
Iranian women to bear the burden for the ‘greater good’, but which is, actually, the 
White Self’s security. The Feminine Other – which in this case refers to the Iranian 
women – is never granted similar security like the one that the White Self enjoys. As 
her security is less valued. The economic sanctions levelled against the Iranian regime 
have been in stark contrast with the US emphasis on Muslim women’s rights and in 
general the West’s insistence to include women as active participants in the world 
outside the home. The economic sanctions have undermined Iranian women’s access 
to income, work, education, and health services and pushed them to the margins of 
social, economic and political life. 
 
For the hardliners in power, the women’s movement – allegedly supported by the old 
enemy – came to represent a possible post-Islamic Republic order. To prevent another 
Iraq from happening, the Iranian regime has increasingly become hypermasculinised. 
At the domestic level, this has materialised in the increasing involvement of military –
and paramilitary organisations in Iran’s political and social life. The militarisation of 
political and social life has impacted both women’s civil society activism and 
everyday life. To counter external attempts to undermine not only the current regime 
but also the Islamic order, the hardliners are attacking those who have been picked by 
the US to represent the post-Islamic era. The state violence against women’s 
movement advocates and the state sponsored nationalist-conservative-traditionalist 
discourse on gender relations has narrowed both physical and discursive activism 
spaces of the women’s movement. Thus, compared to the period 2002-2004 when the 
regime targeted mainly high profile women’s movement supporters in formal politics, 
we see in the period 2005-2008/9 how the crack down was extended to the wider 
society. It is evident that the hardliners in Tehran extended the violent crack down on 
the wider civil society after the Bush Administration began to emphasis the 
importance of ordinary Iranian women’s movement advocates for internal reform.  
 
In essence the chapter wanted to draw attention to the fact that the US, and other 
policy makers, for that matter, need to recognise the damage that the interweaving of 
women’s rights with interventionist policies causes not only to the physical security 
of women but to their work on the ground. While the period 2005-2008 witnessed 
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intensified security consciousness on the part of the Iranian regime, there were 
hundreds and thousands of women who continued their everyday activism and work. 
While the government’s changing gender ideology and violent crack down meant that 
the women’s movement lost avenues at the higher level to push for reform and that 
the risks of activism grew higher and women activists were pushed to  ‘a relatively 
low-key period of activity, characterised by less political overtones and concentration 
on grassroots involvement,’ as one women’s NGO explained in an interview 
(Payvand 2008); the work, however, continued and it should be by no means belittled.  	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CHAPTER 6: IRAN’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 2009: A YEAR AFTER 
NEDA: THE OBJECTIVE OF KILLING IS TO MAKE ONE INVISIBLE75 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The main title of this chapter refers to a young Iranian woman Neda Agha-Soltan, 
who was killed by a basij sniper during the post election demonstrations in June 2009 
and who came to symbolise the Green Movement (GM) – a diverse and fluid group of 
ordinary people and social and political activists. The subtitle refers to the 
governmental sniper bullets fired during the various demonstrations in 2009 and 
which I see having a collective end: to silence the Iranian civil society and women in 
particular, symbolised in Neda. The bullets and other clamp down techniques 
employed by the government did not only silence individuals like Neda but also 
created a climate of fear that consequently paralysed organised civil society in the 
country. 
 
In the spring 2009, Iran was preparing for its tenth presidential elections. Both 
Iranians themselves and the international community had prepared to see 
Ahmadinejad continue for another four years. However, the run up to the elections 
activated not only various networks of activists but ordinary people who shook off 
years of political apathy and joined campaign rallies, street debates and 
enthusiastically campaigned for their own candidate. In the campaigning period that 
started well before the Guardian Council approved the candidates in May, we began 
to see more and more of the colour green. The colour green was the campaigning 
colour of the reformist candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi and which was later deployed 
by the movement, which challenged the election results that many regarded as 
fraudulent. On the Election Day, 85 per cent of the electorate cast their vote and many 
hoped to see a reformist candidate to enter the second runoff with Ahmadinejad.76 
However, the Minister of Interior released the preliminary results only a few hours 
after the polls had closed and declared the incumbent’s re-election. The first section 
of the chapter looks at this pre-election period and how ordinary people and civil 
society actors like women’s movement advocates found breathing space in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 For Neda documentary, http://www.thisisforneda.com/, last accessed 8/10/2010 
76 Hardly anyone expected Mousavi or Mehdi Karroubi, the other reformist candidate, to win 
in the first runoff.  
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somewhat relaxed political atmosphere and how they challenged the candidates on 
issues such as the country’s ailing economy, state-society relations and foreign policy.  
 
The second section of the chapter moves on to examine how the hardline regime dealt 
with the largest street protests in Iran since 1979 and what was the US reaction to this. 
According to some estimates, millions of Iranians took to the streets to show their 
disbelief in the election results. While the demonstrations were sparked by elections 
results that many found rigged, the roots of the unrest can be found in people’s 
growing discontent with the already mentioned governmental economic 
mismanagement, aggressive foreign policy behaviour and the regime’s clamp down 
on civil rights which had intensified since the hardliners began to crawl back to the 
center of Iran’s political life. Although it appeared, at least for a while, that the 
demonstrations could bring the regime to its knees, a day after the first street 
demonstrations the regime began systematically to clear streets and the most violent 
months since the 1980s political purges started against ordinary Iranians and civil 
society actors. It was during these street demonstrations when a basij sniper killed 
Neda Agha-Soltan. Killing Neda was the regime’s collective message to ordinary 
people and civil society actors and women in particular. As this section shows, 
increasing violence against civil society actors that forced them to exit activism or 
leave the country strengthened this message. In short, killing one is to make him/her 
invisible and unheard. The stakes to be visible and have a voice were made so high 
that civil society actors ‘voluntarily’ made themselves invisible. 
 
Mousavi’s victory in the presidential elections would have undone the hardliners’ take 
over of the body politic. While the US rhetoric about the regime had changed with 
President Barack Obama’s new approach to the US-Iran relations, the hardliners’ 
reaction to the GM needs to be placed within the War on Terror framework that 
pushed masculinities to engage in hypermasculine games. I argue that the ones that 
the US had pledged to support were the ones who paid the prize for the White Self’s 
desire for security but which materialises itself in transnational violence and 
insecurity. In the spring 2010, women’s advocacy was paralysed and their NGO work 
had suffered due to the increasing state violence. At the same time, these women 
activists were increasingly trying to work hard to realise their views of women’s 
rights. This was, however, increasingly hard due to the intensified state repression. 
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Also, while many of the women’s movement advocates who I interviewed had agreed 
with the agenda and goals of the GM, they were disappointed with the movement’s 
little focus on economic issues. 
 
2.0 Iran’s tenth presidential elections 
When Iran’s tenth presidential elections were approaching, many Iran observers 
expected them to be a small and insignificant political performance to confirm the re-
election of Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad had everything that he needed to win the 
election at his disposal. Firstly, critical voices were rather well controlled thanks to 
the hardliners’ repression of civil society. Moreover, the political apathy of the 
reformists and ordinary people, which had settled in around the mid-2000s, was 
assumed to keep people at home on the Election Day. Secondly, whilst Ahmadinejad 
did not have Khamenei’s public support for his candidacy, the key ministries 
overseeing the elections were in the hands of Ahmadinejad’s loyal men.77 Similarly, 
his foot soldiers from the IRGC and basij forces were campaigning vigorously for his 
re-election. Fourthly, Ahmadinejad’s supporters controlled the state-owned media and 
oversaw other media outlets, which meant that other candidates had a hard time to get 
airtime on state TV and radio. And finally, as in the 2005 presidential elections, the 
Guardian Council, staffed by hardliners, exercised a rigid vetting process. On 20 May 
2009, the Council approved only four out of 500 candidates. These included the 
incumbent President Ahmadinejad, reformist candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and 
Mehdi Karroubi and a conservative candidate and former Chief Commander of the 
IRGC Mohsen Rezai. 
 
2.1 Enter Mir-Hossein Mousavi 
By the time when the Guardian Council confirmed its approval of presidential 
candidates, Mousavi had already rolled out his election machinery and emerged as the 
leading candidate against Ahmadinejad. Mousavi’s revolutionary credentials far 
surpass those of Ahmadinejad. Mousavi was active in the 1979 Revolution, a close 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 On March 21 2009, Ayatollah Khamenei publicly declined to announce his preferences 
between the two conservative candidates, Ahmadinejad and Mohsen Rezai. He stated that 
‘[T]here were some rumors that I support a special candidate for the presidential elections. 
But I have one vote, and I would not determine a certain candidate because the people 
themselves should choose their candidates based on their own knowledge’ (The Guardian 
2009a). 
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protégée of Ayatollah Khomeini and he served as Prime Minister until 1988. In the 
1980s, he was seen as one of the hardliners and he gained a reputation as a man who 
did not stand for dissent (BBC 2009d). However, it was due to his economic policies 
that the country survived the Iran-Iraq war. In the 2009 elections, many recalled how 
Ayatollah Khomeini had unequivocally backed up Mousavi against then-president Ali 
Khamenei who did not agree with Mousavi’s reconstruction policies (Ehsani et al. 
2009). After President Rafsanjani excluded Mousavi from his cabinet in the early 
1990s, Mousavi retreated from politics for 20 years and focused on teaching Islamic 
architecture and finding his passion in arts. 
When Mousavi re-emerged in the 2009 elections, he had a new message to the Iranian 
people promulgated via his green coalition, as his campaign was named. Whilst the 
international media, which paid close attention to Mousavi, branded him as a modern 
‘western’ type of reformist, Mousavi has a deeply religious background and has 
always emphasised his firm belief in the 1979 Revolution and the Islamic Republic. 
In the election campaign Mousavi emphasised a combination of social justice and 
healthy economic management, as well as the need for politico-legal reforms and 
opening talks with the Obama Administration if President Obama’s ‘actions are 
keeping with his words’ (Mousavi quoted in Iran Chamber 2009). It needs to be noted 
that Mousavi’s concept of social justice was different from that of Ahmadinejad’s. 
Whereas Ahmadinejad had relied on lavish justice shares to the lower classes, 
Mousavi understood social justice as an institutionalised state practice that incites 
economic reforms, creates employment opportunities and boosts both the public and 
private sectors’ performance and which, in turn, materialises on the tables of ordinary 
people. Thus, for Mousavi, social justice was a return to the revolution’s original 
promises and it aimed at improving society at large and in an economically 
sustainable way. Mousavi’s campaign also called for the rule of law and greater 
individual rights. One example of this was Mousavi’s promise to discontinue the 
enforcement of ‘culture of modesty’, which according to him was a political tool used 
by the elite to suppress difference in society (Ehsani et al. 2009). Hence, while 
Mousavi’s concept of social justice appealed to people who struggled in their 
everyday life, his call for greater individual freedoms appealed to the middle classes. 
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However, for women’s movement advocates and ordinary women, it was Mousavi’s 
wife, Zahra Rahnavard, who made Mousavi an interesting presidential candidate. 
Rahnavard is a well-established artist and she held a PhD in political science. She had 
published widely on women, politics and religion, had a long history of political 
activism in leftist-Islamist organisations from the 1960s and 70s onwards and in the 
1979 Revolution she joined, along with her husband, Khomeini’s supporters. After 
the Revolution, Rahnavard sought to participate in the newly organised body politic 
and she was one of the founders of the Women’s Society of the Islamic Republic 
(WSIR). She was also an editor of Rah-e Zainab (Path of Zainab), which under a 
different title had been Iran’s leading women’s magazines in the Pahlavi era (Afary 
2009: 313). However, after Rahnavard began to criticise the regime’s forced 
Islamisation of society, and in particular women’s compulsory hejab, she fell out of 
the regime’s favour and was forced into a period of low activity (Afary 2009: 314). 
Since the early 1990s, Rahnavard had worked with the reformists and pushed for 
reforms in the fields of women’s employment, domestic violence and child custody, 
to name a few. In an interview with the Zanan, which the hardliners closed down in 
2008, Rahnavard argued by referencing Simone de Beauvoir that Iranian women are 
treated as the ‘second sex’ (Afary 2009: 315). Under Khatami, Rahnavard worked as 
a presidential advisor and in 1999, Khatami appointed her as the chancellor of the 
prestigious al-Zahra Women’s University in Tehran. However in the mid-2000s, 
when the hardliners purged universities, Rahnavard was forced to leave her post. 
 
In the run-up to the elections, Rahnavard not only attended campaign events alongside 
her husband but also influenced Mousavi’s campaign agenda which came to address 
women and their rights. She also organised her own events and published extensively 
her own ideas prior to the elections. In one of her articles published before the 
elections, she argued that ‘the […] experience from past elections shows that during 
the election excitement and […] [attempts] to gain women’s votes, women are 
considered first-class citizens and half of the populations. But as soon as the election 
is over women are downgraded to second- and third-class citizens and they're being 
forgotten.’  She further added that Iran should review its laws in order to end the 
discrimination against women and that the Islamic Republic should join international 
conventions that safeguard women's rights, especially within the workplace’ 
(Payvand 2009a). Her gender vision aimed at expanding the familial roles that the 
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hardliners’ gender ideology had tried to impose on society. A day after Mousavi’s 
candidacy had been approved, Rahnavard argued that  
[W]hen participating in social activities, our women must feel both secure and 
liberated. In other words, they must be allowed to freely choose their career, 
work environment, and clothing [in compliance with Islamic dress code]. […] 
The democracy we seek is a religious democracy, which would allow young 
women of our time to thrive and flourish by providing them with security, 
freedom, and employment (Payvand 2009b). 
 
Rahnavard was able to bring the woman question back on the state level and pushed 
to counter the hardliners’ gender ideology that was aimed at driving women back to 
the sphere of the family home. While the women’s movement advocates did not 
officially support any of the candidates, Rahnavard was able to unite both pious and 
secular minded women behind her husband’s candidacy. 
 
2.2 The run-up to the elections 
During the last six weeks of the election campaigning both the regime and the 
presidential candidates introduced new dynamics into the campaigning and people 
keenly responded to these. The regime also relaxed its crackdown on society, for 
example by letting the social media flourish in the Internet, and in this way gave a 
breathing space for the civil society and the campaigning organisations. 
Consequently, political apathy quickly disappeared and within a few weeks the 
public’s enthusiasm grew so large that it made Mehrangiz Kar, a prominent women’s 
rights advocate, described it as ‘election hyper energy’. She noted, ‘[W]e are seeing 
much more freshness in the campaigns than we ever expected. Watching and hearing 
all that is happening, one cannot remain silent to what is going on’ (Kar interviewed 
by Shiriin Jaafari 2009). 
However, while the public was allowed to participate in campaign rallies and debates, 
at the same, according to an Amnesty International report, state repression 
significantly increased against civil society advocates, among those particularly 
targeted were women’s rights activists, student leaders, lawyers, and advocates for 
Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities (AI 2009: 15). Some external actors in the 
country saw this reflecting the regime’s awareness of the real reformist challenge to 
the incumbent (Interviews with several European diplomats, Tehran, March-April 
2010). 
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2.2.1 Public debates 
One of the most exciting openings of the public space was the televised live debates 
between Ahmadinejad and the other candidates: an entirely new development in Iran. 
Ahmadinejad faced each of his opponents individually debating for one and a half 
hours at the time. The airing of the debates took place between 2-8 June and prior to 
the televised debates the candidates were given airtime on state TV for their own 45-
minutes long campaign videos (BBC 2009a). These live debates provided a public 
and relatively sheltered forum for the reformist candidates to voice their agendas and 
challenge Ahmadinejad’s policies from the last four years. The critical dialogue 
coming from Ahmadinejad’s opponents can be seen as a joint reformist-pragmatist 
initiative, which aimed at crafting a sustainable economic-political strategy with clear 
domestic and foreign policy objectives in areas of concern such as economic reforms, 
civil freedoms and better relations with the West. This coalition of reformists and 
pragmatists had been in making for some time now - mostly due to Ahmadinejad’s 
unorthodox economic policies and problematic foreign policy approach, which 
together were derailing the Islamic Republic’s popularity in the eyes of Iranians and 
isolating the country in global affairs. 
 Mousavi tried to engage with Ahmadinejad on these issues on June 3, when it was his 
turn to appear on TV. Mousavi argued that Ahmadinejad’s government ‘has 
undermined the dignity of our nation and of our country. […] It has inflicted heavy 
damages on us and created tension with other countries. It has left us with not a single 
friend in the region’ (TheRealNews 2009). On economics, Mousavi roared at 
Ahmadinejad’s ‘charity based economy’ and argued that  
‘one of our problems is that we are facing […] someone who can stare at the camera, 
look you in the eyes, and claim […] that black is white, that two times two is not four, 
but ten, and state it so emphatically that some of you swayed! Nothing is worse than 
when the government lies to the people!’ (Mousavi quoted in Ehsani et al. 2009). 
 
Ahmadinejad’s performance was rather poor at every debate and he resorted not only 
to blackmailing of his opponents and their family members but also showed very little 
understanding of the country’s economic situation by quoting suspicious if not forged 
data and blaming the previous administrations for Iran’s economic problems. 
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2.2.2 Shaking off political apathy 
As the candidates showed their eagerness to participate in constructive debates, the 
wider society was also electrified and found its way to the public space to express and 
voice their opinions. In the run-up to the elections, many saw the June ballot box 
standing at a delicate crossroad of the country’s future. The person who would be 
elected would decide the direction of the country’s democratisation, its economic 
situation and relations with the outside world. 
 
Ordinary people saw the campaigning period opening a breathing space after the 
political and social crackdown of the past four years under the Ahmadinejad 
Administration and they were quick to seize this opportunity. Many new people, 
particularly young people who were born after the Revolution, found, for the first 
time, interest in the country’s political future (Farah, Tehran, April 2010). At nights 
young people began taking over streets in Tehran and other major cities and they said 
that they sensed that ‘transformation was in making’, but no one could pin it down 
properly, they only felt ‘we are part of something bigger’ (personal communication 
with the author, June 2009). For the first time since the Khatami era people felt 
interested enough to voice their opinions about the country’s economic downturn, 
corruption, inflation and human rights violations. People enthusiastically showed their 
support to their chosen candidates and the last weeks of the campaigning period 
witnessed a growing number of both spontaneous and organised political rallies of 
thousands of people attending not only in the capital but also in other larger cities 
around the country. 
What began to be a prominent theme in these rallies was the colour of green. We 
began to see women wearing green headscarves, younger population fashioning green 
wristbands, and men wearing green t-shirts and headbands, the signature colour of 
Mousavi’s campaign. The soon famous Green Movement (GM) was in the making. 
Mousavi’s campaign slogan, har shahrvand, yek setaad, for each citizen, one camp, 
(Ganji 2009) brought together people across class, gender, ethnic, pious/secular 
divisions and the movement and its energy that grew behind Mousavi’s candidacy 
was unseen in the Islamic Republic’s history.78  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 It needs to be noted that the GM was very much an urban-based movement. 
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However, while especially the foreign media was drumming on about the new 
emerging social and political movement, people inside the country were more realistic 
and careful about the movement and its future. A Nordic diplomat from Tehran 
remembered the atmosphere in late May 2009:  
The Vali Asr Street [of Tehran] was packed with young people and I was 
walking around looking for my friends. The atmosphere was energetic and 
people were almost euphoric. I finally found my friends and asked them what 
was happening. They said people were here to show support to Mousavi. We 
then started discussing about Mousavi and I asked again ‘what it is about this 
Mousavi that makes you to vote for him?’ One of them replied;’ I don’t really 
know, I just want to get rid of Ahmadinejad, I hope someone could replace 
him’. The others were nodding in agreement but none of them could really 
specify what made Mousavi such an appealing choice, especially when 
knowing his background as a regime loyalist conservative in the 80s 
(Interview with a Nordic diplomat, Tehran, April 2010). 
 
Many have noted that prior to the elections, when the GM was still finding its form, 
one of the unifying forces was, in fact, people’s desire to get rid of Ahmadinejad. 
Afshari and Underwood have even argued that the diversity of the people who 
identified with the movement made it hard to define the specific goals and reform 
ideas of the movement (Afshari and Underwood 2009: 8). My interviewees shared 
similar views on the pre-election period. Many of them had had the same feeling that 
most of the people in the streets did not care so much about the candidates’ and their 
agendas and people believed Ahmadinejad to simply symbolise everything that had 
gone wrong in society and that it was time to correct this. The problem seemed to be 
that people, especially the younger segment of the society which compromises 70 per 
cent of the population, did not know what or who could be the replacement for the 
current one. 
 
However, more important in the long run was the fact that the run-up to the elections 
activated ordinary people to participate in civil society activism and take part in 
debates and in essence people made their voices heard, which the regime had tried to 
stifle since the mid-2000s.  
2.3 Women’s movement advocates in the elections 
Women’s movement advocates saw a window of opportunity to open in the run-up to 
the elections and a number of pious and secular women’s groups, individual human 
rights advocates, NGOs, political activists and trade unions formed a broad coalition 
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under one banner called the ‘Women’s Convergence’. The coalition decided not to 
throw its support behind any of the candidates but asked for their individual responses 
to the following questions: first, what was the candidates’ position to the signing of 
CEDAW, and second, if they were willing to revise all local discriminatory laws 
against women in the constitution. At the same time, the aim was to reverse and 
challenge the hardliners’ gender discourse that emphasised women’s roles outside the 
public sphere. 
 
The campaign managed to bring gender questions back in the public sphere and 
demonstrate that within Islam there can be a number of ways to interpret gender 
relations and norms. The coalition also raised awareness among ordinary people and 
re-energised the women’s movement after a period of low-profile work. Women 
working for the coalition published newsletters and made appearances in the media, 
they attended street rallies, organised press conferences and interviews with the 
candidates (Tohidi 2009). The candidates found it almost impossible not to address 
gender questions in their campaigns, Ahmadinejad being the only one who evaded to 
comment. In the end, both Mousavi and Karroubi made women’s rights integral to 
their campaign agendas. As already noted above, the role of Mousavi’s wife 
Rahnavard was important in this matter. Karroubi on his part made a strong statement 
just before his candidacy was approved by stating that ‘[E]nsuring equality between 
men and women was one of the aims of the Islamic Revolution, and this desire was 
reiterated many times by the founder of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini.’ He 
further added that the Islamic Republic needs to be reformed and ‘this change cannot 
be realized except with the restoration of the greatness and the rightful status of 
women’ (Press TV 2009a). Karroubi, who had Jamila Kadivar, a prominent women’s 
movement advocate, as his spokesperson, also promised to have women in his cabinet 
should he be elected. Addressing women’s rights, the conservative candidate Rezai 
made a promise of putting housewives on the payroll if elected president (Press TV 
2009b). While this supported women’s familial roles, in a country where women’s 
presence in the paid labour is low, Rezai’s promise was attractive to many women 
staying home. Rezai also made promises of improving women’s rights in the fields of 
education, economics and health – leaving questions of the family law and political 
rights untouched. However, perhaps most importantly, the coalition managed to incite 
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debate among ordinary people. As a NGO worker described the pre-election 
atmosphere a year later: 
Even in my own family I argued about gender relations and roles with my 
father. I think this is an important step to take and it could initiate change in 
society. When certain customs are being debated, discussed, or questioned, it 
might be possible to change them. In the long run this might contribute to 
changes in laws. Any change must come from inside, not from above or 
outside. If the push for change comes from inside it is harder for the 
government to ignore it (Niaz, Tehran, April 2010). 
 
2.4 The elections 
The week before the elections was coloured by nightly rallies in the main streets of 
Tehran. Mousavi’s rallies gathered together thousands of people and were the largest 
since the student demonstrations in 1999. Mousavi’s mass rallies made some Iran 
analysts believe that the incumbent’s chances to be re-elected were dwindling and 
many of his former supporters were leaning towards Mousavi. Reasons behind this 
shift included Iran’s soaring inflation rate, high unemployment and the West’s 
economic sanctions that were materialising on the backs of ordinary people (see 
Cohen 2009; The Washington Post 2009). The hardliners began to feel unsettled by 
the nightly rallies and for instance on June 5, a week before the elections, Khamenei 
warned people participating in the rallies and campaigns to be careful in order to 
avoid sparking ‘frictions, revolt, and enmity’ (BBC Monitoring Trans Caucus Unit 
2009). 
 
On June 12, Iranians went to the polls and early reports expected the turnout to be 
high and the Ministry of Interior ordered the voting stations to remain open for four 
hours past the scheduled closing (The NYT 2009a). Before the preliminary results 
were announced Mousavi organised a press conference where he claimed his victory 
and charged that there had been serious voting irregularities. He called Khamenei to 
intervene and investigate the irregularities that included a lack of ballot boxes in many 
areas, some of Mousavi’s campaign offices being attacked, his web site being shut 
down and on the day of voting text-messaging services were slowed down in order to 
disturb the opposition’s ability to communicate during the voting process. However, 
just two hours after the polls had been closed, Iran’s state owned media claimed the 
incumbent President Ahmadinejad had won in a landslide (ISNA 2009a). The 
reformists were confounded by the news. They had been confident about their 
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chances to win this time, not necessarily in the first round, but definitely in the second 
runoff. Polling had also supported the reformist hopes about getting re-elected after 
years of conservative power. For example, a poll conducted in Iran’s ten major cities 
in late May found that Mousavi was leading Ahmadinejad with 4 per cent (Press TV 
2009c). 
 
Since no independent election observers were present in Iran, it has been hard to 
conclude if fraud took place, yet, irregularities were reported by several Iran 
observers and human rights organisations. 79  However, some have argued that 
Ahmadinejad’s election was indeed a result of people’s will and there was ‘no solid 
evidence of fraud’ (Walter Mebane’s study on the 2009 elections quoted in Afrasiabi 
2009). However, the regime’s mishandling of the aftermath of the elections only 
added to the perception that the elections had been fraudulent (Abootalebi 2009: 8).   
 
3.0 From ballots to bullets: the green protests 
On June 13, the streets of Tehran and other major Iranian cities had been fuming since 
the early hours. Supporters of Mousavi and Karroubi flooded the streets in numbers 
that surprised even the old generation of student demonstrators from the late 1990s. 
The green wave, now branded as the Green Movement, took over the streets. 
 
The updated elections results published by the Interior Ministry at 8 a.m. only fuelled 
the agitation in the streets. The new results, with 77 per cent of the votes counted, put 
the turnout at 85 per cent and re-announced Ahmadinejad being re-elected with 65 per 
cent, followed by Mousavi with 32 per cent,80 which IRNA translated into 18 million 
votes and 9 million votes respectively (IRNA 2009). Following this, both Mousavi 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See a report by Ali Ansari, Daniel Berman and Tom Rintoul, ”Preliminary Analysis of the 
Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Elections”, published by Chatham House and the 
Iranian Institute, University of St Andrews, June 21, 2009. Available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/755/, retrieved 12.02.2011. 
The report shows, for example, how in two conservative provinces, Mazandaran and Yazd, a 
turnout of more than 100% was recorded. Furthermore, in a third of all provinces, the official 
results would have required that Ahmadinejad had taken not only all former conservative 
voters, all former centrist voters, and all new voters, but also up to 44% of former reformist 
voters, despite a decade of conflict between these groups. See the report for details. 
80 The final official election results gave Ahmadinejad 63,62 percent of the vote, followed by 
Mousavi’s 33,75 percent, Rezai’s 1.73 percent and Karroubi’s .85 percent (’Iran Annouces 
Final Poll Results: Ahmadinezhad Wins, Vision of the Islamic Republic, Network 1, June 13, 
2009. BBC Monitoring). 
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and Karroubi published statements in which they rejected the election results and 
called their supporters and the clerical establishment to challenge the outcome of the 
elections. Only a few hours later Khamenei dismissed the appeal and issued a 
statement on state television congratulating Ahmadinejad on his victory, calling it as a 
‘blessing from God’, and pointedly urged the other candidates to support him. 
 
Continuous demonstrations that began on Saturday 13 June lasted until late June and 
hundreds of thousands, even millions, Iranians attended daily demonstrations.81 One 
of the most famous demonstrations was the symbolic silent march on Monday 15 
June. An estimated three million people walked in silence, their mouths taped, from 
the Enghelab (Revolution) Square to the Azadi (Freedom) Square. After the first 
weeks, the demonstrations grew more sporadic and attracted less people due to the 
heavy state organised violence against people in the streets. 
 
The authorities’ first response to the demonstrations was the denying of permits 
needed for public gatherings and dismissing the protestors as ‘dust and pebbles’ who 
would find no place to ‘shine’ in the ‘transparent nation of Iran’, as Ahmadinejad 
declared on Sunday June 14 (Press TV 2009d). However, the regime was quick to 
activate the IRGC, riot police and basij militias, which systematically forced people 
to retreat from the streets. While the riot police and basijs entered the streets and 
broke up demonstrations, the Guards were concentrating on paramilitary and 
intelligence operations and mostly targeting the leaders and organisers of the GM. 
Interior Minister Mahsouli justified the extensive crack down on the protestors by 
claiming that the demonstrations were illegal without the required permits and thereby 
the arrest and prosecution of protestors was reasonable (ISNA 2009b). Another target 
were the opposition’s tools of communication. The authorities blocked mobile phone 
transmissions, websites, blogs and social media sites such as Facebook. Especially the 
young had widely used text messages and blogs to disseminate information about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 People abroad were able to follow the demonstrations almost interactively when images 
and videos were uploaded from the streets to social media sites such as Facebook and 
YouTube. Outside the country, the June demonstrations were named as the Twitter 
Revolution - echoing the anti-government demonstrations in Moldova earlier in April 2009. 
Although social media did play a role in the demonstrations and in people’s communication, 
it seems that western observers exaggerated its role. See for example, Golnaz Esfandiari, ’The 
Twitter Devolution”, Foreign Policy, June 7, 2010.  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/07/the_twitter_revolution_that_wasnt?sms_ss
=email&at_xt=4d6f6f50030d9b8c%2C0, retrieved February 12, 2011. 
	   178	  
demonstrations and warnings about the security forces.  
 
A partial concession to the demonstrators came on June 15, when Khamenei 
responded to the demonstrators and assumed a public role in the crisis, something that 
he has hardly ever seen to seek. Khamenei called for the Guardian Council to conduct 
a limited re-count of 10 per cent of votes that Mousavi’s campaign office had singled 
out as questionable. A similar re-count had taken place after the first round of the 
2005 presidential elections, which resulted in a run-off between Ahmadinejad and 
Rafsanjani. In 2005, the recount was carried out behind closed doors and it was 
announced that the elections had been clean but the council never published its 
findings. This time, however, the situation was quite different. The public pressure 
from the streets and even some regime hardliners, including Speaker of the Majles Ali 
Larijani, questioning the results meant that Khamenei and his hardline allies faced a 
dilemma: by admitting that voting irregularities had taken place, they would have also 
admitted that they had not been true to the pure image of Islamic Republic they had 
attempted to project. Were they to deny any of the accusations, street protests would 
only accelerate and play into the hands of Mousavi and Karroubi. Maybe Khamenei 
decided that he would deal with loyalty questions and dissident opinions later because 
the re-counted votes confirmed the re-election of Ahmadinejad on June 29 (Press TV 
2009g). 
 
On Wednesday 17 June, Mousavi and the former President Khatami sent a public 
letter to the Judiciary asking judges to use their powers to reduce violence in the 
streets and release protesters who had been arrested. The letter stated that ‘the use of 
violence against ordinary people, raiding people's residences just because they chant 
the sacred phrase of Allh-o-akbar, beating up women and men’ is not in line with the 
standards of the Islamic Republic (CNN 2009a). The hardliners’ response was not 
surprising. It was not only a warning to the demonstrators but also linked them to 
external powers. Mohammad Reza Habibi, a senior prosecutor from Esfahan, declared 
that ‘[W]e warn the few elements controlled by foreigners who try to disrupt domestic 
security by inciting individuals to destroy and to commit arson that the Islamic penal 
code for such individuals waging war against God is execution’ (quoted in the NYT 
2009b). The Supreme National Security Council responded to Mousavi’s criticism by 
not only placing the responsibility of protestors’ injuries and deaths on the shoulders 
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of Mousavi but also accused external actors:  
It is your duty not to incite and invite the public to illegal gatherings; 
otherwise, you will be responsible for its consequences. […] It is your 
responsibility to prevent the public from attending such rallies instead of 
making accusations against the law enforcement. […] We believe this is an 
organized network which is most probably affiliated to foreign-related groups 
and deliberately disturbs the peace and security of the public (Press TV 
2009e). 
 
The dismissal of demonstrations as ‘conspiracy’ by foreign powers only further 
angered protestors as they felt that their demands went unheard by the authorities. 
However, it was Khamenei’s Friday Sermon on June 19, at University of Tehran that 
formulated the regime’s official response. Khamenei reiterated his support for 
Ahmadinejad and denied claims that the last week’s elections had been rigged. 
Khamenei stated that  
[I]f the nation feels that in the remarks made by certain officials there lies an 
issue of enmity with the Islamic system and certain hands are at work to help a 
movement that seeks to deliver a blow to the establishment, they [the nation] 
will distance themselves [from those officials], even if such officials pursue a 
slogan that has arisen from the nation (Press TV 2009f). 
 
He also added that ‘foreign enemies were behind the street unrest’ destroying 
Iranians’ trust in their political leaders’ and pushing to stage a ‘velvet revolution’ 
(The NYT 2009d/The Guardian 2009b). Khamenei also warned the protestors of even 
tougher governmental repression if the demonstrations were to continue (The Times 
2009). Many interpreted this as Khamenei giving green light to any approach that 
security forces would find necessary in order to silence the protestors.  
 
And indeed, the next day, the IRGC and other militia groups intensified the use of 
their machineries and a violent crack down began in the streets of major Iranian cities 
and society at large (BBC Farsi 2009). The state’s security presence stayed stationed 
in the streets and public places for months. Security forces had permission to shoot 
protestors and according to the official reports from Iranian authorities the death toll 
by mid July was 30, however, human rights activists’ anecdotal evidence put the 
figure at hundreds (The Guardian 2009c; The Guardian 2009d). Alongside the street 
protestors, one of the first targets was the media. The Ministry of Interior revoked 
both domestic and foreign journalists’ press credentials and foreign journalists were 
asked to leave the country. This meant that information about what was taking place 
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inside the country was restricted to the haphazard grass root journalism on social 
media such as YouTube and Facebook but which could not be verified. This, of 
course suited the regime. 
 
Starting also on June 20, the security forces systematically cleared the streets by 
placing snipers in the main streets and squares, using tear gas and randomly beating 
protestors. Universities were also attacked with a heavy hand and some institutions 
decided to close early for the summer holidays. 120 academics at the Tehran 
University resigned after five students were reported to been killed in a basij raid. On 
June 20, Tehran’s medical authorities confirmed that at least 47 people had died, 
many from gunshots wounds (The Guardian 2009d). 
 
3.1 Neda Agha-Soltan 
Also, on June 20 took place an iconic event. A young woman called Neda Agha-
Soltan, aged 26, was shot dead by a governmental sniper in one of the street 
demonstrations. Bystanders recorded Neda’s last moments on their mobile phones and 
the footage was quickly uploaded and circulated on YouTube and within hours she 
became the most well known symbol of the post-election repression in Iran. Neda’s 
death unsettled many who had participated in the GM. The past week had already 
demonstrated how hundreds of thousands of women had claimed their presence not 
only in the demonstrations. Moreover, as Tahmasebi-Birgani’s works has shown, 
women were also participating in the inner circle of the emerging social movement 
and shaping the movement’s direction, content and philosophy (Tahmasebi-Birgani 
2010).  
 
Neda’s death was not the only violent attack against women: human rights reports and 
video footages from Iran has showed that basijs and riot police were increasingly 
targeting women in the streets and the systematic clearing of women from the ranks 
of the movement were effectively creating a climate of fear inside the country (Negar, 
Tehran, April 2010). While the regime denied that state security forces had been 
involved in Neda’s death and blamed either other protestors or foreign governments 
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of killing her,82 the violent act was an efficient way to transfer the environment in 
which the Green Movement was taking shape and to stage an ideological message 
before the demonstrators. 
 
Thus, I argue, that the governmental sniper bullet that killed Neda was aimed at 
silencing not just this particular individual woman but also symbolically Iranian civil 
society and female actors within it as a collective. Neda symbolised several socio-
economic and political issues that the hardliners had tried to suppress for years now. 
First, her gender was maybe the most important of all. In 2009, women had shown, 
once again, that they were one of the most vocal groups working in civil society. In 
2009, they had not only actively participated in the run up to the elections but were 
also found in large numbers in the street demonstrations. This made women one of the 
main targets of the hardliners and security forces. And as will be shown, the 
hardliners’ stance on the women’s movement only hardened in the coming moths. 
Second, Neda’s young age draws attention to Iran’s demographics (Tohidi 2009). 70 
per cent of Iran’s population are below age 30 and they have grown increasingly 
frustrated with the repressive socio-political environment that does not allow them to 
be heard. Thirdly, her middle-class background told a story about the Green 
Movement and Iranian women in general. While the middle classes did indeed form 
an important support group within the movement, it is worth examining briefly what 
it means to be from the middle classes in today’s Iran and what it meant for the Green 
Movement. As Dabashi has asked, can we really use the term ‘middle-class’ to 
describe people who are jobless twenty-something-year-olds who still live with their 
parents, who cannot afford their own apartment, marry and/or start a family in a 
principally oil-based economy? (Dabashi 2011: 111). Moreover, of these, women 
represent a disproportionately high number compared to men (Dabashi 2011:111). 
Thus, Neda, with her young age and middle class background, gave her face to the 
many frustrated young women (and men) who were trying to make their voices heard. 
 
However, the governmental bullet that killed Neda, did not only silence individuals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 For example, Iran’s ambassador to Mexico suggested of CIA involvement in Neda’s death 
(CNN, ‘Iranian Envoy: CIA involved in Neda’s Shooting?’, June 25, 2009. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/25/iran.ambassador/index.html, retrieved 
December 13, 2013. 2009b). 
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like Neda but, as already hinted above, created a climate of fear that consequently 
paralysed and silenced the organised civil society in the country (Leili, Tehran, April 
2010). One of my Iranian friends explained how she had felt about the random 
killings in the demonstrations: ‘[I] felt that fear penetrated all of us. You could only 
feel this cold lump in your stomach – it paralysed me and I stopped going to the 
demonstrations’ (Sara, Tehran, April 2010). Many of the women who I talked to saw 
Neda’s death connected to women’s roles in civil society activism. They felt that it 
was almost as if the authorities were showing women their place in society again. 
 
3.2 Dwindling demonstrations 
The fact that there were no restrictions on the use of violence from the side of the 
security forces effectively cleared the public demonstrations in Tehran and in other 
major cities by the end of July. Later in the early autumn demonstrations were 
organised on a smaller scale to commemorate those who had lost their lives in the 
streets. The last large clashes between the regime and protestors took place on 
December 27, 2009. On that day people gathered together to celebrate the Ashura 
mourning ceremony – commemorating the killing of Imam Hussein – but it turned 
into one of the bloodiest days for the GM. More than 300 people were arrested, 
hundreds were injured and ten were reportedly killed by the security forces in Tehran 
and Tabriz (The Guardian 2009e). One of the last attempts for organised protests was 
Mousavi’s call for peaceful demonstrations on February 11 2010, to celebrate the 
Revolution’s anniversary. However, the regime warned civil society in advance and 
many were too frightened to participate. National Chief Police, Ismail Ahmadi 
Moghaddam, issued his warning in January by declaring that the era of ‘mercy’ was 
over and he further added that ‘[A]fter […] Ashura, our tolerance has come to an end, 
and both the police force and the judiciary will be confronting them [protestors] with 
full force’ (The NYT 2010a). The statement was followed by several rounds of 
executions of political prisoners in early February (The NYT 2010b). After this, 
public demonstrations were basically over. After the direct violence employed in the 
streets, the hardliners moved on to ensure that the civil society had lost its voice. A 
NGO worker, who I interviewed in 2010, described the situation as the ‘militarisation 
of society’ (Negin, Tehran, April 2010). 
 
 
	   183	  
3.3 Paralysing civil society: longstanding methods of violence 
In order to silence the more organised civil society, the security forces used arbitrary 
arrests to target both high and mid-level profile reformists, women’s rights advocates, 
other human rights activists, NGO workers, artists, academics, journalists and 
students (see for example AI 2009; Iran HRDC 2010). The hardliners targeted both 
low-and high profile women’s movement advocates and according to a human rights 
advocate, 300 women’s movement advocates were arbitrarily arrested in the aftermath 
of the elections (Abbasgholizadeh 2011). Many women activists had their offices and 
homes raided. By September 2009 the number of arrested people had reached 4,000 
people (AI 2009). A widely used practice was to keep the arrested without access to 
lawyers or families, and without charge for varying lengths of time, often in 
conditions amounting to enforced disappearance (AI 2009: 25). Many families had no 
information available until the arrested showed up at home or until his/her body was 
released by the authorities.83 
 
Another way to silence civil society activists was to put them under house arrest and 
keep them away from their supporters and venues of participation and influence. 
Some people found it safer to leave the country and the number of Iranian exiles in 
the west went up again. However, also this played into the hands of the regime – the 
activists were no longer stirring the situation inside the country. A new technique 
deployed by the regime was the targeting of family members – especially of children 
– instead of the activist him/herself. This long-standing method of violence was 
widely used in the immediate aftermath of the elections but it continued subsequently. 
For example, Faezeh Hashemi Rafsanjani, a women’s rights advocate and the 
daughter of the former President Rafsanjani who had joined the GM, was arrested 
several times. Mousavi’s son and brother-in-law were also under arrest for a long 
time, and the list goes on and it includes children of less known activists as well (see 
AI 2009: 29-30).  
 
After the first days of demonstrations, the regime began to accuse the US and other 
foreign countries of working behind the scenes to bring about a soft revolution to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The number of arrested who died in prisons due to the torture used by the authorities had 
not been confirmed but human rights advocates inside Iran and international human rights 
organisations have reported that the number could be as high as hundreds. 
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overthrow the current government. This accusation increased the arrests of people 
who had links to foreign countries. The arrests of dual-nationals, for instance of the 
French-Iranian embassy worker Nazok Afshar who ended up appearing in the show-
trials later in the year, were widely condemned by the global community. However, 
also women’s movement advocates, NGO workers and journalists were accused of 
having ties to external actors and they were in increasing numbers arbitrarily arrested 
and imprisoned (Siyasat-e Ruz 2009).  
 
In July, the first allegations of the use of rape in detention centers and prisons 
emerged. Rape as a method of torture was used in Iran before the 2009 arrests, but 
very few men have previously admitted in public that they have been rape victims. 
There was also evidence that the rapes were carried out systematically by the 
authorities who not only ordered/allowed the prison personnel to carry out these acts 
out but they also employed sentenced criminals to rape people arrested in the 
demonstrations (The Guardian 2011). According to human rights organisations and 
the GM leaders, more than 100 people were raped (AI 2009; Iran HRDC 2010). In 
2009, the government seemed to be denying sexual honour from those demanding 
political rights (Mir-Hosseini 2009). Potkin Azarmehr, an Iranian-British blogger, 
commented on this arguing ‘[B]y killing protesters, the government makes martyrs of 
them, but by raping them and allowing them to live, it makes them shunned in 
society’ (Azarmehr 2009). Or as UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, 
has argued: ‘[W]hen Government officials use rape, the suffering inflicted might go 
beyond the suffering caused by classic torture, partly because of the intended and 
often resulting isolation of the survivor. In some cultures a rape victim may be 
rejected or formally banished from her community or family’ (AI 2009: 48). 
According to an Amnesty International report, several of the summer 2009 rape 
victims fled the country because of the humiliation. This again served the regime, as 
there were less oppositional voices to be heard. 
 
Mehdi Karroubi, however, openly challenged the stigma of the act in August 2009 by 
demanding the government to investigate the allegations. Karroubi, together with 
Mousavi, set up the Committee for the Follow up of the Injured and Detained in 
Recent Events to support the rape victims and help them with their legal cases. The 
committee has not only recorded the various forms of ill treatment that were practiced 
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in detention centers and prisons but has also helped to break the taboo subject in the 
country. After Karroubi had made the allegations public, the regime denied the 
accusations. Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, a senior hardline cleric who had already 
denounced the street demonstrations as un-Islamic, called Karroubi’s allegations a 
‘total slander against the Islamic system’ (Press TV 2009h).  
 
The arrests and ill treatment and torture in detention usually resulted in forced 
confession and in early August 2009, the regime organised a series of show trials in 
which some of the detained, both ordinary protestors and high profile reformists, 
human rights activists and journalists, were put on trial. The first trial on August 1, at 
the Revolutionary Court building involved 100 detainees who were collectively 
accused of having ‘participated in riots, acting against national security, disturbing 
public order, vandalizing public property and having ties with counter-revolutionary 
groups’ (AI 2009: 54). The first trial was followed by four other and each of them had 
a further 50 defendants (AI 2009: 54). During the first day of court, prosecutors read 
out one of the indictments that was based on one of the detainees’ confession and 
which, according to the authorities, confirmed that the detainees had planned a ‘velvet 
coup’ with the help of the women’s movement, ethnic groups, human rights groups, 
the labour movement, NGOs and students, who, in turn, had been supported in their 
efforts by the US (HRW 2009). The indictment publicly singled out women’s 
movement advocates who were not even present, including Shirin Ebadi, Shadi Sadr, 
Parvin Ardalan and Noushin Khorasani (AI 2009: 55).  
 
The purpose of the show trials was to propagate the hardliners’ account of the 
aftermath of the elections; for instance, the only media allowed to cover the trials was 
the Fars News Agency that has close ties to the IRGC (HRW 2009). The trials, 
parading prisoners in pyjamas and signs of torture, sent also a strong message of what 
are the consequences to those opposing the authorities and initiating unrest in society. 
A day after the first trial, the Chief Prosecutor of Tehran, Said Mortazavi, issued a 
warning that anyone criticising the trials would risk prosecution (AI 2009: 55). The 
effects of the trials were felt for months as the verdicts were read months later. Some 
were sentenced to years in prison and some were issued death sentences. 
 
To keep ordinary people on they tiptoes, the IRGC and basijs further infiltrated 
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society. One of the examples was given by one of my interviewees. The Guards 
published periodic public lists of demonstrators who the authorities had not been able 
to identify. One of the first lists was published in June when the Guards’ website 
‘Cyber Defence Command’ published a list of 26 pictures of street protestors and 
demanded the public to identify the protestors. Many interpreted this as a warning 
against grassroots journalism that was the only way to get information to the outside 
world after the foreign correspondents had left the country. Also, long after the 
demonstrations had subdued, the Guards organised volunteers outside the popular 
supermarkets, including the Refah and Shahrvand chains, to hand out leaflets in 
which they had circled faces of protestors who had not yet been identified. People 
were forced to take the leaflets and instructed to call a governmental hotline number 
set up for this purpose if they could recognise any of the people listed. Other 
techniques to catch activists and ordinary people who had participated in the 
demonstrations included offers of governmental compensation to shop keepers whose 
property had been damaged during the demonstrations and who agreed to file written 
complaints against unidentified protestors. The same tactic was apparently used in 
hospitals where people injured in street protests were threatened with prison if they 
did not lodge a written complaint against unspecified protestors. In addition, the 
security apparatus penetrated Iranians private lives by the introduction of 6,000 basij 
units that recruited in primary schools which effectively allowed the security forces to 
penetrate families and scrutinise people’s private beliefs and spread their basij culture 
(Payvand 2010). Moreover, thousands of basijs were trained in blogging after the 
summer demonstrations. This, according to Student Basij Commander Mohammad 
Saleh Jokar, was aimed at to encourage ‘effective use of using cyberspace to promote 
the values of the Islamic Revolution’ and most significantly, to counter ‘soft threats’ 
(Jokar quoted in Payvand 2010). 
 
The long-standing methods worked as reminders of the authorities capability to bring 
society on its knees. A comment made by one of my interviewees in the spring 2010 
summarised the situation in the aftermath of the state repression:  
The regime succeeded in what they set out to do in June. The organised civil 
society has now disappeared, unless you count the very few who are still 
courageous enough – or who have nothing to lose – to continue their work. 
But people in general are silenced. People are far too scared to attend 
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demonstrations, especially after the Ashura demonstrations in December 
[2009]. People are scared to show or voice their demands for reform. The fact 
that you have no idea what happened to your friends or family members, the 
rapes, the show trials … the regime has is in its hands an extremely strong and 
efficient tool, the security forces. And we don’t really know who we are 
fighting for if we decided to go out and protest. Who will defend me? 
Mousavi? You in the West? I don’t think so (Negin, Tehran, April 2010). 
 
4.0 Green goals & ideology 
While the hardliners saw the GM as a challenge to the Islamic Republic itself, this 
was not the case. 
 
We need to briefly go back to Mousavi’s campaigning colour, the colour green. Green 
is the colour that is associated with Islam. The colour was strategically applied to 
frame the movement. The colour can be seen emphasising a central cultural element 
(Shia Islam) that is the foundation of the political system in the country. 
Consequently, the protest was not about challenging the political system but giving its 
support to this element. Similarly, the slogan seen in the demonstrations ‘Where is my 
vote?’, referred to the country’s republican side and demanded the regime to honour 
also this foundational element. The message was emphasised by employing familiar 
and historical civil society slogans drawing on the country’s Islamico-philosophical 
heritance and it was in this way that people broadened the street demonstrations into a 
political movement. For example at nights people chanted ‘Allahu Akbar’, God is 
Great, from their rooftops, and in the daylight demonstrations ‘marg bar diktator’, 
death to the dictator, Ya Hossein, Mir Hossein (referring to the third Shia Imam and 
via him to Mousavi) were heard widely. These are popular chants from the 1979 
Revolution when they were used against the Pahlavis. Thus, the demonstrators 
challenged the regime on its own terrain and showed how the regime has drifted away 
from its revolutionary ideals. The demonstrations between the protestors and 
governmental forces has been rightly seen as turning into a struggle between 
democratic forces – both religious and secular – and the oppressive regime, which 
wanting to hold onto its power was alienating sizeable portion of its population. In 
essence, the protestors were trying to argue that they are worthy, united and 
committed to their cause and that they should be recognised as valid political actors 
(Tilly 2005). 
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In the course of weeks and months, the goals were articulated more specifically. It all 
centred on the democratisation of the country’s political life. As the movement has 
emphasised, this should not be misunderstood as an ‘offshoot’ of Western liberal 
democratic projects (Tahmasebi-Birgani 2010: 79). Particularly the women involved 
in the movement have been keen to emphasise the long history of Iranian politico-
religious philosophy and civil activism that goes back to the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1906 and how the movement should be seen as an extension of these 
traditions (The Feminist School 2009). The Green Movement anchored itself in basic 
rights and freedoms such as civil and political rights, including the right to assemble, 
the right to rational governance and the right to participate freely and equally in the 
political process.  
 
In the summer of 2010, Mousavi outlined the movement’s objectives when he 
published a new charter that called for reforms while, at the same time, stressed the 
movement’s commitment to the 1979 Revolution’s principles. In his statement, 
Mousavi accused the current regime of ‘institutionalized corruption’ and standing 
behind the ‘hypocritical “holy” veil’ and destroying the revolutionary ideals for the 
sake of power (Khordaad88 2009). He placed the GM to the forefront in the nation’s 
efforts to reform the political system, thus stating firmly that it was not its intention to 
undermine any of its premises. The statement declared: ‘[T]he Green Movement 
reaffirms its commitment to human, moral, religious and Iranian principles and values 
and feels obliged to refine and reform the behaviours of the Islamic Republic of Iran’ 
(Khordaad88 2009) which would eventually lead to the  
strengthening [of] civil society, expanding the space available for social 
dialogue, increasing awareness, [facilitating] the free circulation [of] 
information, [encouraging] the active participation of [various] parties and 
associations, and generating a [liberal environment] for intellectuals as well as 
social and political activists who are loyal to national interests (Khordaad88 
2009). 
 
 
5.0 The Obama Administration’s reaction 
When President Barack Obama was sworn to power in January 2009, many expected 
to see a change in the US-Iran relations. And indeed, Obama articulated his policy 
change in March 2009 when he delivered a Nowruz video speech to mark the Iranian 
New Year. While the Obama Administration had declared that one of its foreign 
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policy goals was a nuclear weapon free Iran, President Obama set out to crumble the 
Dark Monster and treat the Iranian regime in a vastly different way compared to his 
predecessor. His Nowruz speech removed the Bush Administration’s regime change 
policy from the table and Obama emphasised that he was willing and keen to ‘speak 
directly to the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic’ (Obama 2009a, emphasis 
mine). The speech, however, was almost entirely an address to the leaders. Obama 
declared that: 
My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full 
range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United 
States, Iran and the international community. This process will not be 
advanced by threats.  We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded 
in mutual respect. […] The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to 
take its rightful place in the community of nations. You have that right -- but it 
comes with real responsibilities, and that place cannot be reached through 
terror or arms, but rather through peaceful actions that demonstrate the true 
greatness of the Iranian people and civilization. And the measure of that 
greatness is not the capacity to destroy, it is your demonstrated ability to build 
and create (Obama 2009a). 
 
However, Obama’s approach was criticised in the summer 2009. The Obama 
Administration was reluctant to escalate the events inside and the Administration’s 
statements on the elections and the demonstrations were careful and reflected the shift 
that had taken place in the US foreign policy approach to Iran. One of the first 
comments came on June 15, when Obama argued that it should be clear ‘it is up to 
Iranians to make decisions about who Iran's leaders will be; that we respect Iranian 
sovereignty’. However, he added that he was also ‘deeply troubled by the violence’ in 
the streets and that ‘the democratic process -- free speech, the ability of people to 
peacefully dissent -- all those are universal values and need to be respected’ (Obama 
2009c). On June 17, Obama’s Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that Iranians 
deserve to have their votes counted and voices heard, and reiterated the 
Administration’s position that it is for the people of Iran to determine the outcome of 
the elections. She also stressed that the new foreign policy stand towards Iran will not 
change based on the outcome of the elections (Fox News 2009). 
 
The Administration’s balancing between its commitment to diplomacy and ordinary 
Iranians in the streets was criticised not only by the hawks in Washington but by some 
within the Iranian diaspora and other people who sympathised with the people 
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demonstrating in Iran. Of the hawks, Sen. Lindsey Graham declared that ‘the 
President of the United States is supposed to lead the free world, not follow it’ (Daily 
News 2009). Conservative commentator Judith Miller called for ‘external help’ to 
secure the Green Movements demands (Fox News 2009b). On June 16, Obama’s 
interview comment drew particular criticism from Iran observers after he stated that 
from an American national security perspective, there was not much difference 
between President Ahmadinejad and his contestant Mousavi (The NYT 2009c). Many 
criticised the statement by arguing that Obama was viewing the events solely through 
the lens of Iran’s nuclear crisis (Addis 2009). However, many others saw the new 
stand to reflect the Obama Administration’s respect to the Iranian government and 
how this new position would actually help the long-term goals of the US. As Kenneth 
Walsh aptly argued: 
The Obama administration doesn't want to totally alienate Ahmadinejad 
because the West will have to continue dealing with him over very sensitive 
and explosive issues, including Iran's nuclear program, the status of Israel, and 
the overall peace process in the Mideast. In addition, administration officials 
don't want to be too critical of Ahmadinejad's victory because that might make 
the anti-Ahmadinejad reformers seem like puppets of the United States and 
weaken their position internally (Walsh 2009). 
 
To counter some of the criticism, Obama instructed the State Department to contact 
Twitter84 – a type of social media used by some of the Iranians as a tool to organise 
their protests – and ask the company to delay its planned network upgrade in order to 
ensure maximum access to Iranian users. To which Twitter agreed and the upgrade 
took place at 2 p.m. P.T – or 1.30 a.m. Tehran time when the number of Iranians 
using Twitter was at its lowest (Time 2009). 
 
Another noteworthy change in the Administration policy towards Iran was Obama’s 
decision to discontinue the Iran Democracy Fund in October 2009. The hawks in 
Washington attacked Obama’s decision harshly, criticising him of seeing the Green 
protestors ‘as obstacles for statecraft’ (WSJ 2009). Kennet Katzman’s report for 
Congress however stated that the Fund was considered as ‘inconsistent’ in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Twitter was developed in 2006 and is a micro-blogging platform, which allows its users to 
post short messages of 140 characters in length. Messages are often used to update personal 
statuses, forward news comments or messages posted by other users. Its main focus is on 
news and has showed its importance in reporting real-time events such as the aftermath of the 
Presidential elections in Iran in 2009, the demonstrations in Egypt in January-February 2010, 
or Californian forest fires in 2007, to name a few.  
	   191	  
Administration’s efforts to have a dialogue with Iran (Katzman 2009: 83). Moreover, 
Iranian civil society actors welcomed the dismantling of the Fund (BBC 2009c). As 
Akbar Ganji, human rights advocate, stated: 
‘The US democracy fund was severely counterproductive. None of the human 
right activists and members of opposition in Iran had any interest in using such 
funds, but we were all accused by Iran's government of being American spies 
because a few groups in America used these funds’ (BBC 2009c). 
 
The Obama Administration’s approach to Iran and to the War on Terror in general 
changed dramatically the hypermasculinity driven foreign policy of the US. Instead of 
disciplining difference, there was an effort to understand and engage with difference. 
As Obama declared on June 4 2009, when he addressed the Muslim world in Cairo: 
‘[S]o long as our relationship is defined by our differences, we will empower those 
who sow hatred rather than peace, those who promote conflict rather than the co-
operation that can help all of our people achieve justice and prosperity. And this cycle 
of suspicion and discord must end’ (Obama 2009b). 
 
6.0 A year after Neda 
As already noted, types of collective action such as large rallies and campaigns that 
one saw a year earlier had disappeared by spring 2010. However, while many civil 
society actors had to exit the public sphere after the state repression, we have seen 
some larger communities continue their work, like the group Madaran-e Azadar, the 
Mourning Mothers. These are women who lost their children – either through state-
organised kidnappings, killings or imprisonment – and who formed an awareness-
raising group, which met once a week in Tehran’s Laleh Park. They claimed that they 
would continue the meetings until all the children have been released or recovered. 
The state-security forces continuously harassed and arrested these women but they 
have continued their sit-ins to the present. Another example of women’s continued 
public activism was the letters that wives and daughters sent to male political 
prisoners. Mousavi’s Facebook page and women’s groups published these letters 
online and they were made public so that everyone could read them. They were letters 
that showed women’s love and physical longing of their husbands but they also 
discussed questions of freedom and justice in the society – questions that were also 
directed towards the regime. An example could be a letter from the reformist 
intellectual activist Saeed Hajarian’s wife. In 2009 she wrote: 
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‘They were able to target your voice and hand with hatred and revulsion but 
your idea and your conviction will always be green. Today is the birthday of 
the king of compassion and justice. They have imprisoned your ailing body 
but know that your green idea will always remain in our hearts’ (Mousavi’s 
Facebook page 2009). 
 
Many of the women involved in the above-mentioned activism were new to civil 
society activism. This was one of the characteristics of the GM; it invited many new 
social activists who had not previously been active in the public sphere/in civil 
society. In demonstrations we witnessed participants across generations and economic 
classes. However, the violent crackdown scared many who had not previously 
experienced it. While I was in Iran, I interviewed a young woman called Maryam who 
had participated for the first time in civil society activism in the summer of 2009. She 
is a graduate with a degree in psychology and at the time, she was a teacher at a NGO 
organised school that offered classes to women and children. Of the people who I 
came across during my trip, Maryam was the most vocal about her aspirations, ideas 
and hopes. She had been active in the aftermath of the elections and was very 
passionate about how she wanted to see her country change. Maryam told me that 
most of her friends and fellow students from the university had left the country after 
the elections and were trying to convince her to do the same. She strongly 
disapproved of this: 
They are sending me emails and every, every, time the message is the same. 
“Come and live here, you will have everything here! It is so easy here, come 
and join us!” Well, I don’t want that. I want to go and study, to do a Master’s 
degree abroad, but I want to come back. We need to change so many things in 
our society, how could I do that while I’m abroad! It’s an easy option to leave 
the country and live abroad having all those things. That will only change it 
for you. But what about these children who I’m working with? Who will 
change it for them?! They need me. The country needs the others and me! I 
love my country and I only want to make it better. It’s my home country, how 
could I ever leave it! I want to make it better, I want to help people, how could 
I help them from outside! Can you see these children here! They are the 
poorest of the poorest and someone needs to help them! (Maryam, Tehran, 
March 2010). 
 
While I also understand why people, especially those with means to leave and re-start 
their lives abroad, left Iran in the aftermath of the state-orchestrated repression against 
society at large, I also sensed Maryam’s true belief in the system and better future.  
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6.1 Women’s NGOs in the aftermath of the crackdown 
As already noted above, in the aftermath of the demonstrations, the regime began yet 
another campaign against NGOs and their workers, which ‘paralysed civil society’ 
(Leili, Tehran, April 2010). The linking of NGOs, including women’s NGOs that 
were particularly singled out, to the GM began in the show trials in August 2009. 
They were accused of ‘organizing and directing illegal gatherings before and after the 
elections’ (Iran HRDC 2010: 79). Just prior to the Ashura demonstrations in 
December 2009, Minister of Intelligence Moslehi singled out women’s NGOs in his 
report of NGOs that are working towards regime change and declared that ‘we are 
carefully monitoring the comings and goings of the perpetrators of sedition’ (Siyasat-
e Ruz 2009). In 2010, Deputy Interior Minister for Cultural and Social Affairs Alireza 
Afshar warned that ‘NGOs should not get involved in political activities’ and they 
‘should be careful not to fall into the trap of the enemies, especially in their relations 
with foreign organizations’ (Mehr 2010). NGOs were not even allowed to work with 
‘government-approved’ foreign organisations such as the UNFPA that has an office in 
Tehran. UNFPA’s support in training, funding and co-operating projects with 
women’s NGOs has been remarkable but according to one of its managers, their 
policy in the spring of 2010 was ‘not to awaken the sleeping dogs’ (interview with the 
author, Tehran, April 2010). NGOs were also accused of funding Mousavi and 
Karroubi in the aftermath of the 2009 elections and for allowing political parties that 
were dissolved in the crackdown to continue their work with the help of NGOs 
(Aftab-e Yazd 2010; Javan 2010). In the months following the 2009 elections, 
hundreds of NGOs were banned and their licences were revoked (CDI-Iran 2013). 
 
My interviewees who were involved in the NGO community also reported 
challenging circumstances after the 2009 elections. Firstly, in the months following 
the elections, hundreds of NGOs were banned and their licences were revoked and 
NGO workers were arbitrarily arrested and as such their work was disrupted (Mahtab, 
Tehran, April 2010; see also CDI-Iran 2013). Secondly, due to the increased state of 
surveillance, many still operational NGOs severed their ties to other NGOs. This not 
only refers to the question of trust but also to the question of protection. While 
reporting of fellow NGO colleagues to the authorities could have been an issue, most 
importantly, distancing oneself from others working in the field was a means to 
protect colleagues (Nassim, Tehran, April 2010). Thirdly, after the elections, the 
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funding available to NGOs was dwindling. This had previously been a problem with 
foreign sponsors who, after the 2005 presidential elections, had begun to withdraw 
their money to protect the receivers. However, in the aftermath of the 2009 elections, 
many Iranian funders were forced to end their sponsorship if they did not want to be 
identified as ‘counter revolutionary’ and face charges (Negar, Tehran, March 2010). 
The stakes to continue work were made extremely high and this meant that, at least 
according to my interviewees, many were forced to keep quiet and discontinue their 
work. As one of my interviewees, Ladan who is employed by a NGO that provides 
health and educational services to women living in one of the informal housing 
communities in the north-west Tehran,85 
[A]fter the elections, we have made sure that our programs do not mention the 
word woman or gender. We are a strictly educational health organisation that 
assists the government to fill the gaps that it [the government] can no longer 
afford. We provide health services to women, children and men. We offer 
primary level classes to children and adult programs to both women and men. 
We keep our heads down. It’s the only way to survive now. But we’re also 
running out of money. When we started our work in the early 2000s our work 
was rudimentary. Over the years we improved our activities and we moved 
towards fostering social and economic development of women. We helped 
them to acquire skills in different areas that would help them to find jobs and 
empower themselves. However, now when the funding is scarce, we can only 
afford minimal help. We have problems to pay our teachers. It’s also 
expensive to run our little clinic (Ladan, Tehran, March 2010). 
 
Or as another NGO worker, Mahtab who works at a center which also offers adult 
lessons and health care but also legal advice to women, argued:  
Through these activities we have tried to include women in the wider social 
discourse of rights and representation. The fact that women are now [after the 
elections] both harassed and ignored by the Iranian state, has only excluded 
them even more from the political and social sphere where they would be able 
to represent themselves. This exclusion is partly our fault because we are too 
scared to continue our work. Two or our employees were arrested in the 
autumn (Mahtab, Tehran, March 2010). 
 
6.2 Economic justice and women’s rights 
While the leaders of the GM had emphasised that hearing the voices of all Iranians – 
across gender, religious, economic and age divisions – was one of their promises, the 
women who I talked to in spring 2010 felt that their voices had been stifled in the 
aftermath of the elections and that they had not benefited from supporting the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85  These informal housing communities are a result from the migration flows from 
countryside to cities that have been taking place since the 1980s. 
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movement. As I tried to stress before, the women who I encountered were pious 
women’s movement activists whose activism was informed not only by their religious 
beliefs but also by their socio-economic locations. In 2010, there were two problems, 
which were interrelated. Firstly, they felt that while they had sympathised with and 
supported the goals and agendas of the GM, which are firmly placed within the 
principles of Islam and the 1979 Revolution, it had further facilitated the regime’s 
branding of women activists, even pious women, as ‘counter-revolutionary’ and 
narrowed their activism space in civil society. Secondly, eventually the GM facilitated 
the voices of elite women, which was, for the women who I interviewed, an 
unfortunate development. As already said, while the GM respected the ideals of Islam 
and the revolution and encouraged the participation of non-elites, non-elite views 
about gender roles and rights that are aimed at the Islamic Republic were stifled by 
the hardliners’ crackdown. 
 
As has been discussed earlier, what informed the activism of the women involved in 
my study were their socio-economic and political locations as well as their piety. 
Considering the economic situation and the increasing social problems (see Chapter 
5) in contemporary Iran, many of the women who I interviewed emphasised growing 
social and economic inequality in Iranian society, which materialised even in worse 
conditions for women than men. Unlike the hardliners’ gender discourse that stressed 
women’s familial roles (which were also important to the women who I talked to), for 
these women, their subject formation took place also in the public sphere and 
according to them women should be allowed and encouraged to participate in the 
public sphere. However, according to them, women’s access to the public sphere 
depends on her socio-economic location, which in the contemporary Iranian society 
restricts many women from participating in public. Moreover, for them, practicing 
agency in public is to foster and advance a just Islamic society, which, in turn, is a 
duty to both women and men. Thus, it should be noted that this does not mean that 
their agency was solely aimed at re-signifying religious teachings and norms but to 
improve their own piousness and society at large. 
 
When I talked to my interviewees about the GM and its goals, most of them argued 
that the movement had actually hampered their agenda toward social and economic 
justice. One of them, argued that what the movement represented for many women 
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was a class struggle, an issue that the leaders of the GM had avoided addressing 
(Maryam, Tehran, March 2010). The demonstrations attracted people from across 
socio-economic classes, however, the core group came from the middle classes that 
have become extremely frustrated, which I addressed above. The movement drew 
together people in their mid to late twenties who, while from the middle class, do not 
have the opportunities – such as a good job, apartment, marriage, family – that are 
usually seen to materialise easily for people coming from this economic class. And as 
already noted earlier, of these people, women represent a disproportionately high 
number compared to men in Iran (Dabashi 2011:111). Moreover, in Iran’s current 
economic situation, the living standards of the working –and lower classes are even 
more challenging. However, the leadership stayed rather quiet about economic justice 
although it had been one of Mousavi’s campaign themes. Negar, a middle-aged 
woman, who has previously worked in the NGO community but has now withdrawn 
from activism yet identified herself as a pious gender activist, explained her views:  
Last spring I thought that the movement had a chance to achieve something 
real. Our work and ideology has sometimes been overshadowed by the flashy 
campaigns [i.e. the one million signatures campaign], but this time I saw 
ordinary people participating and being interested in things that we have tried 
to make better. And it even seemed that those women who had not worked 
with us before were trying to open their eyes and connect with us. But later I 
changed my mind. I don’t think these women really understood what gender 
reform really means to us. 
 
I asked Negar what she meant by ‘us’ and she elaborated: 
 
Us. You know, ordinary women. Do they know what marginalised women 
want? Can we have social justice without Islam? No, I don’t think so. Our 
fight for reform is not just about having political rights. Like running for 
presidency or other political posts. Yes, that's important too but it’s our duty to 
make sure that we have not only rights but also justice. I don’t think these 
women in the campaign had any sense of social piety (Negar, Tehran, April 
2010). 
 
While these women saw co-operation with women from all walks of life instrumental 
for the future of gender reform in Iran, they felt that the GM’s discourse was too 
elitist and divorced from the realities of ordinary women’s everyday life. As Nazanin, 
a thirty-year old pious woman working for a NGO specialising in health and 
educational work, explained her views. In her view a group that could initiate reforms 
and change in the field of gender relations could not be a group from the top: 
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It will be the people, normal people who will bring change. Young people and 
women who are economically and socially marginalised, who are the real 
victims in Iran. If they feel enough or are frustrated enough or they have the 
courage needed, the change we need might get the push it badly requires, but 
too few feels this way at the moment (Nazanin, Tehran, April 2010). 
 
Another woman shared a similar opinion: 
 
The upper classes are not connected with the majority of people: their 
lifestyles are different, their ideology is different, their economic resources are 
different, and they are socially different. They have a privileged position in 
society. This makes me ask: why would they want to change the prevailing 
situation? Would a revolution make their position stronger or better? 
Revolutions do hardly any good to privileged people. Change would not 
necessarily mean good things happening to these people, not in the current 
economic situation that frustrates so many people from the lower classes’ 
(Afsar, Tehran, April 2010). 
 
And another woman criticised the ways in which the elite women conducted their 
work: 
 
You know this ‘One Million Signatures Campaign’. It has attracted so much 
attention abroad, but an ordinary woman in Iran doesn't have a clue about it. 
Ordinary people need something practical. Yes, raising awareness is also 
good, but when a woman struggles to make her ends meet or wants the 
custody of her children after divorce, she needs practical help and practical 
advice. At the moment, we need to address these gaps in women’s lives. After 
this we can move on (Zahra, Tehran, April 2010). 
  
The message from these women was that the question of social and economic 
inequality between different women (class, age, ethnicity, family background, etc.) in 
Iran was a topic hardly ever discussed and it needed to be addressed before anything 
else. However, they felt that the GM had further postponed debate on this. 
 
A good point was made also by Ziba P., a middle-aged Iranian woman who lives in 
Finland with her Finnish husband but who helps her sister’s women’s health NGO in 
Iran. She noted in one of our conversations how it has become almost impossible for 
ordinary pious activists to get their voices heard outside their own cultural or political 
boundaries and that this has been a problem with the GM as well. The global audience 
that followed the emergence of the GM interpreted it mostly as secular-orientated and 
aiming at toppling down the current regime. This has meant that ‘alternative’ voices 
about Iran’s future go unheard and especially the voices of non-secular civil activists 
have been stifled. This, in turn, has complicated foreigners understanding about 
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Iranians’ views on the direction and content of reform. This, according to her, is a 
result from the lack of space given to dialogue: 
Extremist voices, both secular and religious, are given so much coverage in 
the media here [in the West]. This is a problem for ordinary activists who are 
trying to initiate change from within. Initiate change with their beliefs, with 
their views about the future of their own societies, with their experience of 
social change. But here the voice is given to those whose views are easily 
understood by the audience. You hear the voices that can be easily understood, 
voices you can support with your own experience about life, or voices you can 
judge as wrong. The reason for this is a lack of dialogue, there is no arena for 
you and people who share a different worldview to meet and discuss. The 
West gives a monopoly to voices that they can recognise and comprehend 
(Ziba P., Vaasa, Finland 2012). 
 
 
7.0 Conclusion 
It is important to see the presidential elections of 2009 within the wider framework of 
the War on Terror. The handling of the elections, i.e. the (alleged) fraud, and the 
violent aftermath of the elections can be seen as the hardliners’ exercise of 
hypermasculinity, which reflected the hardliners’ positional insecurity both 
domestically and internationally. Although the Obama Administration had 
demonstrated willingness to engage with the hardline regime, a dialogue had not yet 
taken place between Washington and Tehran. Moreover, the election of Mousavi 
would have undone the hardliners’ take over of the body politic.  
 
Thus, the War on Terror and its interventionist policies started by the Bush 
Administration continued to have echoes in the post-Bush world politics. The most 
alarming development was the extension of the transnationalised violence on the 
bodies of ordinary women and men in Iran. In 2009-2010, the Iranian regime 
extended its crack down from high profile and mid-level civil society activists to 
ordinary citizens. It can be argued that the hardliners finalised their drive to power on 
the bodies of these ordinary people. By targeting people like Neda Agha-Soltan, the 
hardliners demonstrated what are the consequences to civil society at large if some 
courageous enough were planning to voice their views.  
 
The second alarming trend was that killing indeed made one invisible and essentially 
unable to voice her/his concerns (see Hansen 2000). The militarisation of society that 
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began from the streets of major Iranian cities and which was extended to the private 
lives of Iranians had an enormous impact on the work carried out by women’s 
movement activists and their organisations. The climate of fear effectively pushed 
women to exit activism and and/or created obstacles for women’s work. 
 
However, despite the bleak picture of the Iranian civil society in the period of 2009-
2010, many women continued their work by adapting to the new environment. 
However, this chapter aimed at drawing attention to the ways in which women often 
lose more ground in political conflicts, which are dominated by masculinities. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
1.0 Introduction 
In this thesis I have investigated the imagined borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and 
how one’s unwillingness and failure to understand otherness can enact a world of fear 
and insecurities. This often manifests in destruction and violence that is in turn 
eventually experienced on the bodies of ordinary people. I used the US-Iran relations 
in the post-9/11 period (2001-2010) to demonstrate how the crafting and enactment of 
difference between the Self and the Other legitimates and naturalises the use of 
violence against the Other and how this violence is further intensified by sub-
categories of otherness including gender, race and sexuality. Thus, the thesis offered 
an alternative exploration of the War on Terror and the ‘us versus you’ world that the 
conventional IR, global leaders and the media have created in the post-9/11 era.  
 
At the theoretical level, the aim was to find a way to understand why and how Iran 
was conceptualised as one of the Dark Monsters in the post-9/11 world. This was a 
relevant question considering the détente that had begun in the US-Iran relations in 
the late 1990s and which was suddenly reversed. Drawing primarily on postcolonial 
feminism and complemented with studies from feminist IR, critical social 
constructivism and security studies, the framework helped to conceptualise especially 
the Bush Administration’s (in)security seeking foreign policy and its impact on Iran 
in the period 2001-2010. The proposition was that the Bush Administration’s 
masculine identity ‘hypered’ itself and resulted in a hypermasculine identity that 
relies on artificially enacted inclusions, exclusions and mental and physical borders 
(Agathangelou and Ling 2004a). The process of enacting differences and boundaries 
is natural and takes place in all social relations. However, the imagined identity of the 
Other, which the Self crafts and enacts from outside without a dialogue with the 
Other, often leads to the Self’s inability to fully know and understand the Other. Not 
understanding the Other causes insecurity about otherness and the threat it poses 
becomes a constitutive element of the Self’s identity and its relations with others. It 
was argued that what further informed the Bush Administration’s identity formation 
and its relationship with the Other was orientalist anxiety. This materialised itself in 
the constructions of the Dark Monster and the Feminine Other. My methodology used 
here was to identify the crafted and imagined gendered, racial and sexualised 
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inclusions and exclusions that resulted in real material consequences, often violent. 
The aim was to demonstrate how, with the help of the Dark Monster and the Feminine 
Other, the Self can create a baseless fantasy of disconnectedness which helps to 
obscure the violence and destruction that inheres in this type of imagining of and 
making of boundaries between the Self and the Other.  
 
The thesis had another theoretical aim as well. Namely, to draw attention to the 
pious/moral agencies of women’s movement advocates working within religious 
frameworks. It was argued that there is a need to move beyond the old binary of 
‘subversion and submission’ model and to investigate the pious agencies of women’s 
movement activists in Iran. I found this important for two reasons. The first reason 
was a consequence of the so-called ‘post-secular’ turn that took place in feminist 
literature in the 2000s. Feminist studies on Iranian women had hardly employed this 
new trend and my experience in the field demanded me to find a new approach to 
understand my interlocutors and their work in the field of women’s rights and thus the 
studies in the ‘post-secular’ field felt accurate. The second reason relates to the post-
9/11 political environment that has narrowed the space for our understanding of 
difference and via association of different understandings of womanhood, women’s 
agency and subjectivities and human rights. 
 
I drew on Mahmood’s theorisation of embodied agency but I moved my analysis to 
explicate how women’s piousness is both constructed in the public sphere and how 
their public activism is constitutive of their piousness, i.e. how the public assists them 
to enact their pious agency. I had at least two objectives with this theoretical move. 
One was to challenge myself to think and rethink how ‘free’ we are from structures: 
1) how well we understand that our actions are guided by certain structures; 2) how 
we have internalised these structures even without our knowing; and 3) how 
challenging life would be if we were continuously trying to subvert norms that uphold 
the order/life that has been enacted around us? Second aim was to understand why we 
see different structures valued differently, e.g. secularism vs. religion. As Mahmood 
has argued, there is a need to question the humanity and ethics of secular politics and 
movements as well (Mahmood 2005a). The violence and destruction of which many 
Islamic fundamentalist movements have been accused in the post-9/11 era is very 
much present in secular politics as well, as Afghanistan and Iraq have harshly 
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demonstrated. Diversity is being endorsed and celebrated in the speeches of our world 
leaders but often only when we can recognize and concur with it. It is often seen that 
only secular politics can transform and improve societies. With this thesis I wished to 
demonstrate that the women who I encountered in the field did not employ Islam to 
feminist ends but to enact an enhanced Islamic society, true to its just and high values 
and free from the current distorted interpretations, which are currently coloured with 
patriarchalism and power politics. They worked towards an ethical society: society 
that embraces everyone and respects its citizens in the law. 
 
After this the thesis moved on to the empirical findings. The empirical chapters 
wished to demonstrate that Iranian women’s lives are shaped by a number of factors 
and as such trying to demonstrate that the cultural explanations, which have assumed 
a central place in the post 9/11 discourses on Muslim women’s rights are too narrow. 
Like elsewhere in the world, and as the thesis has demonstrated, the lives of Iranian 
women and the agendas of women’s movement advocates are shaped by social, 
economic, cultural, and domestic and international politics. In the case of Iranian 
women, others have usually focused their research on the role of the state and religion 
in shaping women’s lives but this thesis focused on the post-9/11 period and 
examined the impact of the international. 
 
2.0 The Axis of Evil 
The aim of this work was to develop a better understanding of the War on Terror. By 
engaging with three different levels – the international, domestic, and grassroots – I 
investigated the ways in which elitist, militaristic and masculine discourses and 
politics impact people’s everyday life and have real material consequences, something 
that more conventional IR literature may have ignored. The introduction of the Axis 
of Evil in January 2002 changed not only the US-Iran relations but also the War on 
Terror in general. It enacted new discursive inclusions and exclusions and further 
consolidated the civilizational divide between the Christian West and the Muslim 
East. The hypermasculine politics of the Bush Administration threatened and 
eventually invited Iranian hardliners to engage in similar politics. This had 
consequences not only at the global level where the War on Terror intensified but also 
at the local level where the global inclusions and exclusions materialised in the lives 
of ordinary Iranians: deteriorating political system, worsening security environment 
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that affects not only civil society activists but also ordinary people and women in 
particular, dwindling economic situation, human rights abuses, and the list goes on. 
While the western audience – both academic and non-academic – is aware of the 
political tensions colouring the country’s internal affairs, they are less informed of the 
socio-economic/insecurity crisis that has worsened after Iran was made one of the 
culprits in the War on Terror. The paradox is that the crisis is affecting particularly 
Iranian women, those who the US pledged to protect. 
 
In the case of the US and Iran, President Bush’s Axis of Evil speech ended the détente 
that had emerged in the late 1990s and had continued until the late autumn of 2001.  
The thesis argued that the reason for the Bush Administration’s decision to include 
the Iranian regime in the Axis was the Administration’s de-masculinised identity. 
Both domestic and global actors increasingly criticised the Bush Administration over 
its interventionist foreign policies and failures to secure those whom it had vowed to 
protect. This forced President Bush to seek ways to prove that the Administration 
was, indeed, the superior White Self. However, as was demonstrated, the inclusion in 
the Axis of Evil invited the Iranian side to engage in a similar exercise and soon both 
sides were involved in a global game of masculinities that often materialise in 
violence on the bodies of those who are the most vulnerable.  
 
In the period 2002-2004, the Bush Administration’s interventionist politics facilitated 
both the demise of the reformists and the rise of the hardliners inside Iran. The 
hardliners were able to use the Bush Administration’s hardening stance against Iran as 
their springboard for more confrontational domestic politics. Eventually, the 
hardliners secured majorities both in the municipal elections (2003) and in the 
Seventh Majles elections (2004). Reformists were cleared from formal politics and 
voices that could be interpreted as dissident and counter-revolutionary were 
particularly targeted. In 2005, the hardliners consolidated their power over the body 
politic when their candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the presidential elections. 
The election of Ahmadinejad changed the state-society relations at large. The hardline 
party Abadgaran behind Ahmadinejad’s election needed to be rewarded for its 
support. This new political elite came largely from the ranks of the IRGC and the 
Basij. This effectively militarised the already tense state-society relations. 
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President Bush had justified Iran’s membership in the Axis of Evil partly by the 
regime’s human rights violations, and especially women’s human rights were singled 
out. In the January 2002 speech and in its later statements, the Bush Administration 
linked women’s movement advocates to the Administration’s regime change 
campaign. This made the Iranian women’s movement advocates to be one of the first 
groups targeted in the hardliner’s violent drive for power. In order to dominate, no 
alternative voices (or voices that could be interpreted alternative) were allowed. In the 
period 2002-2004, the hardliners in the Majles and the non-elected hardline 
institutions overseeing the Majles were blocking many of the ‘women-friendly’ bills 
as un-Islamic and western influenced. The strategy was to clear women’s movement 
advocates and their high profile supporters from formal politics. Women MPs, high 
profile activists and journalists among others were increasingly targeted as ‘counter-
revolutionary’ and many exited formal politics in early 2004 when the Seventh 
Maljles elections were scheduled to take place. This time period was detrimental to 
many women’s movement advocates and NGOs as they lost their supporters in the 
higher echelons of the body politic and they were no longer in a position to lobby for 
gender reforms at the level of legislation.  
 
In the period 2005-2008, the hardliners’ crackdown was extended and they began 
more systematically to control and discipline women’s voices in civil society. While 
President Khatami had encouraged women to participate in the public sphere and 
anchor themselves in it, the Ahmadinejad Administration changed the gender 
discourse at the state level. Women’s familial roles were emphasised and propagated 
at the various levels of the state, ranging from their role in civil society activism to 
dress code and higher education. The hardline Majles attacked women also in the 
legal sphere when the controversial Family Protection Bill was debated and many 
women were afraid that the Bill would reverse years of hard work. At the same time, 
the regime began to expel mid-level women’s movement advocates from civil society 
activism by revoking NGO licenses and closing down women’s media outlets. Both 
discursive and physical space for women’s activism was shrinking. 
 
The 2009 presidential elections demonstrated how determined the hardliners were in 
sending a collective message to society at large. The hardliners’ reaction to the 
demonstrations and particularly the killing of Neda Agha-Soltan in June 2009, 
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showed society how high the stakes could get not only for women’s movement 
advocates but also for ordinary people. The thesis argued that killing makes one 
invisible. The violent state repression that employed both short and long-term tactics 
not only silenced Iranian civil society, including women’s movement advocates but 
also made it invisible to the outside world as many were too afraid to voice their 
concerns. Many felt that it was smarter to ‘keep their heads down’ and defer from 
activism until the environment was safer. 
 
For the Bush Administration, President Ahmadinejad incarnated the Dark Monster 
and having the Dark Monster sitting at the presidential seat, made it easier for the 
Bush Administration (and later for the Obama Administration) to justify its new 
disciplining policies in the mid-2000s: economic sanctions. After Iran’s referral to the 
UNSC, Iran faced several rounds of economic sanctions. While it was claimed that 
these were so-called smart-sanctions targeting individuals and entities involved in the 
country’s nuclear program, the effects of sanctions trickled down to the level of 
society and affected the lives of ordinary Iranians and women in particular. As 
Chapter 5 demonstrated, the effects of the sanctions reached several different realms 
ranging from women’s employment to health care and from gender relations to civil 
society activism. The bleak story of the impact of the sanctions on Iranian women’s 
lives demonstrates how the economic sanctions are in stark contrast with the US 
emphasis on Muslim women’s rights and in general the West’s insistence to include 
women as active participants in the world outside the home.  
 
In the above sections we see that while the Bush Administration emphasised Muslim 
women’s human rights in its post-9/11 policy approach, the hypermasculine identity 
that informed the Administration’s politics in the same time period effectively invited 
competing masculinities to exercise similar politics and this in turn transnationalised 
violence on the very bodies that President Bush had pledged to protect. However, as 
the thesis has demonstrated, the Self did not see how it had contributed to the 
transnationalisation of violence but it enacted a border that allowed it to blame the 
Other of the violence and destruction. 
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3.0 Strengths and limitations of the research 
Iran offers an interesting insight into the War on Terror studies. While post-invasion 
Afghanistan and Iraq have been studied quite well by both IR and feminist IR 
scholars in the 2000s, Iran has been left out. This is most likely due to the fact that the 
Bush Administration never physically invaded Iran and as a case study it has not 
appeared as urgent as Afghanistan and Iraq. However, while the US has not shared 
diplomatic relations with Iran since the hostage crisis (1979-1981), the country 
continues to be one of the key concerns in America’s foreign policy. 
 
The thesis aimed at developing a better understanding of the War on Terror and it 
succeeded putting forward a conceptual framework substantiated by empirical 
evidence that demonstrates how discourses have impact on foreign policy making and 
how they have real material consequences. The thesis shed light on these 
consequences: state violence, human rights abuses, malfunctioning political system, 
insecurity manifested in the loss of economic income, personal security, and so on. 
This is why it was important to examine what happened to the US-Iran relations after 
9/11. What made this particularly interesting was that the two countries had 
experienced tentative détente just prior to 9/11 and it now suddenly melted away and 
Iran, once again, incarnated evilness.  
 
Thus, instead of taking Iran’s evilness and the US claim to be protector of the world 
as facts, I moved the analysis to examine how the post-9/11 world and its divisions 
into ‘us’ and ‘them’ came about. By developing the framework that drew on 
postcolonial feminist explorations, the thesis contributed to our understanding why 
someone or certain groups are being excluded from politics/privileges/right to 
security/well-being/better futures while others are included in it. It also aimed to 
examine how these inclusions, exclusions and different boundaries were made to 
appear neutral, fair and normal. By examining the three levels –international politics, 
domestic politics and ordinary lives – the thesis opened up a set of insights that may 
expand current literature on the topic: 
 
1 – A reconsideration of borders is needed both in IR and international relations as 
human practice. Here I refer to intersubjectivity. The borders we build and enact are 
artificial and have emerged through different socio-historical and cultural discourses 
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and institutions. They function to create a distinct identity that makes us to be part of 
‘us’. This was extremely important for the Bush Administration in the aftermath of 
9/11 when the nation was traumatised.86 However, these borders can be used to 
neutralise and naturalise even violent and exploitative policies (see Agathangelou and 
Ling 2004b). By looking at the US-Iran relations in the post-9/11 world through the 
thesis’ framework, one can see how the division of the world into ‘us’ and them’ and 
how the crafting of Monsters and Feminine Others was effective and naturalised 
militarised foreign policy making. However, at the same time, the research finding 
also showed to what extent human crafted and manipulated discourses have real 
material effects.  
 
2 – A reconsideration of agency. Here the thesis refers to reverberating agency, to the 
closeness of the Self to the Other: their histories and contemporary lives (see 
Agathangelou and Ling 2004b). While borders such as West vs. East, ‘us vs. them’ 
and different binaries including masculinity/femininity, public/private; 
foreign/domestic emerge in every social relationship, the thesis has hopefully 
demonstrated that if we are able to break down those imagined borders and binaries 
and it becomes possible to engage more productively with the Other. Fewer 
segregations allow us to imagine a different world: a world where we are in a more 
intimate relationship with the Other than we have been able to see through all the 
artificial boundaries and segregations. We are able to recognise the shared history, the 
mutual need for each other and have a more integrated life (see Agathangelou and 
Ling 2004b; Grewal 2003). The thesis has demonstrated that the lack of 
understanding of the closeness of the US to the Other led to a violent and (in)security 
seeking foreign policy in the post-9/11 world. Not knowing and/or understanding the 
interconnectedness of ‘our’ lives to ‘theirs’; not hearing the other side of the story’; 
and/or not suspending judgement based on the imagined borders between us and 
them, prevents us, together with them, finding solutions to political, economic and 
social hierarchies and inequalities that both the mental and physical boundaries 
uphold between the Self and Other. The problem in the US-Iran relations is not only 
the long history of unfortunate political incidents (the 1953 coup, the 1979-1981 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 I was not able to fully explain this within the confines of this thesis. The original thesis had 
a chapter that examined domestic identity formation in the post-9/11 US.  See below in ‘the 
limitations section’.  
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hostage crisis, 9/11) that have caused problems in the relationship but the imagined 
constructions of the other side that impede détente between the two governments. As 
the thesis demonstrated, the consequences of this are often violent and destructive, 
particularly to those who are the most vulnerable. 
 
3 – Following the above point, a reconsideration of concepts such as power, security 
and borders, among others is needed (see Agathangelou and Ling 2004b). There is a 
great deal of violence that inheres in the above concepts when understood in the 
conventional way. This thesis has challenged ‘natural’ explanations of the War on 
Terror and demonstrated how interventions, imported democratization reforms and 
liberation projects claiming to restore people’s human rights, and which are presented 
as fair, neutral and global, are actually often reinforcing parochial and elitist 
interpretations of world order. The discourse that is embedded in the conventional IR 
conception of power is inscribed with violence and terror. We need to ask a set of 
questions: ‘Does power provide security?’; ‘Who benefits from it?’; and ‘Whom does 
it sacrifice?’ (Agathangelou and Ling 2004b). For example, in the American case, we 
can ask if the War on Terror made Americans safer? In the Iranian case we can ask if 
the Iranian women, whom the Bush Administration pledged to protect, were indeed 
being protected?  
 
4 – The above point leads to the final insight. If we truly want to understand and 
engage with the lives and experiences of ‘other’ women, we need to expand our 
definitions of concepts such as agency and subjectivity. While many feminist IR 
scholars have examined how gender, race, ethnicity and sexuality shape one’s 
experiences of life, peace, conflict, human rights, to name a few, the recognition of 
women’s agency and subjectivity continues to be bounded by a static understanding 
what it means to be a woman. The thesis wished to demonstrate that recognition of 
the other and her world is more important than searching for sameness. As Abu-
Lughod warned in 2002, saving others is a process that always entails violence (Abu-
Lughod 2002). Not only physical violence that we have witnessed in the War on 
Terror but it can also be violence that destroys different experiences, worldviews, 
ideas, laws, rules, aspirations and desires that someone employs as building blocks to 
construct her life. If we have the courage to engage with difference, and in a way that 
does not condemn it, we have opened our minds for exchange that may lead to new 
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possibilities and futures that were not visible before. This would be one way to invite 
and include agents from multiple worlds – whether marked by tradition, gender, race, 
culture, class, and sexuality – to build communities together and reduce conflicts. 
 
* 
One of the criticisms that postcolonial works have encountered is the lack of attention 
given to material concerns (Ahmad 1994). I concur that emphasis on discourses may 
distract us from seeing and examining the material ways in which colonial power 
relations persist in contemporary world (McEwan 2001). However, some postcolonial 
feminists have written on this for example in their explorations of capitalist relations 
in contemporary world (see among others Agathangelou 2004; Agathangelou and 
Ling 1997; 2003). I tried to address this criticism by conducting fieldwork and 
engaging with women’s material worlds and link it to the two other levels of analysis. 
None the less, I argue that at the same time, we should also see the constructiveness 
that discourses have to offer. Postcolonial studies, and especially postcolonial 
feminists, have been criticised of not offering building blocks for change on the 
ground or affecting the power relations between North and South (McEwan 2001). 
However, discourses can work in ‘affirmative’ ways as well and provide meditation, 
solutions, understanding and closeness (see Adib-Moghaddam 2009).  
 
Due to the word limit, one of the limitations that the research experienced was the 
thesis’ inability to show how discourses may change from affirmative to 
militaristic/aggressive. In the end I had to remove two chapters but I have included 
one of them, the history chapter, in the Appendix I. Let me first, however, discuss the 
chapter that was not included in the thesis. This chapter was meant to be the first one 
of the empirical chapters and shed light on the reasons why and how after the 9/11 
attacks the US washed away an affirmative discourse in its relations with the Muslim 
East and even with ‘American Others’. The way that the world had been presented 
and understood in the US prior to 9/11 – global conflicts disconnected from the US 
mainland, the world’s vulnerable needing and appreciating the American benevolence 
and sacrifice in ousting dictators and spreading the word of democracy and the world 
benefiting of US generosity through development and investments – partly explains 
why 9/11 was such a traumatising experience and why it was met by disbelief, denial, 
anger, and blame. The American disconnectedness – physically made possible by two 
	   210	  
oceans – from the rest of the world had allowed for a strong sense of physical 
(national) security to be formed (Naveh 2002: 453). As Naveh notes, any challenge to 
US agency had taken place far away from its physical borders – in Somalia, Iraq, 
Yugoslavia – America’s war front had been elsewhere (Naveh 2002: 453).87 The fact 
that non-state actors, terrorists from the caves of Afghanistan (as President Bush kept 
emphasizing), organized an attack with non-traditional weaponry that brought the 
world’s politico-economic and military superpower on its knees – even if only for a 
few days or week – challenged what an individual understands by homeland or 
national security, sovereignty of borders, military and economic might (see 
Agathangelou and Ling 2004a). This allowed the Bush Administration to create, 
rather easily, an ontological difference between the Self and the enemy. President 
Bush effectively disconnected America from the historical and political reasons that 
made for example those nineteen people on September 11, 2001 board and hijack four 
aircrafts. With a discourse of difference, the American Self denied subjectivity, 
agency and voice from the Other and in this way washed away a discourse of 
meditation. In this missing chapter, I also examined how racial, gendered and 
sexualised markers and exclusions strengthened this difference. As several other 
studies have also demonstrated, this was not constrained only to people without the 
US borders but also people within the US borders were also being subject disciplining 
and policing because of their race, sexuality and gender. In short, the Bush 
Administration enacted a discourse of white-heterosexual national identity and it 
policed and disciplined deviancy that was manifested in different sexuality, race and 
gender (see among others Alexander 2006; Alsultany 2008; Grewal 2003; Karim 
2002). In the chapter I drew attention to the ways in which this discourse was 
strengthened via news media and popular media and how this disseminated the 
militaristic solution to the conflict and increased racial discrimination not only in the 
US but also in Europe (see also Razack 2012). The image of the Other, now more 
often than not, had the face of the barbaric and irrational Muslim. Even newspapers 
like The Washington Post and The New York Times contributed to the racist image of 
the enemy in the War on Terror by referring to leaders in the Middle East as ‘mad 
mullahs’ or their political systems as ‘the Islamofascist mullah-ocracy’. TV series or 
computer games such as Homeland or Battlefield 3 singled out Muslims as targets and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 In the past 136 years the US had only been attacked once on its home soil, in 1941. 
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as such emphasised their ‘enemy nature’. A new trend emerged in the popular 
literature as well. Certain ‘authentic’ Muslim female voices were promoted via 
memoirs that supposedly presented women in their own terms but which actually 
confirmed Muslim women as victims of their religion and culture. Thus, these 
‘‘native’ stories, which of course should not be belittled as they are individual’s real 
experiences, were used to back up the Bush Administration’s aggressive foreign 
policy agenda and stir anti-Muslim/War on Terror sentiments in the US. Azar Nafisi’s 
Reading Lolita, Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis, and Azadeh Moaveni’s Lipstick Jihad, 
among others, are some of the works that were hugely popular both in the US and 
Europe after the War on Terror was declared. These works were sold as guides for 
Muslim women’s human rights violations and effectively reinforced and supported 
the American mission of liberating Muslim women across the world. Essentially, as 
this missing chapter wished to argue, the Bush Administration’s American Self’s 
existence relied and built on the violent production of borders and segregations which 
reflected the ‘insecurity about the Other becoming an actor rather than object’ in 
international politics (Nayak 2006: 45, emphasis in original). 
 
Appendix I sheds light on the historic development of the women’s movement in Iran 
and it challenges the view that tradition is something that bounds women to the sphere 
of domesticity and that women’s entry to the public sphere and participation in public 
debates and discourses is solely a development of modern Western political 
structures. The section also demonstrates that concepts such as emancipation, gender 
equality and progress cannot be simply put into the same box with the word 
modernity. In short, the aim was to illustrate how Iranian women – both secular and 
pious – have been active participants in debates shaping gender relationships in 
modern Iran and how current gender ideologies are shaped by (and have shaped) 
political, economic and social structures and policies. Thus, in a way, the section 
aimed at challenging some of the criticism that has accused postcolonial feminists and 
particularly those who have employed the ‘post-secular’ turn’ of impeding feminist 
agenda outside the West. 
 
4.0 Dialogical future? 
In the summer 2013, Iran observers were stunned once again. Hassan Rouhani, a 
moderate, won Iran’s eleventh presidential elections. His campaign promises of the 
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rule of law, respect for human rights and improved relations with the West appealed 
to the Iranians who had been disappointed in the 2009 elections. While we are still 
waiting to see if President Rouhani, who was sworn to power as recently as in August 
2013, is indeed able to reverse the hardliners’ state-society relations, he has showed 
his eagerness to improve Iran’s external relations. However, President Rouhani has 
already set out to address the extensive role of the Revolutionary Guards in society. In 
December, he began to place restrictions on companies owned by the Guards 
(Bloomberg Businessweek 2013). Similarly, Rouhani has also targeted the Basij when 
he cut the organisations’ funding in the same month (Bloomberg Businessweek 
2013). The IRGC Commander in Chief General Mohammad Ali Jafari has already 
warned Rouhani by stating that the Guards ‘cannot sit quietly’ when developments 
like these are taking place (Bloomberg Businessweek 2013). However, while Rouhani 
has emphasised women’s rights in several statements, he has not yet addressed this at 
the practical level, and the pressure from civil society actors is growing. While a few 
political prisoners were released earlier in the autumn and some banned university 
teachers were allowed to return to work, Rouhani has not managed to reverse the 
post-2009 election violence and for example the house arrests of the GM leaders are 
still in place (Payvand 2013b).  
 
However, as already noted above, Rouhani has initiated closer relations with the West 
and the US in particular. After his inauguration in August he stressed his willingness 
to re-open talks with the US and European countries over Iran’s nuclear program and 
to engage ‘in time-bound and result-oriented talks to build mutual confidence and 
removal of mutual uncertainties with full transparency’ (BBC 2013b). The 
international community was guarded in its response but saw Rouhani’s opening as a 
positive step taken by the country. And soon as in October 2013, the nuclear talks 
were re-opened. Iran sat down at the same table with the representatives of the so-
called P5+1, - the US, Britain, France, China, Russia and the plus one, Germany. In 
late November, the talks reached an interim deal in which Iran agreed to curb some of 
its nuclear activities in return for $7 billion in sanctions relief. The deal expires in 
May 2014 but in the meantime the talks will continue and a permanent agreement is 
being sought by the parties involved (BBC 2013c). 
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What made this possible? I argue that it resulted from the both sides’ efforts to 
understand and engage with difference and actively look for an alternative discourse 
to shape their relationship. An example of this is the exchange of letters between 
Presidents Obama and Rouhani in the autumn 2013 – a dramatic change to the 
hypermasculine politics of the neoconservatives in Washington and the hardliners in 
Tehran. When the Obama Administration changed the aggressive and non-dialogical 
question ‘Why do they hate us’ into a dialogical approach (his opening can be traced 
back to March 2009 and his Nowruz message) that has the power to create, instead of 
aggression and belligerence, a platform for equality, Obama and Rouhani were 
provided with a possibility to dissolve exclusions and imaginative and physical 
borders that prevent the two sides from understanding difference. As the thesis has 
demonstrated, not engaging with the Other and clinging onto the imagined borders 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, prevents us, together with them, finding solutions to 
political, economic and social hierarchies and inequalities. However, relating to the 
Other, opening a dialogue with the Other and affirming difference (instead of 
emphasising sameness) enables us together to see how to find a middle space for the 
transformation of the fixed binaries. This, in turn, may result in a form of collective 
engagement that hopefully materialises in a growing sense of interconnectedness of 
different actors and eventually in a more ethical and humane foreign policy making. 	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APPENDIX I 
IRANIAN WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: ROOTS AND AGENDAS 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Throughout the 20th century, and up to the date, Iranian women have been central to 
Iran’s body politic. They have not only been active participants in the shaping of the 
three modern states – the Qajar state, the Pahlavi state and finally the Islamic 
Republic – but they and their bodies have been employed to represent the ills and 
virtues of all these body politics. This section in the Appendix I aims to provide a 
brief historical context for the Iranian women’s movement and examines how women 
have been involved in civil society advocacy and formal politics in Iran since the 
early 20th century. Thus, and firstly, the purpose is to challenge the view that tradition 
is something that bounds women to the sphere of domesticity and that women’s entry 
to the public sphere and participation in public debates and discourses is solely a 
development of modern Western political structures. Secondly, I also wish to 
demonstrate that concepts such as emancipation, gender equality and progress cannot 
be simply put into the same box with the word modernity. In short, the aim is to 
illustrate how Iranian women have been active participants in debates shaping gender 
relationships in modern Iran and how current gender ideologies are shaped by (and 
have shaped) political, economic and social structures and policies.  
 
I begin with a description of the early women’s movement activists who participated 
in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11, which many have interpreted as the 
beginning of women’s civil society activism in Iran. After this, I move on to discuss 
how the state co-opted the woman question under the Pahlavis and what gender 
specific reforms emerged from that period. While under Reza Shah women were 
rather content to have the state as the sponsor of gender reforms, under the second 
Pahlavi Shah, Mohammed Reza Shah, the woman question became firmly located in 
the person of the Shah who dictated the outlook and content of the gender reforms. 
The Pahlavis’ gender reforms in the 1960s and 70s drew heavily on the models 
coming from their Western allies and to counter this, some women’s movement 
activists sought to establish a more independent agenda and joined leftist parties and 
underground societies, which eventually led to women’s strong involvement in the 
1979 Revolution This partly explains why for some the woman question was, and 
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continues to be, a question of identity that draws on the strict separation of the West 
and indigenous practice. The last sections will shed light on women’s participation in 
the 1979 revolution, their position in the Iran-Iraq war and women’s adaption to the to 
the new body politic since the 1980s. By tracing back the history of the women’s 
movement, the aim is to sheds light on the changing political, economic and societal 
circumstances (instead of solely cultural ones) that have shaped women’s lives and 
the various agendas of the women’s movement in Iran.  
 
2.0 The Constitutional Revolution: mothers of the nation 
The origins of the Iranian women’s movement can be traced back to the 
Constitutional Revolution (1905-11) when Iranian women emerged as independent 
political and social actors within the body politic. Women joined the Constitutional 
movement – a coalition led by the ulema, bazaaris, and secular intelligentsia – and 
organised themselves behind the nationalist goals in the run up to the Revolution (see 
for instance Shuster 1912). The constitutionalists were inspired by ideas flowing from 
the West and Iran’s Arab and Caucasian neighbours but the Iranian intelligentsia – 
both its religious and secular elements – developed its own distinctive understanding 
of modernity and progress. The movement’s political goals included the end of the 
arbitrary rule of the Qajar shahs, establishing a Majles (parliament), promoting civil 
rights and containing the growing foreign political and economic influence in the 
country’s internal affairs. The revolution marked a watershed for women at least in 
two ways. On the one hand, it facilitated women’s entry to political activism as 
independent actors, and on the other, it presented a space where women’s status and 
political rights were debated for the first time at the national level. However, like 
elsewhere in the region, the woman question was discussed within the nationalist-
modernist framework and the re-definition of Iranian women and womanhood stayed 
within the limits set by the state and male intelligentsia. 
 
In the early stages of the revolution women participated alongside their male-
compatriots and it was only later, after the enactment of the Electoral Law in 1906 
that excluded women from the electorate, that women began to campaign for specific 
women’s issues independent from the constitutional programme. The first generation 
of women who were active in both the Revolution and later in women advocacy were 
either related to the constitutionalists or from the upper classes. Women turned their 
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traditional social and religious meetings into their own anjumans (associations) and as 
such expanded the boundaries of social and political debates. The first women’s 
anjuman, ‘Women’s Freedom Society’ (Anjuman-e Azadi-ye Zanan), was set up by 
Tehrani upper-class women in 1907 (Bamdad 1977: 30). The membership included 
one of the most famous women activists, Sadiqeh Dawlatabadi, and two of the Qajar 
Shah Naser al-Din’s daughters, one of which, Taj al-Saltana, later claimed her place 
as a feminist and socialist thinker (see Amanat 1993). The growing number of 
anjumans and women’s press, which started off with the paper called Danesh 
‘Knowledge’, in 1910, circulated upper-class women’s ideas of healthcare, hygiene, 
household work and veiling to other women. Women’s activism extended to charity 
and the educational sphere of which the ulema and a few foreign missionary schools 
had dominated the latter. For instance, the Ladies of the Homeland (Anjuman-e 
Mukhaddarat-e Vatan), set up orphanages, organised adult education lessons and was 
associated with the establishment of girls’ schools.  
 
It was in this period when women also established themselves as intellectuals of their 
own right. Women brought with them their own experience of modernity and through 
that they contributed to the constitutional movement’s ideology and various socio-
economic and political debates. However, and maybe most importantly, these women 
came to challenge the male articulated narrative of modernity of the constitutional 
period and helped later generations of women to claim their place in political and 
socio-economic debates and discourses. Whereas the male intelligentsia assigned 
women with the responsibility to represent the nation’s political integrity and educate 
the modern nation as enlightened mothers, women wanted to expand the parameters 
of these roles. Moreover, the Iranian women expatriates in Turkey and especially in 
Central Asia, where socialist ideas were growing strong, formed their own anjumans 
and spread ideas and materials to Iran (Afary 1992: 107). In this way, they also 
contributed to a specific political discourse and form of activism emerging in Iran.  
 
However, like elsewhere in the region, Iranian women and the re-articulation of their 
womanhood became closely connected to the transformations in political and socio-
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economic realms.88 The primary concern for the political and intellectual elites in Iran 
was the transformation of a traditional and backward tribal society into a modern and 
independent nation state. In this effort, women became responsible for the physical, 
moral and intellectual development of children and, via association, of the new nation 
imagined in the various nationalist and political discourses. In order to be fit to raise a 
new nationalist generation women were required to possess both public (e.g. 
education) and private virtues (e.g. chastity). Thus, the modernisation of the body 
politic began from the family home and Iranian women and gender relations at large 
came to offer a framework through which the (male) modernist-nationalist 
intelligentsia imagined, articulated and debated concepts such as the modern Iranian 
nation, nationalism and later citizenship rights (see Najmabadi 1993a; 1993b; 1997; 
1998b). The new Majles and the constitutional movement eventually failed to extend 
women’s agency in ways that it would go beyond the perimeters of home and family 
(e.g. by denying women’s suffrage in the Electoral Law of 1906) – although women 
were now seen – with the help of modern educational regimes - physically, morally 
and intellectually more capable of carrying out their nationalist and domestic 
responsibilities. And as Najmabadi has argued, although the period introduced some 
emancipatory impulses for women, the very same emancipatory impulses also 
included regulatory implications. For instance, in her study of educated housewives 
Najmabadi shows that while the ‘discourse of domesticity’ opened the doors to the 
male domain of modern education and while women’s education was aimed at 
producing learned managers and heads of households and while education also 
facilitated women’s entry to the public sphere and gained them national recognition, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 On Egypt, see for example Beth Baron, Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender and 
Politics (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2007); Lisa Pollard, Nurturing the Nation: 
The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing, and Liberating Egypt, 1805-1923 (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 2005); Lisa Pollard, Learning Gendered Modernity: The 
Home, the Family, and the Schoolroom in the Construction of Egyptian National Identity 
(1885-1919)’ in Amira El-Azhary Sonbol (Ed.), Beyond the Exotic: Women’s Histories in 
Islamic Societies (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press): 249-294. On French Syria, see 
Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege and Gender in 
French Syria and Lebanon (New York, Columbia University Press, 2000); On Iraq; Noga 
Efrati, ‘The Other Awakening in Iraq: The Women’s Movement in the First Half of the 
Twentieth Century’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2004): 153-
173’; See also an excellent edited collection by Lila Abu-Lughod, Remaking Women: 
Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998); 
see also Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation (London, Sage Publications, 1997) 
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also defined the acceptable social space for women’s activities (family 
educator/professional housewife) that were not to be defied (Najmabadi 1998b). 
 
Some scholars have argued that the constitutional period was not very formative for 
the women’s movement in Iran (see e.g. S. Mahdavi. 2003). However, others have 
demonstrated how women asserted themselves as independent social and political 
actors through a variety of civil society activisms and how they opened the doors for 
political and socio-economic debates – including issues such as universal suffrage, 
social services and preservation of national industries89 – that would have been 
overlooked by the male intelligentsia (see e.g. Afary 1989; 1992; 1996; 2009; 
Kashani-Sabet 2005; Najmabadi 1993a; Paidar 1995; Sanasarian 1985). Yet, women 
advocates were drawn largely from the upper classes and hence it is important to 
remember that women living in the early 20th century Iran did not form any 
homogenous group. As Paidar has rightly noted, the diversity of Iranian women, 
which materialised itself in different ethnical, religious, geographical and economic 
locations not only obscured women’s different needs but also how they related to the 
new discourses and practices (Paidar 1995: 30). 
 
3.0 The Pahlavis 1925-1979: state feminism and challenge from below 
3.1 First Pahlavi state, 1925-1941 
The years that followed the Constitutional Revolution were coloured with internal 
chaos, foreign interventions, weak central government and sporadic and regional 
movements (Keddie 2006a). Hence, Iran’s political elites welcomed Reza Khan, who 
embodied their vision of a strong statesman capable of instituting a strong centralised 
state and initiating badly needed socio-economic and political reforms. The years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 An example of women’s activism in preserving Iran’s indigenous industries is their 
campaign to support local handicraft industries in Isfahan, Shiraz, Kashan and Yazd. The 
nineteenth century had witnessed a sharp rise of in textile imports, particularly in cotton 
goods, which had already by 1850s counted for some two-thirds of the total imports. The 
impact of the imported machine-made textiles on Iranian handicrafts was devastating and 
these imports in turn had led to changes in taste and fashion, which made many consumers 
prefer foreign styles to native. To protect local industries against the competition of European 
machine-made goods, women organised campaigns which encouraged school children to 
wear native garments and women pleaded people ‘to wear their old clothes for some time’, 
hoping that the exporting foreign textiles could soon be stopped (Afary 1996: 179). See 
Charles Issawi, ‘European Economic Penetration, 1872-1921’ in Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, 
and Charles Melville (Eds.), Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7: From Nadir Shah to the 
Islamic Republic (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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after Reza Shah’s coronation in 1925 saw a far less direct Western influence in the 
country, centralisation of power, state initiated modernisation and secularisation, 
personalisation of power and co-optation of independent localist and social 
movements such as the emerging women’s movement (Keddie 2006a). In this period, 
Iranian women and the woman question need to be situated within the larger state-
building project and its discourse of secular nationalism (Kashani-Sabet 2005). As 
Najmabadi has argued, the state-organised journey into modernity was symbolised in 
the education and unveiling of the traditional Iranian woman who was urged to 
participate in the nationalist cause (Najmabadi 1991: 51). The social map grew more 
diverse as a new middle class emerged from the reforms that the first Pahlavi state 
introduced in the next fifteen years. However, as Keddie has argued, this eventually 
materialised itself in the situation of ‘two cultures’ where the upper and middle 
classes were culturally, economically and socially separated from the more pious 
lower classes; the resulting economic and social dislocations and tensions became 
visible during the second Pahlavi state in the 1960s (Keddie 1981: 111). Moreover, 
over the years, the intimate relationship between the Pahlavi state and the woman 
question cultivated resentment to gender reforms among lower classes and the ulema 
(Kashani-Sabet 2005: 41). 
 
The primary concern of the first Pahlavi state was to finally start the transformation of 
Iran into a modern and independent nation state. In this period, the state introduced 
reforms in several fields – including healthcare, education and law – that centralised 
the country’s modernisation drive in the government. Like at the turn of the century, 
women and their bodies continued to have a central place in the male intelligentsia’s 
vision of the new body politic and the woman question was often used to rebuke the 
old, traditional and backward Qajar Iran. However, the era of Reza Shah has often 
been labelled as an era of state-feminism where gender discourses were state imposed 
and very little independent debate existed (see Amin 2005). As a response to the 
traditional image of Iran, the state set out to construct a particular image of the 
modern Iranian woman. This modern womanhood was modelled on the European 
example of an emancipated women and the traditional Iranian woman was cast 
denigrated as uneducated and backward (see for example Regan (1985) on Kasravi’s 
ideas of Iranian womanhood in the 1940s). Kashani-Sabet has argued that during the 
first Pahlavi state, the state and the nationalist-modernist discourse of the male 
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intelligentsia remodelled women’s role in Iranian society from patriotic motherhood 
to patriotic womanhood that emphasised women’s roles also outside the domestic 
realm, in the civic community, where women were now required to contribute to the 
building of a modern nation state (Kashani-Sabet 2005). On the one hand, the state 
required Iranian women to be good companions to their husbands and exceptional 
mothers to their children. On the other, however, they were asked to educate 
themselves and be well-trained professional working outside home in order to fulfil 
their civil responsibilities as active participants in national affairs (Amin 2005). 
Several scholars have noted the limits of this state-defined female empowerment 
project. Najmabadi, for example, has argued the project failed due to the limited state 
interest in developing a market economy that would have facilitated the entry of lower 
class women into the labour force and as such the state-led women’s emancipation 
stayed limited to certain sectors of urban upper and middle class women (Najmabadi 
1991: 54). 
 
While the reach of the project was limited, the state assisted women though a host of 
policy openings that helped women to fulfil and embrace their new roles. The state set 
up the Ministry of Health which was put in charge of national healthcare, the 
Organisation for the Care of Mothers and Children was established and women’s own 
societies were also encouraged to participate in educating women on health and 
hygiene issues (Afary 2009: 149). Women had been allowed to public schools in 1918 
and alongside the expansion of the state funded schools, the number of private 
schools for girls was also increasing (Paidar 1995: 108). Further, in 1936, women 
entered higher education when the state opened the universities to women. Reforms in 
the jurisprudence included the codification of laws and the introduction of the more 
secular Civil Code in 1931. The Civil Code revised laws on marriage and divorce, 
custody, guardianship, child maintenance and inheritance, however, although secular 
judges now handled almost all other areas of law, the family remained in the preserve 
of the ulema (Paidar 1995). The revised family laws raised the legal age of marriage 
for girls from nine to fifteen years; gave an eighteen-year old woman a right to 
petition a marriage bureau if her vali (guardian) did not agree with her choice of 
spouse; marriage contracts had to be officially registered in civil bureaus which 
allowed at least urban women to stipulate contractually the right to divorce if the 
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husband decided to take a second wife; a husband who did not provide for his wife’s 
maintenance could also be arrested under the new law (Afary 2009: 153-154). 
 
Perhaps one of the most significant developments for future of the woman question 
was the reshaping of the relationship between the state and the Shi’i ulema. The 
state’s intervention in the legal and educational spheres, which had been exclusive 
domains of the ulema, marginalised their cultural and political influence and made 
them critical of the Pahlavi state. However, Reza Shah allowed the ulema maintain 
their control over the realm of family when he decided to leave the family law 
grounded in the Sharia. On the one hand, Reza Shah understood the importance of the 
ulema’s societal legitimacy among the more conservative and/or poor sectors of 
society and he also needed the ulema’s political support for some of his projects. 
However, on the other hand, in the eyes of the state and the intelligentsia there was 
nothing contradictory about leaving the realm of family in the hands of the clergy 
since, for them, the secular notion of public/private divide justified the ulema 
presence in the private sphere. This was reflected in the legal construction of women 
as civic participants, educated mothers and obedient housewives (Yeganeh 1993: 5).   
 
One of the most controversial modernisation impulses that played on the bodies of 
women was the decree prohibiting veiling in public in 1936. The veil had attracted 
criticism already among the secular-nationalist intelligentsia of the constitutional 
movement. Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani and Malkam Khan had attacked women’s 
veiling by claiming that it was the root cause of women’s lower status in society and 
an impediment for national progress. Although the intellectuals and urban upper 
classes saw the forced unveiling as an emancipatory push for women, the measure 
was not well received among the lower classes. Many pious or lower class women 
refused to leave their houses unveiled and gave up their activities in the public sphere 
– including social life, shopping and conducting business – and hence the law that had 
aimed at ‘liberating’ women ended up enforcing their seclusion, at least in certain 
segments of society. Unveiling formed part of the state’s larger agenda to desegregate 
Iranian society – the state saw society’s homosociability to reflect the nation’s 
traditionalism and singled it out as one of the reasons for stagnating national progress. 
The Western way of mixing of sexes in the public sphere was seen as a remedy for 
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this. Other steps in the process included the introduction of mixed classes in 
elementary schools (Chehabi 1993). 
 
In the period between the Constitutional Revolution and the establishment of the 
Pahlavi state, Iranian women had sought to form a separate movement that had an 
independent platform from the nationalist movement. However, women’s 
participation continued to be rather limited to the urban upper classes. Moreover, 
when Reza Shah assumed power, the women’s movement like other social 
movements were co-opted by the state. If women’s organisations were not closed 
down they were brought under the official umbrella organisation that was set up in 
1935. However, it should also be noted that at the time nationalism, as a 
contemporary social phenomenon, both enabled and shaped social movements, and 
among them the women’s movement (Kashani-Sabet 2005). The Pahlavi state’s 
nationalist-modernist policies linked gender policies to a formal agenda and for the 
first time women became an integral part of state policy (Paidar 1995: 103). Also, it is 
important to stress that women continued to be significant in the shaping of the state’s 
gender reforms and discourses via the women’s press and of course via women’s 
voices in the state orchestrated organisations. In this period, women’s organisations 
proved to be instrumental in offering adult vocational classes and raising women’s 
political and societal consciousness (Hoodfar 1999).  
 
As Paidar has argued, the first Pahlavi state implemented modernisation that defined 
women’s emancipation as a wider political project and linked it to the notion of the 
modern nation state in Iran (Paidar 1995). The new health-care, educational, legal and 
employment agendas raised women’s living standards at least in some segments of 
society. However, the state’s promotion and co-optation of women’s emancipation 
choked alternative voices and narrowed the scope of independent activism. In the 
coming years, the personalisation of state power and increasing involvement of 
foreign powers in the country’s domestic affairs resulted in a growing resentment 
against the Pahlavi state and by the 1940s both secular and religious intelligentsia felt 
alienated from the state and had started campaigning for constitutional rule (Keddie 
2006a). 
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3.2 Second Pahlavi period, 1941-1979 
3.2.1 Civil society liberalisation 1941-1953 
In 1941, the Soviet and British governments accused Reza Shah of German 
sympathies and forced him to abdicate in favour of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. 
The next few years witnessed a degree of civil society liberalisation and several 
political and other civil society groups sought to distance themselves from the central 
government. A similar trend took place among women’s groups and they gained back 
some of the independence they had lost in the past two decades. Women entered 
political parties and began to articulate specific feminist demands centring around 
women’s political rights, marriage and family laws (Hoodfar 1999; Paidar 1995: 123).   
 
Women’s independent activism included a renewed interest in women’s organisation 
and in the period between 1941-1953 dozens of women’s organisations were formed 
(Amin 2008: 8). Women also found their way into party politics that coloured the 
period 1941-1953. Women set up their own branches in parties like the Tudeh and the 
National Front and they called for social justice, women’s equal working 
opportunities, better working conditions, equal pay, childcare centres and vacation 
time (Afary 2009: 176). However, in this period the main political issue that women 
campaigned for was the extension of suffrage to women. The Tudeh Party briefly 
campaigned for female suffrage in the Majles in 1944 but the conservatives 
effectively blocked the campaign (Hoodfar 1999). Mohammad Mosaddeq, the leader 
of the National Front, also supported women’s campaign by proposing that the 
electoral law needed to be revised and called for female suffrage in 1949. However, 
the conservative forces – both secular and religious – in the Majles continued their 
opposition and women were left outside formal political participation (Paidar 1995: 
132; Afary 2009: 192-195). 
 
Women began to grow disillusioned with party politics and the failure of reform 
projects in the Majles. The most significant legal reform in the 1940-1950 period was 
the new labour law that granted women twelve weeks of maternity leave with full pay 
(Keddie 1981: 121). After the unfruitful experiment with the Left, women began 
actively and independently to campaign for their suffrage. The campaign was directed 
by three organisations, The New Path League, the League of Women’s Supporters of 
the Declaration of Human Rights and the Association of Women Lawyers (Bamdad 
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1977: 110; Paidar 1995: 137). By 1960, the campaign had been so successful that the 
political establishment could no longer ignore women’s demands for equal political 
rights and women’s suffrage was one of the Shah’s White Revolution reforms (see 
below). 
 
The relatively liberalised political environment facilitated a growing number of 
women entering higher education and the labour market in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Women began to enter professions such as medicine and law that had traditionally 
been considered as the male domain. Women’s political standings broadened in this 
period as well and women’s journals covered a range of positions from pro-monarchy 
to socialist views. However, women’s movement advocates faced two problems in 
this period. Women’s own women-specific agendas in political parties often failed as 
these were often seen secondary to nationalist issues by the male leadership. The 
second problem manifested itself in the strict separation of politico-economic rights 
and personal rights. Several parties and actors recognised women’s demand for equal 
political and economic rights but would not extend the reforms into the more personal 
sphere that included for example the reform of the family law (Afary 2009: 177-178). 
Some scholars have also noted how women’s organisations continued to ignore the 
ethnic, class and religious diversity of Iranian women which would have been 
important in order to localise and acknowledge women’s specific needs (Amin 2008: 
26). 
 
3.2.2. De-liberalisation of civil society, 1953-1979 
In 1953, American and British forces organised a coup that overthrew the popular 
Prime Minister Mossadeq who had nationalised Iranian oil to the irritation of the 
British90. The post-Mossadeq era witnessed the growth of the Shah’s personal power, 
increasing political repression, pro-Western/American foreign policy, rigged 
elections, constitutional changes, and co-opting and harbouring of reforms and social 
movements under the state’s supervision. Dissident voices were effectively silenced 
when independent political organisations were closed down and civil society was put 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In August 2013, the National Security Archive released declassified CIA documents on the 
United States' role in the controversial operation. While American and British involvement in 
Mosaddeq's ouster had long been public knowledge, the declassified documents were 
interpreted to be the CIA's first formal acknowledgement that the agency helped to plan and 
execute the coup. 
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under the surveillance of the SAVAK in the aftermath of the 1953 coup. However, 
religion was one of the sectors that stayed independent from the state and religious 
scholars, seminars and mosques gradually attracted political dissidents and Islamic 
politics emerged as a new political paradigm in Iran (Afary 2009: 237; Najmabadi 
1991: 60). Similarly, the leftist movements that were now underground began to 
attract more and more followers. In the coming years an unusual relationship was 
forged between the religious and leftist forces that prepared the country for the 
coming revolution. 
 
In this period, the US articulated a new policy towards American allies in the Middle 
East. To counter the Soviet threat in the region, the US allowed Middle Eastern states 
to build up their militaries with American military technologies but demanded 
societies’ democratisation in return (Afary 2009: 202; Warne 2013). In the case of 
Iran, the Americans seemed to have forgotten their participation in the 1953 coup that 
had overthrown a democratically elected government. The Kennedy Administration 
grew rather critical of the Shah’s domestic policies and demands for respecting 
parliamentary power were apparently made to the Shah (Warne 2013). Even though 
reports of the Shah’s repressive domestic politics was being published, the close 
relationship between the Shah and different US Administrations did not change 
dramatically. At the same time, within the country, the growing middle –and 
professional classes and critical student organisations began to voice their discontent 
and the state had to react in order to counter a possible revolution from below (Ansari 
2001). Mohammad Reza Shah’s response to the external and domestic demands of 
political and social reform came with his announcement of the White Revolution in 
1963. However, as one historian has argued, the White Revolution was the elite’s 
political programme that allowed them ‘to sustain as much of the established relations 
of domination as realistically possible’ (Ansari 2001: 2, emphasis in original). The 
White Revolution concentrated the state modernisation drive even more on the person 
of the Shah and in effect closed down the discursive and physical spaces for civil 
society activism. 
 
Although a debated programme, the White Revolution improved Iran’s healthcare, 
education –and welfare policies and women were one of the groups that benefited the 
most from these policies. In addition, when the Shah had suppressed the socially or 
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gender conservative nationalist opposition politics that had coloured the politics in the 
1950s and early 1960s, he extended suffrage to women in 1963, which for him, 
consolidated his modernisation project domestically and profiled him as a support of 
women’s rights abroad.  
 
When women had secured their political rights they turned to campaign for the family 
law reform. The Family Protection Law (FPL) came to an effect in 1967 (amended in 
1975) and many women welcomed it as the most important legal change in women’s 
status in modern Iran. The FPL interfered with the only sphere of influence that had 
stayed in the hands of the ulema: the family. The law secularised the sphere of family 
and transferred it from the sphere of religion to that of the state. The law granted 
women a right to initiate divorce, men could no longer unilaterally divorce women, 
and child custody was no longer the sole prerogative of men. However, as Yeganeh 
has argued, the results of gender reforms that the Pahlavi state introduced were not as 
progressive as many believed: ‘Pahlavi gender policy did not aim to remove 
patriarchal relations, simply to modernise’ them (Yeganeh 1993: 6). One instance 
where this is evident was the new FPL, which, while reformed certain aspects of 
gender relations, effectively continued to understand women as male property (Paidar 
1995). 
 
Women’s organisations that were operational under the state mushroomed in this 
period. By 1977, the now renamed state umbrella organisation for women, the 
Women’s Organisation of Iran, hosted 400 branches in the provinces and had a 
membership base of 70,000 (Hoodfar 1999). While public debates about women’s 
rights and gender relations were carefully controlled by the state, the state initiated 
and launched women specific programs such as family welfare centres, literacy corps, 
legal counselling and vocational training (Hoodfar 1999). Although the Shah 
monopolised the woman question to an extent that women’s rights became almost  
‘royal grants’ (Najmabadi 1991: 60), the women’s movement itself slowly 
democratised itself when middle –and working class women joined the ranks in the 
1960s. Moreover, women’s higher education facilitated women’s entry to the labour 
market as teachers and public sector employees, which in turn, shaped women’s 
political and socio-economic consciousness. Child-care and maternity benefits were 
the state’s attempt to ensure that women would enter and stay in the labour force. In 
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the 1960s, women increasingly joined professional associations that have been central 
forces in shaping Iranian politics (Hoodfar 1999). By 1976, women’s participation in 
formal economy had reached 8.9 per cent of total labour force (Moghadam 2002a: 
50).91 
 
From the 1950s onwards the resentment against the Pahlavi state had begun to grow 
and materialised in anti-monarchist political activism. Women were involved in 
radical underground leftist parties, supported religious thinkers and activists such as 
Ali Shariati and joined the ranks of Ayatollah Khomeini’s followers. The leftist 
women found their way into organisations like People’s Fedayeen and People’s 
Mojahedeen that were influenced by the old members of the Tudeh Party and the 
National Front  (see Chehabi 1990). Whereas the middle classes, students and young 
professionals found their way to leftist organisations, the more pious segments of the 
lower classes and bazaaris aligned themselves with the more religious opposition 
(Afary 2009, see chapter 8). The leftist organisations included women’s emancipation 
on their agendas and at large supported women’s equal political and labour rights. 
However, many of the organisations were highly hierarchical and only a few women 
gained leadership positions (see e.g. Moghissi 1996). Similarly, as one of my 
interviewees recalled, the middle class background of many activists often obstructed 
them from relating to the everyday problems of ordinary women (Interview with 
Nazir, Tehran, March 2010). Partly because of this, the religious opposition to the 
Pahlavi state began to attract a growing number of individual women and women’s 
groups who placed their demands for equal rights within Islam. Within the 
reorganisation of political opposition, a new discourse with regard the woman 
question was slowly being remodelled and it now drew more heavily on Islam 
(Najmabadi 1991: 60) 
 
During the Pahlavi state Iranian women were promoted as the symbols of the nation’s 
progress and future, both domestically and abroad. Yet, although the state was the 
main architect of gender reforms, the legal and socio-economic changes of the Pahlavi 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 To compare, in 1982 – 7.0 per cent; 1986 – 5.4 per cent; 1995 – 25.2 per cent; 2005 – 19.4; 
2010 – 16.1; 2011 – 16.4 (Valentina Moghadam (2003), ‘Feminism in Iran and Algeria: Two 
Models of Collective Action for Women’s Rights’, Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis, 
Vol. 19 (1): 50; UN Data 2012). 
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period would not have been possible without the continuous campaigning, lobbying 
and support of women’s advocates. Their work on the ground through educational and 
technical projects laid the basis for future women’s advocates. The legal changes of 
the Pahlavi era were, however, rather limited and only segments of society had means 
to access the information and/or the social and economic support necessary to take 
advantage of the reforms (Hoodfar 1999). Most women’s lives continued to be shaped 
by familial and other social identities –and relations. In many cases women were 
caught between the emancipatory impulses offered by the state and the more 
communal roles that women expected to be fulfilled in their local communities. The 
women’s movement stayed in the hands of upper and middle class women, although 
women’s political awareness grew in the working classes as well. However, the 
discourse of emancipation that had stayed at large within the secular elites was slowly 
being challenged by Islamic voices and a growing number of women began to voice 
their demands for gender equality within Islamic framework. 
 
4.0 Revolutionary years and consolidation of the Islamic Republic 
4.1 The 1979 Revolution and women 
Over the years the Pahlavi state grew more and more isolated from society. The Shah 
was able to run the state independently from the public opinion with the help of oil 
revenue, centralisation of power and political repression. In the 1970s, the most 
critical voices against the Pahlavi state were articulated by different clerical 
establishments, radical leftist groups and the middle classes who were becoming 
frustrated with modernisation projected from above (Abrahamian 1982). Even middle 
class women who had benefited from the Pahlavi reforms began to criticise and feel 
uncomfortable with the model of womanhood that was promoted by the state. The 
process culminated in mass demonstrations and strikes that paralysed the country in 
1978-1979. The events brought together various segments of society ranging from the 
secular and religious intelligentsia to working classes. The Shah lost his legitimacy 
and was forced to leave the country in mid-January 1979. A few weeks later, 
Ayatollah Khomeini, who had emerged as the opposition’s religious and political 
leader, returned to Iran from France where he had been exiled. 
 
Women’s participation in the revolutionary activities can be traced back to their 
involvement in both religious and leftist organisations in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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However, the agendas that women campaigned for in the run-up to the revolution did 
not include any specific demands for gender equality (Hoodfar 1999). One of the 
largest women’s organisations in this period was the leftist National Union of 
Women, which like other similar organisations, did volunteering, organised adult 
literacy and vocational classes but did not engage with specific women issues (Afary 
2009: 250-251). Women’s participation in street demonstrations – particularly veiled 
women’s participation – was celebrated by many in the West but several Iranian-born 
secular-liberal feminists were taken aback by the images that pictured women in black 
chadors protesting against a modern, secular and progressive Western modelled 
regime (see for instance Tabari and Yeganeh 1982; Afsar 1982; 1984; 1985). To 
acknowledge women’s support for the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini made several 
statements reassuring that the Islamic state would respect women’s political rights and 
restore their dignity and social worth. For instance, in early 1979 Khomeini stated: 
‘Islam made women equal with men; in fact, it shows a concern for women that it 
does not show for men. […] In our revolutionary moment, women have likewise 
earned more credit than men, for it was the women who not only displayed courage 
themselves, but also had reared men of courage’ (quoted in Moghadam 1988: 224). 
 
The consolidation of Islam as the basis of the new body politic was partly a response 
to Iran’s failed experiments with Western imported ideologies like nationalism, 
socialism and modernisation (Najmabadi 1991). As Ansari has argued, the 1979 
Revolution  
‘was as much an intellectual renaissance and challenge to the “West” and its 
overriding philosophy of materialism, as it was a political struggle. The concept of 
“independence” was at least as much an ideological project as a political and 
economic goal’ (Ansari 2006b: 67).  
 
The state that was born out of the revolution came to power in the name of the 
dispossessed and with Khomeini’s promise of social and economic justice. This view 
was embodied in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran drafted in 1979 
(amended 1989). The Constitution enshrines individuals’ social, cultural, political and 
economic rights ranging from the freedom of religion to social welfare. Twelver 
Shi’ism was confirmed as the official state religion and all laws were reformed in 
order to be compatible with the Sharia. The Constitution was modelled on the 
constitution of the French Fifth Republic and the separation of powers between the 
executive, judiciary and the Majles was protected in the Constitution (Ansari 2003: 
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222). This was, however, completed with the inclusion of the mandate of the velayat-
e faqih, which assigned the highest authority to Khomeini (and his successors) to 
interpret Islam and ensure that the law was compatible with Islamic principles (Ansari 
2003: 222). Khomeini also installed an Assembly of Experts that consists of 86 
elected members and has the power to appoint and dismiss the supreme leader. 
Moreover, to make sure that legislation going through the Majles would be in 
accordance with the Sharia, the second article of the Constitution set up a Council of 
Guardians that consists of six religious leaders appointed by the Supreme Leader and 
six by the Majles (Afshar 2006: 7). The Council has the power review election 
candidates in all of Iran’s elections. Hence, some have interpreted Iran to represent a 
theo-democracy (see e.g. Afshar 2006). In order to consolidate and legitimise the new 
system, the regime employed a language that placed the ‘Islam’ and ‘West’ on stark 
opposite sides and this eventually rendered liberal constructions of rights and equality 
not only ineffectual but also traitorous, as the regime claimed to make a break from 
the Pahlavi era’s strong westernisation policies (Osanloo 2009: 30). However, as 
Ansari has pointed out, Khomeini’s decision to use ‘Islamic Republic’ displays a 
contradiction in the state. The regime needs Islam to legitimise itself but it is 
sometimes in a conflict with the republican side that echoes ideas of equality before 
the law and the protection of fundamental rights (see Ansari 2003: 221). In practice 
this has been reflected in the increasing conflict between elected bodies (such as the 
Majles) and non-elected authorities (such as the Guardian Council) of whom the latter 
is being legitimised by their role as the defenders of the Sharia. The most famous case 
is perhaps the reformist dominated Sixth Majles (2000-2004) when the Guardian 
Council (dominated by hardliners) vetted most of the reformist-concerted bills on the 
basis that they did not meet the Islamic criteria laid out in the Constitution.  
 
Women and women’s role in society were already addressed and re-imagined in the 
revolutionary ideologies articulated against the Pahlavi state. One of the reasons why 
Iranian women became, once again, central to the revolutionary imaginary was their 
previous role in the Pahlavi state’s construction of modernity. The Pahlavis had made 
the woman question central to their desire of modernising the country – both in the 
eyes of the domestic and foreign audiences – and as such many coupled women 
strongly with the Pahlavi autocracy and forced westernisation. Moreover, for many 
the Western influence in Iranian domestic affairs did not only materialise in the 
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country’s politico-economic sphere but also in the cultural sphere. Najmabadi has 
pointed out how, among both secular and religious segments of the revolutionary 
forces, there was a shared consensus of the importance of individual morality to the 
health of the body politic, which, in turn, was played on the bodies of Iranian women 
(Najmabadi 1991: 65). The Western economic and political power was thus resisted 
with the help of ‘authenticity’, which drew on indigenous and pre-colonial past and 
which was seen to help countering the West’s political and economic exploitation 
(Moghissi 1994: 60). 
 
The new regime quickly initiated a new official discourse on women that addressed 
the desirable role and position of women in the newly organised Iranian body politic. 
Perhaps one of the most famous aspects of the new discourse was the employment of 
Jalal Al-Ahmad’s notion of  ‘westoxication’, or gharbzadegi. Thinkers like Ali 
Shariati used the concept to describe upper –and middle class women, who, in the 
eyes of the new regime, symbolised the loss of Islamic culture, lack of morality and 
intrusion of Western powers of the Pahlavi era. For Shariati, Western capitalism was 
depriving the East because it empties people out of their ‘selves’, however, western 
modernisation, according to him, was inevitable and it could be adapted to Iran with 
the relevant value system (Yeganeh 1982: 48-49). Shariati’s remedy to this was the 
creation of a subversive figure that materialised in the modern Iranian woman. 
According to Shariati, Iranian women’s lower status in society was not only a result 
of gharbzadegi but also a result from corrupted religion in the hands of the ulema, 
which had taken away the very rights that Islam gives her (Yeganeh 1982: 50). The 
New Woman was expected to embrace modernity and ‘make’ herself through civic 
responsibilities and activism that would improve and protect the new Islamic society, 
however, in ways that would not compete with her responsibilities within the family 
home as a wife, as a mother and/or as a daughter (Yeganeh 1982: 51). Shariati picked 
Fatimah, the youngest daughter of Muhammad, the wife of Ali and mother of 
Hussein, as the role model for Iranian women. For Shariati, Fatimah’s devotion and 
support for her society and men in her life crystallised the role that Iranian women 
were expected to fulfil (Afary 2009: 241). The new discourse on women aimed at 
establishing a coherent indigenous culturo-political framework within which women 
would find their re-defined roles as dutiful citizens, mothers, wives and daughters. 
Pious women activists in particular have found Shariati’s arguments foundational for 
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their agency formation in the post-revolutionary Iran. Shariati’s teachings not only 
justified and required women to participate in and improve the new polity and society 
at large, but they also encouraged pious women (who had been ignored and pushed 
into the margins by the elites) to constitute their own agencies in the public sphere 
that had not been open to them previously. In short, the new discourse enabled pious 
women’s agency formation, gave them a sense of choice and duty to constitute and 
realise their own modalities through public activism aimed at reforming and 
improving the newly organised society. 
 
In order to consolidate the new gender discourse, the state carried out a series of 
political and legal reforms. One of the first legal changes was the abolition of the FPL 
that had granted women new rights in matters of family and marriage. The abolition 
of the FPL was more an ideological motion than anything else and several segments 
of the law were later reintroduced into the Islamic Republic’s law. The state also set 
out to re-segregate society by introducing compulsory veiling, segregating education, 
work places, sports and certain public spaces. In addition, in the early years of the 
post-revolutionary era, the state tried to restrict women’s participation in the public 
sphere and as a consequence many secular urban elite and middle class women lost 
their jobs. The most affected sector was the legal sphere where women were banned 
serving as judges and women lawyers were discouraged from practicing. Women 
were discouraged to work outside home by the implementation of several policies 
including the closing down of childcare centres, the introduction of early-retirement 
packages to female employees, and offering married couples the woman’s full salary 
if she decided to stay home (Moghadam 1988: 226). 
 
Many Western feminists saw the Islamic Republic’s new gender policies as drastic 
reversals in women’s rights; however, as Moghadam has rightly argued, the new 
regime’s gender policies targeted mainly the westernised elite –and middle class 
women. To the contrary, lower class women seemed to claim their place in the 
economic and social spheres of the newly organised society. Veiling sanctioned 
women’s presence in the public sphere by redefining their place from seclusion to 
segregation and in this way the Islamic state legitimised women’s entry to labour 
force, higher education and so on (Sadeghi 2008). Also, contrary to the predictions of 
many feminists, by the late 1980s it was noticed that the regime’s rhetoric and 
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policies did not meet in everyday life. For instance, female employment had not been 
as negatively affected as had been speculated. Moghadam’s study from 1988 
demonstrated that although a large number of elite women had disappeared from the 
labour market, the number of lower class women had increased and for example the 
governmental sector employed now more women than prior to the revolution 
(Moghadam 1988). 
 
In the course of 1979 and 1980 several small women’s organisation emerged to voice 
their programs and gender demands to the new state. There was also an attempt to 
establish a larger organisation, the Women’s Solidarity Committee, that would have 
represented women and their agenda at large but this failed due to women’s diverse 
political backgrounds (Hoodfar 1999). One of the issues that joined together both 
religious and secular women was the question of compulsory veiling; while secular 
women saw it as restricting their agency, many religious women saw it as a question 
of personal piety that should not be enforced from above. The first signs of 
compulsory veiling were seen in February 1979 when Khomeini stated that women 
were allowed to work in public if they covered themselves. This stirred individual 
women and women groups to campaign against compulsory veiling and the state 
backed down on the issue. However, veiling became later compulsory with 
Khomeini’s decree in 1981.  
 
The new state did not interfere with women’s political rights.92 Women were allowed 
to participate in formal politics and they began to run for parliament. In the first 
parliament convened in 1980, four women won seats and thus women’s voices were 
secured within the formal establishment (Moghadam 2002n: 1139). However, the 
early years of the new state were coloured with state repression and leftist and other 
social movements were harshly crushed. During these political purges that cleared 
Khomeini’s political adversaries and dissident voices off the political map, women 
advocates were also arrested, imprisoned and many withdrew from activism 
altogether. Some activists left the country and the Iranian diaspora has been an 
important source of women’s rights activism outside the country. However, small 
informal women’s groups began to re-emerge in the mid –and late 1980s. They 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 However, women are not allowed to run for presidency. 
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focused mainly on awareness raising and offering literacy classes and vocational 
training but they laid the ground for Iran’s NGO movement that took off in the 1990s 
(Hoodfar 1999). 
 
4.2 The Iran-Iraq War 
In September 1980 Saddam Hussein, with the later help of the US, attacked Iran. The 
war was disastrous to both sides. Huge human and infrastructural losses were 
suffered. Human losses on the Iranian side have been estimated at 1 million and 
250,000 – 500,000 for the Iraqi side. In Iran, this was the time when the new regime 
was consolidating and rationalising the new state. Although the war was 
catastrophical to both sides, when it ended the new Iranian state was stronger than it 
had been before the war. And Ansari has argued, Iranians entered the war as obedient 
subjects, but they emerged from it as citizens who had a stronger sense of their 
relationship to the state (Ansari 2003: 239). 
 
During the war, the state continued to implement its new discourse on women and the 
state rhetoric and policies regarding women and gender relations became more 
conservative, however, and as noted above, the realities of war made the regime 
accept compromises. Given the mass mobilisation of men and the death of so many in 
the war, women were needed in the public sphere where they filled the ranks of the 
expanding public sector and state bureaucracy. Women’s lives in the private sphere 
were also affected. Many lost their fathers or husbands and thus women had to 
assume the triple role as a mother/father – breadwinner – head of household. 
 
In addition to the war that terrorised society, the state actively sought to militarise the 
public sphere both through surveillance of society and also by promoting militarised 
citizenship. 93  The militarisation of society also facilitated certain forms of 
masculinities and femininities to emerge. The mobilisation of the nation in the war 
effort was helped by the production and promotion of a culture of martyrdom.  
Martyrdom became a central symbol of the new invented masculinity that drew on 
Shi’i Islam’s cosmology (Varzi 2008) but its meaning and definition were controlled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93  The militarisation of Iranian society is maybe most concretely exemplified in the 
establishment of the Revolutionary Guards and basij forces soon after the Revolution. 
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and defined by the state.94 Strong, sacrificing and honourable masculinities were thus 
promoted in the new body politic.95 Men who volunteered in the war were praised and 
promised eternal paradise and financial state support for their families should they die 
in war.96 Thus, martyrdom became a symbolic site for agency and re-masculinisation 
in the post-Pahlavi era (Moallem 2005: 107).  
 
A complementary role was assigned to women. In addition to women’s 
responsibilities as the New Woman articulated by the religious intelligentsia, women 
were now also expected to give birth to and nurture the next generation of 
warriors/martyrs and contribute to the war effort at home. The official slogan for 
women during the war years read: ‘My sister, your hijab is your martyrdom’ (Gerami 
2003: 268). The highest status that women could receive during the war years was 
that of a mourning mother who had lost her son in war. Through martyrdom – that 
propagated heroic, political, and violent masculinities – and mourning mothers – that 
in turn constructed nurturing, caring and responsible femininities – the state indirectly 
articulated its views on men and women’s public and private roles. Men as 
warriors/martyrs were firmly located in the public sphere and women were 
domesticated and positioned in the private sphere. As Moallem has argued, the reason 
why the regime employed gendered notions of martyrdom and glorified 
motherhood/sisterhood was two folded:  
‘Locally, these symbols transcended all differences of class, religion, and ethno-
national origin; globally, they created a transnational Muslim femininity and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 There are two state organisations that manage the affairs of martyrs. The first one is the 
Revolutionary Guards who turned the basij volunteers into soldiers during the war. The 
second organisation is the Shahid foundation that oversees the state compensation paid to 
martyrs’ families and looks after the war veterans (Gerami 2003). 
95  Although the focus has been on how the Revolution reshaped Iranian womanhood, 
masculinities underwent major changes as well. As Gerami has argued, the new regime 
discredited pre-revolutionary masculinities such as military officers, artists and some 
professionals. As these groups were either purged or demoted, their socio-economic and 
political standings declined. The masculinities that were praised and promoted by the Islamic 
republic were that of mullahs and martyrs (Gerami 2003).  
96 Varzi has noted that it is important to notice that there existed a marked difference 
politically between those who volunteered and were martyred and those who were drafted and 
died. There is a different discourse of mourning for the families who did not believe in 
religious martydom and for those who believed in it. The state, however, did not differentiate 
between these two standpoints but recognised everyone who died as martyrs (Roxanne Varzi, 
(2008), ‘Iran’s Pieta: Motherhood, Sacrifice and Film in the Aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War’, 
Feminist Review, No. 88, pp. 86-98). 
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masculinity that stood in opposition to the West through their complicity with the 
ummat in a cultural war of representation’ (Moallem: 2005: 108) 
 
However, as noted above, due to the realities of war women’s presence was also 
required in the public sphere. After the war, many women felt that they had fulfilled 
their civic responsibilities and as such they could now demand something back from 
the state. The war years had allowed women to venture outside the conventional roles 
as mourning mothers and dutiful daughters and wives – and as a consequence the 
women’s movement began to find its new shape in the course of the 1990s. 
 
The economic situation in Iran had been in decline prior to the Iran-Iraq war. The 
uncontrolled spending and improper planning of the previous regime was followed by 
the new state’s transition period during which the economic growth was not rapid 
enough to balance the economy (Alnasrawi 1986: 870). In addition, the US decision 
to freeze Iranian assets abroad and the Carter Administration’s initiated sanctions 
after the American hostage crisis in 1979-1980 complicated the new regime’s efforts 
to stabilise the economy. However, the Iranian war economy was effectively overseen 
by Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi – especially when compared to the Iraqi 
economy that emerged in ruins after the war – but the destruction of industries, cities, 
high unemployment and general economic stagnation pushed ordinary citizens, and 
women in particular, to find new ways to survive.  
 
It can be argued that the 1979 Revolution brought women back as independent social 
and political actors. Although some may see the new discourses and policies of 
womanhood as restricting and devaluing women’s agency, they also enabled new 
forms of agency and activism. The Islamic Republic welcomed women from pious 
lower classes to participate in social, cultural, economic and political life. Women 
were instrumental for the creation of the state’s distinctive identity and thus they were 
needed in the state’s material production as well; the New Woman marked the 
authenticity of the new Islamic Republic. 
 
4.3 Civil society revitalisation, 1990-2000 
Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989 and the Islamic Republic entered the new decade in 
the hands of Khomeini’s successor, the new Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei 
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and President Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani steered the country away from isolationism 
towards tentative (economic) engagement with the West. Rafsanjani’s policies needed 
a more diverse socio-economic environment and hence the 1990s’ witnessed a more 
relaxed political and socio-cultural atmosphere that facilitated also women’s social 
and political claims on the state. While Iranian economic and political life and civil 
society were cautiously liberalised, the country’s demographic change had been 
enormous in the 1980s and the population had doubled in its size and the new post-
revolutionary generation of young people had increased dramatically, 70 per cent 
being under the age of 30. At the same time, more and more people were migrating to 
cities. The 1990s saw also the re-opening of the country’s physical and mental 
borders to the outside world; the spread of satellite dishes and the Internet allowed the 
world to engage with Iran and Iran with the world. While the Rafsanjani period was 
not a dramatically different break with the past, it nevertheless managed to introduce 
limited changes to the body politic by presenting new ways of making and imagining 
the Islamic Republic (Gheissari and Nasr 2006: 107). These new ways of making and 
imagining politics emerged in the late 1990s and culminated in the election of the 
reformist president Khatami. 
 
In the 1990s a new development emerged among women. Women began to respond 
to the state’s Islamic gender discourse with the same tools and women located their 
demands for gender equality within Islam. The emergence of Islamic feminists and 
pious women activists diversified the social activism map in Iran. In the 1990s, they 
articulated a critique of women’s rights against the government but placed themselves 
firmly within the religion – for them it was the patriarchal social order that had 
misinterpreted the right and just word of the religion (see e.g. Mir-Hosseini 2006a). In 
the early 1990s, after contributing to the war effort and serving in the public sphere, 
women working within Islam were more confident in voicing their demands to the 
state and the government was forced to respond with a series of reforms. For instance, 
in 1992, an official policy was launched that aimed at integrating women into the 
formal labour force; government-sponsored vocational courses were arranged in the 
rural areas, women’s participation in fields of medicine, midwifery, chemistry and so 
on was encouraged; and women’s access to higher education increased steadily 
(Moghadam 2002b: 1140). Women also continued to be represented in formal 
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politics. In addition to their representation in the Majles, the government also 
introduced women’s affairs offices in ministries and governmental offices. 
 
The re-vitalisation of civil society took place on several fronts. In the early 1990s, a 
new religious intelligentsia critical of the regime began to emerge. Led by the 
philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush this new intelligentsia laid the foundations for new 
politico-religious change and debate in the country.97 Also, due to Rafsanjani’s 
economic and social reforms, in the 1990s, the middle classes revived themselves and 
began to participate more actively in the social – and cultural spheres. The country’s 
film, music, modern art, literary and other socio-cultural activities began to re-emerge 
partly due to this revitalisation of the middle classes.  
 
Both religious and secular women found their way to civil society activism. Women 
have embraced women’s media, including women-owned publishing houses, women-
run journals, magazines, and later blogs and other Internet publications, in their social 
activism. Women have been one of the leading forces participating in and 
contributing to political, legal, socio-economic and cultural debates in the country. 
The number of women-run and women’s issue non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) grew rapidly in the 1990s and by 1999 there were 4000 NGOs of which 137 
women specific NGOs (Rostami Povey 2004: 257). These organisations have been 
central challenging institutional power, especially gender-specific access and 
influence, and have contributed to social change (Rostami Povey 2004: 254-255). 
Women’s NGOs have been instrumental in several fields including healthcare, 
technical projects, law, literacy, arts, environmental, income-generating programs, 
(Afghan) refugees, drug abuse and prostitution. 
 
The gradual political and cultural openings that had led to the re-vitalisation of civil 
society culminated in the so-called Reformists who slowly emerged and as a socio-
political movement took its shape in the mid-1990s. The movement advocated for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See Ansari’s examination of Soroush’s work and Mir-Hosseini on Soroush’s views on 
women. Ali Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy – The Politics of Managing Change (London, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2006); Ziba Mir-Hosseini, ‘Religious Modernists and 
the “Woman Question”: Challenges and Complicities’ in Eric Hooglund (Ed.), Twenty Years 
of Islamic Revolution: Political and Social Transition in Iran Since 1979 (Syracuse, Syracuse 
University Press): 74-95. 
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civil liberties, rule of law, women’s rights, and relaxation of political, cultural and 
social regimes, it also offered a critique of Rafsanjani’s economic and political 
programs (see Ansari 2007). The people involved in the reformist camp engaged in 
both secular and religious discourses and they contended that the human 
understanding of Islam is flexible, that Islam’s tenets are open to re-interpretation that 
can support both pluralism and democracy, and that Islam is not ahistorical religion 
and as such it can change in the face of time, space and experience (Mir-Hosseini 
2006: 637). The movement had its momentum in the presidential elections of 1997 
when the reformist candidate Khatami was elected. It is claimed that he secured his 
landslide victory with the help of women who rallied around his agenda of more 
modern interpretation of Islam. Later in 2000, the reformist also secured a majority in 
the Majles. President Khatami and the movement behind him was seen challenging 
not only the state’s authority as the sole interpreter of Islam but challenging ordinary 
people to think and evaluate their beliefs and relation to the Islam propagated by the 
authorities.  
 
Khatami’s first term (1997-2001) succeeded in empowering the middle classes, the 
institutions associated with middle classes in the private sector and civil society 
(Gheissari and Nasr 2006:133). Civil society flourished after Khatami’s election and 
the greater social and political freedom promoted by Khatami facilitated people’s 
interest in journalism, arts, sports and so on. Khatami was well received abroad and 
with his ‘dialogue among civilizations’ he changed the post-revolutionary image of 
the Islamic Republic abroad. However, after Khatami’s re-election in 2001, the 
factional fighting between different political actors intensified and several sectors of 
Khatami’s supporters grew disappointed with him when he failed to consolidate his 
reforms  
 
5.0 Conclusion 
This Appendix section traced the historical development of the Iranian women’s 
movement starting from the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11 to the emergence of 
the Reformist movement in the late 1990s. Throughout Iran’s modern history, women 
have been active political and social actors in almost all aspects of society. They have 
actively participated in contemporary debates about the shape and future of gender 
relations as well as of the body politic. Rather than religion, changing political 
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players, economic situations, wars and state-building projects have shaped the 
contours of women’s lives. Iranian women have challenged the image of passive 
Muslim women tied in the sphere of domesticity and demonstrated that women’s 
participation in the public sphere cannot be seen solely as a development of modern 
Western political structures. Also, I wished to demonstrate that concepts such as 
emancipation, gender equality and progress should not be simply put into the same 
box with the word modernity. The legacies of both the Pahlavi state and the Islamic 
Republic clearly demonstrate this. Many women have found that they are more 
empowered in the Islamic Republic that they were in the Pahlavi times. The current 
agenda of women’s advocates centers around issues of economic and social justice 
and the family law. However, as demonstrated these are issues were already debated 
during the constitutional period and within the ‘modernist’ Pahlavi state and they 
continue be debated now within the Islamic Republic. As the section has 
demonstrated, Iranian women have found their ways to engage with these questions 
and especially pious women are effecting change – especially within civil society. 
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